MEMORANDUM TO: Jim Clancy FROM: Keith Corbett DATE: 23-Jul-87 SUBJ: PICON Tracking/Encryption Scheme COPY: Bill O'Brien George's proposal (21-Jul-87) is a great improvement over the encryption scheme used in PICON 1.x. However, I do have some concerns and questions. A few months ago George told me that the new PICON security scheme would not involve encryption or validation. He was going to make custom tapes with the customer name hidden in the object code, and provide a banner in the PICON window that clearly identified the customer for whom the tape was made. The disadvantage of having to make custom tapes was a tradeoff against the advantage of eliminating the support burden caused by encryption. I agreed to do front-line support for PICON with that understanding. I don't want to pursue that arrangement unless the following objections are addressed to our mutual satisfaction: 1. With this method, each tape must be made separately. This could lead to each customer having the latest, "greatest," version -- no standardization. I'm sure that's not the intention, but it has happened in the past, and made support more difficult. It would be better for the company as a whole if the PICON group would produce a standard release, with documentation, BOM's in the Inventory system, etc. But this requires a standard tape that can be sent from up here. Without that, the PICON group must do all the tracking, shipping, etc. on its own. [Once again, PICON goes its own way, separate from the rest of the company...] 2. The LICENSE-IDENTIFICATION.LISP file feature implies that the authorization would only be needed once. This is a definite improvement. However, the procedure, and implications, must be clearly documented to be useable by the customer; but it must be documented without revealing the details, or customers could defeat the security (i.e., copy the tape and make a copy of the license id file.) 3. I don't like the idea of using SITE-NAME, HOST-NAME, CHAOS and/or INTERNET addresses in the encryption. Our customers -- PICON users, especially -- already have enough site-file-related problems. The expiration-date encryption is a good idea; it could be used more widely as a non-volatile limited-time licensing protection. Even though it's easily defeated, the act of doing so (by setting the system time back) is very visible to customers, LMI service personnel, etc. KMC