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Title: The Works Of The Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. IX. (of 12)

Author: Edmund Burke

Release Date: November 7, 2004 [EBook #13968]

Language: English

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THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE


IN TWELVE VOLUMES


VOLUME THE NINTH




LONDON

JOHN C. NIMMO

14. KING WILLIAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.

MDCCCLXXXVII






CONTENTS OF VOL IX.


                                                          PAGE

ARTICLES OF CHARGE OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
AGAINST WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE, LATE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF BENGAL: PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
IN APRIL AND MAY, 1786.--ARTICLES VII.-XXII.

ART. VII. CONTRACTS                                          3

 VIII. PRESENTS                                             22

   IX. RESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL        42

    X. SURGEON-GENERAL'S CONTRACT                           60

   XI. CONTRACTS FOR POOL BUNDY REPAIRS                     60

  XII. CONTRACTS FOR OPIUM                                  63

 XIII. APPOINTMENT OF R.J. SULIVAN                          70

  XIV. RANNA OF GOHUD.                                      72

   XV. REVENUES.
       PART I.                                              79

       PART II                                              87

  XVI. MISDEMEANORS IN OUDE                                 95

 XVII. MAHOMED REZA KHAN                                    79

XVIII. THE MOGUL DELIVERED UP TO THE MAHRATTAS             202

  XIX. LIBEL ON THE COURT OF DIRECTORS                     228

   XX. MAHRATTA. WAR AND PEACE.                            238

  XXI. CORRESPONDENCE                                      266

 XXII. FYZOOLA KHAN.

       PART I. RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHAN, ETC.,
       BEFORE THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG                      268

       PART II RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHAN UNDER THE
         TREATY OF LALL-DANG                               275

       PART III. GUARANTY OF THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG       278

       PART IV. THANKS OF THE BOARD TO FYZOOLA KHAN        286

       PART V. DEMAND OF FIVE THOUSAND HORSE               287

       PART VI. TREATY OF CHUNAR                           296

       PART VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF CHUNAR      302

       PART VIII. PECUNIARY COMMUTATION OF THE STIPULATED
         AID                                               306

       PART IX. FULL VINDICATION OF FYZOOLA KHAN BY
         MAJOR PALMER AND MR. HASTINGS                     318

APPENDIX TO THE EIGHTH AND SIXTEENTH CHARGES               319

       *       *       *       *       *



SPEECHES IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,
  LATE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

    SPEECH IN OPENING THE IMPEACHMENT.

    FIRST DAY: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1788                   329

    SECOND DAY; SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16.                     396






ARTICLES OF CHARGE OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS AGAINST
WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE, LATE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL:

PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN APRIL AND HAY, 1786.

ARTICLES VII.--XXII.




ARTICLES OF CHARGE AGAINST WARREN HASTINGS, ESQ., LATE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

(CONTINUED.)

       *       *       *       *       *




VII--CONTRACTS.



That the Court of Directors of the East India Company had laid down
the following fundamental rules for the conduct of such of the
Company's business in Bengal as could be performed by contract, and
had repeatedly and strictly ordered the Governor and Council of Port
William to observe those rules, viz.: That all contracts should be
publicly advertised, and the most reasonable proposals accepted; that
the contracts of provisions, and for furnishing draught and carriage
bullocks for the army, should be _annual_; and that they should not
fail to advertise for and receive proposals for those contracts _every
year_.

That the said Warren Hastings, in direct disobedience to the said
positive orders, and, as the Directors themselves say, _by a most
deliberate breach of his duty_, did, in September, 1777, accept of
proposals offered by Ernest Alexander Johnson for providing draught
and carriage bullocks, and for victualling the Europeans, without
advertising for proposals, as he was expressly commanded to do, and
extended the contract for _three years_, which was positively ordered
to be _annual_,--and, notwithstanding that extension of the period,
which ought at least to have been compensated by some advantage to the
Company in the conditions, did conclude the said contract _upon terms
less advantageous than the preceding contract, and therefore not on
the lowest terms procurable_. That the said Warren Hastings, in
defiance of the judgment and lawful orders of his superiors, which in
this case left him no option, declared, that _he disapproved of
publishing for proposals, and that the contract was reduced too low
already_: thereby avowing himself the advocate of the contractor,
against whom, as representative of the Company, and guardian of their
interests, he properly was party, and preferring the advantage of the
contractor to those of his own constituents and employers. That the
Court of Directors of the East India Company, having carefully
considered the circumstances and tendency of this transaction,
condemned it in the strongest terms, declaring, that they would _not
permit_ the contract to be continued, and that,

      "if the contractor should think himself aggrieved, and take
      measures in consequence by which the Company became involved
      in loss or damage, they should certainly hold the majority
      of the Council responsible for such loss or damage, and
      proceed against them accordingly."

--That the said Warren Hastings, in defiance of orders, which the
Directors say were _plain and unequivocal_, did, in January, 1777,
receive from George Templer a proposal essentially different from the
advertisement published by the Governor-General and Council for
receiving proposals for feeding the Company's elephants, and did
accept thereof, not only without having recourse to the proper means
for ascertaining whether the said proposal was the lowest that would
be offered, but with another actually before the board nearly thirty
per cent lower than that made by the said George Templer, to whom the
said Warren Hastings granted a contract, in the terms proposed by the
said Templer, for three years, and did afterwards extend the same to
five years, with new and distinct conditions, accepted by the said
Warren Hastings, without advertising for fresh proposals, by which the
Company were very considerable losers: on all which the Court of
Directors declared,

      "that this waste of their property could not be permitted;
      that he, the said Warren Hastings, had disregarded their
      authority, and disobeyed their orders, in not taking the
      lowest offers";

and they ordered that the contract for elephants should be annulled:
and the said Directors further declared, that,

      "if the contractor should recover damages of the Company for
      breach of engagement, they were determined, in such case, to
      institute a suit at law against those members of the board
      who had presumed, in direct breach of their orders, to
      prefer the interest of an individual to that of the
      Company."

--That the said Warren Hastings did, in the year 1777, conclude with
---- Forde a contract for an armed vessel for the pilotage of the
Chittagong river, and for the defence of the coast and river against
the incursions of robbers, for the term of five years, in further
disobedience of the Company's orders respecting the mode and duration
of contracts, and with a considerable increase of expense to the
Company. That the farming out the defence of a country to a
contractor, being wholly unprecedented, and evidently absurd, could
have no real object but to enrich the contractor at the Company's
expense: since either the service was not dangerous, and then the
establishment was totally unnecessary, or, if it was a dangerous
service, it was evidently the interest of the contractor to avoid such
danger, and not to hazard the loss of his ship or men, which must be
replaced at his own expense, and therefore that an active and faithful
discharge of the contractor's duty was incompatible with his
interest.--That the said Warren Hastings, in further defiance of the
Company's orders, and in breach of the established rule of their
service, did, in the year 1777, conclude a contract with the master
and deputy master attendant of the Company's marine or pilot service,
for supplying the said marine with naval stores, and executing the
said service for the term of two years, and without advertising for
proposals. That the use and expenditure of such stores and the
direction of the pilot vessels are under the management and at the
disposition of the master attendant by virtue of his office; that he
is officially the proper and regular check upon the person who
furnishes the stores, and bound by his duty to take care that all
contracts for furnishing such stores are duly and faithfully executed.
That the said Warren Hastings, by uniting the supply and the check in
the same hands, did not only disobey the Company's specific orders,
and violate the fundamental rules and practice of the service, but did
overset the only just and rational principle on which this and every
other service of a similar nature ought to be conducted, and did not
only subject the Company's interest, in point of expense, to fraud and
collusion, but did thereby expose the navigation of the Bengal river
to manifest hazard and distress: considering that it is the duty of
the master attendant to take care that the pilot vessels are
constantly stationed in the roads to wait the arrival of the Company's
ships, especially in tempestuous weather, and that they should be in a
constant condition to keep the sea; whereas it is manifestly the
interest of the contractor, in the first instance, to equip the said
vessels as scantily as possible, and afterwards to expose them as
little as possible to any service in which the stores to be replaced
by him might be lost or consumed. And, finally, that in June, 1779,
the said contract was prolonged to the said master attendant, by the
said Warren Hastings, for the further period of two years from the
expiration of the first, without advertising for proposals.--That it
does not appear that any of the preceding contracts have been
annulled, or the charges attending any of them abated, or that the
Court of Directors have ever taken any measures to compel the said
Warren Hastings to indemnify the Company, or to make good any part of
the loss incurred by the said contracts.

That in the year 1777 the said Warren Hastings did recommend and
appoint John Belli, at that time his private secretary, to be agent
for supplying the garrison of Fort William with victualling stores;
that the stores were to be purchased with money advanced by the
Company, and that the said agent was to be allowed a commission or
percentage for his risk and trouble; that, in order to ascertain what
sum would be a reasonable compensation for the agent, the
Governor-General and Council agreed to consult some of the principal
merchants of Calcutta; that the merchants so consulted reported their
opinion, that twenty per cent on the prime cost of the stores would be
a reasonable compensation to the agent; that, nevertheless, the said
Warren Hastings, supported by the vote and concurrence of Richard
Barwell, then a member of the Supreme Council, did propose and carry
it, that thirty per cent per annum should be allowed upon all stores
to be provided by the agent. That the said Warren Hastings professed
that

      "he preferred an agency to a contract for this service,
      because, if it were performed by contract, it must then be
      advertised, and the world would know what provision was made
      for the defence of the fort":

as if its being publicly known that the fort was well provided for
defence were likely to encourage an enemy to attack it. That in
August, 1779, in defiance of the principle laid down by himself for
preferring an agency to a contract, the said Warren Hastings did
propose and carry it, that the agency should be _converted into a
contract_, to be granted to the said John Belli, without advertising
for proposals, and fixed for the term of five years,--

      "pretending that he had received frequent remonstrances from
      the said agent concerning the heavy losses and
      inconveniences to which he was _subjected_ by the indefinite
      terms of his agency,"

notwithstanding it appeared by evidence produced at the board, that,
on a supply of about 37,000_l_., he had already drawn a commission of
22,000_l_. and upwards. That the said Warren Hastings pledged himself,
that, _if required by the Court of Directors, the profits arising from
the agency should be paid into the Company's treasury, and
appropriated as the Court should direct_. That the Court of Directors,
as soon as they were advised of the first appointment of the said
agency, declared that they considered the commission of twenty per
cent as an ample compensation to the agent, and did positively order,
that, according to the engagement of the said Warren Hastings, "the
commission paid or to be paid to the said agent should be reduced to
twenty pounds per cent." That the said John Belli did positively
refuse to refund any part of the profits he had received, or to submit
to a diminution of those which he was still to receive; and that the
said Warren Hastings has never made good his own voluntary and solemn
engagement to the Court of Directors hereinabove mentioned: and as his
failure to perform the said engagement is a breach of faith to the
Company, so his performance of such engagement, if he had performed
it, and even his offering to pledge himself for the agent, in the
first instance, ought to be taken as presumptive evidence of a
connection between the said Warren Hastings and the said agent, his
private secretary, which ought not to exist between a Governor acting
in behalf of the Company and a contractor making terms with such
Governor for the execution of a public service.

That, before the expiration of the contract hereinbefore mentioned for
supplying the army with draught and carriage bullocks, granted by the
said Warren Hastings to Ernest Alexander Johnson for three years, the
said Warren Hastings did propose and carry it in Council, that a new
contract should be made on a new plan, and that an offer thereof
should be made to Richard Johnson, brother and executor of the said
contractor, without advertising for proposals, for the term of _five
years_; that this offer was _voluntarily accepted_ by the said Richard
Johnson, who at the same time desired and obtained that the new
contracts should be made out in the name of Charles Croftes, the
Company's accountant and sub-treasurer at Fort William; that the said
Charles Croftes offered the said Richard Johnson as one of his
securities for the performance of the said contract, who was accepted
as such by the said Warren Hastings; and that, at the request of the
said contractor, the contract for victualling the Europeans serving at
the Presidency was added to and united with that for furnishing
bullocks, and fixed for the same period. That this extension of the
periods of the said contracts was not compensated by a diminution in
the charge to be incurred by the Company on that account, as it ought
to have been, but, on the contrary, the charge was immoderately
increased by the new contracts, insomuch that it was proved by
statements and computations produced at the board, that the increase
on the victualling contract would in five years amount to 40,000_l._,
and that the increase on the bullock contract in the same period would
amount to above 400,000_l._ That, when this and many other weighty
objections against the terms of the said contracts were urged in
Council to the said Warren Hastings, he declared that _he should
deliver a reply thereto_; but it does not appear that he did ever
deliver such reply, or ever enter into a justification of any part of
his conduct in this transaction.--That the act of Parliament of 1773,
by which the first Governor-General and Council were appointed, did
expressly limit the duration of their office to the term of five
years, which expired in October, 1779, and that the several contracts
hereinbefore mentioned were granted in September, 1779, and were made
to continue _five_ years after the expiration of the government by
which they were granted. That by this anticipation the discretion and
judgment of the succeeding government respecting the subject-matter of
such contracts was taken away, and any correction or improvement
therein Rendered impracticable. That the said Warren Hastings might
have been justified by the rules and practice or by the necessity of
the public service in binding the government by engagements to endure
one year after the expiration of his own office; but on no principles
could he be justified in extending such engagements beyond the term of
one year, much less on the principles he has avowed, namely, "that it
was only an act of common justice in him to secure _every man
connected with him_, as far as he legally could, from the apprehension
of future oppression." That the oppression to which such apprehension,
if real, must allude, could only consist in and arise out of the
obedience which he feared a future government might pay to the orders
of the Court of Directors, by making all contracts _annual_, and
advertising for proposals publicly and indifferently from all persons
whatever, by which it might happen that such beneficial contracts
would not be constantly held by men _connected with him_, the said
Warren Hastings. That this declaration, made by the said Warren
Hastings, combined with all the circumstances belonging to these
transactions, leaves no room to doubt, that, in disobeying the
Company's orders, and betraying the trust reposed in him as guardian
of the Company's property, his object was to purchase the attachment
of a number of individuals, and to form a party capable of supporting
and protecting him in return.

That, with the same view, and on the same principles, it appears that
excessive salaries and emoluments, at the East India Company's charge
and expense, have been lavished by the said Warren Hastings to sundry
individuals, contrary to the general principles of his duty, and in
direct contradiction to the positive orders of the Court of Directors:
particularly, that, whereas by a resolution of the Court of
Proprietors of the East India Company, and by an instruction of the
Court of Directors, it was provided and expressly ordered that there
should be paid to the late Sir John Clavering "the sum of six thousand
pounds sterling per annum in full for his services as
commander-in-chief, in lieu of travelling charges and of all other
advantages and emoluments whatever," and whereas the Court of
Directors positively ordered that the late "Sir Eyre Coote should
receive the _same_ pay as commander-in-chief of their forces in India
as was received by Lieutenant-General Sir John Clavering," the said
Warren Hastings, nevertheless, within a very short time after Sir Eyre
Coote's arrival in Bengal, did propose and carry it in Council, that a
new establishment should be created for Sir Eyre Coote, by which an
increase of expense would be incurred by the India Company to the
amount of eighteen thousand pounds a year and upwards, exclusive of
and in addition to his salary of ten thousand pounds a year, provided
for him by act of Parliament as a member of the Supreme Council, and
exclusive of and in addition to his salary of six thousand pounds a
year as commander-in-chief, appointed for him by the Company, and
expressly fixed to that amount.

That the disobedience and breach of trust of which the said Warren
Hastings was guilty in this transaction is highly aggravated by the
following circumstances connected with it. That from the death of Sir
John Clavering to the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote in Bengal the
provisional command of the army had devolved to and been vested in
Brigadier-General Giles Stibbert, the eldest officer on that
establishment. That in this capacity, and, as the said Warren Hastings
has declared, "standing no way distinguished from the other officers
in the army, but by his accidental succession to the first place on
the list," he, the said Giles Stibbert, had, by the recommendation and
procurement of the said Warren Hastings, received and enjoyed a
salary, and other allowances, to the amount of 13,854_l._ 12_s._ per
annum. That Sir Eyre Coote, soon after his arrival, represented to the
board that a considerable part of those allowances, amounting to
8,220_l._ 10_s._ per annum, ought to devolve to himself, as
commander-in-chief of the Company's forces in India, and, stating that
the said Giles Stibbert could no longer be considered as
commander-in-chief under the Presidency of Fort William, made a formal
demand of the same. That the said Warren Hastings, instead of reducing
the allowances of the said Giles Stibbert to the establishment at
which they stood during General Clavering's command, and for the
continuance of which after Sir Eyre Coote's arrival there could be no
pretence, continued the allowances of 13,854_l._ 12_s._ per annum to
the said Giles Stibbert, and at the same time, in order to appease and
satisfy the demand of the said Sir Eyre Coote, did create for him that
new establishment, hereinbefore specified, of eighteen thousand pounds
per annum,--insomuch that, instead of the allowance of _six thousand
pounds a year, in lieu of travelling charges, and of all emoluments
and allowances whatsoever_, to which the pay and allowances of
commander-in-chief were expressly limited by the united act of the
legislative and executive powers of the Company, the annual charge to
be borne by the Company on that account was increased by the said
Warren Hastings to the enormous sum of thirty-eight thousand two
hundred and seventeen pounds ten shillings sterling.

That on the 1st of November, 1779, the said Warren Hastings did move
and carry it in Council,

      "that the Resident at the Vizier's court should be furnished
      with an account of all the extra allowances and charges of
      the commander-in-chief when in the field, with orders to add
      the same to the debit of the Vizier's account, as a part of
      his general subsidy,--the charge to commence from the day on
      which the general shall pass the Caramnassa, and to continue
      till his return to the same line."

That this additional expense imposed by the said Warren Hastings on
the Vizier was unjust in itself, and a breach of treaty with that
prince: the specific amount of the subsidy to be paid by him having
been fixed by a treaty, to which no addition could justly be made, but
at the previous requisition of the Vizier. That the Court of
Directors, in their letter of the 18th of October, 1780, did condemn
and prohibit the continuation of the allowances above mentioned to Sir
Eyre Coote in the following words:

      "These allowances appear to us in a light so very
      extraordinary, and so repugnant to the spirit of a
      resolution of the General Court of Proprietors respecting
      the allowance made to General Clavering, that we positively
      direct that they be discontinued immediately, and no part
      thereof paid after the receipt of this letter."

That on the 27th of April, 1781, the Governor-General and Council, in
obedience to the orders of the Directors, did signify the same to the
Commissary-General, as an instruction to him that the extraordinary
allowances to Sir Eyre Coote _should be discontinued, and no part
thereof paid after that day_. That it appears, nevertheless, that the
said extra allowances (amounting to above twenty thousand pounds
sterling a year) were continued to be charged to the Vizier, and paid
to Sir Eyre Coote, in defiance of the orders of the Court of
Directors, in defiance of the consequent resolution of the
Governor-General and Council, and in contradiction to the terms of the
original motion made by the said Warren Hastings for adding those
allowances to the debit of the Vizier, viz., "that they should
continue till Sir Eyre Coote's return to the Caramnassa." That Sir
Eyre Coote arrived at Calcutta about the end of August, 1780, and must
have crossed the Caramnassa, in his return from Oude, some weeks
before, when the charge on the Vizier, if at any time proper, ought to
have ceased. That it appears that the said allowances were continued
to be charged against the Vizier and paid to Sir Eyre Coote for three
years after, even while he was serving in the Carnatic, and that this
was done by the sole authority and private command of the said Warren
Hastings.

That the East India Company having thought proper to create the office
of Advocate-General in Bengal, and to appoint Sir John Day to that
office, it was resolved by a General Court of Proprietors that a
salary of three thousand pounds a year should be allowed to the said
Sir John Day, _in full consideration of all demands and allowances
whatsoever for his services to the Company at the Presidency of Fort
William_. That the said Warren Hastings, nevertheless, shortly after
Sir John Day's arrival in Bengal, did increase the said Sir John Day's
salary and allowances to six thousand pounds a year, in direct
disobedience of the resolution of the Court of Proprietors, and of the
order of the Court of Directors. That the Directors, as soon as they
were informed of this proceeding, declared, "that they held
_themselves_ bound by the resolution of the General Court, and that
they could not allow it to be disregarded by the Company's servants in
India," and ordered that the increased allowances should be forthwith
discontinued. That the said Warren Hastings, after having first
thought it necessary, in obedience to the orders of the Court of
Directors, to stop the extraordinary allowance which he had granted to
Sir John Day, did afterwards resolve that the allowance which had been
struck off should be _repaid_ to him, upon his signing an obligation
to refund the amount which he might receive, in case the Directors
should confirm their former orders, already twice given. That in this
transaction the said Warren Hastings trifled with the authority of the
Company, eluded the repeated orders of the Directors, and exposed the
Company to the risk and uncertainty of recovering, at a distant
period, and perhaps by a process of law, a sum of money which they had
positively ordered him not to pay.

That in the latter part of the year 1776, by the death of Colonel
Monson, the whole power of the government of Fort William devolved to
the Governor and one member of the Council; and that from that time
the Governor-General and Council have generally consisted of an even
number of persons, in consequence of which the casting voice of the
said Warren Hastings has usually prevailed in the decision of all
questions. That about the end of the year 1776 the whole civil
establishment of the said government did not exceed 205,399_l._ per
annum; that in the year 1783 the said civil establishment had been
increased to the enormous annual sum of 927,945_l_. That such increase
in the civil establishment could not have taken place, if the said
Warren Hastings, who was at the head of the government, with the power
annexed to the casting voice, had not actively promoted the said
increase, which he had power to prevent, and which it was his duty to
have prevented. That by such immoderate waste of the property of his
employers, and by such scandalous breach of his fidelity to them, it
was the intention of the said Warren Hastings to gain and secure the
attachment and support of a multitude of individuals, by whose united
interest, influence, and intrigues he hoped to be protected against
any future inquiry into his conduct. That it was of itself highly
criminal in the said Warren Hastings to have so wasted the property of
the East India Company, and that the purpose to be obtained by such
waste was a great aggravation of that crime.

That among the various instances of profusion by which the civil
establishment of Fort William was increased to the enormous annual sum
hereinbefore mentioned, it appears that a Salt Office was created, of
six commissioners, whose annual emoluments were as follows, viz.:--

  President, or Comptroller, per annum   L 18,480
  1st member                               13,100
  2d  do                                   11,480
  3d  do                                   13,183
  4th do                                    6,257
  5th do                                   10,307
                                           ------
                                         L 72,807

That a Board of Revenue was created by the said Warren Hastings,
consisting of five commissioners, whose annual emoluments were as
follows, viz.:--

  1st member, per annum                  L 10,950
  2d  do                                    9,100
  3d  do                                    9,100
  4th do                                    9,100
  5th do                                    9,100
                                         --------
                                         L 47,350

That David Anderson, Esquire, first member of the said board, did not
execute the duties, though he received the emoluments of the said
office: having acted, for the greatest part of the time, as ambassador
to Mahdajee Sindia, with a further salary of 4,280_l._ a year, making
in all 15,230_l._ a year. That the said Warren Hastings did create an
office of Agent-Victualler to the garrison of Fort William, whose
profits, on an average of three years, were 15,970_l._ per annum. That
this agency was held by the Postmaster-General, who in that capacity
received 2,200_l._ a year from the Company, and who was actually no
higher than a writer in the service. That the person who held these
lucrative offices, viz., John Belli, was private secretary to the said
Warren Hastings.

That the said Warren Hastings created a nominal office of Resident at
Goa, where the Company never had a Resident, nor business of any kind
to transact, and gave the said nominal office to a person who was not
a covenanted servant of the Company, with an allowance of 4,280_l._ a
year.

That these instances are proofs of a criminal profusion and high
breach of trust to the India Company in the said Warren Hastings,
under whose government, and by means of whose special power, derived
from the effect of his casting voice, all the said waste and profusion
did take place.

That at the end of the year 1780, when, as the Court of Directors
affirm, _the Company were in the utmost distress for money, and almost
every department in arrear_, and when it appears that there was a
great scarcity and urgent want of grain at Fort St. George, the said
Warren Hastings did accept of a proposal made to him by James Peter
Auriol, then Secretary to the Council, to supply the Presidency of
Fort St. George with rice and other articles, and did appoint the said
Auriol to be the agent for supplying _all the other_ Presidencies with
those articles; that the said Warren Hastings declared that the
intention of the appointment "was most likely to be fulfilled by a
liberal consideration of it," and therefore allowed the said Auriol a
commission of fifteen per cent on the whole of his disbursements,
thereby rendering it the direct interest of the said Auriol to make
his disbursements as great as possible; that the chance of capture by
the enemy, or danger of the sea, was to be at the risk of the India
Company, and not of the said Auriol; that the said Warren Hastings
declared personally to the said Auriol, "that this post was intended
as a reward for his long and faithful services." That the President
and Council of Bombay did remonstrate against what they called _the
enormous amount of the charges_ of the rice with which they wore
supplied, which they state to be nine rupees a bag at Calcutta, when
they themselves could have contracted for its delivery at Bombay, free
of all risk and charges, at five rupees and three sixteenths per bag;
and that even at Madras, where the distress and demand was greatest,
the supplies of grain by private traders, charged to the Company, were
nineteen per cent cheaper than that supplied by the said Auriol,
exclusive of the risk of the sea and of capture by the enemy. That it
is stated by the Court of Directors, that the agent's commission on a
supply of _a single year_ (the said commission being not only charged
on the prime cost of the rice, but also on the freight and all other
charges) would amount to pounds sterling 26,873, and by the said
Auriol himself is admitted to amount to 18,292_l_. That William
Larkins, the Accountant-General at Port William, having been ordered
to examine the accounts of the said agent, did report to the
Governor-General and Council, that he found them to be _correct in the
additions and calculations_; and that then the said Larkins adds the
following declaration:

      "The agent _being upon honor_ with respect to the sums
      charged in his accounts for the cost of the articles
      supplied, I did not think myself authorized to require _any
      voucher_ of the sums charged for the demurrage of sloops,
      either as to the time of detention or the rate of the
      charge, or of those for the articles lost in going down the
      river; and on that ground I thought myself equally bound to
      admit the sums acknowledged as received for the sales of
      goods returned, without requiring vouchers of the rates at
      which they were sold."

That in this transaction the said Warren Hastings has been guilty of a
high breach of trust and duty, in the unnecessary expenditure of the
Company's money, and in subjecting the Company to a profusion of
expense, at all times wholly unjustifiable, but particularly at the
time when that expense was incurred. That the said Warren Hastings was
guilty of breach of orders, as well as breach of trust, in not
advertising generally for proposals; in not _contracting_
indifferently for the supplies with such merchants as might offer to
furnish them on the lowest terms; in giving an enormous commission to
an agent, and that commission not confined to the prime cost of the
articles, but to be computed on the whole of his charges; in accepting
of the _honor_ of the said agent as a sufficient voucher for the cost
of the articles supplied, and for all charges whatever on which his
commission was to be computed; and finally, in giving a lucrative
agency for the supply of a distressed and starving province as a
reward to a Secretary of State, whose labors in that capacity ought to
have been rewarded by an avowed public salary, and not otherwise.
That, after the first year of the said agency was expired, the said
Warren Hastings did agree, that, for the future, the commission to be
drawn by the said agent should be reduced to five per cent, which the
Governor-General and Council then declared to be _the customary,
amount drawn by merchants;_ but that even in this reduction of the
commission the said Warren Hastings was guilty of a deception, and did
not in fact reduce the commission from fifteen to five per cent,
having immediately after resolved that he, the agent, should be
allowed the current interest of Calcutta upon all his drafts on the
Treasury from the day of their dates, until they should be completely
liquidated; that the legal interest of money in Bengal is twelve per
cent per annum, and the current interest from eight to ten per cent.




VII.--PRESENTS.



That, before the appointment of the Governor-General and Council of
Fort William by act of Parliament, the allowances made by the East
India Company to the Presidents of that government were abundantly
sufficient; and that the said Presidents in general, and the said
Warren Hastings particularly, was restrained by a specific covenant
and indenture, which he entered into with the Company, from accepting
any gifts, rewards, or gratuities whatsoever, on any account or
pretence whatsoever. That in the Regulating Act passed in the year
1773, which appointed the said Warren Hastings, Esquire,
Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal, a salary of twenty-five
thousand pounds a year was established for him, to which the Court of
Directors added, "that he should enjoy their principal houses, with
the plate and furniture, both in town and country, _rent-free."_ That
the same law which created the office and provided the salary of the
said Warren Hastings did expressly, and in the clearest and most
comprehensive terms that could be devised, prohibit him from receiving
any present, gift, or donation, in any manner or on any account
whatsoever; and that the said Warren Hastings perfectly understood the
meaning, and acknowledged the binding force of this prohibition,
before he accepted of the office to which it was annexed: he knew, and
had declared, that _the prohibition was positive and decisive; that it
admitted neither of refinement or misconstruction; and that in his
opinion an opposition would be to incur the penalty_.

That, notwithstanding the covenants and engagements above mentioned,
it appears in the recorded proceedings of the Governor-General and
Council of Fort William, that sundry charges have been brought against
the said Warren Hastings for gifts or presents corruptly taken by him
before the promulgation of the act of 1773 in India, and that these
charges were produced at the Council Board in the presence of the said
Warren Hastings. That, in March, 1775, the late Rajah Nundcomar, a
native Hindoo, of the highest caste in his religion, and of the
highest rank in society, by the offices which he had held under the
country government, did lay before the Council an account of various
sums of money paid by him to the said Warren Hastings, amounting to
forty thousand pounds and upwards, for offices and employments
corruptly disposed of by the said Warren Hastings, and did offer and
engage to prove and establish the same by sufficient evidence. That
this account is stated with a minute particularity and precision; the
date of each payment, down to that of small sums, is specified; the
various coins in which such payments were severally made are
distinguished; and the different persons through whose hands the money
passed into those of the said Warren Hastings are named. That such
particularity on the face of such a charge, supposing it false, is
favorable to the party wrongfully accused, and exposes the accuser to
an instant and easy detection: for, though, as the said Warren
Hastings himself has observed on another occasion,

      "papers may be forged, and evidences may appear in numbers
      to attest them, yet it must always be an _easy_ matter to
      detect the falsity of any forged paper produced by examining
      the witnesses separately, and subjecting them to a
      subsequent cross-examination, in which case, if false, they
      will not be able to persevere in one regular, consistent
      story ";

whereas, if no advantage be taken of such particularity in the charge
to detect the falsehood thereof, and if no attempt to disprove it, and
no defence whatever be made, a presumption justly and reasonably
arises in favor of the truth of such charge. That the said Warren
Hastings, instead of offering anything in his defence, declared that
_he would not suffer Nundcomar to appear before the board at his
accuser;_ that he attempted to indict his said accuser for a
conspiracy, in which he failed; and that the said Rajah Nundcomar was
soon after, and while his charge against the said Warren Hastings was
depending before the Council, indicted upon an English penal statute,
which does not extend even to Scotland,[1] before the Supreme Court of
Judicature, for an offence said to have been committed several years
before, and not capital by the laws of India, and was condemned and
executed. That the evidence of this man, not having been encountered
at the time when it might and ought to have been by the said Warren
Hastings, remains justly in force against him, and is not abated by
the capital punishment of the said Nundcomar, but rather confirmed by
the time and circumstances in which the accuser of the said Warren
Hastings suffered death. That one of the offices for which a part of
the money above mentioned is stated to have been paid to the said
Warren Hastings was given by him to Munny Begum, the widow of the late
Mir Jaffier, Nabob of Bengal, whose son, by another woman, holds that
title at present. That the said Warren Hastings had been instructed by
the Court of Directors of the East India Company to appoint

      "_a minister_ to transact the political affairs of the
      government, and to select for that purpose some person well
      qualified for the affairs of government, to be the minister
      and guardian of the Nabob's minority."

That for these offices, and for the execution of the several duties
belonging to them, the said Warren Hastings selected and appointed the
said Munny Begum, a woman evidently unqualified for and incapable of
such offices, and restrained from acting in such capacities by her
necessary seclusion from the world and retirement in a seraglio. That,
a considerable deficiency or embezzlement appearing in this woman's
account of the young Nabob's stipend, she voluntarily declared, by a
writing under her seal, that she had given fifteen thousand pounds to
the said Warren Hastings for an entertainment,--which declaration
corresponds with and confirms that part of the charge produced by
Rajah Nundcomar to which it relates. That neither this nor any other
part of the said charge has been at any time directly denied or
disputed by the said Warren Hastings, though made to his face, and
though he was repeatedly accused by his colleagues, who were appointed
by Parliament at the same time with himself, of peculation of every
sort. That, instead of promoting a strict inquiry into his conduct for
the clearance of his innocence and honor, he did repeatedly endeavor
to elude and stifle all inquiry by attempting to dissolve the meetings
of the Council at which such charges were produced, and by other
means, and has not since taken any steps to disprove or refute the
same. That the said Warren Hastings, so long ago as September, 1775,
assured the Court of Directors,

      "that it was his fixed determination most fully and
      liberally to explain every circumstance of his conduct on
      the points on which he had been injuriously arraigned, and
      to afford them the clearest conviction of his own integrity,
      and of the propriety of his motives for declining a present
      defence of it";

and having never since given to the Court of Directors any explanation
whatever, much less the full and liberal explanation he had promised
so repeatedly, has thereby abandoned even that late and protracted
defence which he himself must have thought necessary to be made at
some time or other, and which he would be thought to have deferred to
a period more suitable and convenient than that in which the facts
were recent, and the impression of these and other charges of the same
nature against him was fresh and unimpaired in the minds of men.

That on the 30th of March, 1775, a member of the Council produced and
laid before the board a petition from Mir Zein Abul Deen, (formerly
farmer of a district, and who had been in creditable stations,)
setting forth, that Khan Jehan Khan, then Phousdar of Hoogly, had
obtained that office from the said Warren Hastings, with a salary of
seventy-two thousand sicca rupees a year, and that the said _Phousdar
had given a receipt of bribe to the patron of the city_, meaning
Warren Hastings, to pay him annually thirty-six thousand rupees a
year, and also to his banian, Cantoo Baboo, four thousand rupees a
year, out of the salary above mentioned. That by the thirty-fifth
article of the instructions given to the Governor-General and Council,
they are directed

      "immediately to cause the strictest inquiry to be made into
      all oppressions which might have been committed either
      against the natives or Europeans, and into all abuses that
      might have prevailed in the collection of the revenues, or
      any part of the civil government of the Presidency, and to
      communicate to the Directors all information which they
      might be able to obtain relative thereto, or to any
      dissipation or embezzlement of the Company's money."

That the above petition and instruction having been read in Council,
it was moved that the petitioner should be ordered to attend the next
day to make good his charge. That the said Warren Hastings declared,

      "that it appeared to him to be the purpose of the majority
      to make him the sole object of their personal attacks; that
      they had taken their line, and might pursue it; that he
      should have other remarks to make upon this transaction,
      but, as they would be equally applicable _to many others_
      which in the course of this business were likely to be
      brought before the board, he should say no more on the
      subject";

--and he objected to the motion. That by the preceding declaration the
said Warren Hastings did admit that many other charges were likely to
be brought against him, and that such charges would be of a similar
nature to the first, viz., a corrupt bargaining for the disposal of a
great office, since he declared that his remarks on that transaction
would be equally applicable to the rest; and that, by objecting to the
motion for the personal attendance of the accuser, he resisted and
disobeyed the Company's instructions, and did, as far as depended on
his power, endeavor to obstruct and prevent all inquiry into the
charge. That in so doing he failed in his duty to the Company, he
disobeyed their express orders, and did leave the charge against
himself without a reply, and even without a denial, and with that
unavoidable presumption against his innocence which lies against every
person accused who not only refuses to plead, but, as far as his vote
goes, endeavors to prevent an examination of the charge, and to stifle
all inquiry into the truth of it. That, the motion having been
nevertheless carried, the said Warren Hastings did, on the day
following, declare,

      "that he could not sit to be confronted with such accusers,
      nor suffer a judicial inquiry into his conduct at the board
      of which he was president, and declared the meeting of the
      board dissolved."

That the board continued to sit and examine witnesses, servants of the
Phousdar, on oath and written evidence, being letters under the hand
and seal of the Phousdar, all directly tending to prove the charge:
viz., that, out of the salary of seventy-two thousand rupees a year
paid by the Company, the said Phousdar received but thirty-two
thousand, and that the remainder was received by the said Warren
Hastings and his banian. That the Phousdar, though repeatedly ordered
to attend the board, did, under various pretences, decline attending,
until the 19th of May, when, the letters stated be his, that is, under
his hand and seal, being shown to him, it was proposed by a member of
the board that he should be asked whether he had any objection to
swear to the truth of such answers as he might make to the questions
proposed by the board; that the said Warren Hastings objected to his
being put to his oath; that the question was nevertheless put to him,
in consequence of a resolution of the board; that he first declined to
swear, under pretence _that it was a matter of serious consequence to
his character to take an oath_, and, when it was finally left to his
option, he declared, "Mean people might swear, but that his character
would not allow him,--that he could not swear, and had rather subject
himself to a loss." That the evidence in support of the charge, being
on oath, was in this manner left uncontradicted. That it was admitted
by the said Warren Hastings, that neither Mussulmen or Hindoos are
forbidden by the precepts of their religion to swear; that it is not
true, as the said Warren Hastings asserted, that it was repugnant to
the _manners_ either of Hindoos or Mussulmen; and that, if, under such
pretences, the natives were to be exempted from taking an oath, when
examined by the Governor and Council, all the inquiries pointed out to
them by the Company's instructions might stop or be defeated. That no
valid reason was or could be assigned why the said Phousdar should not
be examined on oath; that the charge was not against himself; and
that, if any questions had been put to him, tending to make him accuse
himself, he might have declined to answer them. That, if he could have
safely sworn to the innocence of the said Warren Hastings, from whom
he received his employment, he was bound in gratitude as well as
justice to the said Warren Hastings to have consented to be examined
on oath; that, not having done so, and having been supported and
abetted in his refusal by the said Warren Hastings himself, whose
character and honor, were immediately at stake, the whole of the
evidence for the truth of the charge remains unanswered, and in full
force against the said Warren Hastings, who on this occasion recurred
to the declaration he had before made to the Directors, viz., "that he
would most fully and liberally explain every circumstance of his
conduct," but has never since that time given the Directors any
explanation whatsoever of his said conduct. And finally, that, when
the Court of Directors, in January, 1776, referred the question
(concerning the legality of the power assumed and repeatedly exercised
by the said Warren Hastings, of dissolving the Council at his
pleasure) to the late Charles Sayer, then standing counsel of the East
India Company, the said Charles Sayer declared his opinion in favor of
the power, but concerning the use and exercise of it in the cases
stated did declare his opinion in the following words: "I believe he,
Warren Hastings, is the first governor that ever dissolved a council
inquiring into his behavior, when he was innocent." Before he could
summon three councils, and dissolve them, he had time fully to
consider what would be the result of such conduct, _to convince
everybody beyond a doubt of his conscious guilt_.--That, by a
resolution of a majority of the Council, constituting a lawful act of
the Governor-General and Council, the said Khan Jehan Khan was
dismissed from the office of Phousdar of Hoogly for a contempt of the
authority of the board; that, within a few weeks after the death of
the late Colonel Monson, the number of the Council being then even,
and all questions being then determined by the Governor-General's
casting voice, the said Warren Hastings did move and carry it in
Council, that the said Khan Jehan Khan should be restored to his
office; and that restoration, not having been preceded, accompanied,
or followed by any explanation or defence whatsoever, or even by a
denial of the specific and circumstantial charge of collusion with the
said Khan Jehan Khan, has confirmed the truth of the said charge.


That, besides the sums charged to have been paid to the said Warren
Hastings by the said Nundcomar and Munny Begum and Khan Jehan Khan,
and besides the sum of one hundred and ten thousand pounds already
mentioned to have been accepted without hesitation by him, as a
present on the part of the Nabob of Oude and that of his ministers,
the circumstances of which have been particularly reported to the
House of Commons, it appears by the confession of the said Warren
Hastings, that he has at different times since the promulgation of the
act of 1773, received various other sums, contrary to the express
prohibition of the said act, and his own declared sense of the evident
intent and obligation thereof.--That in the month of June, 1780, the
said Warren Hastings made to the Council what he called

      "a very unusual tender, by offering to exonerate the Company
      from the expense of a particular measure, and to _take it
      upon himself_; declaring that he had already deposited two
      lacs of rupees [or twenty-three thousand pounds] in the
      hands of the Company's sub-treasurer for that service."

That in a subsequent letter, dated the 29th of November, 1780, he
informed the Court of Directors, that "this money, by whatever means
it came into their possession, _was not his own_"; but he did not
then, nor has he at any time since, made known to the Court of
Directors from whom or on what account he received that money, as it
was his duty to have done in the first instance, and notwithstanding
the said Directors signified to him their expectation that he should
communicate to them "immediate information of the channel by which
this money came into his possession, with a complete illustration of
the cause or causes of so extraordinary an event." But, from evidence
examined in England, it has been discovered that this money was
received by the said Warren Hastings from Cheyt Sing, the Rajah of
Benares, who was soon after dispossessed of all his property and
driven from his country and government by the said Warren Hastings.
That, notwithstanding the declaration made by the said Warren
Hastings, that he had actually deposited the sum above mentioned in
the hands of the Company's sub-treasurer for their service, it does
not appear that "any entry whatsoever of that or any other payment by
the Governor-General was made in the Treasury accounts at or about the
time," nor is there any trace in the Company's books of its being
actually paid into their treasury. It appears, then, by the confession
of the said Warren Hastings, that this money was received by him; but
it does not appear that he has converted it to the property and use of
the Company.

That in a letter from the said Warren Hastings to the said Court of
Directors, dated the 22d of May, 1782, but not dispatched, as it might
and ought to have been, at that time, but detained and kept back by
the said Warren Hastings till the 16th of December following, he has
confessed the receipt of various other sums, amounting (with that
which he accepted from the Nabob of Oude) to nearly two hundred
thousand pounds, which sums he affirmed had been converted to the
Company's property through his means, but without discovering from
whom or on what account he received the same. That, instead of
converting this money to the Company's property, as he affirmed he had
done, it appears that he had lent the greater part of it to the
Company upon bonds bearing interest, which bonds were demanded and
received by him, and, for aught that yet appears, have never been
given up or cancelled. That for another considerable part of the
above-mentioned sum he has taken credit to himself, as for a deposit
of his own property, and therefore demandable by him out of the
Company's treasury at his discretion. That all sums so lent or
deposited are not alienated from the person who lends or deposits the
same; consequently, that the declaration made by the said Warren
Hastings, that he had converted the whole of these sums to the
Company's property, was not true. Nor would such a transfer, if it had
really been made, have justified the said Warren Hastings in
originally receiving the money, which, being in the first instance
contrary to law, could not be rendered legal by any subsequent
disposition or application thereof; much less would it have justified
the said Warren Hastings in delaying to make a discovery of these
transactions to the Court of Directors until he had heard of the
inquiries then begun and proceeding in Parliament, in finally making a
discovery, such as it is, in terms the most intricate, obscure, and
contradictory. That, instead of that full and clear explanation of his
conduct which the Court of Directors demanded, and which the said
Warren Hastings was bound to give them, he has contented himself with
telling the said Directors, that, "if this matter was to be exposed to
the view of the public, his reasons for acting as he had done might
furnish a variety of conjectures to which it would be of little use to
reply; that he either chose to conceal the first receipts from public
curiosity by receiving bonds for the amount, or possibly acted without
any studied design which his memory could at that distance of time
verify; and that he _could_ have concealed them from their eye and
that of the public forever." That the discovery, as far as it goes,
establishes the guilt of the said Warren Hastings in taking money
against law, but does not warrant a conclusion that he has discovered
_all_ that he may have taken; that, on the contrary, such discovery,
not being made in proper time, and when made being imperfect,
perplexed, and wholly unsatisfactory, leads to a just and reasonable
presumption that other facts of the same nature have been concealed,
since those which he has confessed might have been forever, and that
this partial confession was either extorted from the said Warren
Hastings by the dread of detection, or made with a view of removing
suspicion, and preventing any further inquiry into his conduct.

That the said Warren Hastings, in a letter to the Court of Directors
dated 21st of February, 1784, has confessed his having _privately
received_ another sum of money, the amount of which he has not
declared, but which, from the application he says he has made of it,
could not be less than thirty-four thousand pounds sterling. That he
has not informed the Directors from whom he received this money, at
what time, nor on what account; but, on the contrary, has attempted to
justify the receipt of it, which was illegal, by the application of
it, which was unauthorized and unwarrantable, and which, if admitted
as a reason for receiving money _privately_, would constitute a
precedent of the most dangerous nature to the Company's service. That,
in attempting to justify the receipt and application of the said
money, he has endeavored to establish principles of conduct in a
Governor which tend to subvert all order and regularity in the conduct
of public business, to encourage and facilitate fraud and corruption
in all offices of pecuniary trust, and to defeat all inquiry into the
misconduct of any person in whom pecuniary trust is reposed.--That the
said Warren Hastings, in his letter above mentioned, has made a
declaration to the Court of Directors in the following terms:

      "Having had occasion to disburse from my own cash many sums,
      which, though required to enable me to execute the duties of
      my station, I have hitherto omitted to enter in my public
      accounts, and my own fortune being unequal to so heavy a
      charge, I have resolved to reimburse myself in a mode the
      most suitable to the situation of your affairs, by charging
      the same in my Durbar accounts of the present year, and
      crediting them by a sum _privately received_, and
      appropriated to your service in the same manner with other
      sums received on account of the Honorable Company, and
      already carried to their account."

That at the time of writing this letter the said Warren Hastings had
been in possession of the government of Fort William about twelve
years, with a clear salary, or avowed emoluments, at no time less than
twenty-five thousand pounds sterling a year, exclusive of which all
the principal expenses of his residence were paid for by the Company.
That, if the services mentioned by him were required to enable him to
execute the duties of his station, he ought not to have omitted to
enter them in his public accounts at the times when the expenses were
incurred. That, if it was true, as he affirms, that, when he first
engaged in these expenses, he had no intention to carry them to the
account of the Company, there was no subsequent change in his
situation which could justify his departing from that intention. That,
if his own fortune in the year 1784 was unequal to so heavy a charge,
the state of his fortune at any earlier period must have been still
more unequal to so heavy a charge. That the fact so asserted by the
said Warren Hastings leads directly to an inference palpably false and
absurd, viz., that, the longer a Governor-General holds that lucrative
office, the poorer he must become. That neither would the assertion,
if it were true, nor the inference, if it were admitted, justify the
conduct avowed by the said Warren Hastings in resolving to reimburse
himself out of the Company's property without their consent or
knowledge.--That the account transmitted in this letter is styled by
himself _an aggregate of a contingent account of twelve years_; that
all contingent accounts should be submitted to those who ought to have
an official control over them, at annual or other shorter periods, in
order that the expense already incurred may be checked and examined,
and similar expenses, if disapproved of, may be prohibited in time;
that, after a very long period is elapsed, all check and control over
such expenses is impracticable, and, if it were practicable in the
present instance, would be completely useless, since the said Warren
Hastings, without waiting for the consent of the Directors, did
_resolve to reimburse himself_. That the conduct of the said Warren
Hastings, in withholding these accounts for twelve years together, and
then resolving to reimburse himself without the consent of his
employers, has been fraudulent in the first instance, and in the
second amounts to a denial and mockery of the authority placed over
him by law; and that he has thereby set a dangerous example to his
successors, and to every man in trust or office under him.--That the
mode in which he has reimbursed himself is a crime of a much higher
order, and greatly aggravates whatever was already criminal in the
other parts of this transaction. That the said Warren Hastings, in
declaring that he should reimburse himself by crediting the Company by
_a sum privately received_, has acknowledged himself guilty of an
illegal act in receiving money _privately_. That he has suppressed or
withheld every particular which could throw any light on a conduct so
suspicious in a Governor as the _private_ receipt of money. That the
general confession of the private receipt of a large sum in gross, in
which no circumstance of time, place, occasion, or person, nor even
the amount, is specified, tends to cover or protect any act of the
same nature (as far as a general confession can protect such acts)
which may be detected hereafter, and which in fact may not make part
of the gross sum so confessed, and that it tends to perplex and defeat
all inquiry into such practices.--That the said Warren Hastings, in
stating to the Directors that he has resolved to reimburse himself in
_a mode the most suitable to the situation of their affairs_, viz., by
receiving money privately against law, has stated a presumption highly
injurious to the integrity of the said Directors, viz., that they will
not object to, or even inquire into, any extraordinary expenses
incurred and charged by their Governors in India, provided such
expenses are reimbursed by money privately and illegally received.
That he has not explained what that situation of their affairs was or
could be to which so dangerous and corrupt a principle was or might be
applied.--That no evidence has been produced to prove that it was
true, nor any ground of argument stated to show that it might be
credible, that any native of India had voluntarily and gratuitously
given money privately to the said Warren Hastings, that is, without
some prospect of a benefit in return, or some dread of his resentment,
if he refused. That it is not a thing to be believed, that any native
would give large sums privately to a Governor, which he refused to
give or lend publicly to government, unless it were to derive some
adequate secret advantage from the favor, or to avoid some mischief
from the enmity of such Governor.--That the late confessions made by
the said Warren Hastings of money received against law are no proof
that he did not originally intend to appropriate the same to his own
use, such confessions having been made at a suspicious moment, when,
and not before, he was apprised of the inquiries commenced in the
House of Commons, and when a dread of the consequence of those
inquiries might act upon his mind. That such confessions, from the
obscure, intricate, and contradictory manner in which they are made,
imply guilt in the said Warren Hastings, as far as they go; that they
do not furnish any color of reason to conclude that he has confessed
all the money which he may have corruptly received; but that, on the
contrary, they warrant a just and reasonable presumption, that, in
discovering some part of the bribes he had received, he hoped to lull
suspicion, and thereby conceal and secure the rest.

That the Court of Directors, when the former accounts of these
transactions came before them, did show an evident disposition not to
censure the said Warren Hastings, but to give the most favorable
construction to his conduct; that, nevertheless, they found themselves
obliged

      "to confess that the statement of those transactions
      appeared to them in many parts so _unintelligible_, that
      they felt themselves under the necessity of calling on the
      Governor-General for an explanation, agreeably to his
      promise voluntarily made to them."

That their letter, containing this requisition, was received in Bengal
in the month of August, 1784, and that the said Warren Hastings did
not embark for England until the 2d of February, 1785, but made no
reply to that letter before his departure, owing, as he has since
said, _to a variety of other more important occupations_. That, under
pretence of such occupations, he neglected to transmit to the Court of
Directors a copy of a paper which, he says, contained the _only_
account he ever kept of the transaction. That such a paper, or a copy
of it, might have been transmitted without interrupting other
important occupations, if any could be more important than that of
giving a clear and satisfactory answer to the requisition of the
Directors. That since his arrival in England he has written a letter
to the chairman of that court, professedly in answer to their letter
above mentioned, but in fact giving no explanation or satisfaction
whatsoever on the points which they had declared to be unintelligible.
That the terms of his letter are ambiguous and obscure, such as a
guilty man might have recourse to in order to cover his guilt, but
such as no innocent man, from whom nothing was required but to clear
his innocence by giving plain answers to plain questions, could
possibly have made use of. That in his letter of the 11th of July,
1785, he says,

      "that he has been kindly apprised that the information
      required as above _was yet expected from him_: that the
      submission which his respect would have enjoined him to pay
      to the command imposed on him _was lost to his
      recollection_, perhaps from the stronger impression which
      the first and distant perusal of it had left on his mind
      that it was rather intended as a reprehension for something
      which had given offence in his report of the original
      transaction than as expressive of any want of a further
      elucidation of it."[2]

That the said Warren Hastings, in affecting to doubt whether the
information expressly required of him by his employers was expected or
not, has endeavored to justify a criminal delay and evasion in giving
it. That, considering the importance of the subject, and the recent
date of the command, it is not possible _that it could be lost to his
recollection_; much less is it possible that he could have understood
the specific demand of an answer to specific questions to be intended
only as a reprehension for a former offence, viz., the offence of
withholding from the Directors that very explanation which he ought to
have given in the first instance. That the said Warren Hastings, in
his answer to the said questions, cautiously avoids affirming or
denying anything in clear, positive terms, and professes to recollect
nothing with absolute certainty. That he has not, even now, informed
the Directors of the name of any one person from whom any part of the
money in question was received, nor what was the motive of any one
person for giving the same. That he has, indeed, declared, that his
motive for lending to the Company, or depositing in their treasury in
his own name, money which he has in other places declared to be their
property, was to avoid ostentation, and that _lending_ the money was
_the least liable to reflection_; yet, when he has stated these and
other conjectural motives for his own conduct, he declares _he will
not affirm, though he is firmly persuaded, that those were his
sentiments on the occasion_. That of one thing only the said Warren
Hastings declares he is _certain_, viz.,

      "that it was his design originally to have _concealed_ the
      receipt of all the sums, except the second, even from the
      knowledge of the Court of Directors, but that, when fortune
      threw a sum in his way of a magnitude _which could not be
      concealed_, and the peculiar delicacy of his situation at
      the time in which he received it made him more circumspect
      of appearances, he _chose_ to apprise his employers of it."

That the said Warren Hastings informs the Directors, that he had
indorsed the bonds taken by him for money belonging to the Company,
and lent by him to the Company, _in order to guard against their
becoming a claim on the Company, as part of his estate, in the event
of his death_; but he has not affirmed, nor does it anywhere appear,
that he has surrendered the said bonds, as he ought to have done. That
the said Warren Hastings, in affirming that he had not time to answer
the questions put to him by the Directors, while he was in Bengal,--in
not bringing with him to England the documents necessary to enable him
to answer those questions, or in pretending that he has not brought
them,--in referring the Directors back again to Bengal for those
documents, and for any further information on a subject on which he
has given them no information,--and particularly in referring them
back to a person in Bengal for a paper which he says contained the
_only_ account he ever kept of the transaction, while he himself
professes to doubt whether that paper _be still in being_, whether _it
be in the hands_ of that person, or whether that person _can recollect
anything distinctly concerning it_,--has been guilty of gross
evasions, and of palpable prevarication and deceit, as well as of
contumacy and disobedience to the lawful orders of the Court of
Directors, and thereby confirmed all the former evidence of his having
constantly used the influence of his station for the most scandalous,
illegal, and corrupt purposes.




IX.--RESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL.



That Warren Hastings having by his agent, Lauchlan Macleane, Esquire,
on the 10th day of October, in the year 1776,

      "signified to the Court of Directors his desire to resign
      his office of Governor-General of Bengal, and requested
      their nomination of a successor to the vacancy which would
      be thereby occasioned in the Supreme Council,"

the Court of Directors did thereupon desire the said Lauchlan Macleane
"to inform them of the authority under which he acted in a point of
such very great importance"; and the said Lauchlan Macleane

      "signifying thereupon his readiness to give the court every
      possible satisfaction on that subject, but the powers with
      which he was intrusted by the papers in his custody being
      mixed with other matters of a nature extremely confidential,
      he would submit the same to the inspection of any three of
      the members of the court,"

the said Court of Directors empowered the Chairman, Deputy Chairman,
and Richard Becher, Enquire, to inspect the authorities, powers, and
directions with which Mr. Macleane was furnished by Mr. Hastings to
make the propositions contained in his letter of the 10th October,
1776, and to report their opinion thereon. And the said committee did
accordingly, on the 23d of the said month, report,

      "that, having conferred with Mr. Macleane on the subject of
      his letter presented to the court the 11th instant, they
      found, that, from the purport of Mr. Hastings's
      instructions, contained in a paper in his own handwriting
      given to Mr. Macleane, and produced by him to them, Mr.
      Hastings declared he would not continue in the government of
      Bengal, unless certain conditions therein specified could be
      obtained, of which they saw no probability; and Mr. George
      Vansittart had declared to them, that he was present when
      these instructions were given to Mr. Macleane, and when Mr.
      Hastings empowered Mr. Macleane to declare his resignation
      to the said court; that Mr. Stewart had likewise confirmed
      to them, that Mr. Hastings declared to him, that he had
      given directions to the above purpose by Mr. Macleane."

And the Court of Directors, having received from the said report due
satisfaction respecting the authority vested in the said Lauchlan
Macleane to propose the said resignation of the office of
Governor-General of Bengal, did unanimously resolve to accept the
same, and did also, under powers vested in the said court by the act
of the 13th year of his present Majesty,

      "nominate and appoint Edward Wheler, Esquire, to succeed to
      the office in the Council of Fort William in Bengal which
      will become vacant by the said resignation, if such
      nomination shall be approved by his Majesty":

which nomination and appointment was afterwards in due form approved
and confirmed by his Majesty.

That the Court of Directors did, by a postscript to their general
letter, dated 25th October, 1776, acquaint the Governor-General and
Council at Calcutta of their acceptance of the said resignation, of
their appointment of Edward Wheler, Esquire, to fill the said vacancy,
and of his Majesty's approbation of the said appointment, together
with the grounds of their said proceedings; and did transmit to the
said Governor-General and Council copies of the said instruments of
appointment and confirmation.

That the said dispatches from the Court of Directors were received at
Calcutta, and were read in Council on the 19th day of June, in the
year 1777; and that Warren Hastings, Esquire, having taken no steps to
yield the government to his successor, General Clavering, and having
observed a profound silence on the subject of the said dispatches, he,
the said General Clavering, did, on the next day, being the 20th of
June, by a letter addressed to the said Warren Hastings, require him
to surrender the keys of Fort William, and of the Company's
treasuries; but the said Warren Hastings did positively refuse to
comply with the said requisition, "denying that his office was
vacated, and declaring his resolution to assert and maintain his
authority by every legal means."

That the said General Clavering, conceiving that the office of
Governor-General was vacated by the arrival of the said dispatches,
which acquainted the Council-General of the resignation of the said
Warren Hastings and the appointment of the said Edward Wheler,
Esquire, and that he, the said General Clavering, had in consequence
thereof legally succeeded, under the provisions of the act of the 13th
year of his present Majesty's reign, to the said office of
Governor-General, become vacant in the manner aforesaid, did, in
virtue thereof, issue in his own name summonses to Richard Barwell,
Esquire, and Philip Francis, Esquire, members of the Council, to
attend the same, and in the presence of the said Philip Francis,
Esquire, who obeyed the said summons, did take the oaths as
Governor-General, and did sit and preside in Council as
Governor-General, and prepared several acts and resolutions in the
said capacity of Governor-General, and did, amongst other things,
prepare a proclamation to be made of his said succession to the
government, and of its commencing from the date of the said
proclamation, but did not carry any of the acts or resolutions so
prepared into execution.

The said Warren Hastings did, notwithstanding thereof, and in
pursuance of his resolution to assert and maintain his authority,
illegally and unjustifiably summon the Council to meet in another
department, and did sit and preside therein, apart from the said
General Clavering and his Council, and, in conjunction with Richard
Barwell, Esquire, who concurred therein, issued sundry orders and did
sundry acts of government belonging to the office of Governor-General,
and, amongst others, did order several letters to be written in the
name of the Governor-General and Council, and did subscribe the same,
to the commandant of the garrison of Fort William, and to the
commanding officer at Barrackpore, and to the commanding officers at
the other stations, and also to the provincial councils and collectors
in the provinces, enjoining them severally "to obey no orders
excepting such as should be signed by the said Warren Hastings, or a
majority of his Council."

That the said Warren Hastings did, by the said proceedings, which were
contrary both to law and to good faith, constitute a double
government, thereby destroying and annihilating all government
whatever; and, by his said orders to the military officers, did
prepare for open resistance by arms, exposing thereby the settlement,
and all the inhabitants, subjects of or dependent on the British
government, whether native or European, not only to political
distractions, but to the horrors of civil war; and did, by exposing
the divisions and weakness of the supreme government, and thereby
loosening the obedience of the provinces, shake the whole foundation
of British authority, and imminently endanger the existence of the
British nation in India.

That the said evils were averted only by the moderation of the said
General Clavering and Philip Francis, Esquire, in consenting to a
reference, and submitting to the decision of the judges of the Supreme
Court of Judicature, although they entertained no doubts themselves on
the legality of their proceedings and the validity of General
Clavering's instant right to the chair, and although they were not in
any way bound by law to consult the said judges, who had no legal or
judicial authority therein in virtue of their offices or as a court of
justice, but were consulted, and interposed their advice, only as
individuals, by the voluntary reference of the parties in the said
dispute. And the said Warren Hastings, by his declaration, entered in
Minutes of Council, "that it was his determination to abide by the
opinion of the judges," and by the measures he had previously taken as
aforesaid to enforce the same by arms, did risk all the dangerous
consequences above mentioned: which must have taken place, if the said
General Clavering and Philip Francis, Esquire, had not been more
tender of the public interests, and less tenacious of their own
rights, and had persisted in their claim, as they were by law entitled
to do, the extra-judicial interposition of the judges notwithstanding;
and from which claim they receded only from their desire to preserve
the peace of the settlement, and to prevent the mischiefs which the
illegal resistance of the said Warren Hastings would otherwise
infallibly have occasioned.

That, after the said judges had delivered their opinion,

      "that the place and office of Governor-General of this
      Presidency had not yet been vacated by Warren Hastings, and
      that the actual assumption of the government by the member
      of the Council next in succession to Mr. Hastings, in
      consequence of any deduction which could be made from the
      papers communicated to them, would be absolutely illegal,"

and after the said General Clavering and Philip Francis, Esquire, had
signified to the said Warren Hastings, by a letter dated the 21st of
June, "their intention to acquiesce in the said opinion of the
judges," and when the differences in the Supreme Council were by these
means composed, and the calamities consequent thereon were avoided,
the said Warren Hastings and Richard Barwell, Esquires, did once more
endanger the public peace and security by other illegal,
unwarrantable, and unprovoked acts of violence: having omitted to
summon either the said General Clavering or the said Philip Francis,
Esquire, to Council; and having, in a Council held thus privately and
clandestinely and contrary to law, on the 22d day of June, come to the
following resolutions, viz.

      "Resolved, That, by the said acts, orders, and declarations
      of Lieutenant-General John Clavering, recited in the
      foregoing papers," (meaning the proceedings of General
      Clavering in his separate Council on the 20th of June,) "he
      has actually usurped and assumed and taken possession of the
      place and office of Governor-General of the Presidency of
      Fort William in Bengal, granted by the act of the 13th of
      his present Majesty to Warren Hastings, Esquire.

      "Resolved, That Lieutenant-General John Clavering has
      thereby relinquished, resigned, surrendered, and vacated the
      office of Senior Counsellor of Fort William in Bengal.

      "Resolved, That Lieutenant-General John Clavering has
      thereby relinquished, resigned, surrendered, and vacated his
      place of Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in
      India.

      "Resolved, That Richard Barwell, Esquire, by virtue of the
      said act of Parliament, and by the death of the Honorable
      George Monson, Esquire, is promoted to the office of Senior
      Counsellor of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, in
      consequence of the said relinquishment, resignation,
      surrender, and vacation of General Clavering.

      "Resolved, That the office of Commander-in-Chief of the
      Company's forces in India, by the relinquishment,
      resignation, surrender, and vacation of General Clavering,
      and by the death of the Honorable George Monson, Esquire,
      does no longer exist.

      "Resolved, That, for the preservation of the legality of our
      proceedings, Lieutenant-General John Clavering be not in
      future summoned or admitted as a member of the
      Governor-General and Council."

And the said Warren Hastings and Richard Barwell, Esquire, did again
sit in Council on the next day, being the 23d of June, without
summoning either General Clavering or Philip Francis, Esquire, and did
come to several other resolutions, and make several orders, contrary
to law or justice, and inconsistent with the tranquillity and the
security of the settlement: that is to say, they ordered their
secretary

      "to notify to General Clavering that the board had declared
      his offices of Senior Counsellor and Commander-in-Chief to
      be vacant, and to furnish him with a copy of these
      proceedings, containing the grounds of the board for the
      aforesaid declaration."

And they ordered extracts of the said proceedings "to be issued in
general orders, with letters to all the provincial councils and
military stations, directing them to publish the same in general
orders"; and they resolved, "that all military returns be made to the
Governor-General and Council in their military department, until a
commander-in-chief shall be appointed by the Company."

That on the day following, that is to say, on the 24th of June, the
said

      "Warren Hastings did again omit to summon General Clavering
      to Council, and did again, together with Richard Barwell,
      Esquire, who concurred therein, adhere to and confirm the
      said illegal resolutions come to on the two former days,
      declaring 'that they could not be retracted but by the
      present authority of the law or by future orders from home,'
      and aggravating the guilt of the said unjustifiable acts by
      declaring, as the said Warren Hastings did, 'that they were
      not the precipitate effects of an instant and passionate
      impulse, but the fruits of long and most temperate
      deliberations, of inevitable necessity, of the strictest
      sense of public duty, and of a conviction equal in its
      impression on his mind to absolute certainty.'"

That the said Warren Hastings was the less excusable in this obstinate
adherence to his former unjust proceedings, as the said declarations
were made in answer to a motion made by Philip Francis, Esquire, for
the reversal of the said proceedings, and to a minute introducing the
said motion, in which Mr. Francis set forth in a clear and forcible
manner, and in terms with which the Court of Directors have since
declared their entire concurrence, both the extreme danger and the
illegality and invalidity of the said proceedings of Warren Hastings
and Richard Barwell, Esquire, concluding the said minute by the
following conciliatory declaration:

      "And that this salutary motion may not be impeded by any
      idea or suspicion that General Clavering may do any act
      inconsistent with the acquiescence which both he and I have
      avowed in the decision of the judges, I will undertake to
      answer for him in this respect, or that, if he should depart
      from the true spirit and meaning of that acquiescence, I
      will not be a party with him in such proceedings."

That the said Warren Hastings could not plead ignorance of the law in
excuse for the said illegal acts, as it appears from the proceedings
of the four preceding days that he was well acquainted with the tenure
by which the members of the Council held their offices under the act
of the 13th of his present Majesty, and had stated the same as a
ground for retaining his own office, contrary to an express
declaration of the Court of Directors and an instrument under the
sign-manual of his Majesty; and the judges of the Supreme Court, in
their reasons for their decision in his favor, had stated the
provisions in the said act,[3] so far as they related to the matter in
dispute, from which it appeared that there were but four grounds on
which the office of any member of the Council could be
vacated,--namely, death, removal, resignation, or promotion. And as
the act confined the power of removal to "his Majesty, his heirs and
successors, upon representation made by the Court of Directors of the
said United Company for the time being," and conferred no such power
on the Governor-General, or a majority of the Council, to remove, on
any ground or for any cause whatever, one of their colleagues,--so,
granting the claim of General Clavering to the chair, and his acts
done in furtherance thereof, to have been illegal, and criminal in
whatever degree, yet it did not furnish to the rest of the Council any
ground to remove him from his office of Counsellor under the
provisions of the said act; and there could therefore remain only his
_resignation_ or _promotion_, as a possible means of vacating his said
office. But with regard to the promotion of General Clavering to the
office of Governor-General, although he claimed it himself, yet, as
Mr. Hastings did not admit it, and as in fact it was even receded from
by General Clavering, it could not be considered, at least by Mr.
Hastings, as a valid ground for vacating his office of Senior
Counsellor, since the act requires for that purpose, not a rejected
claim, but an actual and effectual promotion; and General Clavering's
office of Counsellor could no more be vacated by such a naked claim,
unsupported and disallowed, than the seat of a member of the House of
Commons could be vacated, and a new writ issued to supply the vacancy,
by his claim to the office of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, when
his Majesty has refused to appoint him to the said office. And with
regard to resignation, although the said Warren Hastings, as a color
to his illegal resolutions, had affectedly introduced the word
"resigned" amongst those of "relinquished, surrendered, and vacated,"
yet he well knew that General Clavering had made no offer nor
declaration of his resignation of his offices of Senior Counsellor and
Commander-in-Chief, and that he did not claim the office of
Governor-General on the ground of any such resignation made by
himself, but on the ground of a resignation made by the said Warren
Hastings, which resignation the said Warren Hastings did not admit;
and the use of the term _resigned_ on that occasion was therefore a
manifest and wilful misconstruction and misapplication of the words of
the act of his present Majesty. And such misinterpretation and false
extension of the term of resignation was the more indecent in the said
Warren Hastings, as he was at the same moment disavowing and refusing
to give effect to his own clear and express resignation, according to
the true intent and meaning of the word as used in the said act, made
by his agent, duly authorized and instructed by himself so to do, to
an authority competent to receive and accept the same.

That, although the said Warren Hastings did afterwards recede from the
said illegal measures, in compliance with the opinion and advice of
the judges again interposed, and did thereby avoid the guilt of such
further acts and the blame of such further evils as must have been
consequent on a persistence therein, yet he was nevertheless still
guilty of the illegal acts above described; and the same are great
crimes and misdemeanors.

That, although the judges did decide that the office of
Governor-General, held by the said Warren Hastings, was not _ipso
facto_ and _instanter_ vacated by the arrival of the said dispatches
and documents transmitted by the Court of Directors, and did consider
the said consequences of the resignation as awaiting some future act
or event for its complete and effectual operation, yet the said judges
did not declare any opinion on the ultimate invalidity of the said
acts of Lauchlan Macleane, Esquire, as not being binding on his
principal, Warren Hastings, Esquire; nor did they declare any opinion
that the obligation of the said resignation was not from the beginning
conclusive and effectual, although its operation was, from the
necessity of the case, on account of the distance between England and
India, to take place only in future,--or that the said resignation
made by Lauchlan Macleane, Esquire, was only an offer or proposal of a
resignation to be made at some future and indefinite period, or a mere
intimation of the desire of Warren Hastings, Esquire, to resign at
some future and indefinite period, and that the said resignation,
notwithstanding the acceptance thereof by the Court of Directors, and
the regular appointment and confirmation of a successor, was still to
remain optional in the said Warren Hastings, to be ratified or
departed from at his future choice or pleasure; nor did the said
judges pronounce, nor do any of their reasonings which accompanied
their decision tend to establish it as their opinion, that even the
time for ratifying and completing the said transaction was to be at
the sole discretion of the said Warren Hastings; but they only
delivered their opinion as aforesaid, that his said office

      "has not _yet_ been vacated, and [therefore] that the
      _actual_ assumption of the government by the member of the
      Council next in succession was [in the actual circumstances,
      and _rebus sic stantibus_] illegal."

That the said Warren Hastings does nowhere himself contend that the
said resignation was not absolute, but optional, according to the true
meaning and understanding of the parties in England, and so far as the
acts of Lauchlan Macleane, Esquire, and the Court of Directors, were
binding on him; but, on the contrary, he grounds his refusal to
complete the same, not on any interpretation of the words in which the
said resignation, and the other instruments aforesaid, were conceived,
but rather on a disavowal (not direct, indeed, but implied) of his
said agent, and of the powers under which the said agent had claimed
to act in his behalf. Neither did the said Warren Hastings ground his
said refusal on any objection to the particular day or period or
circumstances in which the requisition of General Clavering was made,
nor accompany the said refusal with any qualification in that respect,
or with any intimation that he would at any future or more convenient
season comply with the same,--although such an intimation might
probably have induced General Clavering to waive an instant and
immediate claim to the chair, and might therefore have prevented the
distractions which happened, and the greater evils which impended, in
consequence of the said claim of General Clavering, and the said
refusal of Warren Hastings, Esquire; but the said Warren Hastings did,
on the contrary, express his said refusal in such general and
unqualified terms as intimated an intention to resist absolutely and
altogether, both then and at any future time, the said requisition of
General Clavering. And the subsequent proceedings of the said Warren
Hastings do all concur in proving that such was his intention; for he
did afterwards, in conformity to the advice of the judges, move a
resolution in Council,

      "that all parties be placed in the same situation in which
      they stood before the receipt of the last advices from
      England, reserving and submitting to a decision in England
      the respective claims that each party may conceive they have
      a right to make, but not acting upon those claims till such
      decision shall arrive in Bengal":

thereby clearly and explicitly declaring that it was not his intention
to surrender the government until such decision should arrive in
Bengal, which could not be expected in less time than a year and a
half after the date of the said resolution; and thereby clearly and
explicitly declaring that he did not consider his resignation as
binding for the present. And the said intention was manifested, if
possible, still more directly and expressly in a letter written by the
said Warren Hastings to the Court of Directors, dated the 15th of
August, 1777, being almost two months after the receipt of the said
dispatches, in which the said Warren Hastings declares that "he did
not hold himself bound by the notification made by Mr. Macleane, nor
by any of the acts consequent of it."

That, such appearing to have been the intention of the said Warren
Hastings, General Clavering was justified in immediately assuming the
government, without waiting for any future act of the said Warren
Hastings for the actual surrender of the said government, none such
being likely to happen; and Philip Francis, Esquire, was justified in
supporting General Clavering in the same on the soundest principles of
justice, and on a maxim received in courts of equity, namely, that no
one shall avail himself of his own wrong,--and that, if any one refuse
or neglect to perform that which he is bound to do, the rights of
others shall not be prejudiced thereby, but such acts shall be deemed
and reputed to have been actually performed, and all the consequences
shall be enforced which would have followed from such actual
performance. And therefore the resolutions moved and voted in Council
by the said Warren Hastings, declaring the offices of General
Clavering to be vacant, were not only illegal, inasmuch as the said
Warren Hastings had no authority to warrant such a declaration, even
on the supposition of the acts of General Clavering being contrary to
law, but the said resolutions were further highly culpable and
criminal, inasmuch as the said acts done by General Clavering, which
were made the pretence of that proceeding, were strictly regular and
legal.

That the refusal of the said Warren Hastings to ratify the said
resignation, and his disavowal of the said Lauchlan Macleane, his
agent, is not justified by anything contained in his said letter to
the Court of Directors, dated on the 15th of August, 1777,--the said
Warren Hastings nowhere directly and positively asserting that the
said Lauchlan Macleane was not his agent, and had not both full and
general powers, and even particular instructions for this very act,
although the said Warren Hastings uses many indirect and circuitous,
but insufficient and inapplicable, insinuations to that effect. And
the said letter does, on the contrary, contain a clear and express
avowal that the said Lauchlan Macleane was his confidential agent, and
that in that capacity he acted throughout, and particularly in this
special matter, with zeal and fidelity. And the said letter does
further admit in effect the instructions produced by the said Lauchlan
Macleane, Esquire, confirmed by Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Stewart, and
relied on and confided in by the Court of Directors, by which the said
Lauchlan Macleane appeared to be specially empowered to declare the
said resignation, the words of the said instruction being as follows:
"That he [Mr. Hastings] _will not continue in the government of
Bengal_, unless certain conditions therein specified can be obtained";
and the words of the said letter being as follows:

      "What I myself know with certainty, or can recollect at this
      distance of time, concerning the powers and instructions
      which were given to Messieurs Macleane and Graham, when they
      undertook to be my agents in England, I will
      circumstantially relate. I am in possession of two papers
      which were presented to those gentlemen at the time of their
      departure from Bengal, one of which comprises four short
      propositions _which I required as the conditions of my being
      confirmed in this government_."

And although the said Warren Hastings does here artfully somewhat
change the words of his written instructions (and which having in his
possession he might as easily have given verbatim) to other words
which may appear less explicit, yet they are in fact capable of only
the same meaning: for, as, at the time of giving the said instructions
to his agents, he was in full possession of his office, he could want
no confirmation therein except _his own_; and, in such circumstances,
"to require certain things, _as the conditions of his being confirmed
in his government_," is tantamount to a declaration "_that he will not
continue in his government, unless those conditions can be obtained_."
And the said attempt at prevarication can serve, its author the less,
as either both sentences have one and the same meaning, or, if their
meaning be different, the original instructions in his own
handwriting, or, in other words, the thing itself, must be preferred
as evidence of its contents to a loose statement of its purport,
founded, perhaps, on a loose recollection of it at a great distance of
time.

That the said refusal of Warren Hastings, Esquire, was a breach of
faith with the Court of Directors and his Majesty's ministers in
England; as the said resignation was not merely a voluntary offer
without any consideration, and therefore subject to be recalled or
retracted at the pleasure of the said Warren Hastings, but ought
rather to be considered as having been the result of a negotiation
carried on between Mr. Macleane for the benefit of Warren Hastings,
Esquire, on the one hand, and by the Court of Directors for the
interests of the Company on the other: which view of the transaction
will appear the more probable, when it is considered that at the time
of the said resignation a strict inquiry had been carrying on by the
Court of Directors into the conduct of the said Warren Hastings, and
the solicitor and counsel to the Company, and other eminent counsel,
had given it as their opinions, on cases stated to them, that there
were grounds for suing the said Warren Hastings in the courts of law
and equity, and that the Company would be entitled to recover in the
said suits against Warren Hastings, Esquire, several very large sums
of money taken by him in his office of Governor-General, contrary to
law, and in breach of his covenants, and of his duty to the Company
and the public; and the Court of Directors had also come to various
severe resolutions of censure against the said Warren Hastings, and
amongst others to a resolution to recall the said Warren Hastings, and
remove him from his office of Governor-General, to answer for sundry
great crimes and delinquencies by him committed in his said office.
And on these accounts it appears probable that the said resignation
was tendered and accepted as a consideration for some beneficial
concessions made in consequence thereof to the said Warren Hastings in
his said dangerous and desperate condition.

And the said refusal was also an act of great disrespect to the Court
of Directors and to his Majesty, and, by rendering abortive their said
measures, solemnly and deliberately taken, and ratified and confirmed
by his Majesty, tended to bring the authority of the Court of
Directors and of his Majesty into contempt.

And the said refusal was an injury to General Clavering.

And was also, or might have been, a great injury to Edward Wheler,
Esquire.

And was an act of signal treachery to Lauchlan Macleane, Esquire, as
also to Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Stewart, whose honors and veracity were
thereby brought into question, doubt, and suspicion.

And the said refusal was prejudicial to the affairs of the servants of
the Company in India, by shaking the confidence to be placed in their
agents by those persons with whom it might be for their interests to
negotiate on any matter of importance, and by thus subjecting the
communication of persons abroad with those at home to difficulties not
known before.




X.--SURGEON-GENERAL'S CONTRACT.



That the said Warren Hastings, in the year 1777, did grant to the
Surgeon-General a contract for three years, for defraying every kind
of hospital and medicinal expense,--not only in breach of the general
orders of the Court of Directors with respect to the duration of
contracts, but in direct opposition to a particular order of the Court
of Directors, of the 30th of March, 1774, when they directed

      "that the Surgeon should not be permitted to enjoy any
      emolument arising from his being concerned in dieting the
      patients, and that the occupations of surgeon and contractor
      should be forthwith separated."

That the said contract was in itself highly improper, and inconsistent
with the good of the service; as it afforded the greatest temptation
to abuse, and established a pecuniary interest in the Surgeon-General,
contrary to the duties of his station and profession.




XI--CONTRACTS FOR POOL BUNDY REPAIRS.



That the Governor-General and Council at Fort William did, on the
motion and recommendation of Warren Hastings, Esquire, enter into a
contract with Archibald Frazer, Esquire, on the 16th of April, 1778,
for the repairs of the pools and banks in the province of Burdwan, for
two years, at the rate of 120,000 sicca rupees for the first year, and
80,000 rupees for the second year.

That on the 19th of December, 1778, the said Warren Hastings did
further persuade the Supreme Council to prolong the term of the above
contract with Archibald Frazer for the space of three years more on
the same conditions, namely, the payment of 80,000 sicca rupees for
each year: to which was added a permission to Mr. Frazer to make
_dobunds_, or special repairs, whenever he should judge them
necessary, at the charge of government.

That the said contracts, both in the manner of their acceptance by the
Supreme Council, without having previously advertised for proposals,
and in the extent of their duration, were made in direct violation of
the special orders of the Court of Directors.

That, so far from any advantage having been obtained for the Company
in the terms of these contracts, in consideration of the length of
time for which they were to continue, the expense of government upon
this article was increased by these engagements to a very great
amount.

That it appears that this contract had been held for some years before
by the Rajah of Burdwan at the rate of 25,000 rupees per annum.

That the superintendent of pool bundy repairs, after an accurate and
diligent survey of the bunds and pools, and the Provincial Council of
Burdwan, upon the best information they could procure, had delivered
it as their opinion to the Governor-General and Council, before the
said agreement was entered into, that, after the heavy expense stated
in Mr. Kinlock's estimate, viz., 119,405 sicca rupees, if disbursed as
they recommended, the charge in future seasons would be greatly
reduced, _and, after one thorough and effectual repair, they conceived
a small annual expense would be sufficient to keep the bunds up and
prevent their going to decay_.

That, whatever extraordinary and unusual damages the pools and bunds
might have sustained, either from the neglect of the Rajah's officers,
or from the violence of the then late rains, and the torrents thereby
occasioned, to justify the expense of the first year, yet, as they
were all considered and included in the estimate for that year, there
could be no pretence for allowing and continuing so large and
burdensome a payment as 80,000 rupees per annum for the four
succeeding years.

That the said Warren Hastings did, in his minutes of the 13th of
February, 1778, himself support that opinion, in the comparison to be
made between Mr. Thomson's proposals, of undertaking the same service
for 60,000 rupees a year for nine years, and the terms of Mr. Frazer's
contracts: preferring the latter, because these were "to effect a
complete repair, which could hardly be concluded in one season, and
the subsequent expense would be but trifling."

Notwithstanding which, the said Warren Hastings urged and prevailed
upon the Council to allow in the first year the full amount proposed
by Mr. Kinlock in his estimate of the necessary repairs, and did
burden the Company with what he must have deemed to be, for the
greater part, an unnecessary expense of 80,000 rupees per annum for
four years.

That the permission granted to Mr. Frazer to make dobunds, or new and
additional embankments in aid of the old ones, whenever he should
judge them necessary, at the charge of government, (the said charge to
be verified by the oath of the said Frazer, without any voucher,) was
a power very much to be suspected, and very improper to be intrusted
to a contractor who had already covenanted to keep the old pools in
perfect repair, and to construct new ones wherever the old pools had
been broken down and washed away, or where the course of the rivers
might have rendered new ones necessary, in consideration of the great
sums stipulated to be paid to him by the government.

That the grant of the foregoing contracts, and the permission
afterwards annexed to the second of the said grants, become much more
reprehensible from a consideration of the circumstances of the person
to whom such a grant was made.

That the due performance of the service required local knowledge and
experience, which the said Archibald Frazer, being an officer in the
Supreme Court of Justice, could not have possessed.




XII.--CONTRACTS FOR OPIUM.



That it appears that the opium produced in Bengal and Bahar is a
considerable and lucrative article in the export trade of those
provinces; that the whole produce has been for many years monopolized
either by individuals or by the government; that the Court of
Directors of the East India Company, in consideration of the hardship
imposed on the native owners and cultivators of the lands, who were
deprived of their natural right of dealing with many competitors, and
compelled to sell the produce of their labor to a single monopolist,
did authorize the Governor-General and Council to give up that
commodity as an article of commerce.

That, while the said commodity continued to be a monopoly for the
benefit of government, and managed by a contractor, the contracts for
providing it were subject to the Company's fundamental regulation,
namely, to be put up to auction, and disposed of to the best bidder;
and that the Company particularly ordered that the commodity, when
provided, should be consigned to the Board of Trade, who were directed
to dispose thereof by public auction.

That in May, 1777, the said Warren Hastings granted to John Mackenzie
a contract for the provision of opium, to continue three years, and
without advertising for proposals. That this transaction was condemned
by the Court of Directors, notwithstanding a clause had been inserted
in that contract by which it was left open to the Court of Directors
to annul the same at the expiration of the first or second year.

That, about the end of the year 1780, the said Warren Hastings, in
contradiction to the order above mentioned, did take away the sale of
the opium from the Board of Trade, though he disclaimed, at the same
time, _any intention of implying a censure on their management_.

That in March, 1781, the said Warren Hastings did grant to Stephen
Sulivan, son of Lawrence Sulivan, Chairman of the Court of Directors
of the East India Company, a contract for the provision of opium,
without advertising for proposals, and without even receiving any
written proposals from him, the said Sulivan; that he granted this
contract for four years, and at the request of the said Sulivan did
omit that clause which was inserted in the preceding contract, and by
which it was rendered liable to be determined by orders from the
Company: the said Warren Hastings declaring, contrary to truth, that
such clause was now unnecessary, as the Directors _had approved_ the
contract.

That the said Sulivan had been but a few months in Bengal when the
above contract was given to him; that he was a stranger to the
country, and to all the local commerce thereof, and therefore
unqualified for the management of such a concern; and that the said
Sulivan, instead of executing the contract himself, did, shortly after
obtaining the same, assign it over to John Benn and others, and in
consideration of such assignment did receive from the said Benn a
great sum of money.

That from the preceding facts, as well as from sundry other
circumstances of restrictions taken off (particularly by abolishing
the office of inspector into the quality of the opium) and of
beneficial clauses introduced, it appears that the said Warren
Hastings gave this contract to the said Stephen Sulivan in
contradiction to the orders of the Court of Directors, and without any
regard to the interests of the India Company, for the sole purpose of
creating an instant fortune for the said Sulivan at the expense of the
India Company, without any claim of service or pretence of merit on
his part, and without any apparent motive whatever, except that of
securing or rewarding the attachment and support of his father,
Lawrence Sulivan, a person of great authority and influence in the
direction of the Company's affairs, and notoriously attached to and
connected with the said Warren Hastings.

That the said Stephen Sulivan neither possessed nor pretended to
possess any skill in the business of his contract; that he exerted no
industry, nor showed or could show any exactness, in the performance
of it, since he immediately sold the contract for a sum of money to
another person, (for the sole purpose of which sale it must be
presumed the same was given,) by which person another profit was to be
made; and by that person the same was again sold to a third, by whom a
third profit was to be made.

That the said Warren Hastings, at the very time when he engaged the
Company in a contract for engrossing the whole of the opium produced
in Bengal and Bahar in the ensuing four years on terms of such
exorbitant profit to the contractor, affirmed, that

      "there was little prospect of selling the opium in Bengal at
      a reasonable price, and that it was but natural to suppose
      that the price of opium _would fall, from the demand being
      lessened_";

that in a letter dated the 5th of May, 1781, he informed the
Directors,

      "that, owing to the indifferent state of the markets last
      season to the Eastward, and the very enhanced rates of
      insurance which the war had occasioned, they had not been
      able to dispose of the opium of the present year to so great
      an advantage as they expected, and that more than one half
      of it remained still in their warehouses."

That the said Warren Hastings was guilty of a manifest breach of trust
to his constituents and his employers in monopolizing, for their
pretended use, an article of commerce for which he declared _no
purchasers had offered, and that there was little prospect of any
offering, and the price of which_, he said, _it was but natural to
suppose would fall_.

That the said Warren Hastings, having, by his own act, loaded the
Company with a commodity for which, either in the ordinary and regular
course of public auction, or even by private contract, there was, as
he affirmed, no sale, did, under pretence of finding a market for the
same, engage the Company in an enterprise of great and certain
expense, subject to a manifest risk, and full of disgrace to the East
India Company, not only in their political character, as a great
sovereign power in India, but in their commercial character, as an
eminent and respectable body of merchants; and that the execution of
this enterprise was accompanied with sundry other engagements with
other persons, in all of which the Company's interest was constantly
sacrificed to that of individuals favored by the said Warren Hastings.

That the said Warren Hastings first engaged in a scheme to export one
thousand four hundred and sixty chests of opium, on the Company's
account, on board a ship belonging to Cudbert Thornhill, half of which
was to be disposed of in a coasting voyage, and the remainder in
Canton. That, besides the freight and commission payable to the said
Thornhill on this adventure, twelve pieces of cannon belonging to the
Company were lent for arming the ship; though his original proposal
was, that the ship should be armed at his expense. That this part of
the adventure, depending for its success on a prudent and fortunate
management of various sales and resales in the course of a circuitous
voyage, and being exposed to such risk both of sea and enemy that all
private traders had declined to be concerned in it, was particularly
unfit for a great trading company, and could not be undertaken on
their account with any rational prospect of advantage.

That the said Warren Hastings soon after engaged in another scheme for
exporting two thousand chests of opium directly to China on the
Company's account, and for that purpose accepted of an offer made by
Henry Watson, the Company's chief engineer, to convey the same in a
vessel of his own, and to deliver it to the Company's supra-cargoes.
That, after the offer of the said Henry Watson had been accepted, a
letter from him was produced at the board, in which he declared that
he was unable to equip the ship with a proper number of cannon, and
requested that he might be furnished with thirty-six guns from the
Company's stores at Madras; with which request the board complied.

That it appears that George Williamson, the Company's auctioneer at
Calcutta, having complained that by this mode of exporting the opium,
which used to be sold by public auction, he lost his commission as
auctioneer, the board allowed him to draw a commission of one per cent
on all the opium which had been or was to be exported. That it appears
that the contractor for opium (whose proper duties and emoluments as
contractor ended with the delivery of the opium) was also allowed to
draw a commission on the opium then shipping on the Company's account;
but for what reason, or on what pretence, does not appear.

That the said Warren Hastings, in order to pay the said Stephen
Sulivan in advance for the opium furnished or to be furnished by him
in the first year of his contract, did borrow the sum of twenty lacs
of rupees at eight per cent, or two hundred thousand pounds sterling,
to be repaid by drafts to be drawn on the Company by their
supra-cargoes in China, provided the opium consigned to them should
arrive safe; but that, if the adventure failed, whether by the loss of
the ships or otherwise, the subscribers to the above loan were to be
repaid their capital and interest out of the Company's treasury in
Bengal.

That the said Warren Hastings, having in this manner purchased a
commodity for which he said there was no sale, and paid for it with
money which he was obliged to borrow at a high interest, was still
more criminal in his attempt, or pretended plan, to introduce it
clandestinely into China. That the importation of opium into China is
forbidden by the Chinese government; that the opium, on seizure, is
burnt, the vessel that imports it confiscated, and the Chinese in
whose possession it may be found for sale punished with death.

That the Governor-General and Council were well aware of the existence
of these prohibitions and penalties, and did therefore inform the
supra-cargoes in China, that the ship belonging to the said Henry
Watson would enter the river at China as an armed ship, _and would not
be reported as bearing a cargo of opium, that being a contraband
trade_.

That, of the above two ships, the first, belonging to Cudbert
Thornhill, was taken by the French; and that the second, arriving in
China, did occasion much embarrassment and distress to the Company's
supra-cargoes there, who had not been previously consulted on the
formation of the plan, and were exposed to great difficulty and hazard
in the execution of their part of it. That the ship was delayed, at a
demurrage of an hundred dollars a day, for upwards of three months,
waiting in vain for a better market. The factory estimate the _loss_
to the Company, including port charges, demurrage, and factory charges
allowed the captain, at sixty-nine thousand nine hundred and
ninety-three dollars, or about twenty thousand pounds sterling.

That the Company's factory at China, after stating the foregoing facts
to the Court of Directors, conclude with the following general
observation thereon.

      "On a review of these circumstances, with the extravagant
      and unusual terms of the freight, demurrage, factory
      charges, &c., &c., we cannot help being of opinion that
      private considerations have been suffered to interfere too
      much for any benefit that may have been intended to the
      Honorable Company. We hope for the Honorable Court's
      approbation of our conduct in this affair. The novelty and
      nature of the consignments have been the source of much
      trouble and anxiety, and, though we wished to have had it in
      our power to do more, we may truly say we have exceeded our
      expectations."

That every part of this transaction, from the monopoly with which it
commenced, to the contraband dealing with which it concluded,
criminates the said Warren Hastings with wilful disobedience of orders
and a continued breach of trust; that every step taken in it was
attended with heavy loss to the Company, and with a sacrifice of their
interest to that of individuals; and that, if finally a profit had
resulted to the Company from such a transaction, no profit attending
it could compensate for the probable risk to which their trade in
China was thereby exposed, or for the certain dishonor and consequent
distrust which the East India Company must incur in the eyes of the
Chinese government by being engaged in a low, clandestine traffic,
prohibited by the laws of the country.




XIII.--APPOINTMENT OF R.J. SULIVAN.



That in the month of February, 1781, Mr. Richard Joseph Sulivan,
Secretary to the Select Committee at Fort St. George, applied to them
for leave to proceed to Calcutta _on his private affairs_. That, being
the confidential secretary to the Select Committee at Fort St. George,
and consequently possessed of all the views and secrets of the
Company, as far as they related to that government, he went privately
into the service of the Nabob of Arcot, and, under the pretence of
proceeding to Calcutta on his private business, undertook a commission
from the said Nabob to the Governor-General and Council, to negotiate
with them in favor of certain projects of the said Nabob which had
been reprobated by the Company.

That the said Sulivan was soon after appointed back again by the said
Warren Hastings to the office of Resident at the Durbar of the said
Nabob of Arcot. That it was a high crime and misdemeanor in the said
Hastings to encourage so dangerous an example in the Company's
service, and to interfere unnecessarily with the government of Madras
in the discharge of the duties peculiarly ascribed to them by the
practice and orders of the Company, for the purpose of appointing to a
great and confidential situation a man who had so recently committed a
breach of trust to his employers.

That the Court of Directors, in their letter to Bengal, dated the 12th
of July, 1782, and received there on the 18th of February, 1783, did
_condemn and revoke_ the said appointment. That the said Directors, in
theirs to Fort St. George, dated the 28th of August, 1782, and
received there the 31st of January, 1783, did highly condemn the
conduct of the said Sulivan, and, in order to deter their servants
from practices of the same kind, _did dismiss him from their service_.

That the said Hastings, knowing that the said Sulivan's appointment
had been condemned and revoked by the Court of Directors, and
pretending that on the 15th of March, 1783, he did not know that the
said Sulivan was _dismissed_ from the Company's service, though that
fact was known at Madras on the 31st of the preceding January, did
recommend the said Sulivan to be ambassador at the court of Nizam Ali
Khan, Subahdar of the Deccan, in defiance of the authority and orders
of the Court of Directors.

That, even admitting, what is highly improbable, that the _dismission_
of the said Sulivan from the service of the said Company was not known
at Calcutta in forty-three days from Madras, the last-mentioned
nomination of the said Sulivan was made at least in contempt of the
censure already expressed by the Court of Directors at his former
appointment to the Durbar of the Nabob of Arcot, and which was
certainly known to the said Hastings.




XIV.--RANNA OF GOHUD.



That on the 2d of December, 1779, the Governor-General and Council of
Fort William, at the special recommendation and instance of Warren
Hastings, Esquire, then Governor-General, and contrary to the declared
opinion and protest of three of the members of the Council, viz.,
Philip Francis and Edward Wheler, Esquires, who were present, and of
Sir Eyre Coote, who was absent, (by whose absence the casting voice of
the said Warren Hastings, Esquire, prevailed,) did conclude a treaty
of perpetual friendship and alliance, offensive and defensive, with a
Hindoo prince, called the Ranna of Gohud, for the express purpose of
using the forces of the said Ranna in opposition to the Mahrattas.

That, among other articles, it was stipulated with the said Ranna by
the said Warren Hastings,

      "that, whenever peace should be concluded between the
      Company and the Mahratta state, the Maha Rajah should be
      included as a party in the treaty which should be made for
      that purpose, and his present possessions, together with the
      fort of Gualior, which of old belonged to the family of the
      Maha Rajah, if it should be then in his possession, and such
      countries as he should have acquired in the course of war,
      and which it should then be stipulated to leave in his
      hands, should be guarantied to him by such treaty."

That, in the late war against the Mahrattas, the said Ranna of Gohud
did actually join the British army under the command of Colonel Muir
with two battalions of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, and did
then serve in person against the Mahrattas, thereby affording material
assistance, and rendering essential service to the Company.

That, in conformity to the above-mentioned treaty, in the fourth
article of the treaty of peace concluded on the 13th of October, 1781,
between Colonel Muir, on the part of the English Company, and Mahdajee
Sindia, the Mahratta general, the said Ranna of Gohud was expressly
included.

That, notwithstanding the said express provision and agreement,
Mahdajee Sindia proceeded to attack the forts and lay waste the
territories of the said Ranna, and did undertake and prosecute a war
against him for the space of two years, in the course of which the
Ranna and his family were reduced to extreme distress, and in the end
he was deprived of his forts, and the whole not only of his acquired
possessions, but of his original dominions, so specially guarantied to
him by the British government in both the above-mentioned treaties.

That the said Warren Hastings was duly and regularly informed of the
progress of the war against the Ranna, and of every event thereof;
notwithstanding which, he not only neglected in any manner to
interfere therein in favor of the said Ranna, or to use any endeavors
to prevent the infraction of the treaty, but gave considerable
countenance and encouragement to Malidajee Sindia in his violation of
it, both by the residence of the British minister in the Mahratta
camp, and by the approbation shown by the said Warren Hastings to the
promises made by his agent of observing the strictest neutrality,
notwithstanding he was in justice bound, and stood pledged by the most
solemn and sacred engagements, to protect and preserve the said Ranna
from those enemies, whose resentment he had provoked only by his
adherence to the interests of the British nation.

That, in the only attempt made to sound the disposition of Mahdajee
Sindia relative to a pacification between him and the Ranna of Gohud,
on the 14th of May, 1783, Mr. Anderson, in obedience to the orders he
had received, did clearly and explicitly declare to Bhow Bucksey, the
minister of Mahdajee Sindia, the sentiments of the said Warren
Hastings in the words following:

      "That it was so far from your [the said Hastings's] meaning
      to intercede in his [the said Ranna's] favor, that I only
      desired him to sound Sindia's sentiments, and, in case he
      was desirous of peace, to mention what I had said; but if he
      seemed to prefer carrying on the war, I begged that he would
      not mention a syllable of what had passed, but let the
      matter drop entirely."

That it afterwards appeared, in a minute of the said Hastings in
Council at Fort William, on the 22d of September, 1783, that he
promised, at the instance of a member of the Council, to write to
Lieutenant James Anderson in favor of the Raima of Gohud, and lay his
letter before the board.

That, nevertheless, the said Hastings, professing _not to recollect_
his said promise, _did neglect to write a formal letter to Lieutenant
Anderson in favor of the said Ranna of Gohud_, and that the private
letter, the extract of which the said Hastings did lay before the
board on the 21st of October, 1783, so far from directing any
effectual interference in favor of the said Raima, or commanding his
agent, the said James Anderson, to interpose the mediation of the
British government to procure "_honorable terms_" for the said Raima,
or even "_safety to his person and family_," ontains the bitterest
invectives against him, and is expressive of the satisfaction which
the said Hastings acknowledges himself to have enjoyed in the
distresses of the said Ranna, the ally of the Company.

That the measures therein recommended appear rather to have been
designed to satisfy Mahdajee Sindia, and to justify the conduct of the
British government in not having taken a more active and a more
hostile part against the said Raima, than an intercession on his
behalf.

That, though no consideration of good faith or observance of treaties
could induce the said Hastings to incur the hazard of any hostile
exertion of the British force for the defence or the relief of the
allies of the Company, yet in the said private letter he directed,
that, in case his mediation should be accepted, it should be made _a
specific condition_, that, _if the said Ranna should take advantage of
Sindia's absence to renew his hostilities, we ought, in that case, on
requisition, to invade the dominions of the Ranna_.

That no beneficial effects could have been procured to the said Ranna
by an offer of mediation delayed till Sindia no longer wanted "_our
assistance to crush so fallen an enemy_," at the same time that no
reason was given to Sindia to apprehend the danger of drawing upon
himself the resentment of the British government by a disregard of
their proposal and the destruction of their ally.

That it was a gross and scandalous mockery in the said Hastings to
defer an application to obtain honorable terms for the Ranna, and
safety for his person and family, till he had been deprived of his
principal fort, in defence of which his uncle lost his life, and on
the capture of which, his wife, to avoid the dishonor consequent upon
falling into the hands of her enemies, _had destroyed herself by an
explosion of gunpowder_.

That, however, it does not appear that any offer of mediation was ever
actually made, or any influence exerted, either for the safety of the
Ranna's person and family or in mitigation of the _rigorous intentions
_ supposed by Lieutenant Anderson[4] to have been entertained against
him by Mahdajee Sindia after his surrender.

That the said Hastings, in the instructions[5] given by him to Mr.
David Anderson for his conduct in negotiating the treaty of peace with
the Mahrattas, expressed his determination to desert the Ranna of
Gohud in the following words.

      "You will of course be attentive to any engagements
      subsisting between us and other powers, in settling the
      terms of peace and alliance with the Mahrattas. I except
      from this the Ranna of Gohud.... Leave him to settle his own
      affairs with the Mahrattas."

That the said Anderson appears very assiduously to have sought for
grounds to justify the execution of this part of his instructions, to
which, however, he was at all events obliged to conform.

That, even after his application for that purpose to the Mahrattas,
whose testimony was much to be suspected, because it was their
interest to accuse and their determined object to destroy the said
Ranna, no satisfactory proof was obtained of his defection from the
engagements he had entered into with the Company.

That, moreover, if all the charges which have been pretended against
the Ranna, and have been alleged by the said Hastings in justification
of his conduct, had been well founded and proved to be true, the
subject-matter of those accusations and the proofs by which they wore
to be supported were known to Colonel Muir before the conclusion of
the treaty he entered into with Mahdajee Sindia; and therefore,
whatever suspicions may have been entertained or whatever degree of
criminality may have been proved against the said Ranna previous to
the said treaty, from the time he was so provided for and included in
the said treaty he was fully and justly entitled to the security
stipulated for him by the Company, and had a right to demand and
receive the protection of the British government.

That these considerations were urged by Mr. Anderson to the said
Warren Hastings, in his letter of the 24th of June, 1781, and were
enforced by this additional argument,--

      "that, in point of policy, I believe, it ought not to be our
      wish that the Mahrattas should ever recover the fortress of
      Gualior. It forms an important barrier to our own
      possessions. In the hands of the Ranna it can be of no
      prejudice to us; and notwithstanding the present prospect of
      a permanent peace betwixt us and the Mahrattas, it seems
      highly expedient that there should always remain some strong
      barrier to separate us, on this side of India, from that
      warlike and powerful nation."

That the said Warren Hastings was highly culpable in abandoning the
said Ranna to the fury of his enemies, thereby forfeiting the honor
and injuring the credit of the British nation in India,
notwithstanding the said Hastings was fully convinced, and had
professed, "that the most sacred observance of treaties, justice, and
good faith were necessary to the existence of the national interests
in that country," and though the said Hastings has complained of the
insufficiency of the laws of this kingdom to enforce this doctrine

      "by the punishment of persons in the possession of power,
      who may be impelled by the provocation of ambition, avarice,
      or vengeance, stronger than the restrictions of integrity
      and honor, to the violation of this just and wise maxim."

That the said Hastings, in thus departing from these his own
principles, with a full and just sense of the guilt he would thereby
incur, and in sacrificing the allies of this country "_to the
provocations of ambition, avarice, or vengeance_," in violation of the
national faith and justice, did commit a gross and wilful breach of
his duty, and was thereby guilty of an high crime and misdemeanor.




XV.--REVENUES



PART I.


That the property of the lands of Bengal is, according to the laws and
customs of that country, an inheritable property, and that it is, with
few exceptions; vested in certain natives, called _zemindars_, or
landholders, under whom other natives, called _talookdars_ and
_ryots_, hold certain subordinate rights of property or occupancy in
the said lands. That the said natives are Hindoos, and that their
_rights and privileges are grounded upon the possession of regular
grants, a long series of family succession, and fair purchase_. That
it appears that Bengal has been under the dominion of the Mogul, and
subject to a Mahomedan government, for above two hundred years. That,
while the Mogul government was in its vigor, the property of zemindars
was _held sacred_, and that, either by voluntary grant from the said
Mogul or by composition with him, the native Hindoos were left in the
free, quiet, and undisturbed possession of their lands, on the single
condition of paying a fixed, certain, and unalterable revenue, or
quit-rent, to the Mogul government. That this revenue, or quit-rent,
was called the _aussil jumma_, or _original ground-rent_, of the
provinces, and was not increased from the time when it was first
settled in 1573 to 1740, when the regular and effective Mogul
government ended. That, from that time to 1765, invasions,
usurpations, and various revolutions took place in the government of
Bengal, in consequence of which the country was considerably reduced
and impoverished, when the East India Company received from the
present Mogul emperor, Shah Allum, a grant of the _dewanny_, or
collection of the revenues. That about the year 1770 the provinces of
Bengal and Bahar were visited with a dreadful famine and mortality, by
which at least one third of the inhabitants perished. That Warren
Hastings, Esquire, has declared,

      "that he had always heard the loss of inhabitants reckoned
      at a third, and in many places near one half of the whole,
      and that he knew not by what means such a loss could be
      recruited in four or five years, and believed it
      impossible."

That, nevertheless, the revenue was _violently kept up to its former
standard_,--that is, in the two years immediately preceding the
appointment of the said Warren Hastings to the government of Fort
William,--in consequence of which _the remaining two thirds of the
inhabitants were obliged to pay for the lands now left without
cultivation_; and that from the year 1770 to the year 1775 _the
country had languished, and the evil continued enhancing every day_.
That the said Warren Hastings, in a letter to the Secret Committee of
the Court of Directors, dated 1st September, 1772, declared,

      "that the lands had suffered unheard-of depopulation by the
      famine and mortality of 1769; that the collections,
      _violently kept up to their former standard_, had added to
      the distress of the country, and threatened a general decay
      of the revenue, unless immediate remedies were applied to
      prevent it."

That the said Warren Hastings has declared,

      "that, by intrusting the collections to the hereditary
      zemindars, the people would be treated with _more
      tenderness_, the rents more improved, and cultivation more
      likely to be encouraged; that _they_ have a perpetual
      interest in the country; that _their_ inheritance cannot be
      removed; that _they_ are the proprietors; that the lands are
      _their_ estates, and _their_ inheritance; that, from a long
      continuance of the lands in their families, it is to be
      concluded they have riveted an authority in the district,
      acquired an ascendency over the minds of the ryots, and
      _ingratiated their affections_; that, from continuing the
      lands under the management of those who have a natural and
      perpetual interest in their prosperity, solid advantages
      might be expected to accrue; that the zemindar would be less
      liable to failure or deficiencies than the farmer, from the
      perpetual interest which the former hath in the country, and
      because his inheritance cannot be removed, and it would be
      improbable that he should risk the loss of it by eloping
      from his district, which is too frequently practised by a
      farmer when he is hard-pressed for the payment of his
      balances, and as frequently predetermined when he receives
      his farm."

That, notwithstanding all the preceding declarations made by the said
Warren Hastings of the loss of one third of the inhabitants and
general decline of the country, he did, immediately after his
appointment to the government, in the year 1772, make an arbitrary
settlement of the revenues for five years at a higher rate than had
ever been received before, and with a progressive and accumulating
increase on each of the four last years of the said settlement.

That, notwithstanding the right of property and inheritance,
repeatedly acknowledged by the said Warren Hastings to be in the
zemindars and other native landholders, and notwithstanding he had
declared "that the security of private property is the greatest
encouragement to industry, on which the wealth of every state
depends," the said Warren Hastings, nevertheless, in direct violation
of those acknowledged rights and principles, did universally let the
lands of Bengal _in farm_ for five years,--thereby destroying all the
rights of private property of the zemindars,--thereby delivering the
management of their estates to farmers, and transferring by a most
arbitrary and unjust act of power the whole landed property of Bengal
from the owners to strangers. That, to accomplish this iniquitous
purpose, he, the said Warren Hastings, did put the lands of Bengal up
to a pretended public auction, _and invited all persons to make
proposals for farming the same_, thereby encouraging strangers to bid
against the proprietors,--in consequence of which, not only the said
proprietors were ousted of the possession and management of their
estates, but a great part of the lands fell into the hands of the
banians, or principal black servants of British subjects connected
with and protected by the government; and that the said Warren
Hastings himself has since declared, that _by this way the lands too
generally fell into the hands of desperate or knavish adventurers_.[6]
That, before the measure hereinbefore described was carried into
execution, the said Warren Hastings did establish certain fundamental
regulations in Council, to be observed in executing the same.[7] That
among these regulations it was specially and strictly ordered, that no
farm should exceed the annual amount of _one_ lac of rupees, and

      "that no peshcar, banian, or other servant, of whatever
      denomination, of the collector, or relation or dependant of
      any such servant, should be allowed to farm lands, nor
      directly or indirectly to hold a concern in any farm, nor to
      be security for any farmer."

That, in direct violation of these his own regulations, and in breach
of the public trust reposed in him, and sufficiently declared by the
manifest duty of his station, if it had not been expressed and
enforced by any positive institution, he, the said Warren Hastings,
did permit and suffer his own banian or principal black steward, named
Cantoo Baboo, to hold farms in different purgunnahs, or districts, or
to be security for farms, to the amount of thirteen lac of rupees
(130,000_l._ or upwards) per annum; and that, after enjoying the whole
of those farms for two years, he was permitted by the said Warren
Hastings to relinquish two of them. That on the subject of the farms
held by Cantoo Baboo the said Warren Hastings has made the following
declaration.

      "Many of his farms were taken without my knowledge, and
      almost all against my advice. I had no right to use
      compulsion or authority; nor could I with justice exclude
      him, because he was my servant, from a liberty allowed to
      all other persons in the country. The farms which he quitted
      he quitted by my advice, because I thought that he might
      engage himself beyond his abilities, and be involved in
      disputes, which I did not choose to have come before me as
      judge of them."[8]

That the said declaration contains sundry false and contradictory
assertions: that, if _almost all_ the said farms were taken against
his advice, it cannot be true that _many_ of them were taken without
his knowledge; that, whether Cantoo Baboo had been his servant or not,
the said Warren Hastings was bound by his own regulations to prevent
his holding any farms to a greater amount than one lac of rupees per
annum, and that the said Cantoo Baboo, being the servant of the
Governor-General, was excluded by the said regulations from holding
any farms whatever; that, if (as the Directors observe) it was thought
dangerous to permit the banian of a collector to be concerned in
farms, the same or stronger objections would always lie against the
Governor's banian being so concerned; that the said Warren Hastings
had a right, and was bound by his duty, to prevent his servant from
holding the same; that, in advising the said Cantoo Baboo to
relinquish some of the said farms, for which he was actually engaged,
he has acknowledged an influence over his servant, and has used that
influence for a purpose inconsistent with his duty to the India
Company, namely, to deprive them of the security of the said Cantoo
Baboo's engagement for farms which on trial he had found not
beneficial, or not likely to continue beneficial, to himself; and
that, if it was improper that he, the said Warren Hastings, should be
the judge of any disputes in which his servant might be involved on
account of his farms, that reason ought to have obliged him to prevent
his servant from being engaged in any farms whatever, or to have
advised his said servant to relinquish the remainder of his farms, as
well as those which the said Warren Hastings affirms he quitted by his
advice. That on the subject of the said charge the Court of Directors
of the East India Company have come to the following resolution:

      "_Resolved_, That it appears that the conduct of the late
      President and Council of Fort William in Bengal, in
      suffering Cantoo Baboo, the present Governor-General's
      banian, to hold farms in different purgunnahs to a large
      amount, or to be security for such farms, contrary to the
      tenor and spirit of the 17th regulation of the Committee of
      Revenue at Fort William, of the 14th May, 1772, and
      afterwards relinquishing that security without satisfaction
      made to the Company, was highly improper, and has been
      attended with considerable loss to the Company";

and that in the whole of this transaction the said Warren Hastings has
been guilty of gross collusion with his servant, and manifest breach
of trust to his employers.

That, whereas it was acknowledged by the said Warren Hastings, that
the country, in the years 1770 and 1771, had suffered great
depopulation and decay, and that the collections of those years,
having been violently kept up to their former standard, had added to
the distress of the country, the settlement of the revenues made by
him for five years, commencing the 1st May, 1772, instead of offering
any abatement or relief to the inhabitants who had survived the
famine, held out to the East India Company a promise of great
_increase_ of revenue, to be exacted from the country by the means
hereinbefore described. That this settlement was not realized, but
fell considerably short, even in the first of the five years, when the
demand was the lightest; and that on the whole of the five years the
real collections fell short of the settlement to the enormous amount
of two millions and a half sterling, and upwards. That such a
settlement, if it had been or could have been rigorously exacted from
a country already so distressed, and from a population so impaired,
that, in the belief of the said Warren Hastings, it was impossible
such loss could be recruited in four or five years, would have been in
fact, what it appeared to be in form, an act of the most cruel and
tyrannical oppression; but that the real use made of that unjust
demand upon the natives of Bengal was, to oblige them to compound
privately with the persons who formed the settlement, and who
threatened to enforce it. That the enormous balances and remissions on
that settlement arose from a general collusion between the farmers and
collectors, and from a general peculation and embezzlement of the
revenues, by which the East India Company was grossly imposed on, in
the first instance, by a promised _increase_ of revenue, and
defrauded, in the second, not only by the failure of that _increase_,
but by the revenues falling short of what they were in the two years
preceding the said settlement to a great amount. That the said Warren
Hastings, being then at the head of the government of Bengal, was a
party to all the said imposition, fraud, peculation, and embezzlement,
and is principally and specially answerable for the same; and that,
whereas sundry proofs of the said peculation and embezzlement were
brought before the Court of Directors, the said Directors (in a letter
dated the 4th of March, 1778, and signed by William Devaynes and
Nathaniel Smith, Esquires, now Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the
said Court, and members of this House) did declare, that,

      "although it was rather their wish to prevent future evils
      than to enter into a severe retrospection of past abuses,
      yet, as in some of the cases then before them they conceived
      there had been _flagrant corruption_, and in others great
      oppressions committed on the native inhabitants, they
      thought it unjust to suffer the delinquents to pass wholly
      unpunished, and therefore they directed the Governor-General
      and Council forthwith to commence a prosecution against the
      persons who composed the Committee of Circuit, and their
      representatives, and against all other proper parties";

but that the prosecutions so ordered by the Court of Directors in the
year 1778 have never been brought to trial; and that the said Warren
Hastings did, on the 23d of December, 1783, propose and carry it in
Council, _that orders should be given for withdrawing_ the said
prosecutions,--declaring, that he was clearly of opinion that there
was no ground to maintain them, and _that they would only be
productive of expense to the Company and unmerited vexation to the
parties_.




REVENUES.



PART II.


That the said Warren Hastings has on sundry occasions declared his
deliberate opinion generally against all innovations, and particularly
in the collection and management of the revenues of Bengal: that

      "he was well aware of the expense and inconvenience _which
      ever attends innovations of all kinds_, on, their first
      institution;[9]--that innovations are _always_ attended with
      difficulties and inconveniences, and innovations in the
      revenue with a suspension of the collections;[10]--that the
      continual variations in the mode of collecting the revenue,
      and the continual usurpation on the rights of the people,
      have fixed in the minds of the ryots a rooted distrust of
      the ordinances of government."[11]

That the Court of Directors have repeatedly declared their
apprehensions

      "that a sudden transition from one mode to another, in the
      investigation and collection of their revenue, might have
      alarmed the inhabitants, lessened their confidence in the
      Company's proceedings, and been attended with other
      evils."[12]

That the said Warren Hastings, immediately after his appointment to
the government of Fort William, in April, 1772, did abolish the office
of _Naib Dewan_, or native collector of the revenues, then existing;
that he did at the same time appoint a committee of the board to go on
a circuit through the provinces, and to form a settlement of the
revenues for five years; that he did then appoint sundry of the
Company's servants to have the management of the collections, viz.,
one in each district, under the title of _Collector_; that he did then
abolish the General Board of Revenue or Council at Moorshedabad, for
the following reasons:

      "That, while the controlling and executive part of the
      revenue and the correspondence with the collectors was
      carried on by a council at Moorshedabad, the members of the
      administration at Calcutta had no opportunity of acquiring
      that thorough and comprehensive knowledge which could only
      result from _practical experience_; that the orders of the
      Court of Directors, which established a new system, which
      enjoined many new regulations and inquiries, could not
      properly be delegated to a subordinate council, and it
      became absolutely necessary that the business of the revenue
      should be conducted _under the immediate observation and
      direction of the board_."[13]

--That in November, 1773, the said Warren Hastings abolished the
office of Collector, and transferred the collection and management of
the revenues to several councils of revenue, commonly called
_Provincial Councils_. That on the 24th of October, 1774, the said
Warren Hastings _earnestly offered his advice_ (to the
Governor-General and Council, then newly appointed by act of
Parliament) _for the continuation of the said system of Provincial
Councils in all its parts_. That the said Warren Hastings did, on the
22d of April, 1775, transmit to the Directors a formal plan for the
future settlement of the revenues, and did therein declare, that,
"with respect to the mode of managing the collection of the revenue
and the administration of justice, none occurred to him so good as the
system which was already established of Provincial Councils." That on
the 18th of January, 1776, the said Warren Hastings did transmit to
the Court of Directors a plan for the better administration of
justice, that in this plan the establishment of the said Provincial
Councils was specially provided for and confirmed, and that Warren
Hastings did recommend it to the Directors _to obtain the sanction of
Parliament for a confirmation of the said plan_. That on the 30th of
April, 1776, the said Warren Hastings did transmit to the Court of
Directors the draft or scheme of an act of Parliament for the better
administration of justice in the provinces, in which the said
establishment of Provincial Councils is again specially included, and
special jurisdiction assigned to the said Councils. That the Court of
Directors, in a letter dated 5th of February, 1777, did give the
following instruction to the Governor-General and Council, a majority
of whom, viz., Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis,
had disapproved of the plan of Provincial Councils:

      "If you are fully convinced that the establishment of
      Provincial Councils has not answered nor is not capable of
      answering the purposes intended by such institutions, we
      hereby direct you to form a new plan for the collection of
      the revenues, and to transmit the same to _us for our
      consideration_."

--That the said Warren Hastings, in contradiction to his own
sentiments repeatedly declared, and to his own advice repeatedly and
deliberately given, and in defiance of the orders of the Directors, to
whom he transmitted no previous communication whatever of his
intention to abolish the said Provincial Councils, did, in the
beginning of the year 1781, again change the whole system of the
collections of the public revenue of Bengal, as also the
administration of civil and criminal justice throughout the provinces.
That the said Warren Hastings, in a letter dated 5th of May, 1781,
advising the Court of Directors of the said changes, has falsely
affirmed,

      "that the plan of superintending and collecting the public
      revenue of the provinces through the agency of Provincial
      Councils had been instituted for the temporary and declared
      purpose of introducing another more permanent mode _by an
      easy and gradual change_";

that, on the contrary, the said Warren Hastings, from the year 1773 to
the year 1781, has constantly and uniformly insisted on the wisdom of
that institution, and on the necessity of never departing from it;
that he has in that time repeatedly advised that the said institution
should be confirmed _in perpetuity_ by an act of Parliament; that the
said total dissolution of the Provincial Councils was not introduced
by any easy and gradual change, nor by any gradations whatever, but
was sudden and unprepared, and instantly accomplished by a single act
of power; and that the said Warren Hastings, in the place of the said
Councils, has substituted a Committee of Revenue, consisting of four
covenanted servants, on principles opposite to those which he had
himself professed, and with exclusive powers, tending to deprive the
members of the Supreme Council of a due knowledge of and inspection
into the management of the territorial revenues, specially and
unalienably vested by the legislature in the Governor-General and
Council, and to vest the same solely and entirely in the said Warren
Hastings. That the reasons assigned by the said Warren Hastings for
constituting the said Committee of Revenue are incompatible with those
which he professed when he abolished the subordinate Council of
Revenue at Moorshedabad: that he has invested the said Committee _in
the fullest manner with all the powers and authority of the
Governor-General and Council_; that he has thereby contracted the
whole power and office of the Provincial Councils into a small
compass, and vested the same in four persons appointed by himself;
that he has thereby taken the general transaction and cognizance of
revenue business out of the Supreme Council; that the said Committee
are empowered to conduct the current business of the revenue
department without reference to the Supreme Council, and only _report
to the board such extraordinary occurrences, claims, and proposals as
may require the special orders of the board_; that even the
instruction to report to the board in extraordinary cases is nugatory
and fallacious, being accompanied with limitations which make it
impossible for the said board to decide on any questions whatsoever:
since it is expressly provided by the said Warren Hastings, _that, if
the members of the Committee differ in opinion, it is not expected
that every dissentient opinion should be recorded_; consequently the
Supreme Council, on any reference to their board, can see nothing but
the resolutions or reasons of the majority of the Committee, without
the arguments on which the dissentient opinions might be founded: and
since it is also expressly provided by the said Warren Hastings, that
_the determination of the majority of the Committee should not
therefore be stayed, unless it should be so agreed by the
majority_,--that is, that, notwithstanding the reference to the
Supreme Council, the measure shall be executed without waiting for
their decision.

That the said Warren Hastings has delivered his opinion, with many
arguments to support the same, in favor of long leases of the lands,
in preference to _annual_ settlements: that he has particularly
declared,

      "that the farmer who holds his farm for one year only,
      having no interest in the next, takes what he can with the
      hand of rigor, which, even in the execution of legal claims,
      is often equivalent to violence; he is under the necessity
      of being rigid, and _even cruel_,--for what is left in
      arrear after the expiration of his power is at best a
      doubtful debt, if ever recoverable; he will be tempted to
      exceed the bounds of right, and to augment his income by
      irregular exactions, and by racking the tenants, for which
      pretences will not be wanting, where the farms pass
      _annually_ from one hand to another; that the
      discouragements which the tenants feel from being
      transferred every year to new landlords are a great
      objection to such short leases; that they contribute to
      injure the cultivation and dispeople the lands; that, on the
      contrary, from long farms the farmer acquires a permanent
      interest in his lands; he will, for his own sake, lay out
      money in assisting his tenants in improving lands already
      cultivated, and in clearing and cultivating waste
      lands."[14]

That, nevertheless, the said Warren Hastings, having left it to the
discretion of the Committee of Revenue, appointed by him in 1781, to
fix the time for which the ensuing settlement should be made, and the
said Committee having declared, that, _with respect to the period of
the lease, in general, it appeared to the Committee that to limit them
to one year would be the best period_, he, the said Warren Hastings,
approved of that limitation, in manifest contradiction to all his own
arguments, professions, and declarations concerning the fatal
consequences of _annual_ leases of the lands; that in so doing the
said Warren Hastings did not hold himself bound or restrained by the
orders of the Court of Directors, but acted upon his own discretion;
and that he has, for partial and interested purposes, exercised that
discretion in particular instances against his own general settlement
for one year, by granting perpetual leases of farms and zemindaries to
persons specially favored by him, and particularly by granting a
perpetual lease of the zemindary of Baharbund to his servant Cantoo
Baboo on very low terms.

That in all the preceding transactions the said Warren Hastings did
act contrary to his duty as Governor of Fort William, contrary to the
orders of his employers, and contrary to his own declared sense of
expediency, consistency, and justice, and thereby did harass and
afflict the inhabitants of the provinces with perpetual changes in the
system and execution of the government placed over them, and with
continued innovations and exactions, against the rights of the said
inhabitants,--thereby destroying all security to private property, and
all confidence in the good faith, principles, and justice of the
British government. And that the said Warren Hastings, having
substituted his own instruments to be the managers and collectors of
the public revenue, in the manner hereinbefore mentioned, did act in
manifest breach and defiance of an act of the 13th of his present
Majesty, by which _the ordering and management and government of all
the territorial revenues in the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa_
were vested in the Governor-General and Council, without any power of
delegating the said trust and duty to any other persons; and that, by
such unlawful delegation of the powers of the Council to a subordinate
board appointed by himself, he, the said Warren Hastings, did in
effect unite and vest in his own person the ordering, government, and
management of all the said territorial revenues; and that for the said
illegal act he, the said Warren Hastings, is solely answerable, the
same having been proposed and resolved in Council when the
Governor-General and Council consisted but of two persons
present,--namely, the said Warren Hastings, and the late Edward
Wheler, Esquire, and when consequently the Governor-General, by virtue
of the casting voice, possessed the whole power of the government.
That, in all the changes and innovations hereinbefore described, the
pretence used by the said Warren Hastings to recommend and justify the
same to the Court of Directors has been, that such changes and
innovations would be attended with increase of revenue or diminution
of expense to the East India Company; that such pretence, if true,
would not have been a justification of such acts; but that such
pretence is false and groundless: that during the administration of
the said Warren Hastings the territorial revenues have declined; that
the charges of collecting the same have greatly increased; and that
the said Warren Hastings, by his neglect, mismanagement, and by a
direct and intended waste of the Company's property, is chargeable
with and answerable for all the said decline of revenue, and all the
said increase of expense.




XVI.--MISDEMEANORS IN OUDE.



I. That the province of Oude and its dependencies were, before their
connection with and subordination to the Company, in a flourishing
condition with regard to culture, commerce, and population, and their
rulers and principal nobility maintained themselves in a state of
affluence and splendor; but very shortly after the period aforesaid,
the prosperity both of the country and its chiefs began sensibly and
rapidly to decline, insomuch that the revenue of the said province,
which, on the lowest estimation, had been found, in the commencement
of the British influence, at upwards of three millions sterling
annually, (and that ample revenue raised without detriment to the
country,) did not in the year 1779 exceed the sum of 1,500,000_l._,
and in the subsequent years did fall much short of that sum, although
the rents were generally advanced, and the country grievously
oppressed in order to raise it.

II. That in the aforesaid year, 1779, the demands of the East India
Company on the Nabob of Oude are stated by Mr. Purling, their Resident
at the court of Oude, to amount to the sum of 1,360,000_l._ sterling
and upwards, leaving (upon the supposition that the whole revenue
should amount to the sum of 1,500,000_l._ sterling, to which it did
not amount) no more than 140,000_l._ sterling for the support of the
dignity of the household and family of the Nabob, and for the
maintenance of his government, as well as for the payment of the
public debts due within the province.

III. That by the treaty of Fyzabad a regular brigade of the Company's
troops, to be stationed in the dominions of the Nabob of Oude, was
kept up at the expense of the said Nabob; in addition to which a
temporary brigade of the same troops was added to his establishment,
together with several detached corps in the Company's service, and a
great part of his own native Troops were put under the command of
British officers.

IV. That the expense of the Company's temporary brigade increased in
the same year (the year of 1779) upwards of 80,000_l._ sterling above
the estimate, and the expense of the country troops under British
officers in the same period increased upwards of 40,000_l._ sterling;
and in addition to the aforesaid ruinous expenses, a large civil
establishment was gradually, secretly, and without any authority from
the Court of Directors, or record in the books of the Council-General
concerning the same, formed for the Resident, and another under Mr.
Wombwell, an agent for the Company; as also several pensions and
allowances, in the same secret and clandestine manner, were charged on
the revenues of the said Nabob for the benefit of British subjects,
besides large occasional gifts to persons in the Company's service.

V. That in the month of November, 1779, the said Nabob did represent
to Mr. Purling, the Company's Resident aforesaid, the distressed state
of his revenues in the following terms.

      "During three years past, the expense occasioned by the
      troops in brigade, and others commanded by European
      officers, has much distressed the support of my household,
      insomuch that the allowances made to the seraglio and
      children of the deceased Nabob have been reduced to _one
      fourth_ of what it had been, upon which they have subsisted
      in a very distressed manner for two years past. The
      attendants, writers, and servants, &c._, of my court, have
      received no pay for two years past; and there is at present
      no part of the country that can be allotted to the payment
      of my father's private creditors, whose applications are
      daily pressing upon me. All these difficulties I have for
      these three years past struggled through, and found this
      consolation therein, that it was complying with the pleasure
      of the Honorable Company, and in the hope that the Supreme
      Council would make inquiry from impartial persons into my
      distressed situation; but I am now forced to a
      representation. From the _great increase of expense_, the
      revenues were necessarily farmed out _at a high rate;_ and
      deficiencies followed yearly. The country and cultivation is
      abandoned; and this year in particular, from the excessive
      drought, deductions of many lacs"

(stated by the Resident, in his letter to the board of the 13th of the
month following, to amount to twenty-five lac, or 250,000_l._
sterling)

      "have been allowed the farmers, who were still left
      unsatisfied. I have received but just sufficient to support
      my absolute necessities, the revenues being deficient to the
      amount of fifteen lac [150,000_l._ sterling], and for this
      reason many of the old chieftains with their troops, and the
      useful attendants of the court, were forced to leave it, and
      there is now only a few foot and horse for the collection of
      my revenues; and should the zemindars be refractory, there
      is not left a sufficient number to reduce them to
      obedience."

And the said Nabob did therefore pray that the assignments for the new
brigade, the corps of horse, and the other detached bodies of the
Company's troops might not be required from him: alleging,

      "that the former was not only quite useless to his
      government, but, moreover, the cause of much loss, both in
      the revenues and customs; and that the detached bodies of
      troops under their European officers brought nothing but
      confusion into the affairs of his government, and were
      entirely their own masters."

VI. That it appears that the said Nabob was not bound by any treaty to
the maintenance, without his consent, _even of the old brigade_,--the
Court of Directors having, in their letter of the 15th December, 1775,
approved of keeping the same in his service, "_provided it was done
with the free consent of the Subah, and by no means without it_." And
the _new brigade_ and temporary corps were raised on the express
condition, that the expense thereof should be charged on the Nabob
only "_for so long a time as he should require the corps for his
service_." And the Court of Directors express to the Governor-General
and Council their sense of the said agreement in the following terms:

      "But if you intend to exert your influence first to induce
      the Vizier to acquiesce in your proposal, and afterwards _to
      compel him to keep the troops in his pay during your
      pleasure, your intents are unjust; and a correspondent
      conduct would reflect great dishonor on the Company_."

VII. That, in answer to the decent and humble representation aforesaid
of the Nabob of Oude, the allegations of which, so far as they relate
to the distressed state of the Nabob's finances, and his total
inability to discharge the demands made on him, were confirmed by the
testimony of the English Resident at Oude, and which the said Hastings
did not deny in the whole or in any part thereof, he, the said Warren
Hastings, did, on pretence of certain political dangers, declare the
relief desired to be "without hesitation _totally_ inadmissible," and
did falsely and maliciously insinuate, "that the _tone_ in which the
demands of the Nabob were asserted, and the season in which they were
made, did give cause for _the most alarming suspicions_." And the said
Warren Hastings did, in a letter to the Nabob aforesaid, written in
haughty and insolent language, and without taking any notice of the
distresses of the said Nabob, alleged and verified as before recited,

      "require and insist upon your [the Nabob's] granting
      _tuncaws_ [assignments] for the full amount of their [the
      Company's] demands upon you for the current year, and on
      your reserving funds sufficient to answer them, _even should
      the deficiencies of your revenues compel you to leave your
      own troops unprovided for, or to disband a part of them to
      enable you to effect it_."

VIII. That, in a letter written at the same time to the Resident,
Purling, and intended for his directions in enforcing on the Nabob the
unjust demands aforesaid, the said Warren Hastings hath asserted, in
direct contradiction to the treaties subsisting between the said Nabob
and the Company,

      "that he [the Nabob] stands engaged to our government to
      maintain the English armies which at his own request have
      been formed for the protection of his dominions, and _that
      it is our part, and not his, to judge and determine in what
      manner and at what time these shall be reduced and
      withdrawn_."

And in a Minute of Consultation, when the aforesaid measure was
proposed by the said Hastings to the Supreme Council, he did affirm
and maintain that the troops aforesaid

      "had now no _separate_ or distinct existence from ours, and
      may be properly said to consist of our _whole_ military
      establishment, with the exception only of our European
      infantry; and that they could not be withdrawn without
      imposing on the Company _the additional burden of them_, or
      disbanding nine battalions of disciplined sepoys and three
      regiments of horse."

IX. That in the Minute of Consultation aforesaid, he, the said Warren
Hastings, hath further, in justification of the violent and arbitrary
proceedings aforesaid, asserted,

      "that the arrangement of measures between the British
      government and their allies, the native powers of India,
      must, in case of disagreement about the necessity thereof,
      _be decided by the strongest_";

and hath thereby advanced a dangerous and most indecently expressed
position, subversive of the rights of allies, and tending to breed war
and confusion, instead of cordiality and cooeperation amongst them, and
to destroy all confidence of the princes of India in the faith and
justice of the English nation. And the said Hastings, having further,
in the minute aforesaid, presumed to threaten to "bring to punishment,
if my influence" (his, the said Hastings's, influence) "can produce
that effect, _those incendiaries_ who have endeavored to make
themselves the instruments of division between us," hath, as far as in
him lay, obstructed the performance of one of the most essential
duties of a prince engaged in an unequal alliance with a presiding
state,--that of representing the grievances of his subjects to that
more powerful state by whoso acts they suffer: leaving thereby the
governing power in total ignorance of the effects of its own measures,
and to the oppressed people no other choice than the alternative of an
unqualified submission, or a resistance productive of consequences
more fatal.

X. That, all relief being denied to the Nabob, in the manner and on
the grounds aforesaid, the demands of the Company on the said Nabob in
the year following, that is to say, in the year 1780, did amount to
the enormous sum of 1,400,000_l._ sterling, and the distress of the
province did rapidly increase.

XI. That the Nabob, on the 24th of February of the same year, did
again write to the Governor-General, the said Warren Hastings, a
letter, in which he expressed his constant friendship to the Company,
and his submission and obedience to their orders, and asserting that
he had not troubled them with any of his difficulties, trusting they
would learn them from other quarters, and that he should be relieved
by their friendship. "But," he says,

      "when _the knife had penetrated to the bone_, and I was
      surrounded with such heavy distresses that I could no longer
      live in expectations, I then wrote an account of my
      difficulties. The answer I have received to it is such that
      it has given me inexpressible grief and affliction. I never
      had the least idea or expectation from you and the Council
      that you would have given your orders in _so afflicting a
      manner, in which you never before wrote, and I could never
      have imagined_. I have delivered up all my _private_ papers
      to him [the Resident], that, after examining my receipts and
      expenses, he may take whatever remains. That, as I know it
      to be my duty to satisfy you [the Company and Council], I
      have not failed to obey in any instance; but requested of
      him that it might be done so as not to distress me in my
      _necessary_ expenses. There being no other funds but those
      for the expenses of my _mutseddies_ [clerks and
      accountants], household expenses, and servants, &c., he
      demanded these in such a manner, that, being remediless, I
      was obliged to comply with what he required. He has
      accordingly stopped _the pensions of my old servants for
      thirty years, whether sepoys [soldiers], mutseddies
      [secretaries and accountants], or household servants, and
      the expenses of my family and kitchen, together with the
      jaghires of my grandmother, mother, and aunts, and of my
      brothers and dependants, which were for their support_."

XII. That, in answer to the letter aforesaid, the Resident received
from the said Warren Hastings and Council an order to persevere in the
demand to its fullest extent,--that is to say, to the amount of
1,400,000_l._ sterling.

XIII. That on the 15th of May the Nabob replied, complaining in an
humble and suppliant manner of his distressed situation: that he had
at first opposed the assigning to the use of the Company the estates
of his mother, of his grandmother, of one of his uncles, and of the
sons of another, but that, in obedience to the injunctions of the
gentlemen of the Council, it had been done, to the amount, on the
whole, of 80,000_l._ sterling a year, or thereabouts; that whatever
effects were in the country, with even his table, his animals, and the
salaries of his servants, were granted in assignments; that, besides
these, if they were resolved again to compel him to give up the
estates of his parents and relations, which were granted them for
their maintenance, they were at the Company's disposal; saying,

      "If the Council have directed you to attach them, do it: in
      the country no further sources remain. I have no means; for
      I have not a subsistence.--How long shall I dwell upon my
      misfortunes?"

XIV. That the truth of the said remonstrances was not disputed, nor
the _tone_ in which they were written complained of, the same being
submissive, and even abject, though the cause (his distresses) was by
the said Hastings, in a great degree, and in terms the most offensive,
attributed to the Nabob himself; but no relief was given, and the same
unwarrantable establishments, maintained at the same ruinous expense,
were kept up.

XV. That the said Warren Hastings, having considered as incendiaries
those who advised the remonstrances aforesaid, and, to prevent the
same in future, having denounced vengeance on those concerned therein,
did, for the purpose of keeping in his own power all representations
of the state of the court and country aforesaid, and to subject both
the one and the other to his own arbitrary will, and to draw to
himself and to his creatures the management of the Nabob's revenues,
in defiance of the orders of the Court of Directors, a second time
recall Mr. Bristow, the Company's Resident, from the court of
Oude,--having once before recalled him, as the said Directors express
themselves, "without the shadow of a charge being exhibited against
him," and having, on the occasion and time now stated, produced no
specific charge against the said Resident; and he, the said Hastings,
did appoint Nathaniel Middleton, Esquire, to succeed him,--it being
his declared principle, that he must have a person of _his own_
confidence in that situation.

XVI. That the said Warren Hastings, after he had refused all relief to
the distresses of the Nabob in the manner aforesaid, and had described
those who advised the representation of the grievances of Oude as
_incendiaries_, did himself, in a minute of the 21st May, 1781,
describe that province "as fallen into a state of great disorder and
confusion, and its resources in an extraordinary degree
diminished,"--and did state, that his presence in the said province
was requested by the Nabob, and that, unless some effectual measures
were taken for his relief, he [the Nabob] must be under the necessity
of leaving his country, and coming down to Calcutta, to represent the
situation of his government. And Mr. Wheler did declare that the
Governor-General's representation of the state of that province

      "was but too well founded, and was convinced that it would
      require his utmost abilities and powers, applied and
      exercised on the spot, to restore it to its former good
      order and affluence."

XVII. That the said Warren Hastings, in consequence of the minute
aforesaid, did grant to himself, and did procure the consent of his
only colleague, Edward Wheler, Esquire, to a commission or delegation,
with powers

      "to assist the Nabob Vizier in forming such regulations as
      may be necessary for the peace and good order of his
      government, the improvement of his revenue, and the
      adjustment of the mutual concerns subsisting between him and
      the Company."

And in the said commission or delegation he, the said Warren Hastings,
did cause to be inserted certain powers and provisions of a new and
dangerous nature: that is to say, reciting the business before
mentioned, he did convey to himself

      "such authority to enforce the same _as the Governor-General
      and Council might or could exercise on occasions in which
      they could be warranted to exercise the same_, and to form
      and conclude such several engagements or treaties with the
      Nabob Vizier, the government of Berar, and with any chiefs
      or powers of Hindostan, as _he_ should judge expedient and
      necessary."

Towards the conclusion of the act or instrument aforesaid are the
words following, viz.:

      "It is hereby declared, that all such acts, and all such
      engagements or treaties aforesaid, shall be binding on the
      Governor-General and Council in the same manner, _and as
      effectually, as if they had been done and passed by the
      specific and immediate concurrence and actual junction of
      the Governor-General and Council, in council assembled_."

And the said powers were, by the said Warren Hastings, given by
himself and the said Wheler, under the seal of the Company, on the 3d
July, 1781.

XVIII. That the said commission, delegating to him, the said Warren
Hastings, the whole functions of the Council, is destructive to the
constitution thereof, and is contrary to the Company's standing
orders, and is illegal.

XIX. That, in virtue of those powers, and the illegal delegation
aforesaid, the said Warren Hastings, after he had finished his
business at Benares, did procure a meeting with the Nabob of Oude at a
place called Chunar, upon the confines of the country of Benares, and
did there enter into a treaty, or pretended treaty, with the said
Nabob; one part of which the said Warren Hastings did pretend was
drawn up from a series of requisitions presented to him by the Nabob,
but which requisitions, or any copy thereof, or of any other material
document relative thereto, he did not at the time transmit to the
Presidency,--the said Warren Hastings informing Mr. Wheler, that the
Resident, Middleton, had taken the _authentic_ papers relative to this
transaction with him to Lucknow: and it does not appear that the said
Warren Hastings did ever reclaim the said papers, in order to record
them at the Presidency, to be transmitted to the Court of Directors,
as it was his duty to do.

XX. That the purport of certain articles of the said treaty, on the
part of the Company, was, that, in consideration of the Nabob's
_inability_ (which inability the preamble of the treaty asserts to
have been "repeatedly and urgently represented") to support the
expenses of the temporary brigade, and of three regiments of cavalry,
and also of the British officers with their battalions, and of _other_
gentlemen who were then paid by him, the several corps aforesaid, and
the other gentlemen, (with the exception of the Resident's office
_then on the Nabob's list_, and a regiment of sepoys for the
Resident's guard,) should, after a term of two and a half months, be
no longer at his, the Nabob's, charge: "the true meaning of this
being, that no more troops than one brigade, and the pay and
allowances of a regiment of sepoys," (as aforesaid, to the Resident,)
amounting in the whole to 342,000_l._ a year, should be paid by the
Nabob; and that _no officers, troops, or others, should be put upon
the Nabob's establishment_, exclusive of those in the said treaty
stipulated.

XXI. That the said Warren Hastings did defend and justify the said
articles, in which the troops aforesaid were to be removed from the
Nabob's establishment, by declaring as follows.

      "That the _actual_ disbursements to those troops had fallen
      upon _our own funds_, and that _we_ support a body of
      troops, established _solely_ for the defence of the Nabob's
      possessions, _at our own expense_. It is true, we charge the
      Nabob with this expense; but the large balance already due
      from him shows too justly the little prospect there was of
      disengaging ourselves from _a burden_ which was daily adding
      to _our_ distresses and must soon become _insupportable_,
      although it were granted that the Nabob's debt, then
      suffered to accumulate, _might at some future period be
      liquidated_, and that this measure would substantially
      effect an instant relief to the pecuniary distresses of the
      Company."

XXII. That Nathaniel Middleton, the Resident, did also declare that he
would at all times testify, "that, upon the plan of the foregoing
years, the receipts from the Nabob were only _a deception_, and _not
an advantage_, but _an injury_ to the Company," and "that a remission
to the Nabob of this _insufferable burden_ was _a profit_ to the
Company." And the said Hastings did assert that the force of the
Company was not lessened by withdrawing the temporary troops;
although, when it suited the purpose of the said Hastings, in denying
just relief to the distresses of the said Nabob of Oude, he had not
scrupled to assert the direct contrary of the positions by him
maintained in justification of the treaty of Chunar,--having in his
minute aforesaid, of the 15th of December, 1779, asserted, "that these
troops" (the troops maintained by the Nabob of Oude)

      "had no _separate or distinct existence_, and may be
      properly said to consist of our whole military
      establishment, with the exception only of our European
      infantry, and that they could not be _withdrawn, without
      imposing on the Company the additional burden of their
      expense_, or disbanding nine battalions of disciplined
      sepoys and three regiments of horse."

XXIII. That he, the said Warren Hastings, in justification of his
agreement to withdraw the troops aforesaid from the territories and
pay of the Nabob of Oude, did further declare,

      "that he had been too much accustomed to the tales of
      hostile preparation and impending invasions, against all the
      evidence of political probability, to regard them as any
      other than phantoms raised for the purpose of perpetuating
      or multiplying commands,"

and he did trust

      "all ideas of danger from the neighboring powers were
      altogether visionary; and that, even if they had been better
      founded, this mode of anticipating possible evils would be
      more mischievous than anything they had reason to
      apprehend,"

and that the internal state of the Nabob's dominions did not require
the continuance of the said troops; and that the Nabob, "_whose
concern it was, and not ours_" did affirm the same,--notwithstanding
he, the said Hastings, had before, in answer to the humble
supplications of the Nabob, asserted, that "_it was our part, and not
his_, to judge and determine in what manner and at what time they
should be reduced or withdrawn."

XXIV. That the said Warren Hastings, in support of his measure of
withdrawing the said brigade and other troops, did also represent,
that

      "the remote stations of those troops, placing the commanding
      officers beyond the notice and control of the board,
      afforded too much opportunity and temptation for
      unwarrantable emoluments, and excited the _contagion of
      peculation and rapacity throughout the whole army_, and, as
      an instance thereof, that a court-martial, composed of
      officers of rank and respectable characters, unanimously and
      honorably, 'most honorably,' acquitted an officer upon an
      acknowledged fact which in times of stricter discipline
      would have been deemed a crime deserving the severest
      punishment."

XXV. That the said Warren Hastings, having in the letter aforesaid
contradicted all the grounds and reasons by him assigned for keeping
up the aforesaid establishment, and having declared his own conviction
that the whole was a fallacy and imposition, and a detriment to the
Company instead of a benefit, circumstances (if they are true) which
he might and ought to have well known, was guilty of an high crime and
misdemeanor in carrying on the imposture and delusion aforesaid, and
in continuing an insupportable burden and grievance upon the Nabob for
several years, without attending to his repeated supplications to be
relieved therefrom, to the utter ruin of his country, and to the
destruction of the discipline of the British troops, by diffusing
among them a general spirit of peculation; and the said Hastings hath
committed a grievous offence in upholding the same pernicious system,
until, by his own confession and declaration, in his minute of the
21st of May, 1781,

      "the evils had _grown_ to so great an height, that exertions
      will be required more powerful than can be made through the
      delegated authority of the servants of the Company now in
      the province, and that he was far from sanguine in his
      expectations that _even his own endeavors would be attended
      with much success_."

XXVI. That, at the time of making the said treaty, and at the time
when, under color of the distress of the Nabob of Oude, and the
failure of all other means for his relief, he, the said Hastings,
broke the Company's faith with the parents of the Nabob, and first
encouraged and afterwards compelled him to despoil them of their
landed estates, money, jewels, and household goods, and while the said
Nabob continued heavily in debt to the Company, he, the said Warren
Hastings, did, "_without hesitation_," accept of and receive from the
Nabob of Oude and his ministers (who are notoriously known to be not
only under his influence, but under his absolute command) a bribe, or
unlawful gift or present, of one hundred thousand pounds sterling, and
upwards. That, even if the said pretended gift could be supposed to be
voluntary, it was contrary to the express provision of the Regulating
Act of the 13th year of his Majesty's reign, prohibiting the receipt
of all presents upon any pretence whatsoever, and contrary to his own
sense of the true intent and meaning of the said act, declared upon a
similar, but not so strong a case,--that is, where the service done,
and the present offered in return for it, had taken place before the
promulgation of the above laws in India: on that occasion he declared,
"that the exclusion by an act of Parliament _admitted of no abatement
or evasion_, wherever its authority extended."

XXVII. That the said Warren Hastings, confiding in an interest which
he supposed himself to have formed in the East India House, did
endeavor to prevail on the Court of Directors to violate the said act,
and to suffer him to appropriate the money so illegally accepted by
him to his own profit, as a reward for his services.

XXVIII. That the said Warren Hastings has since declared to the Court
of Directors, that, when _fortune threw a sum in his way_ (meaning the
sum of money above mentioned) _of a magnitude which could not be
concealed, he chose to apprise his employers of it_:[15] thereby
confessing, that, but for the magnitude of the same rendering it
difficult to be concealed, he never would have discovered it to them.
And the said unlawful present being received at the time when, for
reasons directly contradictory of all his former recorded
declarations, he did agree to remove the aforesaid troops from the
Nabob's dominions, and to recall the pensioners aforesaid, it must be
presumed that he did not agree to give the relief (which he had before
so obstinately refused) upon the grounds and motives of justice,
policy, or humanity, but in consideration of the sum of money
aforesaid, which, in a time of such extreme distress in the Nabob's
affairs, could not be rationally given, except for those and other
concessions stipulated for in the said treaty, but which had on former
occasions been refused.

XXIX. That, notwithstanding his, the said Warren Hastings's, receipt
of the present of one hundred thousand pounds, as aforesaid, he did
violate every one of the stipulations in the said treaty contained,
and particularly he did continue in the country, and in the service of
the Nabob of Oude, those troops which he had so recently stipulated to
withdraw from his country and to take from his establishment: for,
upon the 24th of December following, he did order the temporary
brigade, making ten battalions of five hundred men each, to be again
put on the Vizier's list,--although he had recently informed the Court
of Directors, through Edward Wheler, Esquire, that any benefit to be
derived from the Nabob's paying that brigade was _a fallacy and a
deception_, and that the same was _a charge_ upon the Company, and not
_an alleviation of its distresses_, as well as _an insupportable
burden_ to the Nabob: thus having, within a short space of time, twice
contradicted himself, both in declaration and in conduct.

XXX. That this measure, in direct violation of a treaty of not three
months' duration, was so injudicious, that, in the opinion of the
Assistant Resident, Johnson, "nothing less than blows could effect
it": he, the said Resident, further adding,

      "that the Nabob was not even able to pay off the arrears
      still due to it [the new brigade]; and that the troops being
      _all_ in arrears, and no possibility of present payment, so
      large a body assembled here [viz., at Lucknow] without any
      means to check and control them, nothing but disorder could
      follow. As one proof that the Nabob is as badly off for
      funds as we are, I may inform you that his cavalry rose this
      day upon him, and went all armed to the palace, to demand
      from thirteen to eighteen months' arrears, and were with
      great difficulty persuaded to retire, which was probably
      more effected by a body of troops getting under arms to go
      against them than any other consideration."

But the letter of Warren Hastings, Esquire, of the 24th of December,
giving the above orders for the infraction of the treaty, and to which
the letter from whence the foregoing extracts are taken is an answer,
doth not appear, any otherwise than as the same is recited in the said
answer.

XXXI. That, notwithstanding the disorders and deficiencies in the
revenue aforesaid had continued and increased, and that three very
large balances had accumulated, the said Warren Hastings did cause the
Treasury accounts at Calcutta to be examined and scrutinized, and an
account of another arrear, composed of various articles, pretended to
have accumulated during seven years previous to the year 1779, (the
articles composing which, if they had been just, ought to have been
charged at the times they severally became due,) was sent to the
Resident, and payment thereof demanded, to the amount of 260,000_l._
sterling; which unexpected demand, in so distressed a situation, did
not a little embarrass the Nabob. But whilst he and his ministers were
examining into the said unexpected demand, another, and fifth balance,
made up of similar forgotten articles, was demanded, to the amount of
140,000_l._ sterling more. Which said two last demands did so terrify
and confound the Nabob and his ministers, that they declared that the
Resident "might at once take the country, since justice was out of the
question."

XXXII. That the said Hastings, in order to add to the confusion,
perplexity, and distress of the Nabob's affairs, did send to his court
(in which he had already a Resident and Assistant Resident) two secret
agents, Major Palmer and Major Davy, and did instruct Major Palmer to
make a variety of new claims, one of a loan to the Company of
600,000_l_. sterling, although he well knew the Nabob was himself
heavily in arrear to the Company, and was utterly unable to discharge
the same, as well as in arrear to his own troops, and to many
individuals, and that he borrowed (when he could at all borrow) at an
interest of near thirty per cent. To this demand was added a new
bribe, or unlawful present, to himself, to the amount of 100,000_l._
sterling, which he did not refuse as unlawful and of evil example, but
as _indelicate_ in the Nabob's present situation,--and did, as if the
same was his own property, presume to dispose of it, and to desire the
transfer of it, as of his own bounty, to the Company, his masters. To
this second demand he, the said Hastings, added a third demand of
120,000_l._ sterling, for four additional regiments on the Nabob's
list, after he had solemnly engaged to take off the ten with which it
had been burdened: the whole of the claims through his private agent
aforesaid making the sum of 820,000_l._ sterling.

XXXIII. That the demands, claims, &c., made by the said Warren
Hastings upon the government of Oude in that year amounted to the
enormous sum of 2,530,000_l._ sterling; which joined to the arrears to
troops, and some internal failures, amounting to 255,000_l._ sterling
more, the whole charge arose to 2,785,000_l._ sterling, which was
considerably more than double the net produce of the Nabob's
revenue,--the same only amounting to 1,450,000_l_. "nominal revenue,
never completely realized."

XXXIV. That, towards providing for these extravagant demands, he, the
said Warren Hastings, did direct and authorize another breach of the
public faith given in the treaty of Chunar. For whereas, by the second
article of the treaty aforesaid, it was left to the Nabob's discretion
whether or not he should resume the landed estates, called jaghires,
within his dominions, and notwithstanding the said Hastings, in
defence of the said article, did declare that the Nabob should be left
to the exercise of his own authority and pleasure respecting them, yet
he, the said Hastings, did authorize a violent compulsion to be used
towards the said Nabob for accomplishing an universal confiscation of
that species of landed property; and in so doing he did also compel
the Nabob to break his faith with all the landholders of that
description, not only in violating the assurance of his own original
grants, but his assurance recently given, when, being pressed by the
Company, he, the Nabob, had made a temporary seizure of the profits of
the lands aforesaid, in the manner of a compulsory loan, for the
repayment of which he gave his bonds and obligations; and although he
had at the same time solemnly pledged his faith that he never would
again resort to the like oppressive measure, yet he, the said Warren
Hastings, did cause him to be compelled to confiscate the estates of
at least sixty-seven of the principal persons of his country,
comprehending therein his own nearest relations and the ancient
friends and dependants of his family: the annual value of the said
estates thus confiscated amounting to 435,000_l._ sterling, or
thereabouts, upon an old valuation, but stated by the Resident,
Middleton, as being found to yield considerably more.

XXXV. That the violent and unjust measure aforesaid, subversive of
property, utterly destructive of several ancient and considerable
families, and most dishonorable to the British government, did produce
an universal discontent and the greatest confusion throughout the
whole country,--the said confiscated lands being on this occasion put
to rack-rents, and the people grievously oppressed: and to prevent a
possibility of redress, at least for a considerable time, the said
confiscated estates were mortgaged (it appearing otherwise
impracticable to make an approach towards satisfying the exorbitant
demands of the said Hastings) for a great sum to certain usurious
bankers or money-dealers at Benares.

XXXVI. That, besides these enormous demands, which were in part made
for the support of several corps of troops under British officers
which by the treaty of Chunar ought to have been removed, very large
extra charges not belonging to the military list of the said Nabob,
and several civil charges and pensions, were continued, and others
newly put on since the treaty of Chunar, namely, an allowance to Sir
Eyre Coote of 15,554 rupees per month, (being upwards of 18,664_l._
sterling a year,) and an allowance to Trevor Wheler, Esquire, of 5,000
rupees per month (or 6,000_l._ sterling and upwards a year); and the
whole of the settled charges, not of a military nature, to British
subjects, did amount to little less than 140,000_l._ yearly, and, if
other allowances not included in the estimate were added, would
greatly exceed that sum, besides much more which may justly be
suspected to have been paid, no part whereof had at that time been
brought forward to any public account.

XXXVII. That the commander of one of these corps, of whose burden the
said Nabob did complain, was Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hannay, who
did farm the revenues of certain districts called Baraitch and
Goruckpore, which the said Hastings, in the ninth article of his
instructions to Mr. Bristow, did estimate at twenty-three lacs of
rupees, or 230,000_l._, per annum: but under his, the said Hannay's,
management, the collections did very greatly decline; complaints were
made that the countries aforesaid were harassed and oppressed, and the
same did fall into confusion, and at last the inhabitants broke out
into a general rebellion.

XXXVIII. That the far greater part of the said heavy list was
authorized or ordered by him, the said Warren Hastings, for the
purpose of extending his own corrupt influence: for it doth appear,
that, at the time when he did pretend, in conformity to the treaty of
Chunar aforesaid, to remove the Company's servants, "_civil_ and
military, from the court and service of the Vizier," he did assert
that he thereby did "diminish _his own influence_, as well as that of
his colleagues, by narrowing the line of _patronage_"; which proves
that the offices, pensions, and other emoluments aforesaid, in Oude,
were of _his_ patronage, as his patronage could not be diminished by
taking away the said offices, &c., unless the same had been
substantially of his gift. And he did, at the time of the pretended
reformation aforesaid, express both his knowledge of the existence of
the said excessive and abusive establishments, and his sense of his
duty in taking them away: for in agreeing to the article in the treaty
of Chunar for abolishing the said establishments, he did declare
himself "actuated solely by motives of _justice_ to the Nabob, and a
regard to _the honor of our national character_"; and, according to
his own representation, the said servants of the Company, civil and
military,

      "by their numbers, their influence, and the _enormous
      amount_ of their salaries, pensions, and emoluments, were an
      _intolerable_ burden on the revenues and authority of the
      Vizier, and exposed us to _the envy and resentment of the
      whole country_, by excluding the native servants and
      adherents of the Vizier from the rewards of their services
      and attachment."

XXXIX. That the revenue of the country being anticipated, mortgaged,
and dilapidated, by the counsel, concurrence, connivance, and
influence, and often by the direct order of the said Warren Hastings,
the whole civil government, magistracy, and administration of justice
gradually declined and at length totally ceased through the whole of
the vast provinces which compose the territory of Oude, and no power
was visible therein but that of the farmers of the revenue, attended
by bodies of troops to enforce the collections; insomuch that
robberies, assassinations, and acts of every description of outrage
and violence were perpetrated with impunity,--and even in the capital
city of Lucknow, the seat of the sovereign power, there was no court
of justice whatever to take cognizance of such offences.

XL. That the said Warren Hastings, when he did interfere in the
government of Oude, was obliged by his duty to interfere for the good
purposes of government, and not merely for the purpose of extorting
money therefrom and enriching his own dependants,--which latter
purpose alone he did effect, in the manner before mentioned, but not
one of the former. For the said Hastings, having procured the
extraordinary powers given by and to himself by his delegation of the
3d of July, 1781, did declare the same to be for the purpose, among
many others, "of assisting the Nabob Vizier in forming such
regulations as may be necessary for the peace and good order of his
government and the improvement of his revenue." And in consequence of
the said powers, the said Warren Hastings did, in the treaty of
Chunar, obtain an article from the Nabob by which the said Nabob did
promise to attend to his advice in the reformation of his civil
administration; and he did give certain instructions to the Resident,
Middleton, to which he did require him to yield _the most implicit
obedience_, and did in one article thereof direct him to urge the
Nabob to endeavor gradually, if it could not be done at once, to
establish courts of _adawlut_ [justice], and that the _darogahs_
[chief criminal magistrates], _moulavies_ [consulting or assistant
lawyers], and other officers, should be selected by the ministers,
with his, the Resident's, concurrence; and afterwards, in his
instructions to the Resident Bristow, desiring him to pursue the same
object, he declared his opinion,

      "that the want of such courts, and the extreme
      licentiousness occasioned thereby, is one of the most
      disreputable defects in his Highness the Nabob's government,
      and that, while they do not exist, every man knows the
      hazard which he incurs in lending his money ";

but he did give him, the said Resident, no positive instruction
concerning the same, supposing the establishment of such courts a
matter of difficulty, and did therefore leave him a latitude in his
proceedings therein.

XLI. That the said Resident Bristow did, however, in conformity to the
said instructions, at last given with such latitude, endeavor to
prevail on the said minister gradually to introduce courts of justice
for the cognizance of crimes, by beginning to establish a criminal
court under a native judge, to judge according to the Mahomedan law in
the city of Lucknow.
But Hyder Beg Khan, a minister of the said Warren Hastings's
nomination, and solely dependent upon him, did elude and obstruct, and
in the end totally defeat, the establishment of the same.

XLII. That the obstruction aforesaid, and the evil consequences
thereof, were duly represented to the said Hastings; and though the
said Hastings had made it the fourth article of a criminal charge
against the Resident Middleton,

      "that he did not report to the Governor-General, or to the
      board, the progress which he had made from time to time in
      his endeavors to comply with his instructions, and that, if
      he met with any impediments in the execution of them, he had
      omitted to state those impediments, and to apply for fresh
      orders upon them,"

yet he, the said Hastings, did give no manner of support to the
Resident Bristow against the said Hyder Beg Khan, and did not even
answer several of his letters, the said Bristow's letters, stating the
said impediments, or take any notice of his remonstrances, but did at
length revoke his own instructions, declaring that he, the said
Resident, should not presume to act upon the same, and yet did not
furnish him with any others, upon which he might act, but did uphold
the said Hyder Beg Khan in the obstruction by him given to the
performance of the first and fundamental duty of all
government,--namely, the administration of justice, and the protection
of the lives and property of the subject against wrong and violence.

XLIII. That the said Hastings did afterwards proceed to the length of
criminating the Resident Bristow aforesaid for his endeavors to
establish the said necessary court, as an invasion of the rights of
the Nabob's government,--when, if the Nabob in his own proper person
and character, and not the aforesaid Hyder Beg, (who was a creature of
the said Hastings,) had opposed the reestablishment of justice in the
said country, it was the duty of the said Hastings to have pressed the
same upon him by every exertion of his influence. And the said Warren
Hastings, in his pretended attention to the Nabob's authority, when
exercised by his, the said Hastings's, minister, to prevent the
establishment of courts of justice for the protection of life and
property, at the same time that he did not hesitate, in the case of
the confiscation of the jaghires, and the proceedings against the
mother and grandmother of the Nabob, totally to supersede his
authority, and to force his inclinations in acts which overturned all
the laws of property, and offered violence to all the sentiments of
natural affection and duty, and accusing at the same time his
instruments for not going to the utmost lengths in the execution of
his said orders, is guilty of an high crime and misdemeanor.

XLIV. That the said Hastings did highly aggravate his offence in
discountenancing and discouraging the reestablishment of magistracy,
law, and order, in the country of Oude, inasmuch as he did in the
eighth article of his instructions to the Resident order him to
exercise powers which ought to have been exercised by lawful
magistrates, and in a manner agreeable to law. And in the said article
he did state the prevalence of rebellion in the said country of
Oude,--as if rebellion could exist in a country in which there was no
magistracy, and no protection for life or property, and in which the
native authority had no force whatever, and in which he himself states
the exercise of British authority to be an absolute usurpation; and he
did accordingly direct a rigorous prosecution against the offence of
rebellion under such circumstances, but "with a fair and impartial
inquiry," when he did not permit the establishment of those courts of
justice and magistracy by which alone rebellion could be prevented, or
a fair and impartial inquiry relative to the same could be had; and
particularly he did instruct the said Resident to obtain the Nabob's
order for employing some sure means for apprehending certain
zemindars, and particularly three, in the instruction named, whom he,
the said Hastings, did cause to be apprehended upon what he calls good
information, founded upon some facts to which he asserts he has the
testimony of several witnesses,

      "that they had the destruction of Colonel Hannay and the
      officers under his command as their immediate object, and
      ultimately the extirpation of the English influence and
      power throughout all the Nabob's dominions,"

and that they did still persevere in their rebellious conduct without
deviation, "though the Nabob's, and not our government, was then the
object of it"; and he did direct the said Resident, if it should
appear,

      "_on a fair and regular inquiry_, that their conduct towards
      the Nabob had been such as it had been reported to be, to
      insist upon the Nabob's punishing them with _death_, and to
      treat with the same rigor every zemindar and every subject
      who shall be the leader in a rebellion against his
      authority."

XLV. That the crime of the said Hastings, in his procedure aforesaid,
was further highly aggravated by his having received information of
several striking circumstances which strongly indicated the necessity
of a regular magistracy and a legal judicature, from the total failure
of justice, affecting not only the subjects at large, but even the
reigning family itself,--as also of the causes why no legal magistracy
could exist, and why the princes of the reigning family were not only
exposed to the attacks of assassins, but even to a want of the
protection which might be had from their servants and attendants, who
were driven from their masters for want of that maintenance which the
princes, their masters, could not procure even for themselves. And the
circumstances aforesaid were detailed to him, the said Hastings, by
the Resident, Bristow, in a letter from Lucknow, dated the 29th
January, 1784, to the Governor-General, the said Warren Hastings, and
the Council of Bengal, in the terms following.

      "The frequent robberies and murders perpetrated in his
      Excellency's, the Vizier's, dominions, have been _too often_
      the subject of my representations to your honorable board.
      From the total want of police, hardly a day elapses but I am
      informed of some tragical event, whereof the bare recital is
      shocking to humanity. About two months since, an attempt was
      made to assassinate Rajah Ticket Roy, the acting minister's
      confidential agent; but he happily escaped unhurt. Nabob
      Bahadur, _his Highness's brother_, has not been so
      fortunate, as will appear from translations of two of his
      letters to me, No. 1, which I have the honor to inclose for
      your information. Although my feelings are sensibly hurt and
      my compassion strongly excited by _the disgraceful and
      miserable state of poverty to which his Excellency's
      brothers are reduced_, yet, situated as I am, it is not in
      my power to interfere with effect. My efforts on a former
      occasion failed of success, _and my interposition now would
      only excite the resentment of the minister towards the
      unhappy sufferers, in consequence of their application to
      me, from whom ALONE, however, they hope for relief from
      their present distress_, which, their near connection with
      the Vizier considered, is both shameful and unprecedented.
      That no regular courts of justice have been established in
      this country is particularly pointed at in my instructions,
      as the most disreputable defect in his Highness's
      government; yet the minister seems determined on abolishing
      even the shadow of so necessary an institution. The office
      of Chief Justice, as held by Moulavy Morobine, was ever
      nugatory, but now it is sunk into the lowest contempt. The
      original establishment, inadequate as it was, is mouldering
      away, and the officers now attached to it are literally
      starving, as no part of their allowance has been paid for
      above six months past. He himself has proposed to resign his
      appointment, being every way precluded from a possibility of
      exercising the duties of it."

XLVI. That it appears by the said letter, and the papers therewith
transmitted, as well as other documents in the said correspondence,
that, in consequence of the distress brought upon the Nabob's
finances, certain of the princes, his brethren, the children of Sujah
ul Dowlah, the late sovereign of the country, were put upon pensions
unsuitable to their birth and rank, and by the mismanagement of the
minister aforesaid, (appointed by the said Warren Hastings,) for two
years together no considerable part of the said inadequate pension was
paid; and not being able to maintain the attendants necessary for
their protection in a city in which all magistracy and justice was
abolished, they were not only liable to suffer the greatest
extremities of penury, but their lives were exposed to the attempts of
assassins: the condition of one of the said princes, called the Nabob
Bahadur, being by himself strongly expressed in three letters to the
said Resident Bristow,--the first dated the 28th of December, 1783;
the second, the 7th of January, 1784; and the third, the 15th of
January, 1784,--which letters were duly transmitted, in the dispatch
of the 29th of the same month, to Warren Hastings, Esquire, and are as
follow.

      "Your own servant carried you the account of what he himself
      was an eye-witness to, after the affair of last night. These
      are the particulars. About midnight my aunt received twelve
      wounds from a ruffian, of which she died. I also received
      six successive stabs, which alarmed the people of the house,
      who set up a shouting: whereupon the assassin run off.
      Besides being _without food or the means of providing any_,
      this misfortune has befallen me. _I am desirous of sending
      the coffin to your door_. It is your duty, both for the sake
      of God and of Christ, to execute justice, and to inquire
      what harm I have done to the murderer sufficient to deserve
      assassination, or even injury. _You now stand in the place
      of his Excellency the Vizier_. I request you will do me
      justice. What more can I say?

     "P.S. I am also desirous to show you my wounds."

_From the same, 29th [7th?] January, 1784_.

      "You have been duly informed of all the circumstances
      relative both to the murder of the innocent, and of my being
      wounded, as well by my former letter, as by the messenger
      whom you sent to inquire into the state of my health; and I
      have every reason to hope, from your known kindness, that
      you will not be deficient in seeking out the assassin. _I am
      at this moment overwhelmed in misfortune. Whilst the blood
      is flowing from my wounds, neither I nor my children nor my
      servants have wherewithal to procure subsistence;_ nor have
      I it in my power either to purchase remedies or to reward
      the physician: _it is for the sake of God alone that he
      attends me_. Thus loaded with calamity upon calamity, I am
      unable to support life; for I find no relief from any
      affliction either day or night. Do you now stand in the
      place of my father; grant me fresh life by speedy acts of
      benevolence.

      "For these two last years his Excellency established a
      pension for me of twenty thousand rupees; but I never
      received the full amount of it, either last year or the year
      before. Should it, however, be paid me, though inadequate to
      my desires, I shall still be enabled to support myself. From
      the beginning of this year to the present time I have not
      received a farthing, nor do I expect any; though, if you
      afford protection to the oppressed, all my wishes will be
      accomplished. I was desirous of waiting on you with my
      family, that you might be an eye-witness to their condition;
      but I was advised not to stir out on account of my wounds.
      What more can I say?"

       *       *       *       *       *

_The following Extracts are made from the Third Letter from the same
Prince, dated January 15, 1784._

      "The particulars of the late and unforeseen misfortune with
      which I have been overwhelmed are not unknown unto
      you,--that the innocent blood of my aunt, _the prop and
      ruler of my family_, was shed, and in the same manner I,
      too, was wounded. Until now I feel the pain and affliction
      of my wounds; _and no person has regarded my solicitations
      for redress, sought after the assassin, and brought him to
      condign punishment, yourself excepted_."--

      "In like manner as the Honorable Governor-General has
      adopted my brother Saadut Ali Khan for his son and relieved
      him from the vexation, affliction, and dependence of this
      place, would it be extraordinary that you also should, in
      your bounty and favor, consent to adopt me, who do not
      possess the necessaries of life, and permit me to attend you
      to whatever part of the world you may travel, whereby I
      shall at all times derive honor and advantage? Formerly us
      three brothers, Saadut Ali, Mirza Jungly, and I, the poor
      and oppressed, were, in the presence of our blessed father,
      whose soul rests in heaven, treated alike. Now the ministers
      of this government put me upon a footing with our younger
      brothers, who have lately left the zenanah, and whose
      expenses are small. On this scale, which is in every respect
      insufficient for my maintenance, they pay _the pitiful
      allowance only when it is their pleasure to do it_. My
      situation has for years past been increasing in wretchedness
      to a degree that _I am in want of daily bread, and my
      servants and animals are dying of hunger. My distresses are
      so great that I have not been able to pay a daum to the
      surgeons for the cure of my wounds; and they, too, are
      discouraged from affording me their assistance or furnishing
      me with medicines_. How, then, is it possible for me to
      exist? Considering you as my patron, participating in my
      afflictions, I have represented the circumstances concerning
      my situation; and I hope, from your friendship, that you
      will honor me with a favorable answer."

XLVII. The Resident, Bristow, did also receive a strong application
from three others of the brethren of the reigning sovereign, called
Mirza Hyder Ali, Mirza Ennayut Ali, and Mirza Syef Ali, representing
their very pitiable case, in a letter of the 9th of March, 1783, in
which, among other particulars, are contained the following.

      "Our situation is not fit to be represented. _For two years
      we have not received a hubba_ on account of our tuncaw
      [assignment on the revenue], though the ministers have
      annually charged a lac of rupees, and never paid us
      anything. _After all, we are the sons of Sujah ul Dowlah_!
      It is surprising, having such a friend as you, our situation
      is arrived at that pass that we should be in distress for
      _dry bread and clothes_. Whereas you have done many generous
      acts, be pleased so to show us your favor, that by some
      means we may receive our allowances from the Company's
      treasury, and not be obliged to depend upon and solicit
      others for it."

XLVIII. That one of the princes aforesaid, called the Mirza Jungly,
about the beginning of the year 1783, was obliged to fly from the
dominions of the Nabob of Oude, and to leave his country and
connections; and as the Resident, Bristow, writing from Lucknow, hath
observed, "he went to try his fortune at other courts, in preference
to starving at home, which might have been his fate, by all accounts,
at this place." And the said prince sought for succor at the court of
one of the neighboring Mahomedan princes; but conceiving some disgust
at the treatment he met with there, he departed from thence, and on
the 8th of February, 1783, arrived at the Mahratta camp, while David
Anderson, Esquire, was there in the character of Minister
Plenipotentiary to the Company, with a view, if his reception there
should not prove answerable to his wishes, to pass on to the
southward. And the said Anderson, probably considering this event as
of very great importance to the honor of the British government, as
well as to its interest, on the one hand, by exhibiting the son and
brother of a sovereign prince, from whom the Company had received many
millions of money, a fugitive from his country, and a wanderer for
bread through the courts of India, and, on the other, the consequences
which might arise from the Mahrattas having in their possession and
under their influence a son of the late Nabob of Oude, did without
delay advise Warren Hastings, Esquire, of the event aforesaid; and he
did also write to Mr. Bristow, the Resident at the court of the Nabob
Vizier, several letters, of the 9th and 20th of February, and of the
6th of March and 6th of April, 1783, in order that some steps should
be taken for his return and establishment in his own country. And the
said Anderson did inform the Resident, Bristow, in his letter
aforesaid, that, on the arrival of the fugitive prince, brother of the
reigning sovereign of Oude, at the Mahratta camp, he did cause his
tent to be pitched close to that of Mr. Anderson; but finding this not
agreeable to the Mahratta general, Sindia, he afterwards removed: and
that he showed a strong attachment to the English, and was inclined to
throw himself upon their generosity; that he was desirous of going to
Calcutta, and declared, that, if he, the said Anderson, "would give
him the smallest encouragement, he would quit all his followers, and
come alone, and would take up his residence under his protection." And
the said Anderson did declare, that he thought it "would be policy,
and much to the credit of our government, that some provision should
be made for Mirza Jungly in our territories."

XLIX. That the said Bristow did represent the aforesaid circumstances
to Hyder Beg Khan, minister to the Nabob of Oude, declaring it his
opinion,

      "that his Highness's brother's thus taking refuge with a
      foreign prince is a reflection upon the Vizier, and it would
      be advisable that an allowance should be granted to him upon
      the footing of his brothers, that he might remain in the
      presence."

But the Nabob was induced to refuse to his brother any offer of any
allowance beyond the two hundred pounds per month, allowed, but not
paid, to his other brothers,--and which the said prince did observe to
Mr. Anderson, "that it was not only inadequate to his expenses, but
infinitely less" (as the truth was)

      "than what his Excellency has settled on many persons of
      inferior rank, who have not so good a claim to his support;
      and that it would not be sufficient to enable him to live at
      Lucknow, where all his friends and relations were, and so
      many of his inferiors lived in a state of affluence."

In case, therefore, it could not be increased, he requested leave to
live in the Company's provinces, or at Calcutta; for that in any of
these situations "he could with less difficulty regulate his
expenses." And he did declare, that, if his request was granted to
him, he would immediately quit all his prospects with Sindia. To these
propositions he received a very discouraging answer from his brother's
minister, containing a positive and final refusal of any increase of
allowance, obtaining only the Nabob's permission to retire into the
Company's provinces. But Mr. Anderson did not think himself authorized
to take any steps for the prince's retreat into the said province
without Sindia's concurrence, who, he observed, would use every art to
detain him, and accordingly did offer him the command of a battalion
of infantry to be paid directly from his own treasury, and six
thousand pounds sterling a year for keeping up a corps of horse, and
to settle upon him a landed estate of four thousand pounds a year as a
provision for his wife and children: which honorable offers it appears
he did accept, and did and doth remain in the Mahratta service.

L. That, during the whole course of this transaction, the said Warren
Hastings was duly advised thereof, first by a very early letter from
the said Anderson, and afterwards by the Resident, Bristow, who, on
the 23d of April, 1783, transmitted to him his whole correspondence
with Mr. Anderson. But what answer or instructions the said Warren
Hastings did give to Mr. Anderson does not appear, he not having
recorded anything upon that subject; but it appears that to the
Resident, Bristow, who required to be informed whether the reception
of the fugitive prince aforesaid in the Company's provinces would meet
his approbation, he gave no answer whatsoever: by which criminal
neglect, or worse, with regard to a brother of an ally of the Company,
who showed a strong attachment and preference to the English nation,
and by suffering him, without any known effort to prevent it, to
attach himself to the cause and fortunes of the Mahrattas, who, he,
the said Hastings, well knew, did keep up claims upon several parts of
the dominions of Oude, and had with difficulty been persuaded to
include the Nabob in the treaty of peace, he, having suffered him
first to languish at home in poverty, and then to fly abroad for
subsistence, and afterwards taking no step and countenancing no
negotiations for his return from his dangerous place of refuge, at the
same time that several of his, the said Hastings's, creatures had each
of them allowances much more considerable than would have sufficed for
the satisfaction and comfort of him, the said fugitive prince, was
guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor.

LI. That the indigent condition before related of the other brothers
of the Nabob was also duly transmitted to the said Warren Hastings;
but he did never order or direct any steps whatsoever to be taken
towards the relief of the family of a reigning prince, who were daily
in danger of perishing by famine through the effect of his measures,
and those of a person whom he supported in power against the will and
inclinations of the said prince and his family.

LII. That the foregoing instances of the penury, distress, dispersion,
and exile of the reigning family, as well as the general disorder in
all the affairs of Oude, did strongly enforce the necessity of a
proper use of the British influence (the only real government then
existing) in the province aforesaid for a regulation of the economy of
the Vizier's court, as well as for the proper administration of the
public concerns, civil and military, which were in the greatest
disorder; and the said Warren Hastings was under obligation to provide
for the same, and did himself understand it to be his duty so to do,
and that he was therein warranted by the spirit of the treaty of
Chunar, as well as by other universal powers of control, and even of
supersession, supposed by him to exist in the relation between the
British government and that of Oude; and accordingly he did, in his
instructions to the Resident Middleton, to which he required his most
implicit obedience, direct him to an interference in and control upon
all the affairs concerning the revenues, the military arrangements,
and all the other branches of the Nabob's government.

LIII. That, upon his recall of the said Middleton, he, in his
instructions to the Resident Bristow, dated 23d of October, 1781
[1782?], did at large set forth the situation of the court and
government of Oude, the situation and character of the Nabob, of the
acting minister, and of the British Resident at that court, and did
plainly, distinctly, and without reserve, describe the extent of the
authority to be exercised by the last of these persons, as well as the
unqualified compliance to be expected from the two former. And he did
accordingly declare, that,

      "_from the nature of our connection with the government of
      Oude_, and from the Nabob's incapacity, _a necessity will
      forever exist_, while we have the claim of a subsidy upon
      the resources of his country, of exercising an influence,
      and frequently substituting it _ENTIRELY in the place of an
      avowed and constitutional authority, in the administration
      of his [the Nabob's] government_";

and he did further in the said instructions, namely, in instruction
the fourth, direct the said Resident in the words following:

      "I must have recourse to you for the introduction of a _new_
      system in that government; nor can I omit, whilst I express
      my reliance on you for that purpose, to repeat the
      sentiments which I expressed in the verbal instructions
      which I gave you at your departure, _that there can be no
      medium in the relation between the Resident and the
      minister, but either the Resident must be the slave and
      vassal of the minister, or the minister at the absolute
      disposal of the Resident_."

And he, the said Hastings, did state, in the same article of the
instructions aforesaid, that, though the conduct of the said Hyder Beg
Khan had been highly reprehensible, and that he was much displeased
thereat, he would prefer him to any other, on account of his ability
and knowledge of business, with the following proviso,--

      "If he would submit to hold his office on such conditions as
      I require. He exists by his dependence on the influence of
      our government. It must be advisable to try him by the mode
      of conciliation; at the same time that in your _final
      conversation with him_ it will be necessary to declare to
      him, _in the plainest terms_, the footing and condition on
      which he shall be _permitted_ to retain his place, with the
      alternative of a dismission, and a scrutiny into his
      conduct, if he refuses it. In the first place, I will not
      receive from the Nabob, _as his_, letters dictated by _the
      spirit of opposition;_ but shall consider every such attempt
      _as an insult on our government_. In the second place, I
      shall expect that _nothing_ is done in his official
      character but with your knowledge and participation."

LIV. That the said Hastings having described, in the manner aforesaid,
the relative situation of the Resident and the minister, he did state
also the relative situation of the said minister and his master, the
Nabob, declaring,

      "that the minister did hold _without control_ the
      unparticipated and entire administration, with all the
      powers annexed to that government,--_the Nabob being, as he
      ever must be in the hands of some person, a mere cipher in
      his_"

(the minister's). And having thus stated the subordination of the
minister to the Resident, and the subordination of the Nabob to the
minister, he did naturally declare, "that the first share of the
responsibility would rest upon the said Resident" And he did further
declare, "that the other conditions did follow distinctly in their
places, because he did _consider the Resident as responsible for
them_."

LV. That, for the direction of the Resident in the exercise of so
critical a trust, wherein all the true and substantial powers of
government were in an inverted relation and proportion to the official
and ostensible authorities, and in which the said Hastings did suppose
the necessity constantly existing for exercising an influence, and
frequently for substituting _entirely_ the British authority "in the
place of the avowed and constitutional government," he, the said
Hastings, did properly leave to the Resident a discretionary power for
his deviation from any part of his instructions,--interposing a
caution for his security and direction, that, as much as he could, he
would leave the subject free for his, the said Hastings's, correction
of it, and would instantly inform him or the board, according to the
degree of its importance, with his reasons for it.

LVI. That, besides the institution of the courts of justice, as before
recited, four other principal objects in the reformation of the
affairs of Oude were expressly recommended to the Residents Middleton
and Bristow, and must be understood to be the conditions upon which
the said Hastings must have meant to have it understood that the
acting minister of Oude was to hold his employment: namely, the
limitation of the Nabob's personal expenses; the reduction of the
Nabob's troops in number, and the change in arrangement; the
appointment of proper collectors for the revenues; and the appointment
of proper officers for all parts of the executive administration.

LVII. That the first object, namely, that of the limitation of the
Nabob's personal expenses, and separating them from the public
establishments, he, the said Hastings, did state as the first and
fundamental part of his regulation, and that upon which all the others
would depend,--and did declare,

      "that, in order to prevent the Vizier's alliance from being
      a clog instead of an aid to the Company, _the most
      essential_ part is to _limit_ and _separate_ his personal
      disbursements from the public accounts: _they must not
      exceed_ what he has received in any of the last three
      years."

And as to the public treasury and disbursements, he, the said
Hastings, did, in the said instructions, wholly withdraw them from the
personal management or interference of the Nabob, and did expressly
order and direct "that they should be under the _sole_ management of
the ministers, with the Resident's concurrence." And on the
appointment of the Resident Bristow, in October, 1782, he, the said
Hastings, did order and direct him in every point of the instructions
to Middleton not revoked or qualified by his then instructions, to
which he did require his, the said Resident Bristow's, "most attentive
and literal obedience."

LVIII. That the said Resident Bristow did, in consequence of the
renewal to him of the said instructions as aforesaid, endeavor to
limit and put in order the Nabob's expenses; but he was in that
particular traversed and counteracted, and in the end wholly defeated,
by the minister, Hyder Beg Khan. And though the obstructions
aforesaid, agreeably to the instructions given to Middleton, and to
him, the said Bristow, were represented to the said Warren Hastings by
the Resident aforesaid, yet the said Warren Hastings did give no kind
of support to the said Resident, or take any steps towards enabling
him, the said Resident, to effectuate the said necessary limitation
and distribution of expenses, by himself, the said Hastings, ordered
and prescribed; nor, if he disapproved the proceedings of the said
Resident, did he give him any instruction for the forbearance of the
same, or for the exerting his duty in any other mode; nor did he call
for any illustration from him of anything doubtful in his
correspondence, nor state to him any complaint made privately of his
conduct, in order to receive thereon an explanation; but he did leave
him to pursue at his discretion the extensive powers before described,
to effect the reformation which he was directed to accomplish, under
the responsibility denounced to him as aforesaid, if he should fail
therein, as he was supposed to be substantially invested with all the
powers of government.

LIX. That, instead of the said support or instruction, he, the said
Hastings, did countenance, or more probably cause or direct, a
representation to be made to him by the acting minister of the Nabob
of Oude, complaining grievously of the proceedings of the Resident
aforesaid, as usurpations on the Nabob's authority and indignities on
his person. And although he, the said Hastings, did instruct the
Resident, Bristow, to inform the said Hyder Beg Khan that he would not
receive from the Nabob, as _his_, letters directed by the spirit of
opposition, but should consider every such attempt as his, the
minister's, as an insult on our government, yet he did receive as
_his_ the Nabob's own letters, and as written from the impressions on
his own mind, and as the suggestions of his own judgment, letters to
the same effect as those written by the minister, although he had
declared upon record that the said "Nabob was a mere cipher in his,
the said minister's, hands," and "that he had dared to use both the
Nabob's name, and even his seal, affixed to letters either directed to
the Nabob or written as from him without his knowledge," and although
he did assert or record as aforesaid, that, in a letter which he had
lately received from the Nabob, the minister had the presumption to
make the Nabob declare that which was _true_ to be _false_, and that

      "his _making use_ of the Nabob in such a manner did show how
      thin the veil was by which _he_ covered _his own acts_, and
      that such artifices would only tend to make them the more
      criminal from _the falsehood and duplicity with which they
      were associated_."

LX. That the said Hastings did act upon the letters pretended to be
written by the Nabob, as well as on those actually written by the
minister, without previously communicating the matter of the said
complaint to the said Resident, and did give credit to the same, and
coming, as aforesaid, from a person by himself, the said Hastings,
charged with artifice, falsehood, and duplicity, and with abusing to
his own evil purposes the name and seal of his master without his
knowledge, and without any previous inquiry into the facts and
circumstances; and did thereon ground an accusation against the said
Resident, Bristow, before the board at Calcutta, in which he did
represent the conduct of the said Bristow, in attempting to limit the
household expenses of the Nabob, as an indignity

      "which no man living, however mean his rank in life, or
      dependent his condition in it, would permit to be exercised
      by any other, but with the want or forfeiture of every manly
      principle."

And he did further accuse the said Bristow for that, in his
proceedings in the regulation of the Nabob's household,

      "he should receive to himself, or Mr. Cowper for him, or a
      treasurer for both, (for the arrangement has never been well
      defined,) the money assigned for the support of the Nabob's
      household,--issue it as he pleased, not to the Nabob, but to
      the menial officers of his household,--dispose of his
      superfluous horses, and other cattle,--determine how many
      elephants were necessary to the state of the Vizier of the
      Empire, the number of domestics for his attendance, and pry
      into the kitchen for the purpose of ascertaining the
      quantity of victuals which ought to be dressed in
      it,--control the accounts of these disbursements,--and
      appropriate to his own use (for that the consequence was
      inevitable, if he chose it) the residue produced by those
      economical retrenchments."

LXI. That the said charge is malicious and insidious; because the
attempt to introduce proper officers for the management of household
expenses so considerable that the said Hastings has stated the
allotment for the same at three hundred thousand pounds sterling
yearly, and that other accounts have carried it to four hundred
thousand pounds sterling and upwards, and to keep proper and regular
accounts thereof, was a necessary regulation, and agreeable to the
dignity of the Nabob, and by no means a degradation either of his
person or authority, which was specially provided for in the
regulations, as no expense could be incurred but by his own personal
warrant under his sign manual; nor doth there appear therein anything
but what is of absolute necessity to prevent embezzlement to his
prejudice. And the said Hastings hath declared, in the fifth article
of the instructions to the said Resident, that _no_ administration can
be properly conducted without regular offices; and that in the whole
province of Oude "there was _not one_, the _whole_ being engrossed by
the minister": of which minister, in the fourteenth article, he
declares his suspicion that the Nabob did not receive the whole and
punctual payment of the sum assigned for the purpose of the household,
but that some part had been by him withheld from the Nabob; and that,
from private information he had lately received, he had reason to
believe that this was actually the case. And the said Hastings well
knew that the Nabob's household had been ill conducted, that the
allowances of his servants had not been paid, that his distress was
scandalous, and that his nearest relations were in a famishing
condition; and the said Hastings did also well know that the household
of the Nabob was provided for or neglected, not at his own discretion,
but at that of the said Hyder Beg Khan; and he did, in the fourteenth
article aforesaid, instruct the Resident, Bristow, to show every
ostensible and external mark of respect to the Nabob, in order to
induce him to become himself the mover of every act necessary for the
advancing of his own interests and the discharge of his debts to the
Company,--declaring,

      "that they never could be effected while the minister
      retained that ascendency over him which he at present holds
      by the means of a nearer and more private intercourse, and
      by affecting to be the mediator of his rights against the
      claims of our government."

And the said Hastings did further well know that there was no way of
ascertaining the payment of the assignments for the Nabob's household,
either for the general purposes of their destination or to the
particular objects to which they ought to be applied, without regular
offices of receipt and of account, which might prevent the said
minister, Hyder Beg Khan, or the British Resident, or any other, from
embezzling or misapplying the same. But the total want of offices
aforesaid in every department of government did furnish occasion of
concealing all frauds, clandestine presents, or pensions to a
Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief, or other servant of the Company.

LXII. That the said Warren Hastings, who did pretend so deep a concern
for the indignities supposed to be suffered by the Nabob merely in the
limitation and regulation of unnecessary expenses relative to his
kitchen, domestics, &c., did show no attention or compassion to the
said Nabob, when, in the year 1779, the said Nabob represented, that
the pensions of his old servants for thirty years, the expenses of his
family and kitchen, together with the jaghires of his grandmother,
mother, and aunts, and of his brothers and dependants, given for their
support, were not _regulated_, but _stopped_.

LXIII. That the other articles of regulation, namely, the reform of
the troops in number and in arrangement, the appointment of proper
collectors for the revenues, and the general constitution of offices
for the executive administration, were in like manner totally defeated
by the said Hyder Beg Khan. And the said Hastings did receive a charge
from him, and did adopt it as his own, representing the endeavors of
the Resident to act in the regulations aforesaid agreeably to the
spirit of his instructions, and in confidence of the powers vested in
and the responsibility imposed upon him, the said Resident, as
usurpations of the authority and prerogative of the Nabob; and he, the
said Hastings, did make criminal charges thereon against the said
Resident, Bristow, of which charges the Council Board did, on hearing
the same, and the defence of the said Bristow, fully acquit him.

LXIV. That the said Hastings, by abetting Hyder Beg Khan, a person
described by him as aforesaid, in his opposition to all the plans of
necessary reformation proposed by the said Hastings himself, and
having suggested no other whatever in lieu thereof, to answer the
purposes for which he had stipulated in the treaty of Chunar the
interference of the Resident in every branch of the Nabob's
government, did thereby frustrate every one of the good ends proposed
by him in the said treaty of Chunar, and did grossly abuse his trust
in giving the exorbitant powers before recited, and asserting them to
exist in the British Resident, without suffering them even in
appearance to answer any of the proper and justifiable ends for which
any power or influence can or ought to exist in any government.

LXV. That there is just ground to violently presume that not only the
letters in the name of the Nabob aforesaid were dictated to him by his
minister, Hyder Beg Khan, in whose hands the said Hastings has
described his master to be "a mere cipher," &c,. but which Hyder Beg
was the known instrument of the said Hastings, but that the conduct
and letters of complaint of the said Hyder Beg were in effect and
substance prescribed and dictated to him by the said Warren Hastings,
or his secret agent, Palmer, by his direction: because it is notorious
that the powers of the said Hyder Beg were solely supported by him,
the said Hastings, who, according to the state of favor or displeasure
in which he stood, hath frequently promised him support or threatened
him with dismission and punishment, and therefore it is not to be
thought that he would take so material a step as to oppose the
Company's Resident, acting under the instructions of the
Governor-General and Council, and to accuse him with so much
confidence, and in a manner so different from the usual style of
supplication on all other occasions employed by that court, if he had
not been previously well assured that his writing in that manner would
be pleasing to the person upon whom he solely depended for his power,
his fortune, and perhaps for his life;--secondly, because, when it
suited the purposes of the said Hastings on a former occasion, that
is, in the year 1784 [1781?], to remove the Resident Bristow aforesaid
from his office, a letter from the Nabob was laid before the Council
Board at Calcutta, proposing, that, in order to prevent the effects of
the said Bristow's application to Europe for redress, the said
Hastings should send him drafts of letters which he, the said Nabob,
would write in his own name and character to the King, to his
Majesty's ministers, and to the Court of Directors, expressing
himself, in the letter aforesaid, in the words following, viz.,

      "To prevent his [Bristow's] applying to Europe, send me, if
      _you_ think proper, the drafts of letters which _I_ may
      write to the King, the Vizier, and the chiefs of the
      Company";

--thirdly, that, though the said Hastings, and his secret agent,
Palmer, did pretend and positively assert that they had no share in
the letters aforesaid from the Nabob and his minister, there was an
original note to the Nabob's letters of accusation, referring to
distinct parts and specified numbers of the agent Palmer's secret
correspondence with the said Warren Hastings, and the said letter,
with the said reference, was, through inadvertence, laid before the
board.

LXVI. That the said Warren Hastings, having thrown the government of
Oude into great confusion and distress, and thereby prevented the
discharge of the debt, or pretended debt, to the Company, did, by all
the said intrigues, machinations, and charges, aim at the filling the
said office of Resident at Oude with his own dependants or by himself
personally; as it appears that he did first propose to place in the
said office his secret agent, Palmer, and that afterwards, when he was
not able to succeed therein, he did propose nominally to abolish the
said office, but in effect to fill it by himself,--proposing to the
Council and rendering himself responsible (but not in fortune) for the
payment of the Company's debt within a certain given time, if he were
permitted and commissioned by the Council to act for the board in that
province, and did inform them that he was privately well assured that
in a few days he should receive an invitation to that effect; and he
did state, (as in the year 1781 he had stated as a reason for his
former delegation,)

      "that the state of the country was so disordered in its
      revenue and administration, and the credit and influence of
      the Nabob himself so much shook by _the late usurpation_ of
      his authority, and the contests which attended it, as to
      require the accession of an extraneous aid to restore the
      powers and to reanimate the constitution of his government,"

--although he, the said Hastings, did for a long time before attribute
the weakness of his government to an extraneous interference. And the
said Council, on his engagement aforesaid, did consent thereto; and he
did accordingly receive a commission, enabling him to act in the
affairs of Oude, not only as the Resident might have done, but as
largely as the Council-General might legally delegate their own
powers.

LXVII. That the said Warren Hastings, in accepting the said
commission, did subject his character and the reputation of his office
to great imputations and suspicions, by taking upon himself an
inferior office, out of which another had upon his intrigues been
removed by a perpetual obstruction which rendered it impossible for
him to perform his duty or to obey his instructions; and he did
increase the said grounded suspicions by exercising that office in a
government from whence it was notorious he had himself received an
unlawful gift and present from the ministers, and in which he had
notoriously suffered many, and had himself actually directed some,
acts of peculation, by granting various pensions and emoluments, to
the prejudice of the revenue of a distressed country, which he was not
authorized to grant.

LXVIII. That the said Warren Hastings did proceed unto the said
province of Oude under color of providing a remedy for the disorders
described to be existing in the same, and for the recovery of the
Company's pretended debt. And the said Warren Hastings, who had
thought fit to recall the Company's Resident, appointed to that office
by the Court of Directors, and to suspend his office, did,
notwithstanding, of his own choice and selection, and on his own mere
authority, take with him in his progress a large retinue, "and a
numerous society of English gentlemen to compose his family," which he
represents as necessary, although, in a letter from that very place to
which he took that very numerous society, he informs the Court of
Directors "that his own consequence and that of the nation he
represents are independent of show." And after his arrival there, he,
the said Warren Hastings, did write from Lucknow, the capital of that
province, a letter, dated the 30th of April, 1784, to the Court of
Directors, in which are several particulars to the following purport
or tenor, and which he points out to the Directors "to be
circumstances of no trivial information," namely,--

      "that he had found that the lands in that province, as well
      as in some parts more immediately under the Company, have
      suffered in a grievous manner, being completely exhausted of
      their natural moisture by the total failure of one entire
      season of the periodical rains,"

with a few exceptions, which were produced only "by the uncommon labor
of the husbandman." And in a letter to Edward Wheler, Esquire, a
member of the Council-General, from Benares, the 20th of September,
1784, he says, that

      "_the public revenues_ had declined with the failure of the
      cultivation _in three successive years;_ and all the stores
      of grain which the _providence_ of the husbandmen, (as he
      was informed is their _custom_,) in defiance of the
      _vigilance_ of the aumils [collectors], _clandestinely
      reserved for their own use_, were of course exhausted, in
      which state no person would accept of the charge of the
      collections on a positive engagement; nor did the rain fall
      till the 10th of July."

And in another letter, dated from Benares, the 1st of October
following, he repeats the same accounts, and that the "country could
not bear further additions of expense: that it had _no inlets of
trade_ to supply the issues that were made from it" (the exceptions
stated there being inconsiderable);

      "therefore _every rupee_ which is drawn into your treasury
      [the Company's] from its circulation will accelerate the
      period at which its ability must cease _to pay even the
      stipulated subsidy."_

Notwithstanding this state of the country, of which he was well
apprised before he left Calcutta, and the poverty and distress of the
prince having been frequently, but in vain, represented to him, in
order to induce him to forbear his oppressive exactions, he did, in
order to furnish the Council with a color for permitting him to recall
the Company's Resident, and to exercise the whole powers of the
Company in his own person, without any check whatsoever, or witness of
his proceedings, except the persons of his own private choice, make
the express and positive engagement aforesaid, which, if understood of
a real and substantial discharge of debt for the relief of the total
of the Company's finances, was grossly fallacious: because at the very
time he must have been perfectly sensible, that, in the then state of
the revenues and country of Oude, (which are in effect the Company's
revenues and the Company's country,) the debt or pretended debt
aforesaid, asserted to be about five hundred thousand pounds, or
thereabouts, could not be paid without contracting another debt at an
usurious interest, without encroaching on the necessary establishments
or on private property or on the pay of the army, or without grievous
oppression of the country, or all these together. And it doth appear
that one hundred thousand pounds towards the said payment of debts was
borrowed at Calcutta by the Nabob's agent there, but at what interest
is not known; it appears also that other sums were borrowed for arrear
of the interest, on which forty thousand pounds sterling appears in
the Company's claims for the current year, and that various deductions
were made from the jaghires restored to the Begums, as well as other
parts of the Nabob's family; and it did and doth appear that an arrear
is still due to the old and new brigade,--but whether the same be
growing or not doth not appear: yet he hath not hesitated to assert
that he had

      "provided for the _complete_ discharge, in _one_ year, of a
      debt contracted by _the accumulation of many_, and from a
      country whose resources have been wasted and dissipated by
      three successive years of drought and one of anarchy."

But the said Hastings never did even realize the payments to be made
in the first year, (as he confesses in the said letter,) except by an
anticipation of the second; and though he states in his letter
aforesaid the following facts and engagements, that is to say,

      "_that a recovery of so large a part of your property_ [the
      Company's] will afford a seasonable and substantial relief
      to the necessities of your government, and enable it (for
      such is my confident hope) _to begin on the reduction of
      your debt at interest_ before the conclusion of this year (I
      mean the year of this computation)."

Whereas the said Warren Hastings did apply the whole produce of the
revenue to the mere pay of some part of the British army in Oude; and
did not mention in his correspondence that he had remitted any money
whatsoever to Calcutta, nor to any other place, (except the fifty
thousand pounds taken from Almas Ali Khan, and said to be remitted to
Surat,) for the said "substantial relief," in consequence of the said
pretended "recovery of property,"--admitting that it had been
suggested to him, and not by him denied, that he had

      "disappointed the popular expectation by not adopting the
      policy which he had, _on the conception of better grounds_,
      rejected; nor did he begin the reduction of the interest
      debt"

at the time stated, nor at any time; but the whole (he well knowing
the state of the country from whence the resources aforesaid were by
him promised) was a premeditated deceit and imposition on the Board of
Council, his colleagues, and on the Court of Directors, his masters.

LXIX. That no traces of regulation appear to have been adopted by the
said Warren Hastings during his residence at Lucknow, in conformity to
the spirit and intentions of the treaty of Chunar, or of his
instructions to Middleton and Bristow, or of the proposed objects of
his own commission. But he did, in lieu thereof, pretend to free the
Nabob's government from the interference of the Company's servants,
and the usurpation (as he called it) of a Resident, and thereby to
restore it to its proper tone and energy; whereas the measures he took
were such as to leave no useful or responsible superintendence in the
British, and no freedom in the Nabob's government: for he did confirm
the sole, unparticipated, and entire administration, with all the
powers annexed to the government, on the minister, Hyder Beg Khan, to
whom he _prevailed_ on the Nabob Vizier to commit the entire charge of
his revenues, although he knew that his master was a cipher in his
hands,--that he "had affixed his seal to letters written without his
knowledge, and such as evidently tended to promote Hyder Beg Khan's
influence and interest,"--that his said master did not consider him as
a minister of his choice, but as an instrument of his
degradation,--that

      "he exists as a minister by his dependence on the Calcutta
      government, and that the Nabob himself had no other opinion
      of him,--that it is by its _declared_ and most _obvious_
      support _alone_ that he could maintain his authority and
      influence."

And in his instructions to his secret agent, Major Palmer, dated 6th
of May, 1782, to ease his mind and remove his jealousy with regard to
British interference, he did instruct him,

      "that much delicacy and caution will be required in your
      declarations on this subject, lest they should be construed
      to extend to an immediate change in the administration of
      his affairs, or the instruments of it. Their persons must be
      considered as _sacred, while_ they act with the
      _participation of our influence_. This distinction the Nabob
      _understands_; nor will it be either necessary or proper to
      allude to it, unless he himself should first introduce the
      subject."

And the said Hastings did assume, as to a dependant of the lowest
order, to prescribe to him the conditions on which he is to hold his
place,--to threaten him with scrutinies into his conduct, with
dismission, with punishment,--that he was guilty of falsehood and
duplicity, and that he had made his master assert what was true to be
false,--that he suspected he had withheld from his master what he
ought to have paid to him,--that the event of his having _prevailed_
on the Nabob to intrust him as aforesaid was, according to his, the
said Hastings's, own letter, written to the said Hyder Beg Khan
himself,

      "an accumulation of distress, debasement, and
      dissatisfaction to the Nabob, and of disappointment and
      disgrace to me. Every measure which he had himself proposed,
      and to which he had solicited my assistance, has been so
      conducted as to give him cause of displeasure; there are no
      officers established by which his affairs could be regularly
      conducted; mean, incapable, and indigent man have been
      appointed aumils of the districts, without authority, and
      without the means of personal protection; some of them have
      been murdered by the zemindars, and those zemindars, instead
      of punishment, have been permitted to retain their
      zemindaries with independent authority; all the other
      zemindars suffered to rise up in rebellion, and to insult
      the authority of the sircar, without any attempt made to
      suppress them; and the Company's debt, instead of being
      discharged by the assignments, and extraordinary sources of
      money provided for that purpose, is likely to exceed even
      the amount at which it stood at the time in which the
      arrangement with his Excellency was concluded. _The growth
      of these evils was early made known to me, and their effects
      foreboded in the same order and manner as they have since
      come to pass_. In such a state of calamity and disgrace, I
      can no longer remain a passive spectator; nor would it be
      becoming to conceal my sentiments, or qualify the expression
      of them. I now plainly tell you, that you are answerable for
      every misfortune and defect of the Nabob Vizier's
      government."

And after giving orders, and expressing some hopes of better behavior,
he adds,

      "If I am disappointed, you will impose on me the painful and
      humiliating necessity of acknowledging to him that I have
      been deceived, and of recommending the examination of your
      conduct to his justice, both for tho redress of his own and
      the Company's grievances, and for the injury sustained by
      both in their mutual connection. _Do not reply to me_, that
      what I have written is from the suggestion of your enemies;
      nor imagine that I have induced myself to write in such
      plain and declaratory terms, without a clear insight into
      all the consequences of it, and a fixed determination upon
      them."

LXX. That the aforesaid being the tenure of the power of the said
minister, and such his character, as given by the said Warren Hastings
himself, who did originally compel the Nabob to receive him, who did
constantly support him against the Nabob, his master, as well as
against the Company's Resident,--the delivering over to such a person
his master, his family, his country, and the care of the British
interests therein, without control or public inspection, was an high
crime and misdemeanor.

LXXI. That the next person whom the said Hastings did invest with
power in the said country was a certain opulent and powerful native
manager of revenue, called Almas Ali Khan, closely connected with the
said Hyder Beg Khan, and to whom the said Hyder Beg Khan, as the said
Hastings has admitted, "had intrusted the _greatest_ part of his
revenues, without any pledge or security for his fidelity." And
afterwards the said Hastings charges the said Almas Ali with an
intention of removing from the Nabob's dominions: he states, "as
taking with him," and therefore being possessed of, "an immense
treasure, the fruits of his embezzlements and oppressions, and an army
raised for its protection."

LXXII. That the said Warren Hastings was, or pretended to be,
impressed with the evil character, dangerous designs, and immoderate
power of the said Almas Ali; that he did insert among his instructions
to the Resident Bristow an order of a dangerous and unwarrantable
nature, in which, upon his, the said Hastings's, simple allegation of
offences, not accurately described or specified, with regard either to
the fact, the nature of the offence, or the proof, he was required to
urge the Nabob to put him to death, with many qualifications in the
said instructions, full of fraud and duplicity, calculated to insnare
the said Resident Bristow, and to throw upon him the responsibility of
the conduct of the said Almas Ali Khan, if he should continue at large
contrary to his orders, or to subject him, the said Resident, to the
shame and scandal of apprehending and putting him to death by means
which, in the circumstances, must necessarily be such as would be
construed into treachery, and he, the said Almas Ali Khan, being from
nature and situation suspicious and watchful, and being at that very
time in the collection, or farmer of the most important part of the
revenues, with an extensive jurisdiction annexed, and at the head of
fourteen thousand of his own troops, and having been recently accepted
by the Resident Middleton as security for large sums of money advanced
by the bankers of Benares to the use of the East India Company; which
orders (if the said Resident would or could have executed them) must
have raised an universal alarm among all the considerable men of the
country concerned in the government, and would have been a means of
subverting the public credit of the Company, by the murder of a person
engaged for very great sums of money that had been advanced for their
use. And the said instruction is as followeth.

      "If any engagement shall actually subsist between them at
      the time you have charge of the Residency, it must, however
      exceptionable, be faithfully observed; but if he has been
      guilty of any criminal offence to the Nabob, his master, for
      which no immunity is provided in the engagement, or he shall
      break any one of the conditions of it, I do most strictly
      enjoin you, and it must be your special care to endeavor,
      _either by force or surprise_, to secure his person and
      bring him to justice. By bringing him to justice I mean,
      that you urge the Nabob, on due conviction, _to punish him
      with death_, as a necessary example to deter others from the
      commission of the like crimes; nor must you desist till this
      is effected. I cannot prescribe the means; but to guard
      myself against the obloquy to which I may be exposed by a
      forced misconstruction of this order by those who may
      hereafter be employed in searching our records for cavils
      and informations against me, I think it proper to forbid and
      protest against the use of any _fraudulent artifice or
      treachery to accomplish the end which I have prescribed;_
      and as you alone are privy to the order, you will of course
      observe the greatest secrecy, that it may not transpire: but
      I repeat my recommendation of it, as one of the first and
      most essential duties of your office."

LXXIII. That, among the reasons assigned for putting to death the said
Almas Ali, which the said Hastings did recommend directly and
repeatedly to the Resident, "as one of the first and most essential
duties of his office," was, in substance,

      "that, by his extensive trust with regard to the revenues,
      he had been permitted to acquire independency; that the
      means thereof had been long seen and the effects thereof
      foretold by every person acquainted with the state of
      government, except those immediately interested in it";

and he, the said Warren Hastings, did also charge the said Almas Ali
with embezzlement of the revenues and oppression of the people; and
nothing appears to disprove the same, but much to give ground to a
presumption that the said Almas Ali did grievously abuse the power
committed to him, as farmer and collector of the revenue, to the great
oppression of the inhabitants of the countries which had been rented
to him by Hyder Beg Khan with the knowledge and consent of the said
Warren Hastings.

LXXIV. That the Resident, Bristow, declining the violent attempt on
the life of Almas Ali deceitfully ordered by the said Warren Hastings,
did, on weighty reasons, drawn from the spirit of the said Hastings's
own instructions, recommend that his, the said Almas Ali Khan's, farms
of revenue, or a great part of them, should be, on the expiration of
his lease, taken out of his hands, as being too extensive, and
supplying the means of a dangerous power in the country; but yet he,
the said Warren Hastings, did not only continue him in the possession
of the said revenues, but did give to him a new lease thereof for the
term of five years. And on this renovation and increase of trust, the
said Warren Hastings did not consent to produce the informer upon
whose credit he had made his charge of capital crimes on the said
Almas Ali, and had directed him to be put to death, or call upon him
to make good his charges; but, instead of this, totally changing his
relation to the said Almas Ali, did himself labor to procure from all
parts attestations to prove him not guilty of the perfidy and
disloyalty of which the said Hastings himself appears to have been to
that very time his sole accuser, as he hath since been his most
anxious advocate: but though he did use many endeavors to acquit Almas
Ali of his intended flight, yet concerning his embezzlements and
oppressions, the most important of all charges relative to that of the
revenue and collection, he, the said Hastings, hath made no inquiry
whatever; by which it might appear that he was not as fully guilty
thereof as he had always represented him to be. But some time after
he, the said Warren Hastings, had arrived at Lucknow, in the year
1784, he suggested to the said Almas Ali Khan the _advance_ to the
Company's use of a sum of money amounting to fifty thousand pounds or
thereabouts; and the said suggested advance was (as the said Warren
Hastings asserts, no witness or document of the transaction appearing)
"cheerfully and without hesitation complied with, considering it as an
_evidence seasonably_ offered for the general refutation of the
charges of perfidy and disloyalty": which practice of charging wealthy
persons with treason and disloyalty, and afterwards acquitting them on
the payment of a sum of money, is highly scandalous to the honor,
justice, and government of Great Britain; and the offence is highly
aggravated by the said Hastings's declaration to the Court of
Directors that the charges against Almas Ali Khan have been too
laboriously urged against him, and carried at one time to such an
excess as had nearly driven him to abandon his country "_for the
preservation of his life and honor,"_ and thus to give a "color to the
charges themselves," when he, the said Warren Hastings, did well know
that he himself did consider as a crime, and did make it an article in
a formal accusation against the Resident Middleton, that he did not
inform him, the said Hastings, of the supposed treasons of Almas Ali
Khan, and of his design to abandon the country, when he himself did
most laboriously urge the charges against him, and when no attempt
appears to have been made against the life of the said Almas Ali Khan
except by the said Warren Hastings himself.

LXXV. That the sum of fifty thousand pounds sterling, or thereabouts,
publicly taken by the said Warren Hastings, as an _advance_ for the
use of the Company, if given as a consideration or fine, on account of
the renewal for a long term of civil authority and military command,
and the collection of the revenues to an immense amount, the same
being at least eight hundred thousand pounds sterling yearly, was so
totally inadequate to the interest granted, that it may justly be
presumed it was not on that, or on any public ground or condition,
that the said Hastings did delegate, out of all reach of resumption or
correction, a lease of boundless power and enormous profit, for so
long a term, to a known oppressor of the country.

LXXVI. That Warren Hastings, being at Lucknow in consequence of his
deputation aforesaid, did, in his letter from that city, dated 30th of
April, 1784, recommend to the Court of Directors,

      "as his _last and ultimate hope_, that their wisdom would
      put a _final_ period to _the ruinous and disreputable
      system_ of interference, whether _avowed or secret_, in the
      affairs of the Nabob of Oude, and withdraw _forever the
      influence_ by which it is maintained,"

and that they ought to confine their views to the sole maintenance of
the old brigade stationed in Oude by virtue of the first treaty with
the reigning Nabob, expressing himself in the following words to the
Court of Directors.

      "If you transgress that line, you may extend _the
      distribution of patronage, and add to the fortunes of
      individuals_, and to the nominal riches of Great Britain;
      but your _own_ interests will suffer by it; and _the ruin of
      a great and once flourishing nation will he recorded as the
      work of your administration, with an everlasting reproach to
      the British name_. To this reasoning I shall join _the
      obligations of justice and good faith, which cut off every
      pretext for your exercising any power or authority in this
      country, as long as the sovereign of it fulfils the
      engagements he has articled with you_."

LXXVII. That it appears by the extraordinary recommendation aforesaid,
asserted by him, the said Hastings, to be enforced by the
"_obligations of justice and good faith_," that the said Warren
Hastings, at the time of writing the said letter, had made an
agreement to withdraw the British interference, represented by him as
a "ruinous and disreputable system," out of the dominions of the Nabob
of Oude. But the instrument itself, in which the said agreement is
made, (if at all existing,) does not appear; nor hath the said
Hastings transmitted any documents relative to the said treaty, which
is a neglect highly criminal,--especially as he has informed the
Company, in his letter from Benares,

      "that he has promised the Nabob that he will not abandon him
      to the _chance_ of any other mode of relation, and most
      confidently given him assurance of _the ratification and
      confirmation_ of that which he [the said Hastings] had
      established between his government and the Company":

the said _confident assurance_ being given to an agreement never
produced, and made without any sort of authority from the Court of
Directors,--an agreement precluding, on the one hand, the operation of
the discretion of his masters in the conduct of their affairs, or, on
the other, subjecting them to the hazard of an imputation on their
faith, by breaking an engagement confidently made in their name,
though without their consent, by the first officer of their
government.

That the said Hastings, further to preclude the operation of such
discretionary conduct in the administration of this kingdom as
circumstances might call for, has informed the Directors that he has
gone so far as even to condition the existence of the revenue itself
with the exclusion of the Company, his masters, from all interference
whatsoever: for in his letter to Mr. Wheler, dated Benares, 20th
September, 1784, are the following words.

      "The aumils [collectors] demanded that a clause should be
      inserted in their engagements, that they were to be in full
      force for the complete term of their leases, _provided that
      no foreign authority_ was exercised over them,--or, in other
      words, _that their engagements were to cease whenever they
      should be interrupted in their functions by the interference
      of an English agent_. This requisition was officially
      notified to me by the acting minister, and referred to me in
      form by the Nabob Vizier, for my _previous_ consent to it. I
      encouraged it, and I gave my consent to it."

 And the said Hastings has been guilty of the high presumption to
inform his said masters, that he has taken that course to compel them
not to violate the assurances given by him in their name: "There is
one condition" (namely, the above condition) "which _essentially
connects the confirmation of the settlement itself with the interests
of the Company_."

LXXVIII. That the said Warren Hastings, who did show an indecent
distrust of the Company's faith, did endeavor, before that time, at
other times, namely, in his instructions to his secret agent, Major
Palmer, dated the 6th of May, 1782, to limit the confidence to be
reposed in the British government to the duration of his own power, in
the following words in the fifth article.

      "It is very much my desire to impress the Nabob with a
      _thorough_ confidence in the faith and justice of our
      government,--that is to say, _in my own_, while I am at the
      head of it: I cannot be answerable for the acts of others
      independent of me."

LXXIX. That the said Warren Hastings did, in his letter, dated
Benares, the 1st of October, 1784, to the Court of Directors, write,

      "that, if they [the Directors] manifested no _symptoms_ of
      an (1.) _intended_ interference, the objects of his
      engagements will be obtained; (2.) but if a different policy
      shall be adopted,--if new agents are sent into the country,
      and armed with authority for the purposes of vengeance or
      corruption _(for to no other will they be applied_),--if new
      demands are made on the Nabob Vizier, (4.) and accounts
      overcharged on one side, with a wide latitude taken on the
      other, to swell his debt beyond the means of payment,--(5.)
      if political dangers are portended, to ground on them the
      plea of burdening his country with unnecessary defences and
      enormous subsidies,--(6.) or if, even abstaining from
      _direct encroachment on the Nabob's rights_, your government
      shall show but _a degree of personal kindness to the
      partisans_ of the late usurpation, or by any constructive
      indication of partiality and dissatisfaction _furnish_
      grounds for the _expectation_ of an _approaching_ change of
      system,--I am sorry to say, that all my labors will prove
      abortive."

LXXX. That all the measures deprecated in future by the said Warren
Hastings, with a reference to former conduct, in his several letters
aforesaid, being (so far as the same are intelligible) six in number,
have been all of them the proper acts and measures of the said Warren
Hastings himself. For he did himself first of all introduce, and did
afterwards continue and support, that interference which he now
informs the Court of Directors "is ruinous and disreputable, and which
the very _symptoms_ of an _intention_ to renew" he considers in the
highest degree dangerous; he did direct, with a controlling and
absolute authority, in every department of government, and in every
district in the dominions of the Nabob of Oude. Secondly, the
appointment of agents, which was eminently the act of his own
administration: he not only retaining many agents in the country of
Oude, both "_secret and avowed_," but also sending some of them, in
defiance to the orders of that very Court of Directors, to whom, in
his said letter of the 1st of October, 1784, he assigns "vengeance and
corruption" as the only motives that can produce such appointments.
Thirdly, that he, the said Warren Hastings, did instruct one of the
said agents, and did charge him upon pain of "_a dreadful
responsibility,"_ to perform sundry acts of violence against persons
of the highest distinction and nearest relation to the prince; which
acts were justly liable to the imputation of "_vengeance_" in the
execution, and which he, in his reply to the defence of Middleton to
one of his charges, did declare to be liable to the suspicion of
"_corruption_ in the relaxation." Fourthly, that he did raise new
demands on the Vizier, "and overcharge accounts on one side and take a
wide latitude on the other," by sending up a new and before unheard-of
overcharge of four hundred thousand pounds and upwards, not made by
the Resident or admitted by the Vizier, and, by adding the same, did
swell his debt "beyond the means of payment"; and did even insert, as
the ninth article of his charge against Middleton, "his omitting to
take any notice of the additional balance of Rupees 26,48,571, stated
by the Accountant-General to be due from the Vizier on the 30th of
April, 1780," to which he did add fourteen lac more, making together
the above sum. Fifthly, that he, the said Warren Hastings, did assign
"political dangers," in his minute of the 13th December, 1779, for
burdening the said Nabob of Oude "with unnecessary defences and
enormous subsidies," with regard to which he then declared, that "it
was _our_ part, not _his_ [the Nabob's], to judge and to determine."
And, sixthly, that he did not only show the _design_, but the _fact_,
of personal kindness to the partisans of what he here calls, as well
as in another letter, and in one Minute of Consultation, a "late
usurpation,"--he having rewarded the principal and most obnoxious of
the instruments of the said late usurpation, (if such it was,) Richard
Johnson, Esquire, with an honorable and profitable embassy to the
court of the Nizam.

LXXXI. That the said Warren Hastings, therefore,--by assuming an
authority which he himself did consider as an _usurpation_, and by
acts in virtue of that usurped authority, done in his own proper
person and by agents appointed by himself, and proceeding (though with
some mitigation, for which one of them was by him censured and
accused) under his own express and positive orders and instructions,
and thereby establishing, as he himself observed,

      "a system of interference, disreputable and ruinous, which
      could only be subservient to promote patronage, private
      interest, private embezzlement, corruption, and vengeance,"
      to the public detriment of the Company, "and to the ruin of
      a once flourishing nation, and eternally reproachful to the
      British name," and for the evil effects of which system, "as
      his sole and ultimate hope" and remedy, he recommends an
      entire abdication, forever, not only of all power and
      authority, but even of the interference and influence of
      Great Britain,--is guilty of an high crime and misdemeanor.

LXXXII. That the said Warren Hastings, in his letter from Chunar of
the 29th of November, 1781, has represented that very influence and
interference, which in three public papers he denominates "_a late
usurpation"_ as being authorized by a regular treaty and agreement,
voluntarily made with the Nabob himself, at a place called Chunar, on
the 19th of September, 1781, a copy of which hath been transmitted to
the Court of Directors,--and that three persons were present at the
execution of the same, two whereof were Middleton and Johnson, his
agents and Residents at Oude, the third the minister of the Nabob. And
he did, in his paper written to the Council-General, and transmitted
to the Court of Directors, not only declare that the said interference
was agreed to by the said Nabob, and sealed with his seal, but would
be highly beneficial to him: assuring the said Council,

      "that, if the Resident performed his duty in the execution
      of his [the said Hastings's] instructions, the Nabob's part
      of the engagement will prove of still greater benefit to him
      than to our government, in whose behalf it was exacted; and
      that the _participation_ which is allowed our Resident in
      the _inspection_ of the public treasure will secure the
      receipt of the Company's demands, whilst _the influence
      which our government will ALWAYS possess over the public
      minister of the Nabob, and the authority of our own_, will
      be an effectual means of securing an attentive and faithful
      discharge of their several trusts, both towards the Company
      and the Vizier."

LXXXIII. And the said Warren Hastings did not only settle a plan, of
which the agency and interference aforesaid was a part, and assert the
beneficial consequences thereof, but did also record, that the same
"was a great public measure, constituted on a large and _established
system_, and destructive, in its instant effects, of the interest and
fortune of many patronized individuals"; and in consequence of the
said treaty, he, the said Warren Hastings, did authorize and
positively require his agent aforesaid to interfere in and control and
regulate _all the Nabob's affairs whatsoever:_ and the said Warren
Hastings having made for the Company, and in its name, an acquisition
of power and authority, even if it had been abused by others, he ought
to have remedied the abuse, and brought the guilty to condign
punishment, instead of making another treaty without their
approbation, consent, or knowledge, and to this time not communicated
to them, by which it appears he has annulled the former treaty, and
the authority thereby acquired to the Company, as a grievance and
usurpation, to which, from the general corruption of their service, no
other remedy could be applied than a formal renunciation of their
power and influence: for which said actings and doings the said Warren
Hastings is guilty of an high crime and misdemeanor.

LXXXIV. That the Company's army in India is an object requiring the
most vigilant and constant inspection, both to the happiness of the
natives, the security of the British power, and to its own obedience
and discipline, and does require that inspection in proportion as it
is removed from the principal seat of government; and the number and
discipline of the troops kept up by the native princes, along with
British troops, is also of great moment and importance to the same
ends. That Warren Hastings, Esquire, pretending to pursue the same,
did, in virtue of an authority acquired by the treaty of Chunar
aforesaid, give strict orders, and to which he did demand _a most
implicit obedience_, that _all_ officers of the Nabob's army should be
appointed "with _the concurrence of the Resident_," and supposing the
case that persons of obnoxious description or of known disaffection to
the British government should be appointed, (of which he left the
Resident to be the judge,) he did direct in the following words:

      "You are in such case to remonstrate against it; and if the
      Vizier should persist in his choice, you are peremptorily,
      _and in my name_, to oppose it as _a breach of his
      agreement"_;

and he did also direct that the

      "_mootiana_ [or soldiers employed for the collection of
      revenue] should be reformed, and reduced into one corps for
      the whole service, and that _no_ infantry should be left in
      the Nabob's service but what may be necessary for his
      bodyguard";

and he did further order and direct as follows:

      "That in quelling disturbances the commander of the forces
      should assist you [the said Resident] on the requisition of
      the Vizier communicated through you to him [the said
      commander], _or at your own tingle application_. It is
      directed that the regiment ordered for the immediate
      protection of your office and person at Lucknow shall be
      relieved every three months, and during its stay there shall
      act solely and exclusively under your orders."

And it appears in the course of the Company's correspondence, that the
country troops under the Nabob's sole direction would be
ill-disciplined and unserviceable, if not worse, and therefore the
said Warren Hastings did order that "no infantry should be kept in his
service"; yet it appears that the said Warren Hastings did make an
arrangement for a body of native troops wholly out of the control or
inspection of the British government, and left a written order in the
hands of Major Palmer (one of _his_ agents, who had been continued
there, though the Company was not permitted to employ any) to be
transmitted to Colonel Cumming as soon as an adequate force shall be
provided _for the defence of the Nabob's frontier_ by detachments from
_the Nabob's own battalions_,--the said Colonel Cumming's forces, whom
the others were to supersede and replace, consisting wholly of
infantry, and which, being intended for the same service, were
probably of the same constitution.

LXXXV. That the old brigade of British troops, which by treaty was to
remain, had been directed, by the instructions of the said Hastings to
the Resident Middleton and to the Resident Bristow, "not to be
employed at the requisition of the Vizier any otherwise than through
the Resident"; and the said direction was properly given,--it not
being fit that British troops should be under the sole direction of
foreign independent princes, or of any other than the British
government: yet, notwithstanding the proper and necessary direction
aforesaid, he, the said Warren Hastings, hath left the said troops, by
his new treaty, without any local control, or even inspection,
notwithstanding his powers under the treaty of Chunar, and his own
repeated orders, and notwithstanding the mischiefs and dangers which
the said Warren Hastings did foresee would result therefrom, if left
under the sole direction of the Nabob, and their own discretion, the
said Hastings having stipulated with the said Nabob not to exercise
any authority, or even influence, _secret_ or _avowed_, within his
dominions.

LXXXVI. That the crime of the said Warren Hastings, in attempting thus
to abandon the British army to the sole discretion of the Nabob of
Oude, is exceedingly aggravated by the description given by him
severally of the said Nabob of Oude, and of the British army stationed
for the defence of his dominions.

In his letters to the Court of Directors, and in his Minutes of
Consultation, and particularly in his letter of ----, immediately on
the accession of the Nabob, he did inform the said Court, "that the
Nabob had not, by all accounts, the qualities of the head or heart
which fitted him for that office, though there was no dispute
concerning his right to succeed"; and some years afterwards, when his
accounts must have been rendered more certain, he did, in his Minute
of Consultation of the 15th of December, 1779, (regularly transmitted
to the Court of Directors,) upon a discussion for withdrawing certain
troops kept up in the Nabob's country without his consent, by him, the
said Warren Hastings, strongly urge as follows,--

      "the _necessity_ of maintaining the influence and force
      which we possess in the country; that the disorders of his
      state [the Nabob of Oude's state] and dissipation of his
      revenues are the effects of his own conduct, which has
      failed, not so much from the usual effects of _incapacity_
      as from the detestable choice he has made of the ministers
      of his power and the participation of his confidence. I
      forbear to expatiate further on his character; it is
      sufficient that I am understood by the members of this
      board, who must know the truth of my allusions. Mr. Francis"
      (a member of the board) "surely was not aware of the injury
      he did me [Warren Hastings] by attributing to the spirit of
      party the character I gave Asoph ul Dowlah [the Nabob of
      Oude]; he himself knows it _to be true; and it is one of
      those notorieties which supersede the necessity of any
      evidence. I was forced to the allusion I made by the
      imputation cast on this government, as having caused the
      evils which prevail in the government of the Nabob of Oude,
      which I could only answer by ascribing them to their true
      cause, the character and conduct of the Nabob of Oude."_

And the Resident (appointed by the said Hastings, against the orders
of the Court of Directors, as his particular confidential
representative, one whom the said Nabob did himself request might be
continued with him _by an engagement in writing forever_) did some
time before, that is, on the 3d of January, 1779, assure the said
Hastings and the Council-General, that

      "such is his Excellency's [the Nabob of Oude's] disposition,
      and so entirely has he lost the confidence and affections of
      his subjects, that, unless some restraint is imposed on him
      which would effectually secure those who live under the
      protection of his government from violence and oppression, I
      am but too well convinced that no man of reputation or
      property will long continue in these provinces";

and that the said Resident proceeds to an instance of oppression and
rapine,

      "out of _many_ of the Nabob's, which has caused a total
      disaffection and want of confidence among his subjects: he
      hoped the board would take it into their humane
      consideration, and interpose their _influence_, and prevent
      an act which would inevitably bring disgrace upon himself,
      and a proportionable degree of discredit on the national
      character of the English, which I consider to be more or
      less concerned in every act of his administration."

LXXXVII. That no exception was ever taken by the said Warren Hastings
to the truth of the facts, or to the justness of the observation of
the said Resident, which he did transmit to the Court of Directors.
And the said Warren Hastings, in his letter from Chunar, dated the
29th of November, 1781, speaking of the restraints which had been put
by him, the said Hastings, on the Nabob, relative to his own
_mootiana_, or forces for collection and police, and the necessity of
giving the Resident a control in the nomination of the officers of his
army, has asserted,

      "that the necessity of the reservation arose from a too well
      known defect in the Nabob's character: if this _check_ be
      withdrawn, and the choice left absolutely to the Nabob, the
      first commands in his army will be filled with the most
      worthless and abandoned of his subjects: his late
      commander-in-chief is a signal and scandalous instance of
      this."

LXXXVIII. And the said Warren Hastings, in his letter to the Court of
Directors, dated Benares, the 15th of October, 1784, even after he had
made the aforesaid renunciation of the Company's authority and
influence to the Nabob, did write,

      "that the Nabob, though most gentle in his manners, and
      endued with an understanding much above the common level,
      has been _unfortunately bred up in habits_ that draw his
      attention too much from his own affairs, and often subject
      him to the guidance of _insidious and unworthy confidants_";

which, though more decently expressed with regard to the Nabob than in
his former minutes, substantially agrees with them. And the said
Warren Hastings did inform the Court of Directors, after he had
solemnly covenanted to withdraw all the Company's influence on the
assurances and promises of a person so by himself described, that, for
reasons grounded on his knowledge of the imbecility of the character
of the Nabob, he waited in a frontier town, "that he might be at hand
to counteract any attempt to defeat the effect of his proceedings at
Lucknow"; and in his letter to Mr. Wheler from the same place he did
write in the following words: "I am still near enough to attend to the
first effects of the execution, and to interfere with my influence for
the removal of any obstructions to which they are or may be liable."
He therefore found that there was none or but an insufficient security
to the effect of his treaty, but in his own direct personal violation
of it. What otherwise was wanting in the security for the Nabob's
engagements was to be supplied as follows:

      "The most respectable persons of his family will be employed
      to counteract every other which may tend to warp him from
      it; and I am sorry to say _that such assistance was
      wanting_."

And in another letter, "that he had equal ground to expect every
degree of support which could be given it by _the first characters of
his family_, who are warmly and zealously interested in it": the
principal male character of the family, and of the most influence in
that family, being Salar Jung, uncle to the Nabob; and the first
female characters of the family being the mother and grandmother of
the reigning sovereign: all of whom, male and female, he, the said
Warren Hastings, in sundry letters of his own, in the transmission of
various official documents, and even in affidavits studiously
collected and sworn before Sir Elijah Impey during his short residence
at Lucknow and Benares, did himself represent as persons entirely
disaffected to the English power in India,--as having been principal
promoters, if not original contrivers, of a general rebellion and
revolt for the utter extirpation of the English nation,--and as such,
he, the said Warren Hastings, did compel the Nabob reluctantly to take
from them their landed estates; and yet the said Warren Hastings has
had the presumption to attempt to impose on the East India Company by
pretending to place his reliance on those three persons for a
settlement favorable to the Company's interests, on his renunciation
of all their own power, authority, and influence, and on his leaving
their army to the sole and uncontrolled discretion of a stranger,
meriting in his opinion the description given by him as aforesaid, as
well as by him frequently asserted to be politically incapable of
supporting his own power without the aid of the forces of the Company.
And the offence of the said Warren Hastings, in abandoning a
considerable part of the British army in the manner aforesaid, is much
increased by the description which he has himself given of the state
of the said army, and particularly of that part thereof which is
stationed in the Nabob of Oude's dominions: for he did himself, on the
29th of November, 1781, transmit the information following, on that
subject, to the Court of Directors, namely,--

      "that the remote stations of those troops, placing the
      commanding officers beyond the notice and control of the
      board [the Council-General] at Calcutta, afforded too much
      of opportunity and temptation for unwarrantable _emoluments,
      and excited the contagion of peculation and rapacity
      throughout the whole army_. A most remarkable instance and
      uncontrovertible proof of the prevalence of this spirit has
      been seen in the court-martial upon Captain Erskine, where
      the court, composed of officers of rank, and respectable
      characters, unanimously and honorably, (_most_ honorably,)
      upon an acknowledged fact, acquitted him, which in times of
      stricter discipline would have been deemed a crime deserving
      the severest punishment."

From which representation (if the said Warren Hastings did not falsely
and unjustly accuse and slander the Company's service) it appeared
that the peculation which infected the whole army, derived from the
taint which it had in Oude, and so fatal to the discipline of the
troops, would be dangerously increased by his treaty and agreement
aforesaid with the Nabob, and by his own said evil counsel to the
Court of Directors.

LXXXIX. That it appears, after the said Warren Hastings had, on
grounds so disgraceful to the British nation and government, agreed to
remove forever the British influence and interference from the
government of Oude, on account of the disorders in the said
government, solely produced by his own criminal acts and criminal
connivances, that he did overturn his own settlement as soon as he had
made it, and did, after he had abolished the Company's Residency, as a
grievance, wholly violate his own solemn agreement: for he did, for
his private purposes, continue therein his own private agent, Major
Palmer, with a number of officers and pensioners, at a charge to the
revenues of the country greatly exceeding that of the establishment
under Mr. Bristow, which he did represent as frightfully enormous, and
which he pretended to remove: the former amounting to 112,950_l._, the
latter only to 64,202_l._

XC. That his own secret agent, Major Palmer, did receive a salary or
allowance, equal to 22,800_l._ a year, out of the distressed province
of Oude; and this the said Palmer did declare not to be more than he
absolutely did really and _bona fide_ spend, and that he had
retrenched considerably "in some of the articles since the expense has
been borne by the Vizier, and in every particular he made as little
parade and appearance as his station would admit,"--his station being
that of the said Warren Hastings's private agent. But if the said
large salary must be considered as merely equal to the expenses, large
secret emoluments must be presumed to attend it, in order to make it a
place advantageous to the holder thereof. That the said Palmer did
apply to the board at Calcutta for a new authority to continue the
said establishments,--he conceiving their continuance,

      "after the period of the Governor-General's departure,
      depended upon the pleasure of the board, and not upon the
      _authority of the Governor-General, under the sanction of
      which they were established or confirmed_."

XCI. That the said Warren Hastings, in order to ruin the Resident
Bristow, and to justify himself for his former proceedings respecting
him, did bring before the board a new charge against him, for having
paid a large establishment of offices and pensions to the Company's
servants from the revenues of Oude; and the said Bristow, in making
his defence against the charge aforesaid, did plead, that he had found
all the allowances on his list established before his last appointment
to the Residency,--that they had grown to that excess in the interval
between his first removal by the said Warren Hastings and his
reappointment; and having adduced many reasons to make it highly
probable that the said Hastings was perfectly well acquainted with it,
and did approve of the expensive establishments which he, the said
Bristow, simply had paid, but not imposed, he did allege, besides the
official assurances of his predecessor, Middleton, certain facts, as
amounting to a direct proof that the Governor-General, Warren
Hastings, was not averse to the Vizier's granting large salaries to
more than one European gentleman. And the first instance was to Mr.
Thomas, a surgeon, who, exclusive of his pay from the Company, which
was 1,440_l._ a year, claimed from the Vizier, with Mr. Hastings's
knowledge, the sum of 9,763_l._ a year, and upwards, making together
11,203_l._ per annum. The next was Mr. Trevor Wheler, who did receive,
upon the same establishment, when he was Fourth Assistant at Oude,
6,000_l._ a year; and which last fact the said Hastings has admitted
upon record "that the accusations of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Cowper did
_oblige_ and _compel_ him to acknowledge,"--denying, at the same time,
that the allowances of the Residents Middleton and Bristow, except in
this single instance, were ever authorized by him; whereas his own
agent, Palmer, did, in his letter of the 27th of March, 1785,
represent, that the said salaries and allowances (if not more and
larger) were by him authorized or confirmed.

XCII. That the aforesaid Bristow did also produce the following letter
in proof that Mr. Hastings knew and approved of large salaries to
British subjects upon the revenues of Oude, and which he did declare
that nothing but the necessity of self-defence could have induced him
to produce.

     'DEAR BRISTOW,--

      "Sir Eyre Coote has some field-allowances to receive from
      the Vizier; they amount to Sicea Rupees 15,554 per month,
      and he has been paid up by the Vizier to the 20th of August,
      1782. The Governor has directed me to write to you, to
      request you to receive what is due from the Vizier from the
      20th August last, at the rate of Lucknow Sicca Rupees 15,664
      per month, and send me a bill for the amount, the receipt of
      which I will acknowledge in the capacity of Sir Eyre Coote's
      attorney; and the Governor desires that you will continue to
      receive Sir Eyre Coote's field-allowances at the same rate,
      and remit the money to me as it comes in."

     (Signed) "CHARLES CROFTES."

     "CALCUTTA, January 25, 1783."

XCIII. That Sir Eyre Coote aforesaid was at the time of the said
field-allowances not serving in the country of Oude, on which the said
allowances were charged, but in the Carnatic.

XCIV. That, from the declaration of the said Hastings himself, that it
was the conviction of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Cowper that could alone
_oblige_ and _compel_ him to _acknowledge_ certain of his aforesaid
practices, and that nothing _but the necessity of self-defence_ could
have induced Mr. Bristow to make public another and much stronger
instance of the same, it is to be violently presumed, that, where
these two, or either, or both necessities did not exist, many evil and
oppressive practices of the said Hastings do remain
undiscovered,--that, if it had not been for the contests between him,
the said Hastings, and the Resident Bristow, not only the
before-mentioned particulars, but the whole of the expensive civil
establishments for English servants at Oude, would have been forever
concealed from the Directors and from Parliament: and yet the said
Hastings has had the audacity to pretend so complete an ignorance of
the facts, that, representing the Vizier as objecting to the largeness
of the payments made by Bristow, and stating a very reduced list,
which he was willing to allow for, amounting to 30,000_l._ a year, the
said Hastings did affect to be alarmed at the magnitude even of the
list so curtailed, expressing himself as follows, in his minute of the
7th of December, 1784:

      "For my own part, when the Vizier's minister first informed
      me that the amount which his master had authorized, and was
      willing to admit, for the charges of the Residency, and the
      allowances of the gentlemen at Lucknow, was 25,000 rupees
      per month, I own I was startled at the magnitude of the sum,
      and was some days hesitating in my mind whether I could with
      propriety admit of it":

whereas he well knew that the three sums alone of which the
necessities aforesaid had compelled the discovery did greatly exceed
that sum of which at the first hearing he affects to have been so
exceedingly alarmed and thrown into a state of hesitation which
continued for some days, and although he, the said Hastings, was
conscious that he had at the very time authorized an establishment to
more than four times the amount thereof.

XCV. That, in the said deceits, prevarications, contradictions,
malicious accusations, fraudulent concealments, and compelled
discoveries, as well as in the said secret, corrupt, and prodigal
disposition of the revenues of Oude, as well as in his breach of faith
to the Nabob, in continuing expensive establishments under a private
agent of his own after he had agreed to remove the Company's agent,
the said Warren Hastings is guilty of an high offence and misdemeanor.




XVII.--MAHOMED REZA KHAN.



I. That it was the declared policy of the Company, on the acquisition
of the dewanny of Bengal, to continue the country government, under
the inspection of the Resident at the Nabob's durbar in the first
instance, and that of the President and Council in the last; and for
that purpose they did stipulate to assign, for the support of the
dignity of the Nabob, an annual allowance from the revenues, equal to
four hundred thousand pounds a year.

II. That, during the country government, the principal active person
in the administration of affairs, for rank, and for reputation of
probity, and of knowledge in the revenues and the laws, was Mahomed
Reza Khan, who, besides large landed property, was possessed of
offices whose emoluments amounted nearly, if not altogether, to one
hundred thousand pounds a year.

IV.[16] That the Company's servants, in the beginning, were not
conversant in the affairs of the revenue, and stood in need of natives
of integrity and experience to act in the management thereof. On that
ground, as well as in regard to the rank which Mahomed Reza Khan held
in the country, and the confidence of the people in him, they, the
President and Council, did inform the Court of Directors, in their
letter of the 30th of September, 1765, that, "as Mahomed Reza Khan's
short administration was irreproachable, they determined to continue
him in a share of the authority"; and this information was not given
lightly, but was founded upon an inquiry into his conduct, and a
minute examination of charges made against him by his rivals in the
Nabob's court,--they having insinuated to the Nabob that a design was
formed for deposing him, and placing Mahomed Reza on his throne; but,
on examination, the President and Council declare, that

      "he had so openly and candidly accounted _for every rupee_
      disbursed from the treasury, that they could not, without
      injury to his character, and injustice to his conduct during
      his short administration, refuse continuing him in a share
      of the government."

V. That the Company had reason to be satisfied with the arrangement
made, so far as it regarded him: the President and Council having
informed them, in the following year, in their letter of the 9th of
December, 1766, that "the _large_ increase of the revenue must in a
great measure be ascribed to Mr. Sykes's assiduity, and to _Mahomed
Reza Khan's profound knowledge in the finances_."

VI. That the then President and Council, finding it necessary to make
several reforms in the administration, were principally aided in the
same by the suggestion, advice, and assistance of the said Mahomed
Reza Khan; and in their letter to the Court of Directors of the 24th
of June, 1767, they state their resolution of reducing the emoluments
of office, which before had arisen from a variety of presents and
other perquisites, to fixed allowances; and they state the merits of
Mahomed Reza Khan therein, as well as the importance, dignity, and
responsibility of his station, in the following manner.

      "Mahomed Reza Khan has now _of himself, with great delicacy
      of honor_, represented to us the evil consequences that must
      ensue from the continuance of this practice,--since, by
      suffering the principal officers of the government to depend
      for the support of their dignity on the precarious fund of
      perquisites, they in a manner oblige them to pursue
      oppressive and corrupt measures, equally injurious to the
      country and the Company; and they accordingly assigned
      twelve lac of rupees for tho maintenance and support of the
      said Mahomed Reza Khan, and two other principal persons, who
      held in their hands the most important employments of that
      government,--having regard to their elevated stations, and
      to tho expediency of supporting them in all the show and
      parade requisite to keep up the authority and influence of
      their respective offices, as they are all men of weight and
      consideration in the country, who held places of great trust
      and profit under the former government. We further propose,
      by this act of generosity, to engage their cordial services,
      and confirm them steady in our interests; since they cannot
      hope, from the most successful ambition, to rise to greater
      advantages by any chance or revolution of affairs. At the
      same time it was reasonable we should not lose sight of
      Mahomed Reza Khan's past services. He has pursued the
      Company's interest with steadiness and diligence; his
      abilities qualify him to perform the most important
      services; the unavoidable charges of his particular
      situation are great; in dignity he stands second to the
      Nabob only;--and as he engages to increase the revenues,
      without injustice or oppression, to more than the amount of
      his salary, _and to relinquish those advantages, to the
      amount of eight lacs of rupees per annum_, which he
      heretofore enjoyed, we thought it proper, in the
      distribution of salaries, to consider Mahomed Reza Khan in a
      light superior to the other ministers. We have only to
      observe further, that, great and enormous as the sum must
      appear which we have allotted for the support of the
      ministers of the government, we will not hesitate to
      pronounce that it is necessary and reasonable, and will
      appear so on the consideration of the power which men
      employed on these important services have either to obstruct
      or promote the public good, unless their integrity be
      confirmed by the ties of gratitude and interest."

VII. That the said Mahomed Reza Khan continued, with the same
diligence, spirit, and fidelity, to execute the trust reposed in him,
which comprehended a large proportion of the weight of government, and
particularly of the collections; and his attachment to the interest of
the Company, and his extensive knowledge, were again, in the course of
the year 1767, fully acknowledged, and stated to the Court of
Directors. And it further appears that by an incessant application to
business his health was considerably impaired, which gave occasion in
the year following, that is, in February, 1768, to a fresh
acknowledgment of his services in these terms:

      "We must, in justice to Mahomed Reza Khan, express the high
      sense we entertain of his abilities, and of the
      indefatigable attention he has shown in the execution of the
      important trust reposed in him; and we cannot but lament the
      prospect of losing his services from the present declining
      state of his health."

VIII. That as in the increase of the revenue the said Mahomed Reza
Khan was employed as a person likely to improve the same without
detriment to the people, so, when the state of any province seemed to
require a remission, he was employed as a person disposed to the
relief of the people without fraud to the revenue; and this was
expressed by the President and Council as follows, with relation to
the remissions granted in the province of Bahar:

      "That the general knowledge of Mahomed Reza Khan, in all
      matters relative to the dewanny revenues, induced us to
      consent to such deductions being made from the general state
      of that province at the _last poonah_ as may be deemed
      irrecoverable, or such as may procure an immediate relief
      and encouragement to the ryots in the future cultivation of
      their lands."

IX. That the said Mahomed Reza Khan, in the execution of the said
great and important trusts and powers, was not so much as suspected of
an ambitious or encroaching spirit, which might make him dangerous to
the Company's then recent authority, or which might render his
precedence injurious to the consideration due to his colleagues in
office; but, on the contrary, it appears, that, a plan having been
adopted for dividing the administration, in order to remove the
Nabob's jealousies, the same was in danger of being subverted by the
ambition "of two of his colleagues, and _the excessive moderation of
Mahomed Reza Khan."_ And for a remedy of the inconveniences which
might arise from the excess of an accommodating temper, though
attended with irreproachable integrity, the President and Council did
send one of their own members, as their deputy, to the Nabob of
Bengal, at his capital of Moorshedabad; and this measure appears to
have been adopted for the support of Mahomed Reza Khan, in consequence
of an inquiry made and advice given by Lord Clive, in his letter of
the 3d of July, 1765, in which letter he expresses himself of the said
Mahomed Reza Khan as follows:

      "It is with pleasure I can acquaint you, _that, the more I
      see of Mahomed Reza Khan, the stronger is my conviction of
      his honor and moderation_, but that, at the same time, I
      cannot help observing, that, either from timidity or an
      erroneous principle, he is too ready to submit to
      encroachments upon that proportion of power that has been
      allotted him."

X. That, the Nabob Jaffier Ali Khan dying in February, 1765, Mahomed
Reza Khan was appointed guardian to his children, and administrator of
his office, or regent, which appointment the Court of Directors did
approve. But the party opposite to Mahomed Reza Khan having continued
to cabal against him, sundry accusations were framed relative to
oppression at the time of the famine, and for a balance due during his
employment of collector of the revenues; upon which the Directors did
order him to be deprived of his office, and a strict inquiry to be
made into his conduct.

XI. That the said Warren Hastings, then lately appointed to the
Presidency, did, on the 1st of April, and on the 24th of September,
1772, write letters to the Court of Directors, informing them that on
the very next day after he had received (as he asserts) their private
orders, "addressed to himself alone," and not to the board, he did
dispatch, by express messengers, his orders to Mr. Middleton, the
Resident at the Nabob's court at Moorshedabad, in a public character
and trust with the Nabob, to arrest, in his capital, and at his court,
and without any previous notice given of any charge, his principal
minister, the aforesaid Mahomed Reza Khan, and to bring him down to
Calcutta; and he did carefully conceal his said proceedings from the
knowledge of the board, on pretext of his not being acquainted with
their dispositions, and the influence which he thought that the said
Mahomed Reza Khan had amongst them.

XII. That the said Warren Hastings, at the time he gave his orders as
aforesaid for arresting the said Mahomed Reza Khan, did not take any
measures to compel the appearance of any other persons as
witnesses,--declaring it as his opinion, "that there would be little
need of violence to obtain such intelligence as they could give
against their former master, when his authority is taken from him";
but he did afterwards, in excuse for the long detention and
imprisonment of the said Mahomed Reza Khan, without any proofs having
been obtained of his guilt, or measures taken to bring him to a trial,
assure the Directors, in direct contradiction to his former
declaration,

      "that the influence of Mahomed Reza Khan still prevailed
      generally throughout the country, in the Nabob's household,
      and at the capital, and was scarcely affected by his present
      disgrace,"

--notwithstanding, as he, the said Hastings, doth confess, he had used
his utmost endeavors "to break that influence, by removing his
dependants, and putting the direction of all the affairs that had been
committed to his care into the hands of _the most powerful or active
of his enemies_; that he depended on the activity of their hatred to
Mahomed Reza Khan, incited by the expectation of rewards, for
investigating the conduct of the latter; that with this the
institution of the new dewanny coincided; and that the same principle
had guided him in the choice of Munny Begum and Rajah Gourdas,--the
former for the chief administration, the lattoe" (the son of
Nundcomar, and a mere instrument in the hands of his father) "for the
dewanny of the Nabob's household,--both _the declared enemies_ of
Mahomed Reza Khan."

XIII. That, although it might be true that enemies will become the
most active prosecutors, and as such may, though under much guard and
many precautions, be used even as witnesses, and that it ought not to
be an exception, supposing their character and capacity otherwise
good, to the appointing them to power, yet to advance persons to power
on the ground not of their honor and integrity, which might have
produced the enmity of bad men, but merely for the enmity itself,
without any reference whatsoever to a laudable cause, and even with a
declared ill opinion of the morals of one of the party, such as was
actually delivered in the said letter by him, the said Hastings, of
Nundcomar, (and which time has shown he might also on good ground have
conceived of others,) was, in the circumstances of a criminal inquiry,
a motive highly disgraceful to the honor of government, and
destructive of impartial justice, by holding out the greatest of all
possible temptation to false accusation, to corrupt and factious
conspiracies, to perjury, and to every species of injustice and
oppression.

XIV. That, in consequence of the aforesaid motives, and others
pretended, which were by no means a sufficient justification to the
said Warren Hastings, he did appoint the woman aforesaid, called Munny
Begum, who had been of the lowest and most discreditable order in
society, according to the ideas prevalent in India, but from whom he
received several sums of money, to be guardian to the Nabob in
preference to his own mother, _and to administer the affairs of the
government_ in the place of the said Mahomed Reza Khan, the second
Mussulman in rank after the Nabob, and the first in knowledge,
gravity, weight, and character among the Mussulmen of that province.
And in order to try every method and to take every chance for his
destruction, the said Warren Hastings did maliciously and oppressively
keep him under confinement, for a part of the time without any
inquiry, and afterwards with a slow and dilatory trial, for two years
together.

XV. That, notwithstanding a total revolution in the power, in part
avowedly made for his destruction, the persons appointed for his trial
did, on full inquiry, completely acquit the said Mahomed Reza Khan of
the criminal charges against him, on account of which he had been so
long persecuted and confined, and suffered much in mind, body, and
fortune: and the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 3d of
March, 1775, testify their satisfaction in the conduct and result of
the said inquiry, and did direct the restoration of the said Mahomed
Reza Khan to liberty, and to the offices which he had lately held,
which comprehended the management of the Nabob's household, and the
general superintendency of the justice of Bengal; but, according to
the orders of the Court of Directors, his appointments were reduced to
thirty thousand pounds a year, or thereabouts, of which he did make
grievous complaint, on account of the expenses attendant on his
station, and the heavy debts which he had been obliged to contract
during his unjust persecution and imprisonment aforesaid.

XVI. That, on the removal of the said Mahomed Reza Khan from the
superintendency of the criminal justice, and in consequence of letting
the province of Bengal in farm by the said Warren Hastings, several
dangerous and mischievous innovations were made by him, the said
Warren Hastings, and the criminal justice of the country was almost
wholly subverted, and great irregularities and disorders did actually
ensue.

XVII. That the Council-General, established by act of Parliament in
the year 1773, did restore the said Mahomed Reza Khan, with the
consent and approbation of the Nabob, (but under a protest from the
said Warren Hastings,) to his liberty and to his offices, according to
the spirit of the orders given by the Court of Directors as aforesaid;
and the Court of Directors did approve of the said appointment, and
did assure the said Mahomed Reza Khan of their favor and protection as
long as his conduct should merit the same, in the following terms.

      "As the abilities of Mahomed Reza Khan have been
      sufficiently manifested, as official experience qualifies
      him for so high a station in a more eminent degree than any
      other native with whom the Company has been connected, and
      as no proofs of maladministration have been established
      against him, either during the strict investigation of his
      conduct or since his retirement, we cannot under all
      circumstances but approve your recommendation of him to the
      Nabob to constitute him his Naib. We are well pleased that
      he has received that appointment, and authorize you to
      assure him of our favor, so long as a firm attachment to the
      interest of the Company and a proper discharge of the duties
      of his station shall render him worthy of our protection."

And the said Mahomed Reza Khan did continue to execute the same
without any complaint whatsoever of malversation or negligence, in any
manner or degree, in his said office.

XVIII. That in March, 1778, the said Warren Hastings, under color that
the Nabob had completed his twentieth year, and had desired to be
placed in the entire and uncontrolled management of his own affairs,
and that Mahomed Reza Khan should be removed from his office, and that
Munny Begum, his step-mother, the dancing-girl aforesaid, "should take
on herself the management of the _nizamut_ [the government and general
superintendency of criminal justice] without the interference of any
person whatsoever," and notwithstanding the contradictions in the
pretended applications from the Nabob, with whose incapacity for all
affairs he was well acquainted, did, in defiance of the orders of the
Court of Directors, and without regard to the infamy of an arrangement
made for the evident and declared purpose of delivering not only the
family with the prince, but the government and justice of a great
kingdom, into such insufficient, corrupt, and scandalous hands, and
though he has declared his opinion "that our national character is
concerned in the character which the Nabob may obtain in the public
opinion," on obtaining a majority in Council, without any complaint,
real or pretended, remove the said Mahomed Reza from all his offices,
and did partition his salary as a spoil in the following manner: to
Munny Begum, the dancing-girl aforesaid, an additional allowance of
72,000 rupees (7,200_l._) a year; to the Nabob's own mother but half
that sum, that is to say, 36,000 rupees (3,600_l._) a year; to Rajah
Gourdas, son of Nundcomar, (whom he had described as a weak young
man,) 72,000 rupees (7,200_l._) a year, as controller of the
household; and to a magistrate called Sudder ul Hock, who, in real
subserviency to the said Munny Begum, was nominally to act in the
department of criminal justice, 78,000 rupees (7,800_l._) a year: the
total of which allowances exceeding the salary of Mahomed Reza Khan by
18,000 rupees (1,800_l._) yearly, he did, for the corrupt and
scandalous purposes aforesaid, order the same to be made up from the
Company's treasury.

XIX. That Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler having moved that the execution
of the aforesaid arrangement, the whole expense of which, ordinary and
extraordinary, was charged upon the Company's treasury, and therefore
could not be even colorably disposed of at the pretended will of the
said Nabob, might be suspended until the pleasure of the Court of
Directors thereon should be known, and the same being resolved
agreeably to law by a majority of the Council then present, the said
Hastings, urging on violently the immediate execution of his corrupt
project, and having obtained, by the return of Richard Barwell,
Esquire, a majority in Council in his own casting vote, did rescind
the aforesaid resolution, and did carry into immediate execution the
aforesaid most unwarrantable, mischievous, and scandalous design.

XX. That the consequences which might be expected from such a plan of
administration did almost instantly flow from it. For the person
appointed to execute one of the offices which had been filled by
Mahomed Reza Khan did soon find that the eunuchs of Munny Begum began
to employ their power with great superiority and insolence in all the
concerns of government and the administration of justice, and did
endeavor to dispose of the offices relative to the same for their
corrupt purposes, and to rob the Nabob's servants of their due
allowances; and in his letter of the 1st September, 1778, he sent a
complaint to the board, stating, "that certain bad men had gained an
ascendency over the Nabob's temper, by whose instigation he acts"; and
after complaining of the slights he received from the Nabob, he adds:

      "Thus they cause the Nabob to treat me, sometimes with
      indignity, at others with kindness, just as they think
      proper to advise him; their view is, that, by compelling me
      to displeasure at most unworthy treatment, they may force me
      either to relinquish my station, or to join with them, and
      act by their advice, and appoint creatures of their
      recommendation to the different offices, from which they
      might draw profit to themselves."

XXI. That, in a subsequent letter to the Governor, the said
Superintendent of Justice did inform him, the said Warren Hastings, of
the audacious and corrupt manner in which, by violence, fraud, and
forgery, the eunuchs of Munny Begum had abused the Nabob's name, to
deprive the judicial and executory officers of justice of the salaries
which they ought to have drawn from the Company's treasury, in the
following words:

      "The Begum's ministers, before my arrival, with the advice
      of their counsellors, caused the Nabob to sign a receipt, in
      consequence of which they received, at two different times,
      near 50,000 rupees [5,000_l._], in the name of the officers
      of the Adawlut, Phousdary, &c, from the Company's sircars;
      and having drawn up an account-current _in the manner they
      wished_, they had got the Nabob to sign it, and sent it to
      me."

And in the same letter he asserts, "that these people had the Nabob
entirely in their power."

XXII. That the said Warren Hastings, upon this representation, did,
notwithstanding his late pretended opinion of the fitness and the
right of the Nabob to the sole administration of his own affairs,
authoritatively forbid him from any interference therein, and ordered
that the whole should be left to the magistrate aforesaid; to which
the Nabob did, notwithstanding his pretended independence, yield an
immediate and unreserved submission: for the said Hastings's order
being given on the 1st of September at Calcutta, he received _an
answer_ from Moorshedabad on the 3d, in the following terms:
"Agreeably to your pleasure, I have relinquished all concern with the
affairs of the Phousdary and Adawlut, leaving the entire management in
Sudder ul Hock's hands." Which said circumstance, as well as many
others, abundantly proves that all the Nabob's actions were in truth
and fact entirely governed by the influence of the said Hastings, and
that, however the said Hastings may have publicly discouraged the
corrupt transactions of the said court, yet he did secretly uphold the
authority and influence of Munny Begum, who did entirely direct, with
his knowledge and countenance, all the proceedings therein.

XXIII. That on the 13th of the same month of September he did receive
a further complaint of the corrupt and fraudulent practices of the
chief eunuch of the said Munny Begum; and these corrupt practices did
so continue and increase, that on the 10th of October, 1778, he was
obliged to confess, in the strongest terms, the pernicious
consequences of his before-created unwarrantable and illegal
arrangements; for, in a letter of that date to the Nabob, he expresses
himself as follows.

      "At your Excellency's request, I sent Sudder ul Hock Khan to
      take on him the administration of the affairs of the Adawlut
      and Phousdary, and hoped by that means not only to have
      given satisfaction to your Excellency, but that, through his
      abilities and experience, these affairs would have been
      conducted in such manner as to have secured the peace of the
      country and the happiness of the people; and it is with the
      greatest concern I learn that this measure is so far from
      being attended with the expected advantages, that the
      affairs both of the Phousdary and Adawlut are in the
      greatest confusion imaginable, and daily robberies and
      murders are perpetrated throughout the country. This is
      evidently owing to the want of a proper authority in the
      person appointed to superintend them. I therefore addressed
      your Excellency on the importance and delicacy of the
      affairs in question, and of the necessity of lodging full
      power in the hands of the person chosen to administer them;
      in reply to which your Excellency expressed sentiments
      coincident with mine; notwithstanding which, your dependants
      and people, actuated by _selfish, and avaricious views, have
      by their interference so impeded the business as to throw
      the whole country into a state of confusion, from which
      nothing can retrieve it but an unlimited power lodged in the
      hands of the superintendent_. I therefore request that your
      Excellency will give the strictest injunctions to all your
      dependants not to interfere in any manner with any matter
      relative to the affairs of the Adawlut and Phousdary, and
      that you will yourself relinquish all interference therein,
      and leave them entirely to the management of Sudder ul Hock
      Khan: this is absolutely necessary to restore the country to
      a state of tranquillity."

And he concluded by again recommending the Nabob to withdraw all
interference with the administrator aforesaid:

      "otherwise a measure which I adopted at your Excellency's
      request, and with a view to your satisfaction and the
      benefit of the country, will be attended with quite contrary
      effects, and bring discredit on me."

XXIV. That the said Hastings, in the letter aforesaid, in which he so
strongly condemns the acts and so clearly marks out the mischievous
effects of the corrupt influence under which alone the Nabob acted,
and under which alone, from his known incapacity, and his dependence
on the person supported by the said Hastings, he could act, did
propose to put all the offices of justice (which on another occasion
he had requested him to _permit_ to remain in the hands which then
held them) into his own disposal,--telling him, or rather the woman
and eunuchs who governed him,

      "that, if his Excellency has any plan for the management of
      the affairs in future, be pleased to communicate it to me,
      and every attention shall be paid to give your Excellency
      satisfaction":

by which means not only particular parts, as before, but the whole
system of justice was to be afloat, and to be subject to the purposes
of the aforesaid corrupt cabal of women and eunuchs.

XXV. That the Court of Directors, on receiving an account of the above
arrangements, and being well apprised of the spirit, intention, and
probable effect of the same, did, in a clear, firm, and decisive
manner, express their condemnation of the measure, and their rejection
and reprobation of all the pretended grounds and reasons on which the
same was supported,--marking distinctly his prevarication and
contradictions in the same, and pointing to him their full conviction
of the unworthy motives on which he had made so shameful an
arrangement: telling him, in the 17th paragraph of their general
letter of the 4th of February, 1779,

      "The Nabob's letters of the 25th and 30th of August, of the
      3d of September, and 17th of November, leave us no doubt of
      the _true_ design of this _extraordinary_ business being _to
      bring forward_ Munny Begum, and again to invest her with
      improper power and influence, notwithstanding our former
      declaration, that _so great_ a part of the Nabob's allowance
      had been embezzled and misapplied under her
      superintendence."

XXVI. That, in consequence of the censure and condemnation of the
unwarrantable measures of the said Warren Hastings by the Court of
Directors, on the aforesaid and other weighty and substantial grounds,
they did order and direct as follows, in the 20th paragraph of the
general letter of the same date.

      "As we deem it for the welfare of the country that the
      office of Naib Subahdar be for the present continued, and
      that this high office should be filled by a person of
      wisdom, experience, and of approved fidelity to the Company,
      and as we have no reason to alter the opinion given of
      Mahomed Reza Khan in our letter of the 24th of December,
      1776, we positively direct, that you forthwith signify to
      the Nabob Mobarek ul Dowlah our pleasure that Mahomed Reza
      Khan be immediately restored to the office of Naib Subahdar;
      and we further direct, that Mahomed Reza Khan be again
      assured of the continuance of our favor, so long as a firm
      attachment to the interest of the Company and a proper
      discharge of the duties of his station shall render him
      worthy of our protection."

XXVII. That the aforesaid direction did convey in it such evident and
cogent reason, and was so far enforced by justice to individuals and
by regard to the peace and happiness of the natives, as well as by the
common decorum to be observed in all the transactions of government,
that the said Hastings ought to have yielded a cheerful obedience
thereto, even if he had not been by a positive statute, and his
relation of servant to the Company, bound to that just submission. Yet
the said Hastings did, without denying or evading any one of the
reasons assigned by the Court of Directors, or controverting the
scandalous motives assigned by them for his conduct, contumaciously
refuse obedience to the above positive order, on pretence that the
Nabob, who, he had declared it on record "to be as visible as the
light of the sun, is a mere pageant, and without even the shadow of
authority," did dissent from the same; and he did encourage the said
Nabob, or rather the eunuchs, the corrupt ministers of Munny Begum, to
oppose himself and themselves to the authority of the said Court of
Directors: by which means the arrangement, three times either ratified
or expressly ordered by them, was wholly defeated; the aforesaid
corrupt system was continued; Mahomed Reza Khan was not restored to
his office; and a lesson was taught to the natives of all ranks, that
the declared approbation, the avowed sanction, and the decided
authority of the Court of Directors were wholly nugatory to their
protection against the corrupt influence of their servants.

XXVIII. That the said Warren Hastings, on a reconciliation with Mr.
Francis, one of the Council-General, who made it a condition thereof
that certain of the Company's orders should be obeyed, and that
Mahomed Reza Khan should be restored to his offices, did, a
considerable time after, notwithstanding the pretended reluctance of
the Nabob, and his pretended freedom, make, for his convenience in the
said accommodation, the arrangement which he had unwarrantably and
illegally refused to the orders of the Court of Directors, and did of
his own authority and that of the board restore Mahomed Reza Khan to
his offices.

XXIX. That soon after the departure of the said Mr. Francis he did
again deprive the said Mahomed Keza Khan of his said offices, and did
make several great changes in the constitution of the criminal justice
in the said country; and after having, under pretence of the Nabob's
sufficiency for the management of his own affairs, displaced, without
any specific charge, trial, or inquiry whatsoever, the said Mahomed
Reza Khan, he did submit the said Nabob to the entire direction, in
all parts of his concerns, of a Resident of his own nomination, Sir
John D'Oyly, Baronet, and did order an account of the most minute
parts of his domestic economy to be made out, and to be delivered to
the said Sir John D'Oyly, in the following words, contained in a paper
by him intituled, INSTRUCTIONS from the Governor-General to the Nabob
Mobarek ul Dowlah respecting his conduct in the management of his
affairs.

      "You will be pleased to direct your _mutseddies_ to form an
      account of the fixed sums of your monthly expenses, such as
      servants' wages in the different departments, pensions, and
      other allowances, as well as of the estimated amount of
      variable expenses, to be delivered to Sir John D'Oyly _for
      my inspection_. I have given such orders to Sir John D'Oyly
      as will enable him to propose to you such reductions of the
      pensions and other allowances, and such a distribution of
      the variable expenses, as shall be proportionable to the
      total sum of your monthly income; _and I mu"t request you
      will conform to it_."

And he did, in the subsequent articles of his said instructions, order
the whole management to be directed by Sir John D'Oyly, subject to his
own directions as aforesaid; and did even direct what company he
should keep; and did throw reflections on some persons, in places the
nearest to him, as of bad character and base origin,--persons whom he
should decline to name as such, "unless he heard that they still
availed themselves of his goodness to retain _the places_ which they
improperly hold near his person." And he did particularly order the
said Nabob not to admit any English, but such as the said Sir John
D'Oyly should approve, to his presence; and did repeat the said order
in the following peremptory manner: "You _must forbid any_ person of
_that nation_ to be intruded into _your_ presence without _his_
introduction." And he did require his obedience in the following
authoritative style: "I shall think myself obliged to interfere _in
another manner_, if you neglect it."

XXX. That he, the said Warren Hastings, did insult the captive
condition of the said Nabob by informing him, in his imperious
instructions aforesaid, that this total, blind, and implicit
obedience, in every respect whatsoever, to Sir John D'Oyly and himself
personally, and without any reference to the board, "was the very
_conditions_ of the compliance of the Governor-General and Council
with his late requisition"; which requisition was, that he should
enjoy _the free and uncontrolled_ management of his own affairs. And
though the said captive did offer, as he, the said Hastings, himself
admits, _four lacs_ of his stipend, at that time reduced to sixteen
lac, for _the free use of the remainder_, yet he did place him, the
said Nabob, in the state of servitude in the said instructions laid
down but a very short time after he had assumed and used the said
Nabob's independent rights as a ground for refusing to obey the
Company's orders,--and although he has declared, or pretended, on
another occasion, which he would have thought similar, that any
attempt to limit the household expenses of the Nabob of Oude was an
indignity, "which no man living, however mean his rank in life, or
dependent his condition in it, would permit to be exercised by any
other, without the want or forfeiture of every manly principle."

XXXI. That the said Warren Hastings did order the said stipend (which
was to be distributed, in the minutest particular, according to the
said Hastings's personal directions) to be paid monthly, not to any
officer of the Nabob, but to the said Resident, Sir John D'Oyly. And
whereas the Governor-General and Council did, on the appointment of
Mahomed Reza Khan, according to their duty, instruct him, that

      "he do conform to the _orders_ of the Company, which direct
      that an annual account of the Nabob's expenses be
      transmitted through the Resident at the Durbar, for the
      inspection of this _board_"

the said Hastings, in making his new establishment in favor of his
Resident, did wholly omit the said instruction, and did confine the
said communication to _himself_, privately. And in fact it does not
appear that any account whatsoever of the disposition of the said
large sum, exceeding 160,000_l._ sterling a year, has been laid before
the board, or at least that any such account has been transmitted to
the Court of Directors; and it is not fitting that any British servant
of the Company should have the management of any public money, much
less of so great a sum, without a public well-vouched account of the
specific expenditure thereof.

XXXII. That the Court of Directors did, on the 17th of May, 1766,
propose certain rules for regulating the correspondence of the
Resident with the Nabob of Bengal, in which they did direct, as a
principle for the said regulations, as follows (paragraph 16th).

      "We would have his correspondence to be carried on with the
      _Select Committee_ through the channel of the President: he
      should keep a diary of all his transactions. His
      correspondence with the natives _must be publicly
      conducted_: copies of _all_ his letters, sent and received,
      be transmitted monthly to the Presidency, with duplicates
      and triplicates to be transmitted home in our general packet
      by every ship."

XXXIII. That the President and Select Committee (Lord Clive being then
President) did approve of the whole substantial part of the said
regulation (the diary excepted); and the principle, in all matters of
account, ought to have been strictly adhered to, whatever limitations
may have been given to the office of Resident. Yet he, the said Warren
Hastings, in defiance of the aforesaid good rules, orders, and late
precedent in conformity to the same, did not only withhold any order
for the purpose, but, in order to carry on the business of the said
durbar in a clandestine manner for his own purposes, did, as
aforesaid, exclude all English from an intercourse with the Nabob, who
might carry complaints or representations to the board, or the Court
of Directors, of his condition, or the conduct of the Resident,--and
did further, to defeat all possible publicity, insinuate to him to
give the preference to verbal communication above letters, in the
words following, of the ninth article of his instructions to the
Nabob:

      "Although I desire to receive your letters frequently, yet,
      as many matters will occur which cannot be _so easily
      explained by letters as by conversation_, I desire that you
      will on such occasions give your orders to him respecting
      such points as you may desire to have imparted to me; and I,
      postponing every other concern, will give an immediate and
      the most satisfactory reply concerning them."

Accordingly, no relation whatsoever has been received by the Court of
Directors of the said Nabob's affairs, nor any account of the money
monthly paid, except from public fame, which reports that his affairs
are in groat disorder, his servants unpaid, and many of them
dismissed, and all the Mussulmen dependent on his family in a state of
indigence.




XVIII.--THE MOGUL DELIVERED UP TO THE MAHBATTAS.



I. That Shah Allum, the prince commonly called the Great Mogul, or, by
eminence, _The King_, is, or lately was, in the possession of the
ancient capital of Hindostan, and though without any considerable
territory, and without a revenue sufficient to maintain a moderate
state, he is still much respected and considered, and the custody of
his person is eagerly sought by many of the princes in India, on
account of the use to be made of his title and authority; and it was
for the interest of the East India Company, that, while on one hand no
wars shall be entered into in support of his pretensions, on the other
no steps should be taken which may tend to deliver him into the hands
of any of the powerful states of that country, but that he should be
treated with friendship, good faith, and respectful attention.

II. That Warren Hastings, in contradiction to this safe, just, and
honorable policy, strongly prescribed and enforced by the orders of
the Court of Directors, did, at a time when he was engaged in a
negotiation the declared purpose of which was to give peace to India,
concur with the captain-general of the Mahratta state, called Mahdajee
Sindia, in hostile designs against the few remaining territories of
that same Mogul emperor, by virtue of whose grant the Company actually
possess the government and enjoy the revenues of great provinces, and
also against the possessions of a Mahomedan chief called Nudjif Khan,
a person of much merit with the East India Company, in acknowledgment
of which they had granted him a pension, included in the tribute due
to the king, and, together with that tribute, taken from him by the
said Warren Hastings, though expressly _guarantied_ to him by the
Company. With both these powers the Company had been in friendship,
and were actually at peace at the time of the said clandestine
concurrence in a design against them; and the said Hastings hath since
declared, that the right of one of them, namely, "the right of the
Mogul emperor, to our assistance, has been constantly acknowledged."

III. That the said Warren Hastings, at the time of his treacherous
concurrence in a design against a power which he was himself of
opinion we were bound to assist, and against whom there was no doubt
he was bound neither to form nor to concur in any hostile attempt, did
give a caution to Colonel Muir, to whom the negotiation aforesaid was
intrusted on the part of the Company, against "inserting anything in
the treaty which might _expressly_ mark our _knowledge_ of his [the
Mahratta general's] views, _or concurrence in them_." Which said
transaction was full of duplicity and fraud; and the crime of the said
Hastings therein is aggravated by his having some years before
withheld the tribute which by treaty was solemnly agreed to be paid to
the said king, on pretence that he had thrown himself, for the
recovery of his city of Delhi, on the protection of the Mahrattas,
whom the said Warren Hastings then called _the natural enemies_ of the
Company, and the growth of whose power he then alleged to be highly
dangerous to the interests of this kingdom in India.

IV. That, after having concurred, in the manner before mentioned, in a
design of the Mahrattas against the Mogul, and notwithstanding he, the
said Warren Hastings, had formerly declared,

      "that with him [the Mogul] our connection had been a long
      time suspended, and _he wished never to see it renewed_, as
      it had proved a fatal drain to the wealth of Bengal and the
      treasury of the Company, without yielding one advantage or
      possible resource, even of remote benefits, in return,"

the said Warren Hastings did nevertheless, on or about the month of
March, 1783, with the privity and consent of the members of the board,
but by no authoritative act, dispatch, as agents of him, the
Governor-General only, and not as agents of the Governor-General and
Council, as they ought to have been, certain persons, among whom were
Major Browne and Major Davy, to the court of the king at Delhi, and
did there enter into certain engagements with the said king by the
means of those agents, and did carry on certain private and dangerous
intrigues for various purposes, particularly for making war in favor
of the said king against some powers or princes not precisely
described, but which, as may be inferred from a subsequent
correspondence, were certain Mahomedan princes in the neighborhood of
Delhi in amity with the Company, and some of them at that time in the
actual service and in the apparent confidence and favor of the said
Mogul; and he did order Major Browne to offer to the Mogul king to
provide for the _entire_ expense of _any_ troops the Shah [the said
king] might require; and the proposal was accordingly accepted, with
the conditions annexed: by which proposal and acceptance thereof the
East India Company was placed in a situation of great and perplexing
difficulty; since either they were to engage, at an unlimited
_expense_, in new wars, contrary to their orders, contrary to their
general declared policy, and contrary to the published resolutions of
the House of Commons, and wholly incompatible with the state of their
finances, or, to preserve peace, they must risk the imputation of a
new violation of faith, by departing from an agreement made on the
voluntary proposal of their own government,--the agent of the said
Hastings having declared, in his letter to the said Hastings, by him
communicated to the board, "that the business of assisting the Shah
[the Mogul emperor] can and _must_ go on, if we wish to be secure in
India, or regarded as a nation of faith and honor."

V. That the said Warren Hastings did, on the 20th day of January,
1784, send in circulation to the other members of the Council a letter
to him from his agent, Major Browne, dated at Delhi, on the 30th of
December, 1783, viz., that letter to which the foregoing references
are made, in which the said Browne did directly press, and indirectly
(though sufficiently and strongly) suggest, several highly dangerous
measures for realizing the general offers and engagements of the said
Warren Hastings,--proposing, that, besides a proportion of field
artillery, and a train of battering cannon for the purpose of sieges,
six regiments of sepoys in the Company's service should be transferred
to that of the said king, and that certain other corps should also be
raised for the said service in the English provinces and dependencies,
to be immediately under the king's [the Mogul's] orders, and to be
maintained by assignments of territorial revenue within the province
of Oude, a dependent member of the British government, but with a
caution against having any British officer with the same; the said
Major Browne expressing his caution as followeth:

      "If any European officer _be_ with this corps, a very nice
      judgment indeed must direct the choice; for scarce any are
      in the smallest degree _fit_ for _such_ employ, but much
      more likely to do harm than good."

And the letter aforesaid being without any observation thereon, or any
disavowal of the matters of fact or of the counsels so strongly and
authoritatively delivered therein by the said Warren Hastings's agent,
and without any mark of disapprobation of any part of his plan,
whether that of the assignment of territory belonging to the Company's
allies for the maintenance of troops which were to be by that plan put
under the orders of a foreign independent power, or that of employing
the said troops without any British officer with them, or for his
alarming observation by him entered on the Company's records, which,
if not an implied censure on the nature of the service in which
British officers are supposed improper to be trusted, is a strong
reflection on the character of the British officers, which was to
render them unfit to be employed in an honorable service,--the said
Warren Hastings did thereby give a countenance to the said
unwarrantable and dangerous proposals and reflections.


VI. That a considerable time before the production and circulation of
Major Browne's letter, the said Hastings did enter a Minute of
Consultation containing a proposition similar in the general intent to
that in the said letter contained for assisting the Mogul with a
military force; but the other members of the board did disagree
thereto, and, being alarmed at the disposition so strongly shown by
the said Hastings to engage in new wars and dangerous foreign
connections, and possibly having intelligence of the proceedings of
his agent, did call upon him to produce his instructions to Major
Browne; and he did, on the 5th of October, 1783, and not before, enter
on the Consultations a certain paper purporting to be the instructions
which he had given to Major Browne the preceding March, the time of
his, the said Browne's, appointment, in which pretended instructions
no direction whatsoever was given to the effect of his, the said
Hastings's, Minute of Consultation propounded: that is to say, no
power was given in the said instructions to make a direct offer of
military aid to the Mogul, or to form the arrangements stated by the
said Browne, in his letter to the said Hastings, as having been made
by the express authority of the said Hastings himself; but the said
instructions contained nothing further on that subject but a
conditional direction, that, in case a military force should be
required for the Mogul's aid or protection, the Major is to know the
service on which it is to be employed, and the resources from whence
it is to be paid; and the instructions produced as his real
instructions by the said Hastings are so guarded as to caution the
said Browne against _taking any part in the intrigues of those who are
about the King's person_. By which letters, instructions, and
transactions, compared with each other, it appears that the said
Warren Hastings, after six months' delay in entering of (contrary to
the Company's order) any instructions to the said Browne, did at last
enter a false paper as the true, or that he did give other secret
instructions, totally different from, and even opposite to, his public
ostensible instructions, thereby to deceive the Council, and to carry
on with less obstruction dark and dangerous intrigues, contrary to the
orders of the Court of Directors, to the true policy of this kingdom,
and to the safety of the British possessions in the East.

VII. That the said letter from Major Browne was by the said Warren
Hastings transmitted to the Court of Directors, without being
accompanied by any part of the previous correspondence; by which
wilful concealment the said Warren Hastings is guilty of an high and
criminal disrespect to the Court of Directors, and of a most flagrant
breach and violation of their orders, which he was bound by an act of
Parliament to obey.

VIII. That the said Hastings having early in the year 1784 procured to
himself a deputation to act in the upper provinces, the Council, being
well aware of his disposition to engage in unwarrantable designs
against the neighboring states, did expressly confine his powers to
the circumstance of his actual residence within the Company's
provinces. But it appears that ways were found out by which he hoped
to defeat the precautions of the board: for the said Warren Hastings
did write from Lucknow, the capital of the country of Oude, to the
Court of Directors, a certain postscript of a letter, dated the 4th of
May, 1784, in which he informs the Court that the son and
heir-apparent of the Great Mogul had taken refuge with him and the
Nabob of Oude; that he had a conference with that prince on the 10th
of the same month of May, "no person being either present or within
hearing" during the same; and that in the said conference the prince
had informed him of the distresses of his father, and his wish for the
relief of the king and the restoration of the dominions of his house,
as well as to rescue him from the power of certain persons not named,
who degraded him into a mere instrument of their interested and sordid
designs, and that, on a failure of his application to him, he would
either return to his father, or proceed to Calcutta, and thence to
England; and that the said Warren Hastings did give him an answer to
the following effect:

      "That our [the British] government had just obtained relief
      from a state of universal warfare, and required a term of
      repose; that our whole nation was weary of war, and dreaded
      the renewal of it, _and would he equally alarmed at any
      movement of which it could not see the issue or progress,
      but which might eventually tend to create new hostilities_;
      that he came hither [to Lucknow] with a limited authority,
      and could not, if he chose it, engage in a business of that
      nature _without the concurrence of his colleagues in office,
      who he believed would be adverse to it_; that he would
      represent the same to the joint members of his own
      government, and wait their determination. In the mean time
      he advised the prince to make advances to Mahdajee Sindia,
      both because our government _was in intimate and sworn
      connection_ with him, and because he was the effectual head
      of the Mahratta state; besides that he [the said Warren
      Hastings] feared his [Sindia's] taking the other side of the
      question, unless he was early prevented."

IX. That in the statement of this discourse there is much criminal
reserve towards the Court of Directors,--it not appearing distinctly
what the objects were, nor who the persons concerned, nor what the
side was which he apprehended the Mahrattas might take, if not
prevented by his advances; and in the discourse itself there were many
particulars highly criminal, namely,--for that in the said
conversation, in which he describes himself as declining a compliance
with the request of the prince on account of the aversion (therein
strongly expressed) of his colleagues, of the Company, and of the
whole British nation, to engage in any measures which might even
"_eventually lead to hostilities_," he spoke to the prince as if he
had been entirely ignorant of the offers which but five months before
had been made to the king, his father, on the part of that very
government, (whose repugnance to such measures he then for the first
time chose to profess, but which he always had known,) through Major
Browne, the Company's representative at the court of Delhi, "to
provide for the _entire_ expense of _any_ troops which the Shah [the
king] might require," and that this was "what the Resident had
_always_ proposed to the king and his confidential ministers,"--the
said Browne further declaring,

      "that, if, in consequence of the said proposals, certain
      arrangements for the Shah's service by _troops_ were not
      immediately ordered, in his opinion all our [English
      government's] _offers and promises_ will be considered as
      false and insidious."

This being the known state of the business, as represented by the said
Hastings's own agent, and this the public opinion of it, although to
impose on the ignorance of the prince with regard to the proceedings
at his father's court would have been unworthy in itself, yet he, the
said Warren Hastings, could not hope to succeed in such imposition, as
in the postscript aforesaid he represents the said prince (who was the
king's eldest son, and thirty-six years of age) as a person of
considerable qualifications, and perfectly acquainted with the
transactions at his father's court, and as one who had long held the
_principal_ and most active part in the little that remained of _the
administration of Shah Allum_. And the said Hastings conferring with a
prince so well instructed, without making the slightest allusions to
his said positive and recent engagements, or without giving any
explanation with regard to them, the said Warren Hastings must appear
to the said prince either as a person not only contracting
engagements, but actually being the first mover and proposer of them,
without any authority from _his colleagues_, and against theirs and
the general inclination of the British nation, and on that ground not
to be trusted, or that he had used this plea of disagreement between
him and his Council as a pretence, set up without color or decency,
for a gross violation of his own engagements, leaving the princes and
states of the country no solid ground on which they can or ought to
contract with the Company, to the utter destruction of all public
confidence, and to the equal disgrace of the national candor,
integrity, and wisdom.

X. That in a letter dated from the same place, Lucknow, the 16th of
the following June, 1784, the said Warren Hastings informs the Court
of Directors, that Major Browne, their agent to the Mogul, had arrived
there in the character also of agent from the Mogul, with two sets of
instructions from two opposite parties in his ministry, which
instructions were directly contrary to each other: the first, which
were the ostensible instructions, being to engage the said Hastings,
in the Mogul's name, to enter into a treaty of mutual alliance with a
chief of the country, then minister to the said Mogul, called Afrasaib
Khan; the second were from another principal person, called Mudjed ul
Dowlah, also a minister of the said Mogul, (but styled in the said
letter _confidential_, for distinction,) which were directly
destructive of the former; and the said latter instructions, to which
it seems credence was to be given, were sent "under the most solemn
adjurations of secrecy." The purpose of these latter and secret
instructions was to require the Company's aid in freeing the Mogul
from the oppressions of his servants, namely, from the oppressions of
the said Afrasaib, between whom and the Company Major Browne (at once
agent to that Company, and to two opposite factions in the Mogul's
court) accepted a power to make a treaty of mutual alliance under the
sanction of his sovereign. And it does not appear that he, Warren
Hastings, did discountenance the double-dealing and fraudulent
agencies of his and the Company's minister at that court, or did
disavow any particular in the letter from him, the said Browne, of the
30th of December, 1783, stating the offers made on his part to the
Mogul, so contradictory to his late declarations to the heir-apparent
of that monarch, or did give any reprimand to the said Browne, or did
show any mark of displeasure against him, as having acted without
orders, but did again send him, with renewed confidence, to the court
aforesaid.

XI. That the said Warren Hastings, still pursuing his said evil
designs, did apply to the Council for discretionary powers relative to
the intrigues and factions in the Mogul's court, giving assurances of
his resolution not to proceed against their sense; but the said
Council, being fully aware of his disposition, and having Major
Browne's letter, recorded by himself, the said Warren Hastings, before
them, did refuse to grant the said discretionary powers, but, on the
contrary, did exhort him

      "most sedulously and cautiously to avoid, in his
      correspondence with the different princes in India, whatever
      may commit, or be strained into an interpretation of
      committing the Company, either as to their army or
      treasure,"

--observing, "that the Company's orders are positive against their
interference in the objects of dispute between the country powers."

XII. That, in order to subvert the plain and natural interpretation
given by the Council to the orders of the Court of Directors, and to
justify his dangerous intrigues, the said Warren Hastings, in his
letter of the 16th June, 1784, to the said Court, did, in a most
insolent and contemptuous manner, endeavor to persuade them of their
ignorance of the true sense of their own orders, and to limit their
prohibition of interference with the disputes of the country powers to
such country powers as are _permanent_,--expressing himself as
follows:

      "The faction which now surrounds the throne [the Mogul's
      throne] is widely different from the idea which your
      commands are intended to convey by the expressions to which
      you have generally applied them, of _country powers_, to
      which that _of permanency is a necessary adjunct_, and which
      may be more properly compared to a splendid bubble, which
      the slightest breath of opposition may dissipate with every
      trace of its existence."

By which construction the said Hastings did endeavor to persuade the
Court of Directors that they meant to confine their prohibition of
sinister intrigues to those powers only who could not be easily hurt
by them, and whose strength was such that their resentment of such
clandestine interference was to be dreaded; but that, where the powers
were weak and fragile, such intrigues might be allowed.

XIII. That the said Hastings, further to persuade the Court of
Directors to involve themselves in the affairs of the Mogul, and to
reconcile this measure with his former conduct and declared opinions,
did write to them to the following effect: That "at that former period
to which the ancient policy with regard to the Mogul applied, the
king's authority was sufficiently respected" (which he knew not to be
true,--having himself declared, in his minute of the 25th of October,
1774, "that he remained at Delhi, the ancient capital of the empire,
_a mere cipher_ in the administration of it") to maintain itself
against common vicissitudes; that he would not have advised
interference, if the king himself retained the exercise of it,
_however feeble_, in his own hands; that, if it [the Mogul's
authority] is suffered to receive its final extinction, it is
impossible to foresee _what power may arise out of its ruins_, or what
events may be linked in the same chain of revolution with it: but your
interests _may_ suffer by it, your reputation _certainly will_, as his
right to our assistance _has been constantly acknowledged_, and by a
train of consequences to which our government has not intentionally
given birth, but most especially by the movements which _its
influence, by too near an approach_, has excited, it has unfortunately
become the efficient instrument of a great portion of the king's
present distresses and dangers,--intimating (as well as the studied
obscurity of his expressions will permit anything to be discerned)
that his own late intrigues had been among the causes of the
distresses and dangers, which by new intrigues he did pretend to
remove: and he did conclude this part of his letter with some loose
general expressions of his caution not to affect the Company's
interests or revenues by any measures he might at that time take.

XIV. That the principle, so far as the same hath been directly avowed,
of the said proceedings at the Mogul's court, was as altogether
irrational, and the pretended object as impracticable, as the means
taken in pursuit of it were fraudulent and dishonorable, namely, the
restoration of the Mogul in some degree to the dignity of his
situation, and to his free agency in the conduct of his affairs. For
the said Hastings, at the very time in which he did with the greatest
apparent earnestness urge the purpose which he pretended to have in
view with regard to the dignity and liberty of the Mogul emperor, did
represent him as a person wholly disqualified, and even indisposed, to
take any active part whatsoever in the conduct of his own affairs, and
that any attempt for that purpose would be utterly impracticable; and
this he hath stated to the Court of Directors as a matter of public
notoriety, in his said letter of the 16th of June, 1784, in the
following emphatical and decisive terms.

      "_You need not be told_ the character of the king, whose
      inertness, and the habit of long-suffering, has debased his
      dignity and the fortunes of his house _beyond the power of
      retrieving either the one or the other_. Whilst his personal
      repose is undisturbed, he will _prefer_ to live in _the
      meanest state of indigence_, under the rule of men whose
      views are bounded by avarice and the power which they derive
      from his authority, rather than commit any share of it to
      his own sons, (though his affection for them is boundless in
      every other respect,) from a natural jealousy, founded on
      the experience of a very different combination of those
      circumstances which once served as a temptation and example
      of unlawful ambition in the princes of the royal line. His
      ministers, from a policy more reasonable, have constantly
      employed every means of influence to confirm this
      disposition, and to prevent his sons from having any share
      in the distribution of affairs, so as to have established a
      complete usurpation of the royal prerogative under its own
      sanction and patronage."

XV. That the said Warren Hastings, having given this opinion of the
sovereign for whose freedom he pretended so anxious a concern, did
describe the minister with whom he had long acted in concurrence, and
from whom he had just received the extraordinary secret embassy
aforesaid for the purpose of effecting the deliverance of his master,
the Mogul, from the usurpations of _his ministers_, as follows.

      "The first minister, Mudjed ul Dowlah, is _totally_
      deficient in every military quality, conceited of his own
      superior talents, and formed to the practice of _that
      crooked policy which, generally defeats its own purpose_,
      but sincerely attached to his master."

The reality of the said attachment was not improbable, but altogether
useless, as the said minister was the only one among the principal
persons about the king who (besides the total want of all military and
civil ability) possessed no territories, troops, or other means of
serving and supporting him, but was himself solely upheld by his
influence over his master: neither doth the said Hastings free him,
any more than the persons more efficient, who were to be destroyed,
from a disposition to alienate the king from an attention to his
affairs, and from all confidence in his own family; but, on the
contrary, he brings him forward as the very first among the instances
he adduces to exemplify the practices of the ministers against their
sovereign and his children.

XVI. That the said Warren Hastings, recommending in general terms, and
yet condemning in detail, every part of his own pretended plan, as
impracticable in itself, and as undertaken in favor of persons all of
whom he describes as incapable, and the principal as indisposed to
avail himself thereof, must have had some other motives for this long,
intricate, dark, and laborious proceeding with the Mogul, which must
be sought in his actions, and the evident drift and tendency thereof,
and in declarations which were brought out by him to serve other
purposes, but which serve fully to explain his real intentions in this
intrigue.

XVII. That the other members of the Council-General having abundantly
certified their averseness to his intrigues, and even having shown
apprehensions of his going personally to the Mogul and the Mahrattas
for the purpose of carrying on the same, the said Hastings was driven
headlong to acts which did much more openly indicate the true nature
and purpose of his machinations. For he at length recurred directly,
and with little disguise, to the Mahrattas, and did open an intrigue
with them, although he was obliged to confess, in his letter aforesaid
of the 16th June, 1784, that the exception which he contended to be
implied in the orders of the Court of Directors forbidding the
intermeddling in the disputes of "the country powers," namely, "powers
not permanent," did by no means apply to the Mahrattas; and he informs
the Court of Directors that he did, on the very first advice he
received of the flight of the Mogul's son, write to Mr. James Anderson
to apprise the Mahratta chief, Sindia, of that event,--"for which as
he was unprepared, he desired his [the said Sindia's] advice for his
conduct on the occasion of it." Which method of calling for the advice
of a foreign power to regulate his political conduct, instead of being
regulated therein by the advice of the British Council and the
standing orders of the Court of Directors, was a procedure highly
criminal; and the crime is aggravated by his not communicating the
said correspondence to the Council-General, as by his duty he was
bound to do; but it does abundantly prove his concert with the
Mahrattas in all that related to his negotiations in the Mogul court,
which were carried on agreeably to their advice, and in subserviency
to their views and purposes.

XVIII. That, in consequence of the cabal begun with the Mahrattas, the
said chief, Sindia, did send his "familiar and confidential ministers"
to him, the said Hastings, being at Lucknow, with whom the said
Hastings did hold several secret conferences, without any secretary or
other assistant: and the said Hastings hath not conveyed to the Court
of Directors any minutes thereof, but hath purposely involved even the
general effect and tendency of these conferences in such obscurity
that it is no otherwise possible to perceive the drift and tendency of
the same, but by the general scope of councils and acts relative to
the politics of the Mogul and of the Mahrattas together, and by the
final event of the whole, which is sufficiently visible. For

XIX. That the said Hastings had declared, in his said letter of the
16th June, 1784, that the Mogul's right to our assistance had been
constantly acknowledged, that the Mogul had been oppressed by the
lesser Mahomedan princes in the character of his officers of state and
military commanders, and he did plainly intimate that the said Mogul
ought to be relieved from that servitude. And he did, in giving an
account to the Court of Directors of the conferences aforesaid, assure
them that "his inclinations [the inclinations of the Mahratta chief
aforesaid] were not very dissimilar from his own"; and that

      "neither in this nor in any other instance would he suffer
      himself to be drawn into measures which shall tend to weaken
      their connection, nor _in this even to oppose his_ [the said
      chiefs] _inclinations_":

the said Hastings well knowing, as in his letter to Colonel Muir of
the ---- he has confessed, that the inclinations of the said Sindia
were to seize on the Mogul's territories, and that he himself did
secretly concur therein, though he did not formally insert his
concurrence in the treaty with the said Mahratta chief. It is plain,
therefore, that he did all along concur with the Mahrattas in their
designs against the said king and his ministers, under the treacherous
pretence of supporting the authority of the former against the latter,
and did contrive and effect the ruin of them all. For, first, he did
give evil and fraudulent counsel to the heir-apparent of the Mogul "to
make advances to the Mahrattas," when he well knew, and had expressly
concurred in, the designs of that state against his father's, the
Mogul's, dominions; and further to engage and entrap the said prince,
did assert that "our government" (meaning the British government) "was
in intimate and sworn connection with Mahdajee Sindia," when no
alliance, offensive or defensive, appears to exist between the said
Sindia and the East India Company, nor can exist, otherwise than in
virtue of some secret agreement between him, the said Sindia, and
Warren Hastings, entered into by the latter without the knowledge of
his colleagues and the government, and never communicated to the Court
of Directors. And, secondly, he did, in order to further the designs
of the Mahrattas, contrive and effect the ruin of the said Mogul and
his authority, by setting on foot, through the aforesaid Major Browne,
sundry perplexed and intricate negotiations, contrary to public faith,
and to the honor of the British nation; by which he did exceedingly
increase the confusion and disorders of the Mogul's court, exposing
the said Mogul to new indignities, insults, and distresses, and almost
all of the northern parts of India to great and ruinous convulsions,
until three out of four of the principal chieftains, some of them
possessing the territories lately belonging to Nudjif Khan, and
maintaining among them eighty thousand troops of horse and foot, and
some of which chiefs wore the ministers aforesaid, being cut off by
their mutual dissensions, and the fort of Delhi being at length
delivered to the Mahrattas, the said Sindia became the uncontrolled
ruler of the royal army, and the person of the Mogul, with the use of
all his pretensions and claims, fell into the hands of a nation
already too powerful, together with an extensive territory, which
entirely covers the Company's possessions and dependencies on one
side, and particularly those of the Nabob of Oude.

XX. That the circumstances of these countries did, in the opinion of
the said Warren Hastings himself, sufficiently indicate to him the
necessity of not aggrandizing any power whatsoever on their borders,
he having in the aforesaid letter of the 16th June given a deliberate
opinion of the situation of Oude in the words following: "That, whilst
we are at peace with the powers of Europe, it is only in this quarter
that your possessions under the government of Bengal are vulnerable."
And he did further in the said letter state, that, "if things had
continued as they had been to that time, with a divided government,"
(viz., the Company's and the Vizier's, which government he had himself
established, and under which it ever must in a great degree remain,
whilst the said country continues in a state of dependence,) "the
_slightest_ shock from a foreign hand, or even an _accidental internal
commotion_, might have thrown the whole into confusion, and produced
the most fatal consequences." In this perilous situation he made the
above-recited sacrifices to the ambition of the Mahrattas, and did all
along so actively countenance and forward their proceedings, and with
so full a sense of their effect, that in his minute of the 24th
December, 1784, he has declared, "that in the countries which border
on the dominions of the Nabob Vizier, or on that quarter of our own,
in effect _there is no other power_." And he did further admit, that
the presence of the Mahratta chief aforesaid, so near the borders of
the Nabob's dominions, was no cause of suspicion; for "that it is the
effect _of his own solicitation_, and is _so far_ the effect of an act
of that government."

XXI. That, in further pursuit of the same pernicious design, he, the
said Warren Hastings, did enter into an agreement to withdraw a very
great body of the British troops out of the Nabob's
dominions,--asserting, however truly, yet in direct contradiction to
his own declarations, that "this government" (meaning the British
government) "has not any right to force defence with its maintenance
upon him" (the Nabob); and he did thus not only avowedly aggrandize
the Mahratta state, and weaken the defence upon the frontier, but did
as avowedly detain their captain-general in force on that very
frontier, notwithstanding he was well apprised that they had designs
against those dependent territories of Oude, which they had with great
difficulty been persuaded, even in appearance, to include in the
treaty of peace,--and that they have never renounced their claims upon
certain large and valuable portions of them, and have shown evident
signs of their intentions, on the first opportunity, of asserting and
enforcing them. And, finally, the said Warren Hastings, in
contradiction to sundry declarations of his own concerning the
necessity of curbing the power of the Mahrattas, and to the principle
of sundry measures undertaken by himself professedly for that purpose,
and to the sense of the House of Commons, expressed in their
resolution of 28th May, 1782, against any measures that tended to
unite the dangerous powers of the Mahratta empire under one active
command, has endeavored to persuade the Company, that, "while Sindia
lives, every accession of territory obtained by him will be an
advantage to this [the British] government"; which if it was true as
respecting the personal dispositions of Sindia, which there is no
reason to believe, yet it was highly criminal to establish a power in
the Mahrattas which must survive the man in confidence of whose
personal dispositions a power more than personal was given, and which
may hereafter fall into hands disposed to make a more hostile use of
it.

XXII. That, in consequence of all the before-recited intrigues, the
Mogul emperor being in the hands of the Mahrattas, he, the said Mogul,
has been obliged to declare the head of the Mahratta state to be
vicegerent of the Mogul empire, an authority which supersedes that of
Vizier, and has thereby consolidated in the Mahratta state all the
powers acknowledged to be of legal authority in India; in consequence
of which, they have acquired, and have actually already attempted to
use, the said claims of general superiority against the Company
itself,--the Mahrattas claiming a right in themselves to a fourth part
of the revenues of all the provinces in the Company's possession, and
claiming, in right of the Mogul, the tribute due to him: by which
actings and doings the said Hastings has to the best of his power
brought the British provinces in India into a dependence on the
Mahratta state: and in order to add to the aforesaid enormous claims a
proportioned force, he did never cease, during his stay in India, to
contrive the means for its increase; for it is of public notoriety,
that one great object of the Mahratta policy is to unite under their
dominion the nation or religious sect of the Seiks, who, being a
people abounding with soldiers, and possessing large territories,
would extend the Mahratta power over the whole of the vast countries
to the northwest of India.

XXIII. That the said Warren Hastings, further to augment the power of
the said Mahrattas, and to endanger the safety of the British
possessions, having established in force the said Mahrattas on the
frontier, as afore-recited, and finding the Council-General averse in
that situation to the withdrawing the British forces therefrom, and
for disbanding them to the extent required by the said Hastings, did,
in a minute of the 4th December, 1784, after stating a supposition,
that, contrary to his opinion, the said troops should not be reduced,
propose to employ them under the command of the Mogul's son, then
under the influence of the Mahrattas, in a war against the aforesaid
people or religious sect called Seiks, defending the same on the
following principles:

      "I feel the sense of an obligation, imposed on me by the
      supposition I have made, to state a mode of rendering the
      detachment of use in its prescribed station, and of
      affording the _appearance_ of a cause for its retention."

XXIV. That the said Hastings did admit that there was no present
danger to the Company's possessions from that nation which could
justify him in such a war, as he had declared that the Mahrattas were
_the only power_ that bordered on the Company's possessions and those
of the Vizier; but he did assign as a reason for going to war with
them their military and enthusiastic spirit,--the hardiness of their
natural constitution,--the dangers which might arise from them in some
future time, if they should ever happen to be united under one head,
they existing at present in a state little different from anarchy; and
he did predict great danger from them, and at no very remote period,
"if this people be permitted to grow into maturity without
interruption." And though he doth pretend that the solicitations of
the heir-apparent of the Mogul, who, he says, did repeatedly and
earnestly solicit him to obtain the permission to use the Company's
troops for the purpose aforesaid, had weight with him, yet he doth
declare, as he expresses himself in the minute aforesaid, that "a
_stronger impulse_, arising from the hope of _blasting the growth_ of
a generation whose strength _might_ become fatal to our own, strongly
pleaded in my mind for supporting his wishes."

XXV. That the said Warren Hastings, after forcibly recommending the
plan aforesaid, did state strong objections, that did, "in his
judgment, outweigh the advantages which might arise from a compliance
with it." Yet the said Hastings, being determined to pursue his scheme
for aggrandizing at any rate the Mahratta power, in whose adult growth
and the recent effects of it he could see no danger, did pursue the
design of war against a nation or sect of religion in its infancy,
from whom he had received no injury, and in whose present state of
government he did not apprehend any mischief whatsoever; and finding
the Council fixed and determined on not disbanding the frontier
regiments, and thinking that therein he had found an advantage, ho did
ground thereon the following proposition.

      "If the expense [of the frontier troops] is to be continued,
      it may be surely better continued for some useful purpose
      than to keep up the parade of a great military corps
      designed merely to lie inactive in its quarters. On this
      ground, therefore, and on the supposition premised, I revert
      to my original sentiments in favor of the prince's plan; but
      as this will require some qualification in the execution of
      it, I will state my recommendation of it in the terms of a
      proposition, viz., that, if it shall be the resolution of
      the board to continue the detachment now under the command
      of Colonel Sir John Cumming at Furruckabad, and if the
      prince Mirza Jeliander Shah shall apply, _with the authority
      of the king, and the concurrence of Mahdajee Sindia_, for
      the assistance of an English military force, to act in
      conjunction with him, to expel the Seiks from the
      territories of which they have lately possessed themselves
      in the neighborhood of Delhi, it may be granted, and such a
      portion of the said detachment allotted to that service as
      shall be hereafter judged adequate to it."

XXVI. That the said Warren Hastings did, in the said proposal,
endeavor to circumvent and overreach the Council-General, by
converting an apparent and literal compliance with their resolution
into a real and substantial opposition to and disappointment thereof.
For his first proposal was, to withdraw the Company's troops from the
Vizier's country on the pretence of relieving him from the burden of
that establishment, but in reality with a view of facilitating the
Mahratta pretensions on that province, which would then be deprived of
the means of defence. And when the Council rejected the said proposal
on the express ground of danger to the province by withdrawing from
the Mahrattas the restraint of our troops, the said Hastings, finding
his first scheme in favor of the Mahrattas against the provinces
dependent on the Company defeated by the refusal of the Council to
concur in the said measure of withdrawing the troops, did then
endeavor to obtain the same purpose in a different way; and instead of
leaving the troops, according to the intention and policy of the
Council, as a check to the ambition and progress of the Mahrattas, he
proposed to employ them in the actual furtherance of those schemes of
aggrandizement of which his colleagues were jealous, and which it was
the object of their resolution to counteract.

XXVII. That, in the whole of the letters, negotiations, proposals, and
projects of the said Warren Hastings relative to the Mogul, he did
appear to pursue but one object, namely, the aggrandizement of the
lately hostile and always dangerous power of the Mahrattas, and did
pursue the same by means highly dishonorable to the British character
for honor, justice, candor, plain-dealing, moderation, and humanity.

XIX.--LIBEL ON THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

I. That Warren Hastings, Esquire, was, during the whole of the year
1783, a servant of the East India Company, and was bound by the duties
of that relation not only to yield obedience to the orders of the
Court of Directors, but to give to the whole of their service an
example of submission, reverence, and respect to their authority; and
that, if they should in the course of their duty call in question any
part of his conduct, he was bound to conduct his defence with temper
and decency; and while his conduct was under their consideration, it
was not allowable to print and publish any of his letters to them
without their consent first had and obtained; and he was bound by the
same principles of duty, enforced by still more cogent reasons, to
observe, in a paper intended for publication, great modesty and
moderation, and to treat the said Court of Directors, his lawful
masters, with respect.

II. That the said Warren Hastings did print and publish, or cause to
be printed and published, at Calcutta in Bengal, the narrative of his
transactions at Benares, in a letter written at that place, without
leave had of the Court of Directors, in order to preoccupy the
judgment of the servants in that settlement, and to gain from them a
factious countenance and support, previous to the judgment and opinion
of the Court of Directors, his lawful superiors.

III. That the Court of Directors, having come to certain resolutions
of fact relative to the engagements subsisting between them and the
Rajah of Benares, and the manner in which the same had been fulfilled
on the part of the Rajah, did, in the fifth resolution, which was
partly a resolution of opinion, declare as follows:

      "That it appears to this Court that the conduct of the
      Governor-General towards the Rajah, whilst he was at
      Benares, was improper; and that the imprisonment of his
      person, thereby disgracing him in the eyes of his subjects
      and others, was unwarrantable and highly impolitic, and may
      tend to weaken the confidence which the native princes of
      India ought to have in the justice and moderation of the
      Company's government."

IV. That the said resolutions being transmitted to the said Warren
Hastings, he, the said Warren Hastings, did write, and cause to be
printed and published, a certain false, insolent, malicious, and
seditious libel, purporting to be a letter from him, the said Warren
Hastings, to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, 20th March,
1783, "calculated," as the Directors truly affirm, "to bring contempt,
as well as an odium, on the Court of Directors, for their conduct on
that occasion"; and the said libel had a direct tendency to excite a
spirit of disobedience to the lawful government of this nation in
India through all ranks of their service.

V. That he, the said Warren Hastings, among other insolent and
contumacious charges and aspersions on the Court of Directors, did
address them in the printed letter aforesaid as follows.

      "I deny that Rajah Cheyt Sing was a native prince of India.
      Cheyt Sing is the son of a collector of the revenue of that
      province, which his arts, and the misfortunes of his master,
      enabled him to convert to a permanent and hereditary
      possession. This man, whom _you have thus ranked among the
      princes_ of India, will be astonished, when he hears it, at
      an elevation so unlooked for, nor less at the independent
      rights which _your_ commands have assigned him,--rights
      which are _so foreign to his conceptions, that I doubt
      whether he will know in what language to assert them,
      unless_ the example which _you have thought it consistent
      with justice, however opposite to policy, to show, of
      becoming his advocates against your own interests, should
      inspire any of your own servants to be his advisers and
      instructors_."

And he did further, to bring into contempt the authority of the
Company, and to excite a resistance to their lawful orders, frame a
supposition that the Court of Directors had intended the restoration
of the Rajah of Benares, and on that ground did presume in the said
libel to calumniate, in disrespectful and contumelious terms, the
policy of the Court of Directors, as well as the person whom he did
conceive to be the object of their protection, as followeth.

      "Of the consequences of such a policy I forbear to speak.
      _Most happily, the wretch whose hopes may be excited by the
      appearances in his favor is ill qualified to avail himself
      of them_, and _the force which is stationed in the province
      of Benares is sufficient to suppress any symptoms of
      internal sedition_; but it cannot fail to create distrust
      and suspense in the minds both of the rulers and of the
      people, and such a state is always productive of disorder.
      But it is not in this partial consideration that I dread the
      effects of your commands; it is in your proclaimed
      indisposition against the first executive member of your
      first government in India. I almost shudder at the
      reflection of what might have happened, had these
      denunciations against your own minister, in favor of a man
      universally considered in this part of the world as justly
      attainted for his crimes, the murderer of your servants and
      soldiers, and the rebel to your authority, arrived two
      months earlier."

VI. That the said Warren Hastings did also presume to censure and
asperse the Court of Directors for the moderate terms in which they
had expressed their displeasure against him, as putting him under the
necessity of stating in his defence a strong accusation against
himself, and as implying in the said Court a consciousness that he was
not guilty of the offences charged upon him,--being, as he asserts, in
the resolutions of the Court of Directors,

      "arraigned and prejudged of _a violation of national faith,
      in acts of such complicated aggravation_, that, _if they
      were true_, no punishment SHORT OF DEATH could atone for the
      injury which the interest and credit of the public had
      sustained in them";

and he did therefore censure the said Court for applying no stronger
or more criminating epithets than those of "improper, unwarrantable,
and highly impolitic," to an offence so by them charged, and by him
described. And though it be true that the expressions aforesaid are
much too reserved for the purpose of duly characterizing the offences
of the said Hastings, yet was it _in him_ most indecent to libel the
Court of Directors for the same; and his implication, from the
tenderness of the epithets and descriptions aforesaid used towards
him, was not only indecent, but ungrounded, malicious, and
scandalous,--he having himself highly, though truly, aggravated "the
charge of the injuries done by him to the Rajah of Benares," in order
to bring the said Directors into contempt and suspicion, the
paragraphs in the said libel being as follow.--

      "Here I must crave leave to say, that the terms 'improper,
      unwarrantable, and highly impolitic' are much too gentle, as
      deductions from such premises; and as every reader of the
      latter will obviously feel, as he reads, the deductions
      which inevitably belong to them, I will add, that the strict
      performance of solemn engagements on one part, followed by
      acts directly subversive of them and by total dispossession
      on the other, stamps on the perpetrators of the latter the
      guilt of the greatest possible violation of faith and
      justice."

      --"There is an appearance of tenderness in this deviation
      from plain construction, of which, however meant, I have a
      right to complain; because it imposes on me the necessity of
      framing the terms of the accusation against myself, which
      you have only not made, but have stated the leading
      arguments to it so strongly, that no one who reads these can
      avoid making it, _or not know it to have been intended_."

VII. That the said Hastings, being well aware that his own
declarations did contain the clearest condemnation of his own conduct
from his own pen, did in the said libel attempt to overturn,
frustrate, and render of none effect all the proofs to be given of
prevarication, contradiction, and of opposition of action to
principle, which can be used against men in public trust, and did
contend that the same could not be used against him; and as if false
assertions could be justified by factious motives, he did endeavor to
do away the authority of his own _deliberate, recorded_ declarations,
entered by him _in writing_ on the Council-Books of the Presidency;
for, after asserting, _but not attempting to prove_, that his
declarations were consistent with his conduct, he writes in the said
libel as follows: For

      "were it otherwise, they were not to be made the rules of my
      conduct; and God forbid that every expression dictated by
      the impulse of present emergency, and unpremeditatedly
      uttered in the heat of party contention, should impose upon
      me the obligation of a fixed principle, and be applied to
      every variable occasion!"

VIII. That the said Hastings, in order to draw the lawful dependence
of the servants of the Company from the Court of Directors to a
factious dependence on himself, did, in the libel aforesaid, treat the
acts and appointments of their undoubted authority, when exercised in
opposition to his arbitrary will, as ruinous to their affairs, in the
following terms.

      "It is as well known to the Indian world as to the Court of
      English Proprietors, that the first declaratory instruments
      of the dissolution of my influence, in the year 1774, were
      Mr. John Bristow and Mr. Francis Fowke. By your ancient and
      known constitution the Governor has been ever held forth and
      understood to possess the ostensible powers of government;
      all the correspondence with foreign princes is conducted in
      his name; and every person resident with them for the
      management of your political concerns is understood to be
      _more especially his_ representative, and of _his_ choice:
      and such ought to be the rule; for how otherwise can they
      trust an agent nominated against the will of _his_
      principal? When the state of this administration was such as
      seemed to _admit of_ the appointment of Mr. Bristow to the
      Residency of Lucknow without _much_ diminution of _my own_
      influence, I gladly seized the occasion to show my readiness
      to submit to your commands; I proposed his nomination; he
      was nominated, and declared to _be the agent of my own
      choice_. Even this effect of my caution _is defeated by your
      absolute command for his reappointment independent of me,
      and with the supposition that I should be adverse to it_.--I
      am now wholly deprived of my official powers, both in the
      province of Oude, and in the zemindary of Benares."

IX. That, further to emancipate others and himself from due obedience
to the Court of Directors, he did, in the libel aforesaid, enhance his
services, which, without specification or proof, he did suppose in the
said libel to be important and valuable, by representing them as done
under their displeasure, and doth attribute his not having done more
to their opposition, as followeth.

      "It is now a complete period of eleven years since I first
      received the first nominal charge of your affairs; in the
      course of it I have _invariably_ had to contend, not with
      ordinary difficulties, but such as most _unnaturally_ arose
      _from the opposition of those very powers from which I
      primarily derived my authority, and which were required for
      the support of it_. My exertions, though applied to an
      unvaried and consistent line of action, have been occasional
      and desultory; yet I please myself with the hope, that, in
      the annals of your dominion, which shall be written after
      the extinction of recent prejudices, this term of its
      administration will appear not the least conducive to the
      interests of the Company, nor the least reflective of the
      honor of the British name: and allow me to suggest the
      instructive reflection of _what good might have been done,
      and what evil prevented, had due support been given to that
      administration which has performed such eminent and
      substantial services without it_."

And the said Hastings, further to render the authority of the said
Court perfectly contemptible, doth, in a strain of exultation for his
having escaped out of a measure in which by his guilt he had involved
the Company in a ruinous war, and out of which it had escaped by a
sacrifice of almost all the territories before acquired (from that
enemy which he had made) either by war or former treaties, and by the
abandoning the Company's allies to their mercy, attribute the said
supposed services to his acting in such a manner as had on former
occasions excited their displeasure, in the following words.

      "Pardon, Honorable Sirs, this digressive exultation. I
      cannot suppress the pride which I feel in this successful
      achievement of a measure so fortunate for your interests and
      the national honor; for that pride is the source of my zeal,
      so frequently exerted in your support, and never more
      happily than in those instances _in which I have departed
      from the prescribed and beaten path of action, and assumed a
      responsibility which has too frequently drawn on me the most
      pointed effects of your displeasure_. But however I may
      yield to my private feelings in thus enlarging on the
      subject, my motive in introducing it was immediately
      connected with its context, and was to contrast _the actual
      state of your political affairs, derived from a happier
      influence, with that which might have attended an earlier
      dissolution of it_":

and he did value himself upon "the _patience_ and temper with which he
had submitted to all the indignities which have been heaped upon him"
(meaning, by the said Court of Directors) "in this long service"; and
he did insolently attribute to an unusual strain of zeal for their
service, that he "_persevered_ in the VIOLENT MAINTENANCE OF HIS
OFFICE."

X. That, in order further to excite the spirit of disobedience in the
Company's servants to the lawful authority set over them, he, the said
Warren Hastings, did treat contemptuously and ironically the supposed
disposition of the Company's servants to obey the orders of the Court
of Directors, in the words following.

      "The recall of Mr. Markham, who was known to be the public
      agent of my own nomination at Benares, and the reappointment
      of Mr. Francis Fowke by your order, contained in the same
      letter, would place it [the restoration of Cheyt Sing]
      beyond a doubt. _This order has been obeyed; and whenever
      you shall be pleased to order the restoration of Cheyt Sing,
      I will venture to promise the same ready and exact
      submission in the other members of the Council_."

And he did, in the postscript of the said letter, and as on
recollection, endeavor to make a reparation of honor to his said
colleagues, as if his expressions aforesaid had arisen from animosity
to them, as follows.

      "Upon a careful revisal of what I have written, I fear that
      an expression which I have used, respecting the probable
      conduct of the board in the event of orders being received
      for the restoration of Cheyt Sing, may be construed as
      intimating a sense of dissatisfaction applied to
      transactions already past.--It is not my intention to
      complain of any one."

XI. That the said Hastings, in the acts of injury aforesaid to the
Rajah of Benares, did assume and arrogate to himself an illegal
authority therein, and did maintain that the acts done in consequence
of that measure were not revocable by any subsequent authority, in the
following words.

      "If you should proceed to order the restoration of Cheyt
      Sing to the zemindary, from which, _by the powers which I
      legally possessed_, and conceive myself legally _bound to
      assert_ against any _subsequent authority to the contrary_
      derived from _the same common source_, he was dispossessed
      for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your Council shall
      resolve to execute the order, I will instantly give up my
      station and the service."

XII. That the said Warren Hastings did attempt to justify his
publication of the said libellous letter to and against the Court of
Directors by asserting therein that these resolutions (meaning the
resolutions of the Court of Directors relative to the Rajah of
Benares) "were _either_ published or _intended_ for publication":
evidently proving that he did take this unwarrantable course without
any sufficient assurance that the ground and motive by him assigned
had any existence.




XX.--MAHRATTA WAR AND PEACE.



I. That by an act passed in 1773 it was expressly ordered and
provided,

      "that it should not be lawful for any President and Council
      of Madras, Bombay, or Bencoolen, for the time being, to make
      any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or
      making war, against any Indian princes or powers, or for
      negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace, or other
      treaty, with any such Indian princes or powers, without the
      consent and approbation of the Governor-General and Council
      first had and obtained, except in such cases of _imminent
      necessity_ as would render it dangerous to postpone such
      hostilities or treaties until the orders from the
      Governor-General and Council might arrive."

That, nevertheless, the President and Council of Bombay did, in
December, 1774, without the consent and approbation of the
Governor-General and Council of Fort William, and in the midst of
profound peace, commence an unjust and unprovoked war against the
Mahratta government, did conclude a treaty with a certain person, a
fugitive from that government, and proscribed by it, named Ragonaut
Row, or Ragoba, and did, under various base and treacherous pretences,
invade and conquer the island of Salsette, belonging to the Mahratta
government.

II. That Warren Hastings, on the first advices received in Bengal of
the above transactions, did condemn the same in the strongest
terms,--declaring that

      "the measures adopted by the Presidency of Bombay had a
      tendency to a very extensive and indefinite scene of
      troubles, and that their conduct was unseasonable,
      impolitic, unjust, and unauthorized."

And the Governor-General and Council, in order to put a stop to the
said unjust hostilities, did appoint an ambassador to the Peshwa, or
chief of the Mahratta state, resident at Poonah; and the said
ambassador did, after a long negotiation, conclude a definitive treaty
of peace with the said Peshwa on terms highly honorable and beneficial
to the East India Company, who by the said treaty obtained from the
Mahrattas a cession of considerable tracts of country, the Mahratta
share of the city of Baroach, twelve lacs of rupees for the expenses
of the said unjust war, and particularly the island of Salsette, of
which the Presidency of Bombay had possessed themselves by surprise
and treachery. That, in return for these extraordinary concessions,
the articles principally insisted on by the Mahrattas, with a view to
their own future tranquillity and internal quiet, were, that _no
assistance should he given to any subject or servant of the Peshwa
that should cause disturbances or rebellion in the Mahratta
dominions_, and particularly that the English _should not assist
Ragonaut Row_, to whom the Mahrattas agreed to allow five lacs of
rupees a year, or a jaghire to that amount, and that he should reside
at Benares. That, nevertheless, the Presidency of Bombay did receive
and keep Ragonaut Row at Bombay, did furnish him with a considerable
establishment, and continue to carry on secret intrigues and
negotiations with him, thereby giving just ground of jealousy and
distrust to the Mahratta state. That the late Colonel John Upton, by
whom the treaty of Poorunder was negotiated and concluded, did declare
to the Governor-General and Council,

      "that, while Ragonaut Row resides at Bombay in expectation
      of being supported, the ministers can place no confidence in
      the Council there, which must now be productive of the
      greatest inconveniences, and perhaps in the end of fatal
      consequences."

That the said Warren Hastings, concurring with his Council, which then
consisted of Sir John Clavering, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis,
Esquires, did, on the 18th of August, 1777, declare to the Presidency
of Bombay, that

      "he could see no reason to doubt that the presence of Ragoba
      at Bombay would continue to be _an insuperable bar_ to the
      completion of the treaty concluded with the Mahratta
      government; nor could any sincere cordiality and good
      understanding be established with them, as long as he should
      appear to derive encouragement and support from the
      English."

That Sir John Clavering died soon after, and that the late Edward
Wheler, Esquire, succeeded to a seat in the Supreme Council. That on
the 29th of January, 1778, the Governor-General and Council received a
letter from the Presidency of Bombay, dated 12th December, 1777, in
which they declared,

      "that they had agreed to give encouragement to a _party_
      formed in Ragoba's favor, and flattered themselves they
      should meet with the hearty concurrence of the
      Governor-General and Council in the measures they might be
      obliged to pursue in consequence."

That the _party_ so described was said to consist of four principal
persons in the Mahratta state, on whose part _some overtures_ had been
made to Mr. William Lewis, the Resident of Bombay at Poonah, _for the
assistance of the Company to bring Ragoba to Poonah_. That the said
Warren Hastings, immediately on the receipt of the preceding advices,
did propose and carry it in Council, by means of his casting voice,
and against the remonstrances, arguments, and solemn protest of two
members of the Supreme Council, that the _sanction_ of that government
should be given to the plan which the President and Council of Bombay
had agreed to form with the Mahratta government; and also that a
supply of money (to the amount of ten lacs of rupees) should be
immediately granted to the President and Council of Bombay _for the
support of their engagements above mentioned_; and also that a
military force should be sent to the Presidency of Bombay. That in
defence of these resolutions the said Warren Hastings did falsely
pretend and affirm,

      "that the resolution of the Presidency of Bombay was formed
      on such a case of _imminent necessity_ as would have
      rendered it dangerous to postpone the execution of it until
      the orders from the Governor-General and Council might
      arrive; and that the said Presidency of Bombay _were
      warranted by the treaty of Poorunder_ to join in a plan for
      conducting Ragonaut Row to Poonah on the application of the
      ruling part of the Mahratta state":

whereas the main object of the said treaty on the part of the
Mahrattas, and to obtain which they made many important concessions to
the India Company, was, that the English should withdraw their forces,
and give no assistance to Ragoba, and that he should be excluded
forever from any share in their government, being a person
_universally held in abhorrence_ in the Mahratta empire; and if it had
been true (instead of being, as it was, notoriously false) that _the
ruling part_ of the administration of the Mahratta state solicited the
return of Ragonaut Row to Poonah, his return in that case might have
been effected by acts of their own, without the interposition of the
English power, and without our interference in their affairs. That it
was the special duty of the said Warren Hastings, derived from a
special trust reposed in him and power committed to him by Parliament,
to have restrained, as by law he had authority to do, the subordinate
Presidency of Bombay from entering into hostilities with the
Mahrattas, or from making engagements the manifest tendency of which
was to enter into those hostilities, and to have put a stop to them,
if any such had been begun; that he was bound by the duty of his
office to preserve the faith of the British government, pledged in the
treaty of Poorunder, inviolate and sacred, as well as by the special
orders and instructions of the East India Company _to fix his
attention to the preservation of peace throughout India_: all which
important duties the said Warren Hastings did wilfully violate, in
giving the _sanction_ of the Governor-General and Council to the
dangerous, faithless, and ill-concerted projects of the President and
Council of Bombay hereinbefore mentioned, from which the subsequent
Mahratta war, with all the expense, distress, and disgraces which have
attended it, took their commencement; and that the said Warren
Hastings, therefore, is specially and principally answerable for the
said war, and for all the consequences thereof. That in a letter dated
the 20th of January, 1778, the President and Council of Bombay
informed the Governor-General and Council, that, in consequence of
later intelligence received from Poonah, they had _immediately
resolved that nothing further could be done, unless Saccaram Baboo,
the principal in the late treaty_ (of Poorunder) _joined in making a
formal application to them_. That no such application was ever made by
that person. That the said Warren Hastings, finding that all this
pretended ground for engaging in an invasion of the Mahratta
government had totally failed, did then pretend to give credit to, and
to be greatly alarmed by, the suggestions of the President and Council
of Bombay, that the Mahrattas were negotiating with the French, and
had agreed to give them the port of Choul, on the Malabar coast, and
did affirm that the French _had obtained possession of that port_.
That all these suggestions and assertions were false, and, if they had
been true, would have furnished no just occasion for attacking either
the Mahrattas or the French, with both of whom the British nation was
then at peace. That the said Warren Hastings did then propose and
carry the following resolution in Council, against the protest of two
members thereof, that,

      "for the purpose of granting you [the Presidency of Bombay]
      the most effectual support in our power, we have resolved to
      assemble a strong military force near Calpee, the commanding
      officer of which is to be ordered to march by the most
      practicable route to Bombay, or to such other place as
      future occurrences and your directions to him may render it
      expedient";

and with respect to the _steps_ said to be taking _by the French to
obtain a settlement on the Malabar coast_, the said Warren Hastings
did declare to the Presidency of Bombay,

      "that it was the opinion of the Governor-General and Council
      that no time ought to be lost in forming and carrying into
      execution such measures as might most effectually tend to
      frustrate such dangerous designs."

That the said Warren Hastings, therefore, instead of fixing his
attention to the preservation of peace throughout India, as it was his
duty to have done, did continue to abet, encourage, and support the
dangerous projects of the Presidency of Bombay, and did thereby
manifest a determined intention to disturb the peace of India, by the
unfortunate success of which intention, and by the continued efforts
of the said Hastings, the greatest part of India has been for several
years involved in a bloody and calamitous war. That both the Court of
Directors and Court of Proprietors did specially instruct the said
Warren Hastings, in all his measures, "to make the safety and
prosperity of Bengal his principal object," and did heavily censure
the said Warren Hastings for having employed their troops at a great
distance from Bengal in a war against the Rohillas, which the House of
Commons have pronounced to be _iniquitous_,[17] and did on that
occasion expressly declare,

      "that they disapproved of all such distant expeditions as
      might eventually carry their forces to any situation too
      remote to admit of their speedy and safe return to the
      protection of their own provinces, in case of
      emergency."[18]

That the said Warren Hastings nevertheless ordered a detachment from
the Bengal army to cross the Jumna, and to proceed across the
peninsula by a circuitous route through the diamond country of
Bundelcund, and through the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, situated
in the centre of Hindostan, and did thereby strip the provinces
subject to the government of Fort William of a considerable part of
their established defence, and did thereby disobey the general
instructions and positive orders of the Court of Directors, (given
upon occasion of a crime of the same nature committed by the said
Hastings,) and was guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor.

That the said Warren Hastings, having taken the measures hereinbefore
described for supporting those of the Presidency of Bombay, did, on
the 23d of March, 1778,

      "invest the said Presidency with authority to form a new
      alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in _any_ scheme
      which they should deem expedient and safe for retrieving his
      affairs."

That the said Hastings was then in possession of a letter from the
Court of Directors, dated the 4th of July, 1777, containing a positive
order to the Presidency of Bombay in the following words. "Though that
treaty" (meaning the treaty of Poorunder)

      "is not, upon the whole, so agreeable to us as we could
      wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it on our
      parts. You must therefore be particularly vigilant, while
      Ragoba is with you, to prevent him from forming any plan
      against what is called the ministerial party at Poonah; and
      we hereby positively order you not to engage with him in any
      scheme whatever in retrieving his affairs, without the
      consent of the Governor-General and Council, or the Court of
      Directors."

That the said Ragoba neither did or could form any plan for his
restoration but what was and must be against the ministerial party at
Poonah, who held and exercised the regency of that state in the
infancy of the Peshwa; and that, supposing him to have formed any
other _scheme_, in conjunction with Bombay, _for retrieving his
affairs_, the said Hastings, in giving a previous _general_ authority
to the Presidency of Bombay to engage with Ragoba in _any_ scheme for
that purpose, without knowing what such scheme might be, and thereby
relinquishing and transferring to the discretion of a subordinate
government that superintendence and control over all measures tending
to create or provoke a war which the law had exclusively vested in the
Governor-General and Council, was guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor.

That the said Warren Hastings, having first declared that the measures
taken by him were for the support of the engagements made by the
Presidency of Bombay in favor of Ragoba, did afterwards, when it
appeared that those negotiations were _entirely laid aside_, declare
that his apprehension of the consequence of a pretended _intrigue_
between the Mahrattas and the French _was the sole motive of all the
late measures taken for the support of the Presidency of Bombay_; but
that neither of the preceding declarations contained the true motives
and objects of the said Hastings, whose real purpose, as it appeared
soon after, was, to make use of the superiority of the British power
in India to carry on offensive wars, and to pursue schemes of
conquest, impolitic and unjust in their design, ill-concerted in the
execution, and which, as this House has resolved, _have brought great
calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the East India Company_.

That the said Warren Hastings, on the 22d of June, 1778, made the
following declaration in Council.

      "Much less can I agree, that, with such superior advantages
      as we possess over every power which can oppose us, we
      should act _merely on the defensive_. On the contrary, if it
      be really true that the British arms and influence have
      suffered so severe a check in the Western world, it is more
      incumbent on those who are charged with the interests of
      Great Britain in the East _to exert themselves for the
      retrieval of the national loss_. We have the means in our
      power, and, if they are not frustrated by our own
      dissensions, I trust that the event of this expedition will
      yield every advantage _for the attainment of which it was
      undertaken_."

That, in pursuance of the principles avowed in the preceding
declaration, the said Warren Hastings, on the 9th of July, 1778, did
propose and carry it in Council, that an embassy should be sent from
Bengal to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar,--falsely asserting that
the said Rajah

      "was, by interest and inclination, likely to join in an
      alliance with the British government, and suggesting that
      two advantages might be offered to him as the inducements to
      it: first, the support of his pretensions to the sovereign
      power"

(viz., of the Mahratta empire); "second, the recovery of the captures
made on his dominions by Nizam Ali." That the said Hastings, having
already given full authority to the Presidency of Bombay to engage the
British faith to Ragonaut Row to support him in _his_ pretensions to
the government or to the regency of the Mahratta empire, was guilty of
a high crime and misdemeanor in proposing to engage the same British
faith to support the pretensions of another competitor for the same
object; and that, in offering to assist the Rajah of Berar to recover
the captures made on his dominions by the Nizam, the said Hastings did
endeavor, as far as depended on him, to engage the British nation in a
most unjust and utterly unprovoked war against the said Nizam, between
whom and the East India Company a treaty of peace and friendship did
then subsist, unviolated on his part,--notwithstanding the said
Hastings well knew that it made part of the East India Company's
fundamental policy to support that prince against the Mahrattas, and
_to consider him as one of the few remaining chiefs who were yet
capable of coping with the Mahrattas_, and that it was the Company's
_true interest to preserve a good understanding with him_. That, by
holding out such offers to the Rajah of Berar, the said Hastings
professed to hope that the Rajah _would ardently catch at the objects
presented to his ambition_: and although the said Hastings did about
this time lay it down as a maxim that _there is always a greater
advantage in receiving solicitations than in making advances_, he
nevertheless declared to the said Rajah that _in the whole of his
conduct he had departed from the common line of policy, and had made
advances where others in his situation would have waited for
solicitation_. That the said unjust and dangerous projects did not
take effect, because the Rajah of Berar refused to join or be
concerned therein; yet so earnest was the said Hastings for the
execution of those projects, that in a subsequent letter he daringly
and treacherously assured the Rajah,

      "that, if he had accepted of the terms offered him by
      Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with the government
      of Bengal upon them, he should have held the obligation of
      it superior to that of any engagement formed by the
      government of Bombay, and should have thought it his duty to
      maintain it, &c., against every consideration _even of the
      most valuable interests and safety of the English
      possessions intrusted to his charge_."

That all the offers of the said Hastings were rejected with slight and
contempt by the Rajah of Berar; but the same being discovered, and
generally known throughout India, did fill the chief of the princes
and states of India with a general suspicion and distrust of the
ambitious designs and treacherous principles of the British
government, and with an universal hatred of the British nation. That
the said princes and states were thereby so thoroughly convinced of
the necessity of uniting amongst themselves to oppose a power which
kept no faith with any of them, and equally threatened them all, that,
renouncing all former enmities against each other, they united in a
common confederacy against the English, viz.: the Peshwa, as
representative of the Mahratta state, and Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah
of Berar, that is, the principal Hindoo powers of India, on one side;
and Hyder Ali, and the Nizam of the Deccan, that is, the principal
Mahomedan powers of India, on the other: and that in consequence of
this confederacy Hyder Ali invaded, overran, and ruined the Carnatic;
and that Moodajee Boosla, instead of _ardently catching at the objects
presented to his ambition_ by the said Hastings, sent an army to the
frontiers of Bengal,--which army the said Warren Hastings was at
length forced to buy off with twenty-six lacs of rupees, or
300,000_l._ sterling, after a series of negotiations with the Mahratta
chiefs who commanded that army, founded and conducted on principles so
dishonorable to the British name and character, that the Secret
Committee of the House of Commons, by whom the rest of the proceedings
in that business were reported to the House, _have upon due
consideration thought it proper to leave out the letter of
instructions to Mr. Anderson_, viz., those given by the said Warren
Hastings to the representative of the British government, and
concerning which the said committee have reported in the following
terms:

      "The schemes of policy by which the Governor-General seems
      to have dictated the instructions he gave to Mr. Anderson"
      (the gentleman deputed) "will also appear in this document,
      as well respecting the particular succession to the _rauje_,
      as also the mode of accommodating the demand of _chout_, the
      establishment of which was apparently the great aim of
      Moodajee's political manoeuvres, while the
      Governor-General's wish to defeat it was avowedly more
      intent on the removal of a nominal disgrace than on the
      anxiety or resolution to be freed from an expensive, if an
      unavoidable incumbrance."

That, while the said Warren Hastings was endeavoring to persuade the
Rajah of Berar to engage with him in a scheme to place the said Rajah
at the head of the Mahratta empire, the Presidency of Bombay, by
virtue of the powers specially vested in them for that purpose by the
said Hastings, did really engage with Ragonaut Row, the other
competitor for the same object, and sent a great part of their
military force, established for the defence of Bombay, on an
expedition with Ragonaut Row, to invade the dominions of the Peshwa,
and to take Poonah, the capital thereof; that this army, being
surrounded and overpowered by the Mahrattas, was obliged to
capitulate; and then, through the moderation of the Mahrattas, was
permitted to return quietly, but _very disgracefully_, to Bombay.
That, supposing the said Warren Hastings could have been justified in
abandoning the project of reinstating Ragonaut Row, which he at first
authorized and promised to support, and in preferring a scheme to
place the Rajah of Berar at the head of the Mahratta empire, he was
bound by his duty, as well as injustice to the Presidency of Bombay,
to give that Presidency timely notice of such his intention, and to
have restrained them positively from resuming their own project; that,
on the contrary, the said Warren Hastings did, on the 17th of August,
1778, again _authorize_ the said Presidency "to assist Ragoba with a
military force to conduct him to Poonah, and to establish him in the
regency there," and, so far from communicating his change of plan to
Bombay, did keep it concealed from that Presidency, insomuch that,
even so late as the 19th of February, 1779, William Hornby, then
Governor of Bombay, declared in Council his total ignorance of the
schemes of the said Hastings in the following terms:

      "The schemes of the Governor-General and Council with regard
      to the Rajah of Berar _being yet unknown to us_, it is
      impossible for us to found any measures on them; yet I
      cannot help now observing, that, if, as has been
      conjectured, the gentleman of that Presidency have
      entertained thoughts of restoring, in his person, the
      ancient Rajah government, the attempt seems likely to be
      attended with no small difficulty."

That, whereas the said Warren Hastings did repeatedly affirm that it
was his intention to support the plan formed by the Presidency of
Bombay in favor of Ragoba, and did repeatedly authorize and encourage
them to pursue it, he did nevertheless, at the same time, in his
letters and declarations to the Peshwa, to the Nizam, and to the Rajah
of Berar, falsely and perfidiously affirm, _that it never was nor is
designed by the English chiefs to give support to Ragonaut Row,--that
he_ (Hastings) _had no idea of supporting Ragonaut Row,--and that the
detachment he had sent to Bombay was solely to awe the French, without
the least design to assist Ragonaut Row_. That, supposing it to have
been the sole _professed_ intention of the said Hastings, in sending
an army across India, to protect Bombay against a Trench invasion,
even that pretence was false, and used only to cover the real design
of the said Hastings, viz., to engage in projects of war and conquest
with the Rajah of Berar. That on the 11th of October, 1778, he
informed the said Rajah "that the detachment would soon arrive in his
territories, and depend on him [Moodajee Boosla] for its subsequent
operations"; that on the 7th of December, 1778, the said Hastings
revoked the powers he had before given[19] to the Presidency of Bombay
over the detachment, declaring that the event of Colonel Goddard's
negotiation with the Rajah of Berar _was likely to cause a very speedy
and essential change in the design and operations of the detachment_;
and that on the 4th of March, 1779, the said Hastings, immediately
after receiving advice of the defeat of the Bombay army near Poonah,
and when Bombay, if at any time, particularly required to be protected
against a French invasion, did declare in Council that he _wished for
the return of the detachment to Berar, and dreaded to hear of its
proceeding to the Malabar coast_: and therefore, if the said Hastings
did not think that Bombay was in danger of being attacked by the
French, he was guilty of repeated falsehoods in affirming the contrary
for the purpose of covering a criminal design; or, if he thought that
Bombay was immediately threatened with that danger, he then was guilty
of treachery in ordering an army necessary on that supposition to the
immediate defence of Bombay to halt in Berar, to depend on the Rajah
of Berar for its subsequent operations, or on _the event of a
negotiation_ with that prince, which, as the said Hastings declared,
_was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the design
and operations of the detachment_; and finally, in declaring that _he
dreaded to hear of the said detachment's proceeding to the Malabar
coast_, whither he ought to have ordered it to proceed without delay,
if, as he has solemnly affirmed, it was true that _he had been told by
the highest authority that a powerful armament had been prepared in
France, the first object_ of which was an attack upon Bombay, and that
he knew with moral certainty that all the powers of the adjacent
continent were ready to join the invasion_.

That through the whole of these transactions the said Warren Hastings
has been guilty of continued falsehood, fraud, contradiction, and
duplicity, highly dishonorable to the character of the British nation;
that, in consequence of the unjust and ill-concerted schemes of the
said Hastings, the British arms, heretofore respected in India, have
suffered repeated disgraces, and great calamities have been thereby
brought upon India; and that the said Warren Hastings, as well in
exciting and promoting the late unprovoked and unjustifiable war
against the Mahrattas, as in the conduct thereof, has been guilty of
sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.

That, by the definitive treaty of peace concluded with the Mahrattas
at Poorunder, on the 1st of March, 1776, the Mahrattas gave up all
right and title to the island of Salsette, unjustly taken from them by
the Presidency of Bombay; did also give up to the English Company
forever all right and title to their entire shares of the city and
purgunnah of Baroach; did also give forever to the English Company a
country of three lacs of rupees revenue, near to Baroach; and did also
agree to pay to the Company twelve lacs of rupees, in part of the
expenses of the English army: and that the terms of the said treaty
_were honorable and advantageous to the India Company_.[20]

That Warren Hastings, having broken the said treaty, and forced the
Mahrattas into another war by a repeated invasion of their country,
and having conducted that war in the manner hereinbefore described,
did, on the 17th of May, 1782, by the agency of Mr. David Anderson,
conclude another treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance with the
Mahrattas, by which the said Hastings agreed to deliver up to them all
the countries, places, cities, and forts, particularly the island of
Bassein, (taken from the Peshwa during the war,) and to relinquish all
claim to the country of three lacs of rupees ceded to the Company by
the treaty of Poorunder; that the said Warren Hastings did also at the
said time, by a private and separate agreement, deliver up to Mahdajee
Sindia the whole of the city of Baroach,--that is, not only the share
in the said city which the India Company acquired by the treaty of
Poorunder, but the other share thereof which the India Company
possessed for several years before that treaty; and that among the
reasons assigned by Mr. David Anderson for totally stripping the
Presidency of Bombay of all their possessions on the Malabar coast, he
has declared,

      "that, from the general tenor of the _rest_ of the treaty,
      the settlement of Bombay would be in future put on such a
      footing that it might well become a question whether the
      possession of an inconsiderable territory without forts
      would not be attended with more loss than advantage, as it
      must necessarily occasion considerable expense, must require
      troops for its defence, and might probably in the end lead,
      as Sindia apprehended, to a renewal of war."

That the said Warren Hastings, having in this manner put an end to a
war commenced by him without provocation, and continued by him without
necessity, and having for that purpose made so many sacrifices to the
Mahrattas in points of essential interest to the India Company, did
consent and agree to other articles utterly dishonorable to the
British name and character, having sacrificed or abandoned every one
of the native princes who by _his_ solicitations and promises had been
engaged to take part with us in the war,--and that he did so without
necessity: since it appears that Sindia, the Mahratta chief who
concluded the treaty, _in every part of his conduct manifested a
hearty desire of establishing a peace_ with us; and that this was the
disposition of all the parties in the Mahratta confederacy, who were
only kept together by a general dread of their common enemy, the
English, and who only waited for a cessation of hostilities with us to
return to their habitual and permanent enmity against each other. That
the Governor-General and Council, in their letter of 31st August,
1781, made the following declaration to the Court of Directors.

      "The Mahrattas have demanded the sacrifice of the person of
      Ragonaut Row, the surrender of the fort and territories of
      Ahmedabad, and of the fortress of Gualior, _which are not
      ours to give, and which we could not wrest from the
      proprietors without the greatest violation of public faith_.
      No state of affairs, in our opinions, could warrant our
      acquiescence to such requisition; and we are morally
      certain, that, had we yielded to them, such a consciousness
      of the state of our affairs would have been implied as would
      have produced an effect the very reverse from that for which
      it was intended, by raising the presumption of the enemy to
      exact yet more _ignominious_ terms, or perhaps their refusal
      to accept of any; nor, in our opinion, would they have
      failed to excite in others the same belief, and the
      consequent decision of all parties against us, as the
      natural consequences of our decline."

That the said Hastings himself, in his instructions to Mr. David
Anderson, after authorizing him to restore _all_ that we had conquered
during the war, expressly "_excepted_ Ahmedabad, and the territory
conquered for Futty Sing Gwicowar." That, nevertheless, the said
Hastings, in the peace concluded by him, has yielded to every one of
the conditions reprobated in the preceding declarations as
_ignominious_ and incompatible with public faith.

That the said Warren Hastings did abandon the Ranna of Gohud in the
manner already charged; and that the said Ranna has not only lost the
fort of Gualior, but all his own country, and is himself a prisoner.
That the said Hastings did not interpose to obtain any terms in favor
of the Nabob of Bopaul, who was _with great reason desirous of
concealing from the Mahrattas the attachment he had borne to the
English government:_[21] the said Nabob having a just dread of the
danger of being exposed to the resentment of the Mahrattas, and no
dependence on the faith and protection of the English. That by the
ninth article of the treaty with Futty Sing it was stipulated, that,
when a negotiation for peace should take place, his interest should be
primarily considered; and that Mr. David Anderson, the minister and
representative of the Governor-General and Council, did declare to
Sindia, that it was indispensably incumbent on us to support Futty
Sing's rights: that, nevertheless, every acquisition made for or by
the said Futty Sing during the war, particularly _the fort and
territories of Ahmedabad_, were given up by the said Hastings; that
Futty Sing was replaced under the subjection of the Peshwa, (whose
resentment he had provoked by taking part with us in the war,) and
under an obligation to pay a tribute, not specified, to the Peshwa,
and to perform such services and to be subject to such obedience _as
had long been established and customary_; and that, no limit being
fixed to such tribute or services, the said Futty Sing has been left
wholly at the mercy of the Mahrattas.

That, with respect to Ragoba, the said Hastings, in his instructions
to Mr. Anderson, dated 4th of November, 1781, contented himself with
saying, "We cannot _totally_ abandon the interests of Ragonaut Row.
Endeavor to obtain for him an adequate provision." That Mr. Anderson
declared to Mahdajee Sindia,[22]

      "that, as we had given Ragoba protection as an independent
      prince, and not brought him into our settlement as a
      prisoner, we could not _in honor_ pretend to impose the
      _smallest_ restraint on his will, and he must be at liberty
      to go wherever he pleased; that it must rest with Sindia
      himself to prevail on him to reside in his country: all that
      we could do was to _agree_, after a reasonable time, _to
      withdraw our protection from him, and not to insist on the
      payment of the stipend to him_, as Sindia had proposed,
      unless on the condition of his residing in some part of
      Sindia's territories."

That, notwithstanding all the preceding declarations, and in violation
of the public faith repeatedly pledged to Ragoba, he was totally
abandoned by the said Hastings in the treaty, no provision whatever
being made even for his subsistence, but on a condition to which he
could not submit without the certain loss of his liberty and probable
hazard of his life, namely, _that he should voluntarily and of his own
accord repair to Sindia, and quietly reside with him_. That such
treacherous desertion of the said Ragoba is not capable of being
justified by any plea of necessity: but that in fact no such necessity
existed; since it appears that the Nizam, who of all the contracting
parties in the confederacy was personally most hostile to Ragoba, did
himself _propose that Ragoba, might have an option given him_ of
residing within the Company's territories.

That the plan of negotiating a peace with the Mahrattas by application
to Sindia, and through his mediation, was earnestly recommended to the
said Hastings by the Presidency of Bombay so early as in February,
1779, who stated clearly to him the reasons why such application ought
to be made to Sindia in preference to any other of the Mahratta
chiefs, and why it would probably be successful; the truth and justice
of which reasons were fully evinced in the issue, when the said
Hastings, after incurring, by two years' delay, all the losses and
distresses of a calamitous war, did actually pursue that very plan
with much less effect or advantage than might have been obtained at
the time the advice was given. That he neglected the advice of the
Presidency of Bombay, and retarded the peace, as well as made its
conditions worse, from an obstinate attachment to his project of an
alliance offensive and defensive with the Rajah of Berar, the object
of which was rather a new war than a termination of the war then
existing against the Peshwa.

That the said Hastings did further embarrass and retard the conclusion
of a peace by employing different ministers at the courts of the
several confederate powers, whom he severally empowered to treat and
negotiate a peace. That these ministers, not acting in concert, not
knowing the extent of each other's commissions, and having no
instructions to communicate their respective proceedings to each
other, did in effect counteract their several negotiations. That this
want of concert and of simplicity, and the mystery and intricacy in
the mode of conducting the negotiation on our part, was complained of
by our ministers as embarrassing and disconcerting to us, while it was
advantageous to the adverse party, who were thereby furnished with
opportunity and pretence for delay, when it suited their purpose, and
enabled to play off one set of negotiators against another; that it
also created jealousy and distrust in the various contending parties,
with whom we were treating at the same time, and to whom we were
obliged to make contradictory professions, while it betrayed and
exposed to them all our own eagerness and impatience for peace,
raising thereby the general claims and pretensions of the enemy. That,
while Dalhousie Watherston, Esquire, was treating at Poonah, and David
Anderson, Esquire, in Sindia's camp, with separate powers applied to
the same object, the minister at Poonah informed the said Watherston,
that he had received proposals for peace from the Nabob of Arcot with
the approbation of Sir Eyre Coote; that he had returned other
proposals to the said Nabob of Arcot, who had assured him, the
minister, that those proposals _would be acceded to, and that Mr.
Macpherson would set out for Bengal, after which orders should be
immediately dispatched from the Honorable the Governor-General and
Council to the effect he wished_; that the said Nabob

      "had promised to obtain and forward to him the expected
      _orders from Bengal in fifteen days_, and that he was
      therefore every instant in expectation of their
      arrival,--and observed, that, when General Goddard proposed
      to send a confidential person to Poonah, he conceived that
      those orders must have actually reached him":

that therefore the treaty formally concluded by David Anderson was in
effect and substance the same with that offered and in reality
concluded by the Nabob of Arcot, with the exception only of Salsette,
which the Nabob of Arcot had agreed to restore to the Mahrattas.

That the intention of the said Warren Hastings, in pressing for a
peace with the Mahrattas on terms so dishonorable and by measures so
rash and ill-concerted, was not to restore and establish a general
peace throughout India, but to engage the India Company in a new war
against Hyder Ali, and to make the Mahrattas parties therein. That the
eagerness and passion with which the said Hastings pursued this object
laid him open to the Mahrattas, who depended thereon for obtaining
whatever they should demand from us. That, in order to carry the point
of an offensive alliance against Hyder Ali, the said Hastings exposed
the negotiation for peace with the Mahrattas to many difficulties and
delays. That the Mahrattas were bound by a clear and recent
engagement, which Hyder had never violated in any article, to make no
peace with us which should not include him; that they pleaded the
sacred nature of this obligation in answer to all our requisitions on
this head, while the said Hastings, still importunate for his favorite
point, suggested to them various means of reconciling a substantial
breach of their engagement with a formal observance of it, and taught
them how they might at once be parties in a peace with Hyder Ali and
in an offensive alliance for immediate hostility against him. That
these lessons of public duplicity and artifice, and these devices of
ostensible faith and real treachery, could have no effect but to
degrade the national character, and to inspire the Mahrattas
themselves, with whom we were in treaty, with a distrust in our
sincerity and good faith. That the object of this fraudulent policy
(viz., the utter destruction of Hyder Ali, and a partition of his
dominions) was neither wise in itself, or authorized by the orders and
instructions of the Company to their servants; that it was
incompatible with the treaty of peace, in which Hyder Ali was
included, and contrary to the repeated and best-understood injunctions
of the Company,--being, in the first place, a bargain for a new war,
and, in the next, aiming at an extension of our territory by conquest.
That the best and soundest political opinions on the relations of
these states have always represented our great security against the
power of the Mahrattas to depend on its being balanced by that of
Hyder Ali; and the Mysore country is so placed as a barrier between
the Carnatic and the Mahrattas as to make it our interest rather to
strengthen and repair that barrier than to level and destroy it. That
the said treaty of partition does express itself to be _eventual_ with
regard to the making and keeping of peace; but through the whole
course of the said Hastings's proceeding he did endeavor to prevent
any peace with the Sultan or Nabob of Mysore, Tippoo Sahib, and did
for a long time endeavor to frustrate all the methods which could have
rendered the said treaty of conquest and partition wholly unnecessary.

That the Mahrattas having taken no effectual step to oblige Hyder Ali
to make good the conditions for which they had engaged in his behalf,
and the war continuing to be carried on in the Carnatic by Tippoo
Sultan, son and successor of Hyder Ali, the Presidency of Fort St.
George undertook, upon their own authority, to open a negotiation with
the said Tippoo: which measure, though indispensably necessary, the
said Hastings utterly disapproved and discountenanced, expressly
denying that there was any ground or motive for entering into any
direct or separate treaty with Tippoo, and not consenting to or
authorizing any negotiation for such treaty, until after a cessation
of hostilities had been brought about with him by the Presidency of
Fort St. George, in August, 1783, and the ministers of Tippoo had been
received and treated with by that Presidency, and commissioners, in
return, actually sent by the said Presidency to the court of Poonah:
which late and reluctant consent and authority were extorted from him,
the said Hastings, in consequence of the acknowledgment of his agent
at the court of Mahdajee Sindia, upon whom the said Warren Hastings
had depended for enforcing the clauses of the Mahratta treaty, of the
precariousness of such dependence, and of the necessity of that direct
and separate treaty with Tippoo, so long and so lately reprobated by
the said Warren Hastings, notwithstanding the information and
entreaties of the Presidency of Fort St. George, as well as the known
distresses and critical situation of the Company's affairs. That,
though the said Warren Hastings did at length give instructions for
negotiating and making peace with Tippoo, expressly adding, that those
instructions extended to _all_ the points which occurred to _him or
them_ as capable of being agitated or gained upon the
occasion,--though the said instructions were sent after the said
commissioners by the Presidency of Fort St. George, with directions to
obey them,--though not only the said instructions were obeyed, but
advantages gained which did not occur to the said Warren
Hastings,--though the said peace formed a contrast with the Mahratta
peace, in neither ceding any territory possessed by the Company before
the war, or delivering up any dependant or ally to the vengeance of
his adversaries, but providing for the restoration of all the
countries that had been taken from the Company and their
allies,--though the Supreme Council of Calcutta, forming the legal
government of Bengal in the absence of the said Warren Hastings,
ratified the said treaty,--yet the said Warren Hastings, then absent
from the seat of government, and out of the province of Bengal, and
forming no legal or integral part of the government during such
absence, did, after such ratification, usurp the power of acting as a
part of such government (as if actually sitting in Council with the
other members of the same) in the consideration and unqualified
censure of the terms of the said peace.

That the Nabob of Arcot, with whom the said Hastings did keep up an
unwarrantable clandestine correspondence, without any communication
with the Presidency of Madras, wrote a letter of complaint, dated the
27th of March, 1784, against the Presidency of that place, without any
communication thereof to the said Presidency, the said complaint being
addressed to the said Warren Hastings, the substance of which
complaint was, that he, the Nabob, had not been made a party to the
late treaty; and although his interest had been sufficiently provided
for in the said treaty, the said Warren Hastings did sign a
declaration, on the 23d of May, at Lucknow, forming the basis of a new
article, and making a new party to the treaty, after it had been by
all parties (the Supreme Council of Calcutta included) completed and
ratified, and did transmit the said new stipulation to the Presidency
at Calcutta, solely for the purposes and at the instigation of the
Nabob of Arcot; and the said declaration was made without any previous
communication with the Presidency aforesaid, and in consequence
thereof orders were sent by the Council at Calcutta to the Presidency
of Fort St. George, _under the severest threats in case of
disobedience_: which orders, whatever were their purport, would, as an
undue assumption of and participation in the government, from which he
was absent, become a high misdemeanor; but, being to the purport of
opening the said treaty after its solemn ratification, and proposing a
new clause and a new party to the same, was also an aggravation of
such misdemeanor, as it tended to convey to the Indian powers an idea
of the unsteadiness of the councils and determinations of the British
government, and to take away all reliance on its engagements, and as,
above all, it exposed the affairs of the nation and the Company to the
hazard of seeing renewed all the calamities of war, from whence by the
conclusion of the treaty they had emerged, and upon a pretence so weak
as that of proposing the Nabob of Arcot to be a party to the
same,--though he had not been made a party by the said Warren Hastings
in the Mahratta treaty, which professed to be for the relief of the
Carnatic,--though he was not a party to the former treaty with Hyder,
also relative to the Carnatic,--though it was not certain, if the
treaty were once opened, and that even Tippoo should then consent to
that Nabob's being a party, whether he, the said Nabob, would agree to
the clauses of the same, and consequently whether the said treaty,
once opened, could afterwards be concluded: an uncertainty of which
he, the said Hastings, should have learned to be aware, having already
once been disappointed by the said Nabob's refusing to accede to a
treaty which he, the said Warren Hastings, made for him with the
Dutch, about a year before.

That the said Warren Hastings,--having broken a solemn and honorable
treaty of peace by an unjust and unprovoked war,--having neglected to
conclude that war when he might have done it without loss of honor to
the nation,--having plotted and contrived, as far as depended on him,
to engage the India Company in another war as soon as the former
should be concluded,--and having at last put an end to a most unjust
war against the Mahrattas by a most ignominious peace with them, in
which he sacrificed objects essential to the interests, and submitted
to conditions utterly incompatible with the honor of this nation, and
with his own declared sense of the dishonorable nature of those
conditions,--and having endeavored to open anew the treaty concluded
with Tippoo Sultan through the means of the Presidency of Fort St.
George, upon principles of justice and honor, and which established
peace in India, and thereby exposing the British possessions there to
the renewal of the dangers and calamities of war,--has by these
several acts been guilty of sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.




XXI.--CORRESPONDENCE.



That, by an act of the 13th year of his present Majesty, intituled,

      "An act for establishing certain regulations for the better
      management of the affairs of the East India Company, as well
      in India as in Europe, the Governor-General and Council are
      required and directed to pay due obedience to all such
      orders as they shall receive from the Court of Directors of
      the said United Company, and to correspond from time to
      time, and constantly and diligently transmit to the said
      Court an exact particular of all advices or intelligence and
      of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come
      to their knowledge, relating to the government, commerce,
      revenues, or interest of the said United Company."

That, in consequence of the above-recited act, the Court of Directors,
in their general instructions of the 29th March, 1774, to the
Governor-General and Council, did direct,

      "that the correspondence with the princes or country powers
      in India should be carried on through the Governor-General
      only; but that all letters to be sent by him should be first
      approved in Council; and that he should lay before the
      Council, at their next meeting, all letters received by him
      in the course of such correspondence, for their
      information."

And the Governor-General and Council were therein further ordered,

      "that, in transacting the business of their department, they
      should enter with the utmost perspicuity and exactness all
      their proceedings whatsoever, and all dissents, if such
      should at any time be made by any member of their board,
      together with all letters sent or received in the course of
      their correspondence; and that broken sets of such
      proceedings, to the latest period possible, be transmitted
      to them [the Court of Directors], a complete set at the end
      of every year, and a duplicate by the next conveyance."

That, in defiance of the said orders, and in breach of the
above-recited act of Parliament, the said Warren Hastings has, in
sundry instances, concealed from his Council the correspondence
carried on between him and the princes or country powers in India, and
neglected to communicate the advices and intelligence he from time to
time received from the British Residents at the different courts in
India to the other members of the government, and, without their
knowledge, counsel, or participation, has dispatched orders on matters
of the utmost consequence to the interests of the Company.

That, moreover, the said Warren Hastings, for the purpose of covering
his own improper and dangerous practices from his employers, has
withheld from the Court of Directors, upon sundry occasions, copies of
the proceedings had, and the correspondence carried on by him in his
official capacity as Governor-General, whereby the Court of Directors
have been kept in ignorance of matters which it highly imported them
to know, and the affairs of the Company have been exposed to much
inconvenience and injury.

That, in all such concealments and acts done or ordered without the
consent and authority of the Supreme Council, the said Warren Hastings
has been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors.




XXII.--FYZOOLA KHAN.



PART I.


RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHAN, ETC., BEFORE THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.


I. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, who now holds of the Vizier the
territory of Rampoor, Shahabad, and certain other districts dependent
thereon, in the country of the Rohillas, is the second son of a prince
renowned in the history of Hindostan under the name of Ali Mohammed
Khan, some time sovereign of all that part of Rohilcund which is
particularly distinguished by the appellation of the Kutteehr.

II. That, after the death of Ali Mohammed aforesaid, as Fyzoola Khan,
together with his elder brother, was then a prisoner of war at a place
called Herat, "the Rohilla chiefs took possession of the ancient
estates" of the captive princes; and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was from
necessity compelled to waive his hereditary rights for the
inconsiderable districts of Rampoor and Shahabad, then estimated to
produce from six to eight lacs of annual revenue.

III. That in 1774, on the invasion of Rohilcund by the united armies
of the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Company, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan,
"with some of his people, was present at the decisive battle of St.
George," where Hafiz Rhamet, the great leader of the Rohillas, and
many others of their principal chiefs were slain; but, escaping from
the slaughter, Fyzoola Khan "made his retreat good towards the
mountains, with all his treasure." He there collected the scattered
remains of his countrymen; and as he was the eldest surviving son of
Ali Mohammed Khan, as, too, the most powerful obstacle to his
pretensions was now removed by the death of Hafiz, he seems at length
to have been generally acknowledged by his natural subjects the
undoubted heir of his father's authority.

IV. That, "regarding the sacred _sincerity_ and friendship of the
English, whose _goodness_ and celebrity is everywhere known, _who
dispossess no one_," the Nabob Fyzoola Khan made early overtures for
peace to Colonel Alexander Champion, commander-in-chief of the
Company's forces in Bengal: that he did propose to the said Colonel
Alexander Champion, in three letters, received on the 14th, 24th, and
27th of May, to put himself under the protection either of the
Company, or of the Vizier, through the mediation and with the guaranty
of the Company; and that he did offer, "whatever was conferred upon
him, to pay as much without damage or deficiency as any other person
would agree to do": stating, at the same time, his condition and
pretensions hereinbefore recited as facts "evident as the sun"; and
appealing, in a forcible and awful manner, to the generosity and
magnanimity of this nation, "by whose means he hoped in God that he
should receive justice"; and as "the person who designed the war was
no more," as "in that he was himself guiltless," and as

      "he had never acted in such a manner as for the Vizier to
      have taken hatred to his heart against him, that he might be
      reinstated in his ancient possessions, the country of Ins
      father."

V. That on the last of the three dates above mentioned, that is to
say, on the 27th of May, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did also send to the
commander-in-chief a _vakeel_, or ambassador, who was authorized on
the part of him, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, his master, to make a
specific offer of three propositions; and that by one of the said
propositions

      "an annual increase of near 400,000_l._ would have accrued
      to the revenues of our ally, and the immediate acquisition
      of above 300,000_l._ to the Company, for their influence in
      effecting an accommodation perfectly consistent with their
      engagements to the Vizier,"

and strictly consonant to the demands of justice.

VI. That, so great was the confidence of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan in the
just, humane, and liberal feelings of Englishmen, as to "lull him into
an inactivity" of the most essential detriment to his interests:
since, "in the hopes which he entertained from the interposition of
our government," he declined the invitation of the Mogul to join the
arms of his Majesty and the Mahrattas, "refused any connection with
the Seiks," and did even neglect to take the obvious precaution of
crossing the Ganges, as he had originally intended, while the river
was yet fordable,--a movement that would have enabled him certainly to
baffle all pursuit, and probably "to keep the Vizier in a state of
disquietude for the remainder of his life."

VII. That the commander-in-chief, Colonel Alexander Champion
aforesaid,

      "thought nothing could be more honorable to this nation than
      the support of so exalted a character; and whilst it could
      be done on terms so advantageous, supposed it very unlikely
      that the vakeel's proposition should be received with
      indifference";

that he did accordingly refer it to the administration through Warren
Hastings, Esquire, then Governor of Fort William and President of
Bengal; and he did at the same time inclose to the said Warren
Hastings a letter from the Nabob Fyzoola Khan to the said
Hastings,--which letter does not appear, but must be supposed to have
been of the same tenor with those before cited to the
commander-in-chief,--of which also copies were sent to the said
Hastings by the commander-in-chief; and he, the commander-in-chief
aforesaid, after urging to the said Hastings sundry good and cogent
arguments of policy and prudence in favor of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan,
did conclude by "wishing for nothing so much as for the adoption of
some measure that might strike all the powers of the East with
admiration of our justice, in contrast to the conduct of the Vizier."

VIII. That, in answer to such laudable wish of the said
commander-in-chief, the President, Warren Hastings, preferring his own
prohibited plans of extended dominion to the mild, equitable, and wise
policy inculcated in the standing orders of his superiors, and now
enforced by the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, did instruct
and "desire" him, the said commander-in-chief, "instead of soliciting
the Vizier to relinquish his conquest to Fyzoola Khan, to discourage
it as much as was in his power"; although the said Hastings did not
once express, or even intimate, any doubt whatever of the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan's innocence as to the origin of the war, or of his
hereditary right to the territories which he claimed, but to the said
pleas of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, as well as to the arguments both of
policy and justice advanced by the commander-in-chief, he, the said
Hastings, did solely oppose certain speculative objects of imagined
expediency, summing up his decided rejection of the proposals made by
the Nabob Fyzoola Khan in the following remarkable words.

      "With respect to Fyzoola Khan, _he appears not to merit our
      consideration. The petty sovereign of a country estimated at
      six or eight lacs ought not for a moment to prove an
      impediment to any of our measures, or to affect the
      consistency of our conduct_."

IX. That, in the aforesaid violent and arbitrary position, the said
Warren Hastings did avow it to be a public principle of his
government, that no right, however manifest, and no innocence, however
unimpeached, could entitle the weak to our protection against others,
or save them from our own active endeavors for their oppression, and
even extirpation, should they interfere with our notions of political
expediency; and that such a principle is highly derogatory to the
justice and honor of the English name, and fundamentally injurious to
our interests, inasmuch as it hath an immediate tendency to excite
distrust, jealousy, fear, and hatred against us among all the
subordinate potentates of Hindostan.

X. That, in prosecution of the said despotic principle, the President,
Warren Hastings aforesaid, did persist to obstruct, as far as in him
lay, every advance towards an accommodation between the Vizier Sujah
ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan; and particularly on the 16th of
September, only eight days after the said Hastings, in, conjunction
with the other members of the Select Committee of Bengal, had publicly
testified his _satisfaction_ in the prospect of _an accommodation_,
and had _hoped_ that "his Excellency [the Vizier] would be disposed to
conciliate the affections [of the Rohillas] to his government _by
acceding to lenient terms_," he, the said Hastings, did nevertheless
write, and without the consent or knowledge of his colleagues did
privately dispatch, a certain answer to a letter of the
commander-in-chief, in which answer the said Hastings did express
other _contradictory hopes_, namely, that the commander-in-chief _had
resolved on prosecuting the war to a final issue_,--"because" (as the
said Hastings explains himself)

      "it appears very plainly that Fyzoola Khan and his adherents
      _lay at your mercy_, because I apprehend much inconveniency
      from delays, and because _I am morally certain that no good
      will he gained by negotiating_":

thereby artfully suggesting his wishes of what might be, in his hopes
of what had been, resolved; and plainly, though indirectly,
instigating the commander-in-chief to much effusion of blood in an
immediate attack on the Rohillas, posted as they were "in a very
strong situation," and "combating for all."

XI. That the said Hastings, in the answer aforesaid, did further
endeavor to inflame the commander-in-chief against the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan, by representing the said Nabob "as highly presuming, insolent,
and evasive"; and knowing the distrust which the Nabob Fyzoola Khan
entertained of the Vizier, the said Hastings did "expressly desire it
should be left wholly to the Vizier to treat with the enemy by _his
own agents_ and _in his own manner_,"--though he, the said Hastings,

      "by no means wished the Vizier to lose time by seeking an
      accommodation, since it would be more effectual, more
      decisive, and more _consistent with his dignity, indeed with
      his honor, which he has already pledged_, to abide by his
      first offers, to dictate the conditions of peace, and to
      admit only an acceptance without reservation, or a clear
      refusal, from his adversary":

thereby affecting to hold up, in opposition to and in exclusion of the
substantial claims of justice, certain ideal obligations of dignity
and honor,--that is to say, the gratification of pride, and the
observance of an arrogant determination once declared.

XII. That, although the said answer did not reach the
commander-in-chief until peace was actually concluded, and although
the dangerous consequences to be apprehended from the said answer were
thereby prevented, yet, by the sentiments contained in the said
answer, Warren Hastings, Esquire, did strongly evince his ultimate
adherence to all the former violent and unjust principles of his
conduct towards the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, which principles were
disgraceful to the character and injurious to the interests of this
nation; and that the said Warren Hastings did thereby, in a particular
manner, exclude himself from any share of credit for "the honorable
period put to the Rohilla war, which has in some degree done away the
reproach so wantonly brought on the English name."





PART II.



RIGHTS OF FYZOOLA KHAN UNDER THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.


I. That, notwithstanding the culpable and criminal reluctance of the
President, Hastings, hereinbefore recited, a treaty of peace and
friendship between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan was finally signed and sealed on the 7th October, 1774, at a
place called Lall-Dang, in the presence and with the attestation of
the British commander-in-chief, Colonel Alexander Champion aforesaid;
and that for the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khan agreed to pay, and
did actually pay, the valuable consideration of half his treasure, to
the amount of fifteen lacs of rupees, or 150,000_l._ sterling, and
upwards.

II. That by the said treaty the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was established in
the quiet possession of Rampoor, Shahabad, and "some other districts
dependent thereon," subject to certain conditions, of which the more
important were as follow.

"That Fyzoola Khan should retain in his service five thousand
_troops_, and not a single man more.

"That, with whomsoever the Vizier should make war, Fyzoola Khan should
send _two or three thousand men, according to his ability_, to join
the forces of the Vizier.

"And that, if the Vizier should march in person, Fyzoola Khan should
himself accompany him _with his troops_."

III. That from the terms of the treaty above recited it doth plainly,
positively, and indisputably appear that the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, in
case of war, was not bound to furnish more than three thousand men
under any construction, unless the Vizier should march in person.

IV. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was not positively bound to furnish so
many as three thousand men, but an indefinite number, not more than
three and not less than two thousand; that of the precise number
within such limitations the ability of Fyzoola Khan, and not the
discretion of the Vizier, was to be the standard; and that such
ability could only mean that which was equitably consistent not only
with the external defence of his jaghire, but with the internal good
management thereof, both as to its police and revenue.

V. That, even in case the Vizier should march in person, it might be
reasonably doubted whether the personal service of the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan "with his troops" must be understood to be with _all_ his troops,
or only with the number before stipulated, not more than three and not
less than two thousand men; and that the latter is the interpretation
finally adopted by Warren Hastings aforesaid, and the Council of
Bengal, who, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated April 5th,
1783, represent the clauses of the treaty relative to the stipulated
aid as meaning simply that Fyzoola Khan "should send two or three
thousand men to join the Vizier's forces, or attend in person in case
it should be requisite."

VI. That from the aforesaid terms of the treaty it doth not
specifically appear of what the stipulated aid should consist, whether
of horse or foot, or in what proportion of both; but that it is the
recorded opinion, maturely formed by the said Hastings and his
Council, in January, 1783, that even "a single horseman included in
the aid which Fyzoola Khan might furnish would prove a literal
compliance with the stipulation."

VII. That, in the event of any doubt fairly arising from the terms of
the treaty, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, in consideration of his hereditary
right to the whole country, and the price by him actually paid for the
said treaty, was in equity entitled to the most favorable
construction.

VIII. That, from the attestation of Colonel Champion aforesaid, the
government of Calcutta acquired the same right to interpose with the
Vizier for the protection of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan as they, the said
government, had before claimed from a similar attestation of Sir
Robert Barker to assist the Vizier in extirpating the whole nation of
the said Fyzoola Khan,--more especially as in the case of Sir Robert
Barker it was contrary to the remonstrances of the then
administration, and the furthest from the intentions of the said
Barker himself, that his attestation should involve the Company, but
the attestation of Colonel Champion was authorized by all the powers
of the government, as a "sanction" intended "to add validity" to the
treaty; that they, the said government, and in particular the said
Warren Hastings, as the first executive member of the same, were bound
by the ties of natural justice duly to exercise the aforesaid right,
if need were; and that their duty so to interfere was more
particularly enforced by tho spirit of the censures passed both by the
Directors and Proprietors in the Rohilla war, and the satisfaction
expressed by tho Directors "in the honorable end put to that war."




PART III.



GUARANTY OF THE TREATY OF LALL-DANG.


I. That during the life of the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah, and for some
time after his death, under his son and successor, Asoph ul Dowlah,
the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did remain without disturbance or molestation;
that he did all the while imagine his treaty to be under the sanction
of the Company, from Colonel Champion's affixing his signature thereto
as a witness, "which signature, as he [Fyzoola Khan] supposed,"
(rendered the Company the _arbitrators_) between the Vizier and
himself, in case of disputes; and that, being "a man of sense, but
_extreme pusillanimity_, a good farmer, fond of wealth, _not possessed
of the passion of ambition_," he did peaceably apply himself to
"improve the state of his country, and did, _by his own prudence and
attention_, increase the revenues thereof beyond the amount specified
in Sujah ul Dowlah's grant."

II. That in the year 1777, and in the beginning of the year 1778,
being "alarmed at the young Vizier's resumption of a number of
jaghires granted by his father to different persons, and the injustice
and oppression of his conduct in general," and having now learned
(from whom does not appear, but probably from some person supposed of
competent authority) that Colonel Champion formerly witnessed the
treaty as a private person, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did make frequent
and urgent solicitations to Nathaniel Middleton, Esquire, then
Resident at Oude, and to Warren Hastings aforesaid, then
Governor-General of Bengal, "for a renovation of his [the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan's] treaty with the late Vizier, and the guaranty of the
Company," or for a "separate agreement with the Company for his
defence": considering them, the Company, as "the only power in which
he had confidence, and to which he could look up for protection."

III. That the said Resident Middleton, and the said Governor-General
Hastings, did not, as they were in duty bound to do, endeavor to allay
the apprehensions of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan by assuring him of his
safety under the sanction of Colonel Champion's attestation aforesaid,
but by their criminal neglect, if not by positive expressions, (as
there is just ground from their subsequent language and conduct to
believe,) they, the said Middleton and the said Hastings, did at least
keep alive and confirm (whoever may have originally suggested) the
said apprehension; and that such neglect alone was the more highly
culpable in the said Hastings, inasmuch as he, the said Hastings, in
conjunction with other members of the Select Committee of the then
Presidency of Bengal, did, on the 17th of September, 1774, write to
Colonel Champion aforesaid, publicly authorizing him, the said Colonel
Champion, to join his _sanction_ to the accommodations agreed on
between the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah and the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, _to add
to their validity_,--and on the 6th of October following did again
write to the said Colonel Champion, more explicitly, to join his
sanction, "either by attesting the treaty, or _acting as guaranty_ on
the part of the Company for the performance of it": both which
letters, though they did not arrive until after the actual signature
of the said Colonel Champion, do yet incontrovertibly mark the solemn
intention of the said Committee (of which the said Hastings was
President) that the sanction of Colonel Champion's attestation should
be regarded as a public, not a private, sanction; and it was more
peculiarly incumbent on such persons, who had been members of the said
Committee, so to regard the same.

IV. That the said Warren Hastings was further guilty of much criminal
concealment for the space of "twelve months," inasmuch as he did not
lay before the board the frequent and urgent solicitations which he,
the said Hastings, was continually receiving from the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan, until the 9th of March, 1778; on which day the said Hastings did
communicate to the Council a public letter of the aforesaid Middleton,
Resident at Oude, acquainting the board that he, the said Middleton,
taking occasion from a late application of Fyzoola Khan for the
Company's guaranty, had deputed Mr. Daniel Octavus Barwell (Assistant
Resident at Benares, but then on a visit to the Resident Middleton at
Lucknow) to proceed with a special commission to Rampoor, there to
inquire on the spot into the truth of certain reports circulated to
the prejudice of Fyzoola Khan, which reports, however, the said
Middleton did afterwards confess himself to have "_always_" _thought_
"_in the highest degree improbable_."

That the said Resident Middleton did

      "request to know whether, on proof of Fyzoola Khan's
      innocence, the honorable board would be pleased to grant him
      [the Resident] permission to comply with his [Fyzoola
      Khan's] request of the Company's guarantying his treaty with
      the Vizier."

And the said Middleton, in excuse for having irregularly "availed
himself of the abilities of Mr. Daniel Barwell," who belonged to
another station, and for deputing him with the aforesaid commission to
Rampoor without the previous knowledge of the board, did urge the plea
"_of immediate necessity_"; and that such plea, if the necessity
really existed, was a strong charge and accusation against the said
Warren Hastings, from whose criminal neglect and concealment the
urgency of such necessity did arise.

V. That the Governor-General, Warren Hastings aforesaid, did
immediately move,

      "that the board approve the deputation of Mr. Daniel
      Barwell, and that the Resident [Middleton] be authorized to
      offer the Company's guaranty for the observance of the
      treaty subsisting between the Vizier and Fyzoola Khan,
      provided it meets with the Vizier's concurrence";

and that the Governor-General's proposition was resolved in the
affirmative: the usual majority of Council then consisting of Richard
Barwell, Esquire, a near relation of Daniel Octavus Barwell aforesaid,
and the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, who, in case of an
equality, had the casting voice.

VI. That, on receiving from Mr. Daniel Barwell full and early
assurance of Fyzoola Khan's "having preserved every article of his
treaty inviolate," the Resident, Middleton, applied for the Vizier's
concurrence, which was readily obtained,--the Vizier, however,

      "_premising_, that he gave his consent, taking it for
      granted, that, on Fyzoola Khan's receiving the treaty and
      _khelaut_ [or robe of honor], he was to make him a return of
      the complimentary presents usually offered on such
      occasions, and _of such an amount as should be a
      manifestation of Fyzoola Khan's due sense of his friendship,
      and suitable to his Excellency's rank to receive_";

and that the Resident, Middleton, "did make himself in some measure
responsible for the said presents being obtained," and did write to
Mr. Daniel Barwell accordingly.

VII. That, agreeably to the resolution of Council hereinbefore
recited, the solicited guaranty, under the seal of the Resident,
Middleton, thus duly authorized on behalf of the Company, was
transmitted, together with the renewed treaty, to Mr. Daniel Barwell
aforesaid at Rampoor, and that they were both by him, the said
Barwell, presented to the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, with a solemnity not
often paralleled,

      "in the presence of the greatest part of the Nabob's
      subjects, who were assembled, that the ceremony might create
      a full belief in the breasts of all his people that the
      Company would protect him as long as he strictly adhered to
      the _letter_ of his treaty."

VIII. That, in the conclusion of the said ceremony, the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan did deliver to the said Barwell, for the use of the Vizier, a
_nuzzer_ (or present) of elephants, horses, &c., and did add thereto a
lac of rupees, or 10,000_l._ and upwards: which sum the said Barwell,

      "not being authorized to accept any pecuniary consideration,
      did at first refuse; but upon Fyzoola Khan's urging, that on
      such occasions it was the invariable custom of Hindostan,
      and _that it must on the present be expected, as it had been
      formerly the case_,"

(but when does not appear,) he, the said Barwell, did accept the said
lac in the name of the Vizier, our ally, "in whose wealth" (as Warren
Hastings on another occasion observed) "we should participate," and on
whom we at that time had an accumulating demand.

IX. That, over and above the lac of rupees thus presented to the
Vizier, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did likewise offer one other lac of
rupees, or upwards of 10,000_l._ more, for the Company,

      "as some acknowledgment of the obligation he received; that,
      although such acknowledgment was not pretended to be the
      invariable custom of Hindostan on such occasions, however it
      might on the present be expected,"

Mr. Daniel Barwell aforesaid (knowing, probably, the disposition and
views of the then actual government at Calcutta) did not, _even at
first_, decline the said offer, but, as he was not empowered to accept
it, did immediately propose taking a bond for the amount, until the
pleasure of the board should be known.

That the offer was accordingly communicated by the said Barwell to the
Resident, Middleton, to be by him, the Resident, referred to the
board, and that it was so referred; that, in reply to the said
reference of the Resident, Middleton, the Governor-General, Warren
Hastings, did move and carry a vote of Council, "authorizing Mr.
Middleton to accept the offer made by Fyzoola Khan to the Company of
one lac of rupees," without assigning any reason whatever in support
of the said motion, notwithstanding it was objected by a member of the
board, "that, if the measure was right, it became us to adopt it
without such a consideration," and that "our accepting of the lac of
rupees as a recompense for our interposition is beneath the dignity of
this government [of Calcutta], and will discredit us in the eyes of
the Indian powers."

That the acceptance of the said sum, in this circumstance, was beneath
the dignity of the said government, and did tend so to discredit us;
and that the motion of the said Hastings for such acceptance was
therefore highly derogatory to the honor of this nation.

X. That the aforesaid member of the Council did further disapprove
altogether of the guaranty, "as unnecessary"; and that another member
of Council, Richard Barwell, Esquire, the near relation of Daniel
Octavus Barwell, hereinbefore named, did declare, (but after the said
guaranty had taken place,) that "this government [of Calcutta] was in
fact engaged by Colonel Champion's signature being to the treaty with
Fyzoola Khan." That the said unnecessary guaranty did not only subject
to an heavy expense a prince whom we were bound to protect, but did
further produce in his mind the following obvious and natural
conclusion, namely, "_that the signature of any person, in whatever
public capacity he at present appears, will not be valid and of
effect, as soon as some other shall fill his station_": a conclusion,
however, immediately tending to the total discredit of all powers
delegated from the board to any individual servant of the Company, and
consequently to clog, perplex, and embarrass in future all
transactions carried on at a distance from the seat of government, and
to disturb the security of all persons possessing instruments already
so ratified,--yet the only conclusion left to Fyzoola Khan which did
not involve some affront either to the private honor of the Company's
servants or to the public honor of the Company itself; and that the
suspicions which originated from the said idea in the breast of
Fyzoola Khan to the prejudice of the Resident Middleton's authority
did compel the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, to obviate the bad
effects of his first motion for the guaranty by a second motion,
namely,

      "That a letter be written to Fyzoola Khan from myself,
      _confirming the obligations of the Company as guaranties_ to
      the treaty formed between him and the Vizier,--which will be
      equivalent in its effect, though not in form, to an
      engagement sent him with the Company's seal affixed to it."

XII.[23] That, whether the guaranty aforesaid was or was not
necessary, whether it created a new obligation or but more fully
recognized an obligation previously existing, the Governor-General,
Warren Hastings, by the said guaranty, did, in the most explicit
manner, pledge and commit the public faith of the Company and the
nation; and that by the subsequent letter of the said Hastings (which
he at his own motion wrote, confirming to Fyzoola Khan the aforesaid
guaranty) the said Hastings did again pledge and commit the public
faith of the Company and the nation, in a manner (as the said Hastings
himself remarked) "equivalent to an engagement with the Company's seal
affixed to it," and more particularly binding the said Hastings
personally to exact a due observance of the guarantied treaty,
especially to protect the Nabob Fyzoola Khan against any arbitrary
construction or unwarranted requisition of the Vizier.




PART IV.



THANKS OF THE BOARD TO FYZOOLA KHAN.


I. That, soon after the completion of the guaranty, in the same year,
1778, intelligence was received in India of a war between England and
France; that, on the first intimation thereof, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan,
"being indirectly sounded," did show much "promptness to render the
Company any assistance within the bounds of his finances and ability";
and that by the suggestion of the Resident, Middleton, hereinbefore
named, he, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, in a letter to the Governor-General
and Council, did make a voluntary "offer to maintain two thousand
cavalry (all he had) for our service," "though he was under no
obligation to furnish the Company with a single man."

II. That the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did even "anticipate the wishes of the
board"; and that, "on an application made to him by Lieutenant-Colonel
Muir," the Nabob Fyzoola Khan did, "without hesitation or delay,"
furnish him, the said Muir, with five hundred of his best cavalry.

That the said conduct of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan was communicated by
the Company's servants both to each other and to their employers, with
expressions of "pleasure" and "particular satisfaction," as an event
"even surpassing their expectations"; that the Governor-General,
Warren Hastings, was officially requested to convoy "the thanks of the
board"; and that, not satisfied with the bare discharge of his duty
under the said request, he, the said Hastings, did, on the 8th of
January, 1779, write to Fyzoola, "that, _in his own name_," as well as
"that of the board, he [the said Hastings] returned him the _warmest_
thanks for this instance of his faithful attachment to the Company and
the English nation."

IV.[24] That by the strong expressions above recited the said Warren
Hastings did deliberately and emphatically add his own particular
confirmation to the general testimony of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan's
meritorious fidelity, and of his consequent claim on the generosity,
no less than the justice, of the British government.




PART V.



DEMAND OF FIVE THOUSAND HORSE.


I. That, notwithstanding his own private honor thus deeply engaged,
notwithstanding the public justice and generosity of the Company and
the nation thus solemnly committed, disregarding the plain import and
positive terms of the guarantied treaty, the Governor-General, Warren
Hastings aforesaid, in November, 1780, while a body of Fyzoola Khan's
cavalry, voluntarily granted, were still serving under a British
officer, did recommend to the Vizier "to require from Fyzoola Khan the
quota of troops stipulated by treaty to be furnished by the latter for
his [the Vizier's] service, being FIVE THOUSAND HORSE," though, as the
Vizier did not march in person, he was not, under any construction of
the treaty, entitled by stipulation to more than "_two or three
thousand troops_," horse and foot, "according to the ability of
Fyzoola Khan"; and that, whereas the said Warren Hastings would have
been guilty of very criminal perfidy, if he had simply neglected to
interfere as a guaranty against a demand thus plainly contrary to the
faith of treaty, so he aggravated the guilt of his perfidy in the most
atrocious degree by being himself the first mover and instigator of
that injustice, which he was bound by so many ties on himself, the
Company, and the nation, not only not to promote, but, by every
exertion of authority, influence, and power, to control, to divert, or
to resist.

II. That the answer of Fyzoola Khan to the Vizier did represent, with
many expressions of deference, duty, and allegiance, that the whole
force allowed him was but "five thousand men," and that "these
consisted of two thousand horse and three thousand foot; which," he
adds, "in consequence of our intimate connection, are equally yours
and the Company's": though he does subsequently intimate, that "the
three thousand foot are for the management of the concerns of his
jaghire, and without them the collections can never be made in time."

That, on the communication of the said answer to the Governor-General,
Warren Hastings, he, the said Hastings, (who, as the Council now
consisted only of himself and Edward Wheler, Esquire, "united in his
own person all the powers of government,") was not induced to relax
from his unjust purpose, but did proceed with new violence to record,
that

      "the Nabob Fyzoola Khan _had evaded the performance of his
      part of the treaty_ between the late Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah
      and him, to which the Honorable Company were guaranties, and
      upon which he was lately summoned to furnish the stipulated
      number of troops, which he is obliged to furnish on the
      condition by which he holds the jaghire granted to him."

That, by the vague and indefinite term of evasion, the said Warren
Hastings did introduce a loose and arbitrary principle of interpreting
formal engagements, which ought to be regarded, more especially by
guaranties, ill a sense the most literally scrupulous and precise.

That he charged with such evasion a moderate, humble, and submissive
representation on a point which would have warranted a peremptory
refusal and a positive remonstrance; and that in consequence of the
said imputed evasion he indicated a disposition to attach such a
forfeiture as in justice could only have followed from a gross breach
of treaty,--though the said Hastings did not then pretend any actual
infringement even of the least among the conditions to which, in the
name of the Company, he, the said Hastings, was the executive
guaranty.

III. That, however "the number of troops stipulated by treaty may have
been understood," at the period of the original demand, "to be five
thousand horse," yet the said Warren Hastings, at the time when he
recorded the supposed evasion of Fyzoola Khan's answer to the said
demand, could not be unacquainted with the express words of the
stipulation, as a letter of the Vizier, inserted in the same
Consultation, refers the Governor-General to inclosed copies "of all
engagements entered into by the late Vizier and by himself [the
reigning Vizier] with Fyzoola Khan," and that the treaty itself,
therefore, was at the very moment before the said Warren Hastings:
which treaty (as the said Hastings observed with respect to another
treaty, in the case of another person)

      "most assuredly does not contain a syllable to justify his
      conduct; but, by the unexampled latitude which he assumes in
      his constructions, he may, if he pleases, extort this or any
      other meaning from any part of it."[25]

IV. That the Vizier himself appears by no means to have been persuaded
of his own right to five thousand horse under the treaty,--since, in
his correspondence on the subject, he, the Vizier, nowhere mentions
the treaty as the ground of his demand, except where he is
recapitulating to the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, the substance
of his, the said Hastings's, own letters; on the contrary, the Vizier
hints his apprehensions lest Fyzoola Khan should appeal to the treaty
against the demand, as a breach thereof,--in which case, he, the
Vizier, informs the said Hastings of the projected reply. "Should
Fyzoola Khan" (says the Vizier)

      "mention anything of the tenor of the treaty, _the first
      breach of it has been committed by him_, in keeping up more
      men than allowed of by the treaty: _I have accordingly sent
      a person to settle that point also_. In case he should
      mention to me anything respecting the treaty, I will then
      reproach him with having kept up too many troops, and will
      oblige him to send the five thousand horse":

thereby clearly intimating, that, as a remonstrance against the demand
as a breach of treaty could only be answered by charging a prior
breach of treaty on Fyzoola Khan, so by annulling the whole treaty to
reduce the question to a mere question of force, and thus "oblige
Fyzoola Khan to send the five thousand horse": "for," (continues the
Vizier,) "if, when the Company's affairs, on which my honor depends,
require it, Fyzoola Khan will not lend his assistance, _what_ USE _is
there to continue the country to him_?"

That the Vizier actually did make his application to Fyzoola Khan for
the five thousand horse, not as for an aid to which he had a just
claim, but as for something over and above the obligations of the
treaty, something "that would give increase to their friendship and
satisfaction to the Nabob Governor," (meaning the said Hastings,)
whose directions he represents as the motive "of his call for the five
thousand horse to be employed," not in his, the Vizier's, "but in the
Company's service."

And that the aforesaid Warren Hastings did, therefore, in recording
the answer of Fyzoola Khan as an evasion of treaty, act in notorious
contradiction not only to that which ought to have been the fair
construction of the said treaty, but to that which he, the said
Hastings, must have known to be the Vizier's own interpretation of the
same, disposed as the Vizier was "to reproach Fyzoola Khan with breach
of treaty," and to "send up persons who should settle points with
him."

V. That the said Warren Hastings, not thinking himself justified, on
the mere plea of an evasion, to push forward his proceedings to that
extremity which he seems already to have made his scope and object,
and seeking some better color for his unjust and violent purposes, did
further move, that commissioners should be sent from the Vizier and
the Company to Fyzoola Khan, to insist on a clause of a treaty which
nowhere appears, being essentially different from the treaty of
Lall-Dang, though not in the part on which the requisition is founded;
and the said Hastings did then, in a style unusually imperative,
proceed as follows.

      "_Demand immediate delivery of three thousand cavalry; and
      if he should evade or refuse compliance, that the deputies
      shall deliver him a formal protest against him for breach of
      treaty_, and return, making this report to the Vizier, which
      Mr. Middleton is to transmit to the board."

VI. That the said motion of the Governor-General, Hastings, was
ordered accordingly,--the Council, as already has been herein related,
consisting but of two members, and the said Hastings consequently
"uniting in his own person all the powers of government."

VII. That, when the said Hastings ordered the said demand for three
thousand cavalry, he, the said Hastings, well knew that a compliance
therewith, on the part of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, was utterly
impossible: for he, the said Hastings, had at the very moment before
him a letter of Fyzoola Khan, stating, that he, Fyzoola Khan, had "but
two thousand cavalry" altogether; which letter is entered on the
records of the Company, in the same Consultation, immediately
preceding the Governor-General's minute. That the said Hastings,
therefore, knew that the only possible consequence of the aforesaid
demand necessarily and inevitably must be a protest for a breach of
treaty; and the Court of Directors did not hesitate to declare that
the said demand "carried the appearance of a determination to create a
pretext for depriving him [Fyzoola Khan] of his jaghire entirely, or
to leave him at the mercy of the Vizier."

VIII. That Richard Johnson, Esquire, Assistant Resident at Oude, was,
agreeably to the afore-mentioned order of Council, deputed
commissioner from Mr. Middleton and the Vizier to Fyzoola Khan; but
that he did early give the most indecent proofs of glaring partiality,
to the prejudice of the said Fyzoola Khan: for that the very next day
(as it seems) after his arrival, he, the said Johnson, from opinions
imbibed in his journey, did state himself to be "unwilling to draw any
favorable or flattering inferences relatively to the object of his
mission," and did studiously seek to find new breaches of treaty, and,
without any form of regular inquiry whatever, from a single glance of
his eye in passing, did take upon himself to pronounce "the Rohilla
soldiers, in the district of Rampoor alone, to be not less than twenty
thousand," and the grant of course to be forfeited. And that such a
gross and palpable display of a predetermination to discover guilt did
argue in the said Johnson a knowledge, a strong presumption, or a
belief, that such representations would be agreeable to the secret
wishes and views of the said Hastings, under whose orders he, the said
Johnson, acted, and to whom all his reports were to be referred.

IX. That the said Richard Johnson, did soon after proceed to the
immediate object of his mission, "which" (the said Johnson relates)
"was short to a degree." The demand was made, and "a flat refusal"
given. The question was repeated, with like effect. The said Johnson,
in presence of proper witnesses, then drew up his protest, "together
with a memorandum of _a palliative offer_ made by the Nabob Fyzoola
Khan," and inserted in the protest:--

      "That he would, in compliance with the demand, and _in
      conformity to the treaty, which specified no definite number
      of cavalry or infantry, only expressing troops_, furnish
      three thousand men: viz., he would, in addition to the one
      thousand cavalry already granted, give one thousand more,
      when and wheresoever required, and one thousand foot,"

--together with one year's pay in advance, and funds for the regular
payment of them in future.

And this, the said Richard Johnson observes, "I put down at his [the
Nabob Fyzoola Khan's] particular desire, but otherwise useless; as _my
orders_" (which orders do not appear) "_were, not to receive any
palliation, but a negative or affirmative_": though such palliation,
as it is called by the said Johnson, might be, as it was, in the
strictest conformity to the treaty.

X. That in the said offer the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, instead of
palliating, did at once admit the extreme right of the Vizier under
the treaty, by agreeing to furnish three thousand men, when he,
Fyzoola Khan, would have been justified in pleading his inability to
send more than two thousand; that such inability would not (as
appears) have been a false and evasive plea, but perfectly true and
valid,--as the three thousand foot maintained by Fyzoola Khan were for
the purposes of his internal government, for which the whole three
thousand must have been demonstrably necessary; and that the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan, by declining to avail himself of a plea so fair, so well
founded, and so consonant to the indulgence expressly acknowledged in
the treaty, and by thus meeting the specific demand of the Vizier as
fully as, according to his own military establishment, he could, did
for the said offer deserve rather the thanks of the said Vizier and
the Company than the protest which the aforesaid Johnson, under the
orders of Warren Hastings, did deliver.

XI. That the report of the said protest, as well as the former letter
of the said Johnson, were by the Resident, Middleton, transmitted to
the board, together with a letter from the Vizier, founded on the said
report and letter of the said Johnson, and proposing in consequence
"to resume the grant, and to leave Fyzoola Khan to join his other
faithless brethren who were sent across the Ganges."

That the said papers were read in Council on the 4th of June, 1781,
when the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, did move and carry a vote
to suspend a final resolution on the same: and the said Hastings did
not express any disapprobation of the proceedings of the said Johnson;
neither did the said Hastings assign any reasons for his motion of
suspension, which passed without debate. That in truth the said
Hastings had then projected a journey up the country to meet the
Vizier for the settlement of articles relative to the regulation of
Oude and its dependencies, among which was included the jaghire of
Fyzoola Khan; and the said Hastings, for the aforesaid purposes, did,
on the 3d of July, by his own casting vote, grant to himself, and did
prevail on his colleague, Edward Wheler, Esquire, to grant, a certain
illegal delegation of the whole powers of the Governor-General and
Council, and on the seventh of the same month did proceed on his way
to join the Vizier at a place called Chunar, on the borders of
Benares; and that the aforesaid vote of suspending a final resolution
on the transactions with Fyzoola Khan was therefore in substance and
effect a reference thereof by the said Hastings from himself in
council with his colleague, Wheler, to himself in conference and
negotiation with the Vizier, who, from the first demand of the five
thousand horse, had taken every occasion of showing his inclination to
dispossess Fyzoola Khan, and who before the said demand (in a letter
which does not appear, but which the Vizier himself quotes as
antecedent to the said demand) had complained to the said Hastings of
the "injury and irregularity in the management of the provinces
bordering on Rampoor, arising from Fyzoola Khan having the
uncontrolled dominion of that district."




PART VI.



TREATY OF CHUNAR.


I. That the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, being vested with the
illegal powers before recited, did, on the 19th of September, 1781,
enter into a treaty with the Vizier at Chunar,--which treaty (as the
said Hastings relates) was drawn up "from a series of requisitions
presented to him [the said Hastings] by the Vizier," and by him
received "with an instant and unqualified assent to each article"; and
that the said Hastings assigns his reasons for such ready assent in
the following words: "I considered the subjects of his [the Vizier's]
requests as essential to the reputation of our government, and no less
to our interest than his."

II. That in the said treaty of Chunar the third article is as follows.

      "That, as Fyzoola Khan has by his breach of treaty forfeited
      the protection of the English government, and causes by his
      continuance in his present independent state great alarm and
      detriment to the Nabob Vizier, he be permitted, _when time
      shall suit_, to resume his lands, and pay him in money,
      through the Resident, the amount stipulated by treaty, after
      deducting the amount and charges of the troops he stands
      engaged to furnish by treaty; which amount shall be passed
      to the account of the Company during the continuance of the
      present war."

III. That, for the better elucidation of his policy in the several
articles of the treaty above mentioned, the said Hastings did send to
the Council of Calcutta (now consisting of Edward Wheler and John
Macpherson, Esquires) two different copies of the said treaty, with
explanatory minutes opposed to each article; and that the minute
opposed to the third article is thus expressed.

      "The conduct of Fyzoola Khan, in refusing the aid demanded,
      though (1.) _not an absolute breach of treaty_, was evasive
      and uncandid. (2.) _The demand was made for five thousand
      cavalry_. (3.) _The engagement, in the treaty is literally
      for five thousand horse and foot_. Fyzoola Khan could not be
      ignorant that we had no occasion for any succors of infantry
      from him, and that cavalry would be of the most essential
      service. (4.) _So scrupulous an attention to literal
      expression, when a more liberal interpretation would have
      been highly useful and acceptable to us, strongly marks his
      unfriendly disposition, though it may not impeach his
      fidelity, and leaves him little claim to any exertions from
      us for the continuance of his jaghires. But_ (5.) _I am of
      opinion that neither the Vizier's nor the Company's
      interests would be promoted by depriving Fyzoola Khan of his
      independency, and I have_ (6.) _therefore reserved the
      execution of this agreement to an indefinite term; and our
      government may always interpose to prevent any ill effects
      from it_."

IV. That, in his aforesaid authentic evidence of his own purposes,
motives, and principles, in the third article of the treaty of Chunar,
the said Hastings hath established divers matters of weighty and
serious crimination against himself.

1st. That the said Hastings doth acknowledge therein, that he did, in
a public instrument, solemnly recognize, "_as a breach of treaty_,"
and as such did subject to the consequent penalties, an act which he,
the said Hastings, did at the same time think, and did immediately
declare, to be "_no breach of treaty_"; and by so falsely and unjustly
proceeding against a person under the Company's guaranty, the said
Hastings, on his own confession, did himself break the faith of the
said guaranty.

2d. That, in justifying this breach of the Company's faith, the said
Hastings doth _wholly abandon his second peremptory demand for the
three thousand horse_, and the protest consequent thereon; and the
said Hastings doth thereby himself condemn the violence and injustice
of the same.

3dly. That, in recurring to the original demand of five thousand horse
as the ground of his justification, the said Hastings doth falsely
assert "the engagement in the treaty to be _literally_ FIVE _thousand
horse and foot_," whereas it is in fact for TWO _or_ THREE _thousand
men_; and the said Hastings doth thereby wilfully attempt to deceive
and mislead his employers, which is an high crime and misdemeanor in a
servant of so great trust.

4thly. That, with a view to his further justification, the said
Hastings doth advance a principle that "_a scrupulous attention to the
literal expression_" of a guarantied treaty "_leaves_" to the person
so observing the same "_but little claim to the exertions_" _of a
guaranty on his behalf_; that such a principle is utterly subversive
of all faith of guaranties, and is therefore highly criminal in the
first executive member of a government that must necessarily stand in
that mutual relation to many.

5thly. That the said Hastings doth profess his opinion of an article
to which he gave an "_instant and unqualified assent_," that it was a
measure "_by which neither the Vizier's nor the Company's interests
would be promoted_," but from which, without some interposition, "_ill
effects_" _must be expected_; and that the said Hastings doth thereby
charge himself with a high breach of trust towards his employers.

6thly. That the said Hastings having thus confessed that consciously
and wilfully (from what motives he hath not chosen to confess) he did
give his formal sanction to a measure both of injustice and impolicy,
he, the said Hastings, doth urge in his defence, that he did at the
same time insert words "reserving the execution of the said agreement
to an indefinite term," with an intent that it might in truth be never
executed at all,--but that "our government might always interpose,"
without right, by means of an indirect and undue influence, to prevent
the ill effects following from a collusive surrender of a clear and
authorized right to interpose; and the said Hastings doth thereby
declare himself to have introduced a principle of duplicity, deceit,
and double-dealing into a public engagement, which ought in its
essence to be clear, open, and explicit; that such a declaration tends
to shake and overthrow the confidence of all in the most solemn
instruments of any person so declaring, and is therefore an high crime
and misdemeanor in the first executive member of government, by whom
all treaties and other engagements of the state are principally to be
conducted.

V. That, by the explanatory minute aforesaid, the said Warren Hastings
doth further, in the most direct manner, contradict his own assertions
in the very letter which inclosed the said minute to his colleagues;
for that one of the articles to which he there gave "_an instant and
unqualified assent, as no less to our interest than to the Vizier's_"
he doth here declare unequivocally to be _neither to our interests nor
the Vizier's_; and the "_unqualified_ assent" given to the said
article is now so _qualified_ as wholly to defeat itself. That by such
irreconcilable contradictions the said Hastings doth incur the
suspicion of much criminal misrepresentation in other like cases of
unwitnessed conferences; and in the present instance (as far as it
extends) the said Hastings doth prove himself to have given an account
both of his actions and motives by his own confession untrue, for the
purpose of deceiving his employers, which is an high crime and
misdemeanor in a servant of so great trust.

VI. That the said third article of the treaty of Chunar, as it thus
stands explained by the said Hastings himself, doth on the whole
appear designed to hold the protection of the Company in suspense;
that it acknowledges all right of interference to cease, but leaves it
to our discretion to determine when it will suit our conveniency to
give the Vizier the liberty of acting on the principles by us already
admitted; that it is dexterously constructed to balance the desires of
one man, rapacious and profuse, against the fears of another,
described as "of extreme pusillanimity and wealthy," but that,
whatever may have been the secret objects of the artifice and intrigue
confessed to form its very essence, it must on the very face of it
necessarily implicate the Company in a breach of faith, whichever
might be the event, as they must equally break their faith either by
withdrawing their guaranty unjustly or by continuing that guaranty in
contradiction to this treaty of Chunar; that it thus tends to hold out
to India, and to the whole world, that the public principle of the
English government is a deliberate system of injustice joined with
falsehood, of impolicy, of bad faith, and treachery; and that the said
article is therefore in the highest degree derogatory to the honor,
and injurious to the interests of this nation.




PART VII.



CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF CHUNAR.


I. That, in consequence of the treaty of Chunar, the Governor-General,
Warren Hastings, did send official instructions respecting the various
articles of the said treaty to the said Resident, Middleton; and that,
in a postscript, the said Hastings did forbid the resumption of the
Nabob Fyzoola Khan's jaghire, "until circumstances may render it more
expedient and easy to be attempted than the present more material
pursuits of government make it appear": thereby intimating a positive
limitation of the indefinite term in the explanatory minute above
recited, and confining the suspension of the article to the pressure
of the war.

II. That, soon after the date of the said instructions, and within two
months of the signature of the treaty of Chunar, the said Hastings did
cause Sir Elijah Impey, Knight, his Majesty's chief-justice at Fort
William, to discredit the justice of the crown of Great Britain by
making him the channel of unwarrantable communication, and did,
through the said Sir Elijah, signify to the Resident, Middleton, his,
the said Hastings's, "approbation of a _subsidy_ from Fyzoola Khan."

III. That the Resident, in answer, represents the proper equivalent
for two thousand horse and one thousand foot (the forces offered to
Mr. Johnson by Fyzoola Khan) to be twelve lacs, or 120,000_l._
sterling and upwards, each year; which the said Resident supposes is
considerably beyond what he, Fyzoola Khan, _will voluntarily pay_:
"however, if it is your wish that the claim should be made, I am ready
to take it up, and _you may he assured nothing in my power shall be
left undone to carry it through_."

IV. That the reply of the said Hastings doth not appear; but that it
does appear on record that "a negotiation" (Mr. Johnson's) "was begun
for Fyzoola Khan's cavalry to act with General Goddard, and, on his
[Fyzoola Khan's] _evading_ it, _that a sum of money was demanded_."

V. That, in the months of February, March, and April, the Resident,
Middleton, did repeatedly propose the resumption of Fyzoola Khan's
jaghire, agreeably to the treaty of Chunar; and that, driven to
extremity (as the said Hastings supposes) "by the public menaces and
denunciations of the Resident and minister," Hyder Beg Khan, a
creature of the said Hastings, and both the minister and Resident
acting professedly on and under the treaty of Chunar, "the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan made such preparations, and such a disposition of his
family and wealth, as evidently manifested either an intended or an
_expected rupture_."

VI. That on the 6th of May the said Hastings did send his confidential
agent and friend, Major Palmer, on a private commission to Lucknow;
and that the said Palmer was charged with secret instructions relative
to Fyzoola Khan, but of what import cannot be ascertained, the said
Hastings in his public instructions having inserted only the name of
Fyzoola Khan, as a mere reference (according to the explanation of the
said Hastings) to what he had verbally communicated to the said
Palmer; and that the said Hastings was thereby guilty of a criminal
concealment.

VII. That some time about the month of August an engagement happened
between a body of Fyzoola Khan's cavalry and a part of the Vizier's
army, in which the latter were beaten, and their guns taken; that the
Resident, Middleton, did represent the same but as a slight and
accidental affray; that it was acknowledged the troops of the Vizier
were the aggressors; that it did appear to the board, and to the said
Hastings himself, an affair of more considerable magnitude; and that
they did make the concealment thereof an article of charge against the
Resident, Middleton, though the said Resident did in truth acquaint
them with the same, but in a cursory manner.

VIII. That, immediately after the said "fray" at Daranagur, the Vizier
(who was "but a cipher in the hands" of the minister and the Resident,
both of them directly appointed and supported by tho said Hastings)
did make of Fyzoola Khan a new demand, equally contrary to the true
intent and meaning of the treaty as his former requisitions: which new
demand was for the detachment in garrison at Daranagur to be cantoned
as a stationary force at Lucknow, the capital of the Vizier; whereas
he, the Vizier, had only a right to demand an occasional aid to join
his army in the field or in garrison during a war. But the said new
demand being _evaded_, or rather refused, agreeably to the fair
construction of the treaty, by the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, the matter was
for the present dropped.

IX. That in the letter in which the Resident, Middleton, did mention
"what he calls the fray" aforesaid, the said Middleton did again apply
for the resumption of the jaghire of Rampoor; and that, the objections
against the measure being now removed, (by the separate peace with
Sindia,) he desired to know if the board "would give assurances of
their support to the Vizier, in case, _which_" (says the Resident) "_I
think very probable, his_ [the Vizier's] _own strength should be found
unequal to the undertaking_."

X. That, although the said Warren Hastings did make the foregoing
application a new charge against the Resident, Middleton, yet the said
Hastings did only criminate the said Middleton for a proposal tending
"at such a crisis to increase the number of our enemies," and did in
no degree, either in his articles of charge or in his accompanying
minutes, express any disapprobation whatever of the principle; that,
in truth, the whole proceedings of the said Resident were the natural
result of the treaty of Chunar; that the said proceedings were from
time to time communicated to the said Hastings; that, as he nowhere
charges any disobedience of orders on Mr. Middleton with respect to
Fyzoola Khan, it may be justly inferred that the said Hastings did not
interfere to check the proceedings of the said Middleton on that
subject; and that by such criminal neglect the said Hastings did make
the guilt of the said Middleton, whatever it might be, his own.




PART VIII.



PECUNIARY COMMUTATION OF THE STIPULATED AID.


I. That on the charges and for the misdemeanors above specified,
together with divers other accusations, the Governor-General, Warren
Hastings, in September, 1782, did remove the aforesaid Middleton from
his office of Resident at Oude, and did appoint thereto John Bristow,
Esquire, whom he had twice before, without cause, recalled from the
same; and that about the same time the said Hastings did believe the
mind of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan to be so irritated, in consequence of
the above-recited conduct of the late Resident, Middleton, and of his,
the said Hastings's, own criminal neglect, that he, the said Hastings,
found it necessary to write to Fyzoola Khan, assuring him "of the
favorable disposition of the government toward him, while he shall not
have forfeited it by any improper conduct"; but that the said
assurances of the Governor-General did not tend, as soon after
appeared, to raise much confidence in the Nabob, over whom a public
instrument of the same Hastings was still holding the terrors of a
deprivation of his jaghire, and an exile "among his other faithless
brethren across the Ganges."

II. That, on the subject of Fyzoola Khan, the said Hastings, in his
instructions to the new Resident, Bristow, did leave him to be guided
by his own discretion; but he adds, "Be careful to prevent the
Vizier's affairs from being involved with new difficulties, while he
has already so many to oppress him": thereby plainly hinting at some
more decisive measures, whenever the Vizier should be less oppressed
with difficulties.

III. That the Resident, Bristow, after acquainting the
Governor-General with his intentions, did under the said instructions
renew the aforesaid claim for a sum of money, but with much caution
and circumspection, distantly sounding Allif Khan, the _vakeel_ (or
envoy) of Fyzoola Khan at the court of the Vizier; that "Allif Khan
wrote to his master on the subject, and in answer he was directed not
to agree to the granting of any pecuniary aid."

IV. That the Resident, Bristow, did then openly depute Major Palmer
aforesaid, with the concurrence of the Vizier, and the approbation of
the Governor-General, to the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, at Rampoor; and that
the said Palmer was to

      "endeavor to convince the Nabob that _all doubts of his
      attachment to the Vizier are ceased, and whatever claims may
      be made on him are founded upon the basis of his interest
      and advantage and a plan of establishing his right to the
      possession of his jaghire_."

That the sudden ceasing of the said doubts, without any inquiry of the
slightest kind, doth warrant a strong presumption of the Resident's
conviction that they never really existed, but were artfully feigned,
as a pretence for some harsh interposition; and that the indecent
mockery of establishing, as a matter of favor, for a pecuniary
consideration, rights which were never impeached but by the treaty of
Chunar, (an instrument recorded by Warren Hastings himself to be
founded on falsehood and injustice,) doth powerfully prove the true
purpose and object of all the duplicity, deceit, and double-dealing
with which that treaty was projected and executed.

V. That the said Palmer was instructed by the Resident, Bristow, with
the subsequent approbation of the Governor-General, "to obtain from
Fyzoola Khan _an annual tribute_"; to which the Resident adds,--

      "_If you can procure from him, over and above this, a
      peshcush_ [or fine] _of at least five lacs_, it would be
      rendering an essential service to the Vizier, and add to
      _the confidence his Excellency would hereafter repose in the
      attachment of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan_."

And that the said Governor-General, Hastings, did give the following
extraordinary ground of calculation, as the basis of the said Palmer's
negotiation for the annual tribute aforesaid.

      "_It was certainly understood_, at the time the treaty was
      concluded, (of which this stipulation was a part,) that it
      applied _solely to cavalry_: as the Nabob Vizier, possessing
      the service of our forces, could not possibly require
      infantry, and least of all such infantry as Fyzoola Khan
      could furnish; and _a single horseman included in the aid
      which Fyzoola Khan might furnish would prove a literal
      compliance with the said stipulation_. The number,
      therefore, of horse implied by it ought at least to be
      ascertained: _we will suppose five thousand_, and, allowing
      the exigency for their attendance to exist only in the
      proportion of _one year in five_, reduce the demand to one
      thousand for the computation of the subsidy, which, at the
      rate of _fifty rupees_ per man, will amount to fifty
      thousand _per mensem_. This may serve for the basis of this
      article in the negotiation upon it."

VI. That the said Warren Hastings doth then continue to instruct the
said Palmer in the alternative of a refusal from Fyzoola Khan.

      "If Fyzoola Khan shall refuse to treat for a subsidy, and
      claim the benefit of his original agreement in its literal
      expression, _he possesses a right which we cannot dispute_,
      and it will in that case remain only to fix the precise
      number of horse which he shall furnish, which ought at least
      to exceed twenty-five hundred."

VII. That, in the above-recited instruction, the said Warren Hastings
doth insinuate (for he doth not directly assert),--

1st. That we are entitled by treaty to five thousand troops, which he
says were undoubtedly intended to be all cavalry.

2d. That the said Hastings doth then admit that a single horseman,
included in the aid furnished by Fyzoola Khan, would prove a literal
compliance.

3d. That the said Hastings doth next resort again to the supposition
of our right to the whole five thousand cavalry.

4th. That the said Hastings doth afterwards think, in the event of an
explanation of the treaty, and a settlement of the proportion of
cavalry, instead of a pecuniary commutation, it will be all we can
demand that the number should _at least exceed twenty-five hundred_.

5th. That the said Hastings doth, in calculating the supposed time of
their service, assume an arbitrary estimate of one year of war to four
of peace; which (however moderate the calculation may appear on the
average of the said Hastings's own government) doth involve a
principle in a considerable degree repugnant to the system of perfect
peace inculcated in the standing orders of the Company.

6th. That, in estimating the pay of the cavalry to be commuted, the
said Hastings doth fix the pay of each man at fifty rupees a month;
which on five thousand troops, all cavalry, (as the said Hastings
supposes the treaty of Lall-Dang to have meant,) would amount to an
expense of thirty lacs a year, or between 300,000_l._ or 400,000_l._
And this expense, strictly resulting (according to the calculations of
the said Hastings) from the intention of Sujah ul Dowlah's grant to
Fyzoola Khan, was designed to be supported out of a jaghire valued at
fifteen lacs only, or something more than 150,000_l._ of yearly
revenue, just half the amount of the expense to be incurred in
consideration of the said jaghire.

And that a basis of negotiation so inconsistent, so arbitrary, and so
unjust is contrary to that uprightness and integrity which should mark
the transactions of a great state, and is highly derogatory to the
honor of this nation.

VIII. That, notwithstanding the seeming moderation and justice of the
said Hastings in admitting the clear and undoubted right of Fyzoola
Khan to insist on his treaty, the head of instruction immediately
succeeding doth afford just reason for a violent presumption that such
apparent lenity was but policy, to give a color to his conduct: he,
the said Hastings, in the very next paragraph, bringing forth a new
engine of oppression, as follows.

      "To demand the surrender of all the ryots [or peasants] of
      the Nabob Vizier's dominions to whom Fyzoola has given
      protection and service, _or an annual tribute in
      compensation for the loss sustained by the Nabob Vizier in
      his revenue thus transferred to Fyzoola Khan_.

"You have stated the increase of his jaghire, occasioned by this act,
at the moderate sum of fifteen lacs. _The tribute ought at least to be
one third of that amount_.

      "We conceive that Fyzoola Khan himself may be disposed to
      yield to the preceding demand, on the additional condition
      of being allowed to hold his lands in _ultumgaw_ [or an
      inheritable tenure] instead of his present tenure by
      _jaghire_ [or a tenure for life]. This we think the Vizier
      can have no objection to grant, and we recommend it; _but
      for this a fine, or peshcush, ought to be immediately paid,
      in the customary proportion of the jumma, estimated at
      thirty lacs_."

IX. That the Resident, Bristow, (to whom the letter containing Major
Palmer's instructions is addressed,) nowhere attributes the increase
of Fyzoola Khan's revenues to this protection of the fugitive ryots,
subjects of the Vizier; that the said Warren Hastings was, therefore,
not warranted to make that a pretext of such a peremptory demand.
That, as an inducement to make Fyzoola Khan agree to the said demand,
it is offered to settle his lands upon a tenure which would secure
them to his children; but that settlement is to bring with it a new
demand of a fine of thirty lacs, or 300,000_l._ and upwards; that the
principles of the said demand are violent and despotic, and the
inducement to acquiescence deceitful and insidious; and that both the
demand and the inducement are derogatory to the honor of this nation.

X. That Major Palmer aforesaid proceeded under these instructions to
Rampoor, where his journey "_to extort a sum of money_" was previously
known from Allif Khan, vakeel of Fyzoola Khan at the Vizier's court;
and that, notwithstanding the assurances of the friendly disposition
of government given by the said Hastings, (as is herein related,) the
Nabob Fyzoola Khan did express the most serious and desponding
apprehensions, both by letter and through his vakeel, to the Resident,
Bristow, who represents them to feajor Palmer in the following manner.

      "The Nabob Fyzoola Khan complains of the distresses he has
      this year suffered from the drought. The whole collections
      have, with great management, amounted to about twelve lacs
      of rupees, from which sum he has to support his troops, his
      family, and several relations and dependants of the late
      Rohilla chiefs. _He says, it clearly appears to be intended
      to deprive him of his country, as the high demand you have
      made of him is inadmissible_. Should he have assented to it,
      it would be impossible to perform the conditions, and then
      his reputation would be injured by a breach of agreement.
      _Allif Khan further represents, that it is his master's
      intention, in case the demand should not be relinquished by
      you, first to proceed to Lucknow, where he proposes having
      an interview with the Vizier and the Resident; if he should
      not be able to obtain his own terms for a future possession
      of his jaghire, he will set off for Calcutta in order to
      pray for justice from the Honorable the Governor-General_.
      He observes, it is the custom of the Honorable Company, when
      they deprive a chief of his country, to grant him some
      allowance. This he expects from Mr. Hastings's bounty; _but
      if he should be disappointed, he will certainly set off upon
      a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and renounce the cares of
      the world_.--_He directs his vakeel to ascertain whether the
      English intend to deprive him of his country_; for if they
      do, he is ready to surrender it, upon receiving an order
      from the Resident."

XI. That, after much negotiation, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, "being fully
sensible that an engagement to furnish military aid, _however clearly
the conditions might be stated, must be a source of perpetual
misunderstanding and inconveniences_," did at length agree with Major
Palmer to give fifteen lacs, or 150,000_l._ and upwards, by four
instalments, that he might be exempted from all future claims of
military service; that the said Palmer represents it to be his belief,
"_that no person, not known to possess your_ [the said Hastings's]
_confidence and support in the degree that I am supposed to do_, would
have obtained nearly so good terms"; but from what motive "terms so
good" were granted, and how the confidence and support of the said
Hastings did truly operate on tho mind of Fyzoola Khan, doth appear to
be better explained by another passage in the same letter, where the
said Palmer congratulates himself on _the satisfaction which he gave
to Fyzoola Khan_ in the conduct of this negotiation, as he spent a
month in order to effect "by argument and persuasion _what he could
have obtained in an hour by threats and compulsions_."




PART IX.



FULL VINDICATION OF FYZOOLA KHAN BY MAJOR PALMER AND MR. HASTINGS.


I. That, in the course of the said negotiation for establishing the
rights of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, Major Palmer aforesaid did
communicate to the Resident, Bristow, and through the said Resident to
the Council-General of Bengal, the full and direct denial of the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan to all and every of the charges made or pretended to be
made against him, as follows.

"Fyzoola Khan persists in denying the infringement on his part of any
one article in the treaty, or the neglect of any obligation which it
imposed upon him.

"He does not admit of _the improvements reported to be made_ in his
jaghire, and even asserts that the collections this year will fall
short of the original _jumma_ [or estimate] by reason of the long
drought.

"He denies having exceeded the limited number of Rohillas in his
service;

"And having refused the required aid of cavalry, made by Johnson, to
act with General Goddard.

      "He observes, respecting the charge of evading the Vizier's
      requisition for the cavalry lately stationed at Daranagur,
      to be stationed at Lucknow, that he is not bound by treaty
      to maintain a stationary force for the service of the
      Vizier, but to supply an aid of two or three thousand troops
      in time of war.

      "Lastly, he asserts, that, so far from encouraging the ryots
      [or peasants] of the Vizier to settle in his jaghire, it has
      been his constant practice to deliver them up to the Aumil
      of Rohilcund, whenever he could discover them."

II. That, in giving his opinions on the aforesaid denials of the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan, the said Palmer did not controvert any one of the
constructions of tho treaty advanced by the said Nabob.

That, although the said Palmer, "from general appearances as well as
universal report, did not doubt that the jumma of the jaghire is
_greatly increased_," yet he, the said Palmer, did not intimate that
it was increased in any degree near _the amount reported_, as it was
drawn out in a regular estimate transmitted to the said Palmer
expressly for the purposes of his negotiation, which was of course by
him produced to the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, and to which specifically the
denial of Fyzoola Khan must be understood to apply.

That the said Palmer did not hint any doubt of the deficiency affirmed
by Fyzoola Khan in the collections for the current year: and,

That, if any increase of jumma did truly exist, whatever it may have
been, the said Palmer did acknowledge it "to have been solemnly
relinquished (in a private agreement) by the Vizier."

That, although the said Palmer did suppose the number of Rohillas
(employed "in ordinary occupations) in Rampoor alone to exceed that
limited by the treaty for his [Fyzoola Khan's] service," yet the said
Palmer did by no means imply that the Nabob Fyzoola Khan _maintained
in his service_ a single man more than was allowed by treaty; and by a
particular and minute account of the troops of Fyzoola Khan,
transmitted by the Resident, Bristow, to the said Palmer, the number
was stated but at 5,840, probably including officers, who were not
understood to be comprehended in the treaty.

That the said Palmer did further admit it "_to be not clearly
expressed_ in the treaty, whether the restriction included Rohillas of
all descriptions"; but, at any rate, he adds,

      "it does not appear that their number is formidable, or that
      he [Fyzoola Khan] _could by any means subsist such numbers
      as could cause any serious alarm to the Vizier_; neither is
      there any appearance of their entertaining any views beyond
      the quiet possession of the advantages which they at present
      enjoy."

And that, in a subsequent letter, in which the said Palmer thought it
prudent "to vindicate himself from any possible insinuation that he
meant to sacrifice the Vizier's interest," he, the said Palmer, did
positively attest the new claim on Fyzoola Khan for the protection of
the Vizier's ryots to be wholly without foundation, as the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan "had proved to him [Palmer], by producing receipts of
various dates and for great numbers of these people surrendered upon
requisition from the Vizier's officers."

III. That, over and above the aforesaid complete refutation of the
different charges and pretexts under which exactions had been
practised, or attempted to be practised, on the Nabob Fyzoola Khan,
the said Palmer did further condemn altogether the principle of
calculation assumed in such exactions (even if they had been founded
in justice) by the following explanation of the nature of the tenure
by which, under the treaty of Lall-Dang, the Nabob Fyzoola Khan held
his possessions as a jaghiredar.

      "There are no precedents in the ancient usage of the country
      for ascertaining the _nuzzerana_ [customary present] or
      _peshcush_ [regular fine] of grants of this nature: _they
      were bestowed by the prince as rewards or favors_; and the
      accustomary present in return was adapted to the dignity of
      the donor rather than to the value of the gift,--_to which
      it never, I believe, bore any kind of proportion_."

IV. That a sum of money ("which of course was to be received by the
Company") being now obtained, and the "_interests both of the Company
and the Vizier_" being thus much "_better promoted_" by "_establishing
the rights_" of Fyzoola Khan than they could have been by "_depriving
him of his independency_," when every undue influence of secret and
criminal purposes was removed from the mind of the Governor-General,
Warren Hastings, Esquire, he, the said Hastings, did also concur with
his friend and agent, Major Palmer, in the vindication of the Nabob
Fyzoola Khan, and in the most ample manner.

That the said Warren Hastings did now clearly and explicitly
understand the clauses of the treaty, "that Fyzoola Khan should send
_two_ or _three_ [and not _five_] thousand men, or _attend in person,
in case it was requisite_."

That the said Warren Hastings did now confess that the right of the
Vizier under the treaty was at best "but _a precarious and
unserviceable right_; and that he thought fifteen lacs, or 150,000_l._
and upwards, an ample equivalent," (or, according to the expression of
Major Palmer, _an excellent bargain_,) as in truth it was, "for
expunging an article of such a tenor and so loosely worded."

And, finally, that the said Hastings did give the following
description of the general character, disposition, and circumstances
of the Nabob Fyzoola Khan.

      "The rumors which had been spread of his hostile designs
      against the Vizier were totally groundless, and if he had
      been inclined, he had not the means to make himself
      formidable; on the contrary, being in the decline of life,
      and possessing a very fertile and prosperous jaghire, it is
      more natural to suppose that Fyzoola Khan wishes to spend
      the remainder of his days in quietness than that he is
      preparing to embark in active and offensive scenes which
      must end in his own destruction."

V. Yet that, notwithstanding this virtual and implied crimination of
his whole conduct toward the Nabob Fyzoola Khan, and after all the
aforesaid acts systematically prosecuted in open violation of a
positive treaty against a prince who had an hereditary right to more
than he actually possessed, for whose protection the faith of the
Company and the nation was repeatedly pledged, and who had deserved
and obtained the public thanks of the British government,--when, in
allusion to certain of the said acts, the Court of Directors had
expressed to the said Hastings their wishes "to be considered rather
as the guardians of the honor and property of the native powers than
as the instruments of oppression," he, the said Hastings, in reply to
the said Directors, his masters, did conclude his official account of
the final settlement with Fyzoola Khan with the following indecent,
because unjust, exultation:--

"Such are the measures which we shall ever wish to observe towards our
allies or dependants upon our frontiers."




APPENDIX



TO THE EIGHTH AND SIXTEENTH CHARGES.[26]


Copy of a Letter from Warren Hastings, Esquire, to William Devaynes,
Esquire, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company,
dated Cheltenham, 11th of July, 1785, and printed by order of the
House of Commons.

      _To William Devaynes, Esquire, Chairman of the Honorable the
      Court of Directors_.

      SIR,--The Honorable Court of Directors, in their general
      letter to Bengal by the "Surprise," dated the 16th March,
      1784, were pleased to express their desire that I should
      inform them of the periods when each sum of the presents
      mentioned in my address of the 22d May, 1782, was received,
      what were my motives for withholding the several receipts
      from the knowledge of the Council, or of the Court of
      Directors, and what were my reasons for taking bonds for
      part of these sums, and for paying other sums into the
      treasury as deposits on my own account.

      I have been kindly apprised that the information required as
      above is yet expected from me. I hope that the circumstances
      of my past situation, when considered, will plead my excuse
      for having thus long withheld it. The fact is, that I was
      not at the Presidency when the "Surprise" arrived; and when
      I returned to it, my time and attention were so entirely
      engrossed, to the day of my final departure from it, by a
      variety of other more important occupations, of which, Sir,
      I may safely appeal to your testimony, grounded on the large
      portion contributed by myself of the volumes which compose
      our Consultations of that period, that the submission which
      my respect would have enjoined me to pay to the command
      imposed on me was lost to my recollection, perhaps from the
      stronger impression which the first and distant perusal of
      it had left on my mind that it was rather intended as a
      reprehension for something which had given offence in my
      report of the original transaction than as expressive of any
      want of a further elucidation of it.

      I will now endeavor to reply to the different questions
      which have been stated to me in as explicit a manner as I am
      able. To such information as I can give the Honorable Court
      is fully entitled; and where that shall prove defective, I
      will point out the easy means by which it may be rendered
      more complete.

      First, I believe I can affirm with certainty, that the
      several sums mentioned in the account transmitted with my
      letter above mentioned were received at or within a very few
      days of the dates which are prefixed to them in the account;
      but as this contains only the gross sums, and each of these
      was received in different payments, though at no great
      distance of time, I cannot therefore assign a greater degree
      of accuracy to the account. Perhaps the Honorable Court will
      judge this sufficient for any purpose to which their inquiry
      was directed; but if it should not be so, I will beg leave
      to refer for a more minute information, and for the means of
      making any investigation which they may think it proper to
      direct, respecting the particulars of this transaction, to
      Mr. Larkins, your Accountant-General, who was privy to every
      process of it, and possesses, as I believe, the original
      paper, which contained the only account that I ever kept of
      it. In this each receipt was, as I recollect, specifically
      inserted, with the name of the person by whom it was made;
      and I shall write to him to desire that he will furnish you
      with the paper itself, if it is still in being and in his
      hands, or with whatever he can distinctly recollect
      concerning it.

      For my motives for withholding the several receipts from the
      knowledge of the Council, or of the Court of Directors, and
      for taking bonds for part of these sums, and paying others
      into the treasury as deposits on my own account, I have
      generally accounted in my letter to the Honorable the Court
      of Directors of the 22d May, 1782: namely, that

      "I either chose to conceal the first receipts from public
      curiosity by receiving bonds for the amount, or possibly
      acted without any studied design which my memory at that
      distance of time could verify; and that I did not think it
      worth my care to observe the same means with the rest.

      "It will not be expected that I should be able to give a
      more correct explanation of my intentions after a lapse of
      three years, having declared at the time that many
      particulars had escaped my remembrance; neither shall I
      attempt to add more than the clearer affirmation of the
      facts implied in that report of them, and such inferences as
      necessarily, or with a strong probability, follow them.

      "I have said that the three first sums of the account were
      paid into the Company's treasury without passing through my
      hands. The second of these was forced into notice by its
      destination and application to the expense of a detachment
      which was formed and employed against Mahdajee Sindia under
      the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Camac, as I particularly
      apprised the Court of Directors in my letter of the 29th
      November, 1780. The other two were certainly not intended,
      when I received them, to be made public, though intended for
      public service, and actually applied to it. The exigencies
      of the government were at that time my own, and every
      pressure upon it rested with its full weight upon my mind.
      Wherever I could find allowable means of relieving those
      wants, I eagerly seized them; but neither could it occur to
      me as necessary to state on our Proceedings every little aid
      which I could thus procure, nor do I know how I could have
      stated it, without appearing to court favor by an
      ostentation which I disdain, nor without the chance of
      exciting the jealousy of my colleagues by the constructive
      assertion of a separate and unparticipated merit, derived
      from the influence of my station, to which they might have
      laid an equal claim. I should have deemed it particularly
      dishonorable to receive for my own use money tendered by men
      of a certain class, from whom I had interdicted the receipt
      of presents to my inferiors, and bound them by oath not to
      receive them. I was therefore more than ordinarily cautious
      to avoid the suspicion of it, which would scarcely have
      failed to light upon me, had I suffered the money to be
      brought directly to my own house, or to that of any person
      known to be in trust for me: for these reasons I caused it
      to be transported immediately to the treasury. There, you
      well know, Sir, it could not be received without being
      passed to some credit, and this could only be done by
      entering it as a loan or as a deposit: the first was the
      least liable to reflection, and therefore I had obviously
      recourse to it. Why the second sum was entered as a deposit
      I am utterly ignorant: possibly it was done without any
      special direction from me; possibly because it was the
      simplest mode of entry, and therefore preferred, as the
      transaction itself did not require concealment, having been
      already avowed.

      "Although I am firmly persuaded that these were my
      sentiments on the occasion, yet I will not affirm that they
      were. Though I feel their impression as the remains of a
      series of thoughts retained on my memory, I am not certain
      that they may not have been produced by subsequent
      reflection on the principal fact, combining with it the
      probable motives of it. Of this I am certain, that it was my
      design originally to have concealed the receipt of all the
      sums, except the second, even from the knowledge of the
      Court of Directors. They had answered my purpose of public
      utility, and I had almost totally dismissed them from my
      remembrance. But when fortune threw a sum in my way of a
      magnitude which could not be concealed, and the peculiar
      delicacy of my situation at the time in which I received it
      made me more circumspect of appearances, I chose to apprise
      my employers of it, which I did hastily and generally:
      hastily, perhaps to prevent the vigilance and activity of
      secret calumny; and generally, because I knew not the exact
      amount of the sum, of which I was in the receipt, but not in
      the full possession. I promised to acquaint them with the
      result as soon as I should be in possession of it, and in
      the performance of my promise I thought it consistent with
      it to add to the account all the former appropriations of
      the same kind: my good genius then suggesting to me, with a
      spirit of caution which might have spared me the trouble of
      this apology, had I universally attended to it, that, if I
      had suppressed them, and they were afterwards known, I might
      be asked what were my motives for withholding part of these
      receipts from the knowledge of the Court of Directors and
      informing them of the rest.

      "It being my wish to clear up every doubt upon this
      transaction, which either my own mind could suggest or which
      may have been suggested by others, I beg leave to suppose
      another question, and to state the terms of it in my reply,
      by informing you that the indorsement on the bonds was made
      about the period of my leaving the Presidency, in the middle
      of the year 1781, in order to guard against their becoming a
      claim on the Company, as part of my estate, in the event of
      my death occurring in the course of the service on which I
      was then entering.

      "This, Sir, is the plain history of the transaction. I
      should be ashamed to request that you would communicate it
      to the Honorable Court of Directors, whose time is too
      valuable for the intrusion of a subject so uninteresting,
      but that it is become a point of indispensable duty; I must
      therefore request the favor of you to lay it, at a
      convenient time, before them. In addressing it to you
      personally, I yield to my own feelings of the respect which
      is due to them as a body, and to the assurances which I
      derive from your experienced civilities that you will kindly
      overlook the trouble imposed by it."

     "I have the honor to be, Sir,
     Your very humble and most obedient servant,
     (Signed) "WARREN HASTINGS."

     "CHELTENHAM, 11 July, 1785."




SPEECHES IN THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE, LATE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.




SPEECH IN OPENING.



FEBRUARY, 1788.



SPEECH OPENING THE IMPEACHMENT.



FIRST DAY: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1788.



MY LORDS,--The gentlemen who have it in command to support the
impeachment against Mr. Hastings have directed me to open the cause
with a general view of the grounds upon which the Commons have
proceeded in their charge against him. They have directed me to
accompany this with another general view of the extent, the magnitude,
the nature, the tendency, and the effect of the crimes which they
allege to have been by him committed. They have also directed me to
give an explanation (with their aid I may be enabled to give it) of
such circumstances, preceding the crimes charged on Mr. Hastings, or
concomitant with them, as may tend to elucidate whatever may be found
obscure in the articles as they stand. To these they wished me to add
a few illustrative remarks on the laws, customs, opinions, and manners
of the people concerned, and who are the objects of the crimes we
charge on Mr. Hastings. The several articles, as they appear before
you, will be opened by other gentlemen with more particularity, with
more distinctness, and, without doubt, with infinitely more ability,
when they come to apply the evidence which naturally belongs to each
article of this accusation. This, my Lords, is the plan which we mean
to pursue on the great charge which is now to abide your judgment.

My Lords, I must look upon it as an auspicious circumstance to this
cause, in which the honor of the kingdom and the fate of many nations
are involved, that, from the first commencement of our Parliamentary
process to this the hour of solemn trial, not the smallest difference
of opinion has arisen between the two Houses.

My Lords, there are persons who, looking rather upon what was to be
found in our records and histories than what was to be expected from
the public justice, had formed hopes consolatory to themselves and
dishonorable to us. They flattered themselves that the corruptions of
India would escape amidst the dissensions of Parliament. They are
disappointed. They will be disappointed in all the rest of their
expectations which they have formed upon everything, except the merits
of their cause. The Commons will not have the melancholy unsocial
glory of having acted a solitary part in a noble, but imperfect work.
What the greatest inquest of the nation has begun its highest tribunal
will accomplish. At length justice will be done to India. It is true
that your Lordships will have your full share in this great
achievement; but the Commons have always considered that whatever
honor is divided with you is doubled on themselves.

My Lords, I must confess, that, amidst these encouraging prospects,
the Commons do not approach your bar without awe and anxiety. The
magnitude of the interests which we have in charge will reconcile some
degree of solicitude for the event with the undoubting confidence with
which we repose ourselves upon your Lordships' justice. For we are
men, my Lords; and men are so made, that it is not only the greatness
of danger, but the value of the adventure, which measures the degree
of our concern in every undertaking. I solemnly assure your Lordships
that no standard is sufficient to estimate the value which the Commons
set upon the event of the cause they now bring before you. My Lords,
the business of this day is not the business of this man, it is not
solely whether the prisoner at the bar be found innocent or guilty,
but whether millions of mankind shall be made miserable or happy.

Your Lordships will see, in the progress of this cause, that there is
not only a long, connected, systematic series of misdemeanors, but an
equally connected system of maxims and principles invented to justify
them. Upon both of these you must judge. According to the judgment
that you shall give upon the past transactions in India, inseparably
connected as they are with the principles which support them, the
whole character of your future government in that distant empire is to
be unalterably decided. It will take its perpetual tenor, it will
receive its final impression, from the stamp of this very hour.

It is not only the interest of India, now the most considerable part
of the British empire, which is concerned, but the credit and honor of
the British nation itself will be decided by this decision. We are to
decide by this judgment, whether the crimes of individuals are to be
turned into public guilt and national ignominy, or whether this nation
will convert the very offences which have thrown a transient shade
upon its government into something that will reflect a permanent
lustre upon the honor, justice, and humanity of this kingdom.

My Lords, there is another consideration, which augments the
solicitude of the Commons, equal to those other two great interests I
have stated, those of our empire and our national
character,--something that, if possible, comes more home to the hearts
and feelings of every Englishman: I mean, the interests of our
Constitution itself, which is deeply involved in the event of this
cause. The future use and the whole effect, if not the very existence,
of the process of an impeachment of high crimes and misdemeanors
before the peers of this kingdom upon the charge of the Commons will
very much be decided by your judgment in this cause. This tribunal
will be found (I hope it will always be found) too great for petty
causes: if it should at the same time be found incompetent to one of
the greatest,--that is, if little offences, from their minuteness,
escape you, and the greatest, from their magnitude, oppress you,--it
is impossible that this form of trial should not in the end vanish out
of the Constitution. For we must not deceive ourselves: whatever does
not stand with credit cannot stand long. And if the Constitution
should be deprived, I do not mean in form, but virtually, of this
resource, it is virtually deprived of everything else that is valuable
in it. For this process is the cement which binds the whole together;
this is the individuating principle that makes England what England
is. In this court it is that no subject, in no part of the empire, can
fail of competent and proportionable justice; here it is that we
provide for that which is the substantial excellence of our
Constitution,--I mean, the great circulation of responsibility, by
which (excepting the supreme power) no man, in no circumstance, can
escape the account which he owes to the laws of his country. It is by
this process that magistracy, which tries and controls all other
things, is itself tried and controlled. Other constitutions are
satisfied with making good subjects; this is a security for good
governors. It is by this tribunal that statesmen who abuse their power
are accused by statesmen and tried by statesmen, not upon the niceties
of a narrow jurisprudence, but upon the enlarged and solid principles
of state morality. It is here that those who by the abuse of power
have violated the spirit of law can never hope for protection from any
of its forms; it is here that those who have refused to conform
themselves to its perfections can never hope to escape through any of
its defects. It ought, therefore, my Lords, to become our common care
to guard this your precious deposit, rare in its use, but powerful in
its effect, with a religious vigilance, and never to suffer it to be
either discredited or antiquated. For this great end your Lordships
are invested with great and plenary powers: but you do not suspend,
you do not supersede, you do not annihilate any subordinate
jurisdiction; on the contrary, you are auxiliary and supplemental to
them all.

Whether it is owing to the felicity of our times, less fertile in
great offences than those which have gone before us, or whether it is
from a sluggish apathy which has dulled and enervated the public
justice, I am not called upon to determine,--but, whatever may be the
cause, it is now sixty-three years since any impeachment, grounded
upon abuse of authority and misdemeanor in office, has come before
this tribunal. The last is that of Lord Macclesfield, which happened
in the year 1725. So that the oldest process known to the Constitution
of this country has, upon its revival, some appearance of novelty. At
this time, when all Europe is in a state of, perhaps, contagious
fermentation, when antiquity has lost all its reverence and all its
effect on the minds of men, at the same time that novelty is still
attended with the suspicions that always will be attached to whatever
is new, we have been anxiously careful, in a business which seems to
combine the objections both to what is antiquated and what is novel,
so to conduct ourselves that nothing in the revival of this great
Parliamentary process shall afford a pretext for its future disuse.

My Lords, strongly impressed as they are with these sentiments, the
Commons have conducted themselves with singular care and caution.
Without losing the spirit and zeal of a public prosecution, they have
comported themselves with such moderation, temper, and decorum as
would not have ill become the final judgment, if with them rested the
final judgment, of this great cause.

With very few intermissions, the affairs of India have constantly
engaged the attention of the Commons for more than fourteen years. We
may safely affirm we have tried every mode of legislative provision
before we had recourse to anything of penal process. It was in the
year 1774 [1773?] we framed an act of Parliament for remedy to the
then existing disorders in India, such as the then information before
us enabled us to enact. Finding that the act of Parliament did not
answer all the ends that were expected from it, we had, in the year
1782, recourse to a body of monitory resolutions. Neither had we the
expected fruit from them. When, therefore, we found that our inquiries
and our reports, our laws and our admonitions, were alike despised,
that enormities increased in proportion as they were forbidden,
detected, and exposed,--when we found that guilt stalked with an erect
and upright front, and that legal authority seemed to skulk and hide
its head like outlawed guilt,--when we found that some of those very
persons who were appointed by Parliament to assert the authority of
the laws of this kingdom were the most forward, the most bold, and the
most active in the conspiracy for their destruction,--then it was time
for the justice of the nation to recollect itself. To have forborne
longer would not have been patience, but collusion; it would have been
participation with guilt; it would have been to make ourselves
accomplices with the criminal.

We found it was impossible to evade painful duty without betraying a
sacred trust. Having, therefore, resolved upon the last and only
resource, a penal prosecution, it was our next business to act in a
manner worthy of our long deliberation. In all points we proceeded
with selection. We have chosen (we trust it will so appear to your
Lordships) such a crime, and such a criminal, and such a body of
evidence, and such a mode of process, as would have recommended this
course of justice to posterity, even if it had not been supported by
any example in the practice of our forefathers.

First, to speak of the process: we are to inform your Lordships, that,
besides that long previous deliberation of fourteen years, we
examined, as a preliminary to this proceeding, every circumstance
which could prove favorable to parties apparently delinquent, before
we finally resolved to prosecute. There was no precedent to be found
in the Journals, favorable to persons in Mr. Hastings's circumstances,
that was not applied to. Many measures utterly unknown to former
Parliamentary proceedings, and which, indeed, seemed in some degree to
enfeeble them, but which were all to the advantage of those that were
to be prosecuted, were adopted, for the first time, upon this
occasion. In an early stage of the proceeding, the criminal desired to
be heard. He was heard; and he produced before the bar of the House
that insolent and unbecoming paper which lies upon our table. It was
deliberately given in by his own hand, and signed with his own name.
The Commons, however, passed by everything offensive in that paper
with a magnanimity that became them. They considered nothing in it but
the facts that the defendant alleged, and the principles he
maintained; and after a deliberation not short of judicial, we
proceeded with confidence to your bar.

So far as to the process; which, though I mentioned last in the line
and order in which I stated the objects of our selection, I thought it
best to dispatch first.

As to the crime which we chose, we first considered well what it was
in its nature, under all the circumstances which attended it. We
weighed it with all its extenuations and with all its aggravations. On
that review, we are warranted to assert that the crimes with which we
charge the prisoner at the bar are substantial crimes,--that they are
no errors or mistakes, such as wise and good men might possibly fall
into, which may even produce very pernicious effects without being in
fact great offences. The Commons are too liberal not to allow for the
difficulties of a great and arduous public situation. They know too
well the domineering necessities which frequently occur in all great
affairs. They know the exigency of a pressing occasion, which, in its
precipitate career, bears everything down before it,--which does not
give time to the mind to recollect its faculties, to reinforce its
reason, and to have recourse to fixed principles, but, by compelling
an instant and tumultuous decision, too often obliges men to decide in
a manner that calm judgment would certainly have rejected. We know, as
we are to be served by men, that the persons who serve us must be
tried as men, and with a very large allowance indeed to human
infirmity and human error. This, my Lords, we knew and we weighed
before we came before you. But the crimes which we charge in these
articles are not lapses, defects, errors of common human frailty,
which, as we know and feel, we can allow for. We charge this offender
with no crimes that have not arisen from passions which it is criminal
to harbor,--with no offences that have not their root in avarice,
rapacity, pride, insolence, ferocity, treachery, cruelty, malignity of
temper,--in short, in [with?] nothing that does not argue a total
extinction of all moral principle, that does not manifest an
inveterate blackness of heart, dyed in grain with malice, vitiated,
corrupted, gangrened to the very core. If we do not plant his crimes
in those vices which the breast of man is made to abhor, and the
spirit of all laws, human and divine, to interdict, we desire no
longer to be heard upon this occasion. Let everything that can be
pleaded on the ground of surprise or error, upon those grounds be
pleaded with success: we give up the whole of those predicaments. We
urge no crimes that were not crimes of forethought. We charge him with
nothing that he did not commit upon deliberation,--that he did not
commit against advice, supplication, and remonstrance,--that he did
not commit against the direct command of lawful authority,--that he
did not commit after reproof and reprimand, the reproof and reprimand
of those who were authorized by the laws to reprove and reprimand him.
The crimes of Mr. Hastings are crimes not only in themselves, but
aggravated by being crimes of contumacy. They were crimes, not against
forms, but against those eternal laws of justice which are our rule
and our birthright. His offences are, not in formal, technical
language, but in reality, in substance and effect, _high_ crimes and
high misdemeanors.

So far as to the crimes. As to the criminal, we have chosen him on the
same principle on which we selected the crimes. We have not chosen to
bring before you a poor, puny, trembling delinquent, misled, perhaps,
by those who ought to have taught him better, but who have afterwards
oppressed him by their power, as they had first corrupted him by their
example. Instances there have been many, wherein the punishment of
minor offences, in inferior persons, has been made the means of
screening crimes of an high order, and in men of high description. Our
course is different. We have not brought before you an obscure
offender, who, when his insignificance and weakness are weighed
against the power of the prosecution, gives even to public justice
something of the appearance of oppression: no, my Lords, we have
brought before you the first man of India, in rank, authority, and
station. We have brought before you the chief of the tribe, the head
of the whole body of Eastern offenders, a captain-general of iniquity,
under whom all the fraud, all the peculation, all the tyranny in India
are embodied, disciplined, arrayed, and paid. This is the person, my
Lords, that we bring before you. We have brought before you such a
person, that, if you strike at him with the firm and decided arm of
justice, you will not have need of a great many more examples. You
strike at the whole corps, if you strike at the head.

So far as to the crime: so far as to the criminal. Now, my Lords, I
shall say a few words relative to the evidence which we have brought
to support such a charge, and which ought to be equal in weight to the
charge itself. It is chiefly evidence of record, officially signed by
the criminal himself in many instances. We have brought before you his
own letters, authenticated by his own hand. On these we chiefly rely.
But we shall likewise bring before you living witnesses, competent to
speak to the points to which they are brought.

When you consider the late enormous power of the prisoner,--when you
consider his criminal, indefatigable assiduity in the destruction of
all recorded evidence,--when you consider the influence he has over
almost all living testimony,--when you consider the distance of the
scene of action,--I believe your Lordships, and I believe the world,
will be astonished that so much, so clear, so solid, and so conclusive
evidence of all kinds has been obtained against him. I have no doubt
that in nine instances in ten the evidence is such as would satisfy
the narrow precision supposed to prevail, and to a degree rightly to
prevail, in all subordinate power and delegated jurisdiction. But your
Lordships will maintain, what we assert and claim as the right of the
subjects of Great Britain, that you are not bound by any rules of
evidence, or any other rules whatever, except those of natural,
immutable, and substantial justice.

God forbid the Commons should desire that anything should be received
as proof from them which is not by nature adapted to prove the thing
in question! If they should make such a request, they would aim at
overturning the very principles of that justice to which they resort;
they would give the nation an evil example that would rebound back on
themselves, and bring destruction upon their own heads, and on those
of all their posterity.

On the other hand, I have too much confidence in the learning with
which you will be advised, and the liberality and nobleness of the
sentiments with which you are born, to suspect that you would, by any
abuse of the forms, and a technical course of proceeding, deny justice
to so great a part of the world that claims it at your hands. Your
Lordships always had an ample power, and almost unlimited
jurisdiction; you have now a boundless object. It is not from this
district or from that parish, not from this city or the other
province, that relief is now applied for: exiled and undone princes,
extensive tribes, suffering nations, infinite descriptions of men,
different in language, in manners, and in rites, men separated by
every barrier of Nature from you, by the Providence of God are blended
in one common cause, and are now become suppliants at your bar. For
the honor of this nation, in vindication of this mysterious
Providence, let it be known that no rule formed upon municipal maxims
(if any such rule exists) will prevent the course of that imperial
justice which you owe to the people that call to you from all parts of
a great disjointed world. For, situated as this kingdom is, an object,
thank God, of envy to the rest of the nations, its conduct in that
high and elevated situation will undoubtedly be scrutinized with a
severity as great as its power is invidious.

It is well known that enormous wealth has poured into this country
from India through a thousand channels, public and concealed; and it
is no particular derogation from our honor to suppose a possibility of
being corrupted by that by which other empires have been corrupted,
and assemblies almost as respectable and venerable as your Lordships'
have been directly or indirectly vitiated. Forty millions of money, at
least, have within our memory been brought from India into England. In
this case the most sacred judicature ought to look to its reputation.
Without offence we may venture to suggest that the best way to secure
reputation is, not by a proud defiance of public opinion, but by
guiding our actions in such a manner as that public opinion may in the
end be securely defied, by having been previously respected and
dreaded. No direct false judgment is apprehended from the tribunals of
this country; but it is feared that partiality may lurk and nestle in
the abuse of our forms of proceeding. It is necessary, therefore, that
nothing in that proceeding should appear to mark the slightest trace,
should betray the faintest odor of chicane. God forbid, that, when you
try the most serious of all causes, that, when you try the cause of
Asia in the presence of Europe, there should be the least suspicion
that a narrow partiality, utterly destructive of justice, should so
guide us that a British subject in power should appear in substance to
possess rights which are denied to the humble allies, to the attached
dependants of this kingdom, who by their distance have a double demand
upon your protection, and who, by an implicit (I hope not a weak and
useless) trust in you, have stripped themselves of every other
resource under heaven!

I do not say this from any fear, doubt, or hesitation concerning what
your Lordships will finally do,--none in the world; but I cannot shut
my ears to the rumors which you all know to be disseminated abroad.
The abusers of power may have a chance to cover themselves by those
fences and intrenchments which were made to secure the liberties of
the people against men of that very description. But God forbid it
should be bruited from Pekin to Paris, that the laws of England are
for the rich and the powerful, but to the poor, the miserable, and
defenceless they afford no resource at all! God forbid it should be
said, no nation is equal to the English in _substantial_ violence and
in _formal_ justice,--that in this kingdom we feel ourselves competent
to confer the most extravagant and inordinate powers upon public
ministers, but that we are deficient, poor, helpless, lame, and
impotent in the means of calling them to account for their use of
them! An opinion has been insidiously circulated through this kingdom,
and through foreign nations too, that, in order to cover our
participation in guilt, and our common interest in the plunder of the
East, we have invented a set of scholastic distinctions, abhorrent to
the common sense and unpropitious to the common necessities of
mankind, by which we are to deny ourselves the knowledge of what the
rest of the world knows, and what so great a part of the world both
knows and feels. I do not deprecate any appearance which may give
countenance to this aspersion from suspicion that any corrupt motive
can influence this court; I deprecate it from knowing that hitherto we
have moved within the narrow circle of municipal justice. I am afraid,
that, from the habits acquired by moving within a circumscribed
sphere, we may be induced rather to endeavor at forcing Nature into
that municipal circle than to enlarge the circle of national justice
to the necessities of the empire we have obtained.

This is the only thing which does create any doubt or difficulty in
the minds of sober people. But there are those who will not judge so
equitably. Where two motives, neither of them perfectly justifiable,
may be assigned, the worst has the chance of being preferred. If, from
any appearance of chicane in the court, justice should fail, all men
will say, better there were no tribunals at all. In my humble opinion,
it would be better a thousand times to give all complainants the short
answer the Dey of Algiers gave a British ambassador, representing
certain grievances suffered by the British merchants,--"My friend,"
(as the story is related by Dr. Shaw,) "do not you know that my
subjects are a band of robbers, and that I am their captain?"--better
it would be a thousand times, and a thousand thousand times more
manly, than an hypocritical process, which, under a pretended
reverence to punctilious ceremonies and observances of law, abandons
mankind without help and resource to all the desolating consequences
of arbitrary power. The conduct and event of this cause will put an
end to such doubts, wherever they may be entertained. Your Lordships
will exercise the great plenary powers with which you are invested in
a manner that will do honor to the protecting justice of this kingdom,
that will completely avenge the great people who are subjected to it.
You will not suffer your proceedings to be squared by any rules but by
their necessities, and by that law of a common nature which cements
them to us and us to them. The reports to the contrary have been
spread abroad with uncommon industry; but they will be speedily
refuted by the humanity, simplicity, dignity, and nobleness of your
Lordships' justice.

Having said all that I am instructed to say concerning the process
which the House of Commons has used, concerning the crimes which they
have chosen, concerning the criminal upon whom they attach the crimes,
and concerning the evidence which they mean to produce, I am now to
proceed to open that part of the business which falls to my share. It
is rather an explanation of the circumstances than an enforcement of
the crimes.

Your Lordships of course will be apprised that this cause is not what
occurs every day, in the ordinary round of municipal affairs,--that it
has a relation to many things, that it touches many points in many
places, which are wholly removed from the ordinary beaten orbit of our
English affairs. In other affairs, every allusion immediately meets
its point of reference; nothing can be started that does not
immediately awaken your attention to something in your own laws and
usages which you meet with every day in the ordinary transactions of
life. But here you are caught, as it were, into another world; you are
to have the way pioneered before you. As the subject is new, it must
be explained; as it is intricate as well as new, that explanation can
be only comparatively short: and therefore, knowing your Lordships to
be possessed, along with all other judicial virtues, of the first and
foundation of them all, judicial patience, I hope that you will not
grudge a few hours to the explanation of that which has cost the
Commons fourteen years' assiduous application to acquire,--that your
Lordships will not disdain to grant a few hours to what has cost the
people of India upwards of thirty years of their innate, inveterate,
hereditary patience to endure.

My Lords, the powers which Mr. Hastings is charged with having abused
are the powers delegated to him by the East India Company. The East
India Company itself acts under two very dissimilar sorts of powers,
derived from two sources very remote from each other. The first source
of its power is under charters which the crown of Great Britain was
authorized by act of Parliament to grant; the other is from several
charters derived from the Emperor of the Moguls, the person in whose
dominions they were chiefly conversant,--particularly that great
charter by which, in the year 1765, they acquired the high-stewardship
of the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. Under those two bodies
of charters, the East India Company, and all their servants, are
authorized to act.

As to those of the first description, it is from the British charters
that they derive the capacity by which they are considered as a public
body, or at all capable of any public function. It is from thence they
acquire the capacity to take from any power whatsoever any other
charter, to acquire any other offices, or to hold any other
possessions. This, being the root and origin of their power, renders
them responsible to the party from whom all their immediate and
consequential powers are derived. As they have emanated from the
supreme power of this kingdom, the whole body and the whole train of
their servants, the corporate body as a corporate body, individuals as
individuals, are responsible to the high justice of this kingdom. In
delegating great power to the East India Company, this kingdom has not
released its sovereignty; on the contrary, the responsibility of the
Company is increased by the greatness and sacredness of the powers
that have been intrusted to it. Attempts have been made abroad to
circulate a notion that the acts of the East India Company and their
servants are not cognizable here. I hope on this occasion your
Lordships will show that this nation never did give a power without
annexing to it a proportionable degree of responsibility.

As to their other powers, the Company derives them from the Mogul
empire by various charters from that crown, and from the great
magistrates of that crown, and particularly by the Mogul charter of
1765, by which they obtained the _dewanny_, that is, the office of
lord high-steward, of the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. By
that charter they bound themselves (and bound inclusively all their
servants) to perform all the duties belonging to that new office, and
to be held by all the ties belonging to that new relation. If the
Mogul empire had existed in its vigor, they would have been bound,
under that responsibility, to observe the laws, rights, usages, and
customs of the natives, and to pursue their benefit in all things: for
this duty was inherent in the nature, institution, and purpose of the
office which they received. If the power of the sovereign from whom
they derived these powers should by any revolution in human affairs be
annihilated or suspended, their duty to the people below them, which
was created under the Mogul charter, is not annihilated, is not even
suspended; and for their responsibility in the performance of that
duty, they are thrown back upon that country (thank God, not
annihilated) from whence their original power, and all subsequent
derivative powers, have flowed. When the Company acquired that high
office in India, an English corporation became an integral part of the
Mogul empire. When Great Britain virtually assented to that grant of
office, and afterwards took advantage of it, Great Britain guarantied
the performance of all its duties. Great Britain entered into a
virtual act of union with that country, by which we bound ourselves as
securities to preserve the people in all the rights, laws, and
liberties which their natural, original sovereign was bound to
support, if he had been in condition to support them. By the
disposition of events, the two duties, flowing from two different
sources, are now united in one. The people of India, therefore, come
in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, but in their own right,
to the bar of this House, before the supreme royal justice of this
kingdom, from whence originally all the powers under which they have
suffered were derived.

It may be a little necessary, when we are stating the powers the
Company have derived from their charter, and which we state Mr.
Hastings to have abused, to state in as short and as comprehensive
words as I can (for the matter is large indeed) what the constitution
of that Company is,--I mean chiefly, what it is in reference to its
Indian service, the great theatre of the abuse. Your Lordships will
naturally conceive that it is not to inform you, but to revive
circumstances in your memory, that I enter into this detail.

You will therefore recollect, that the East India Company had its
origin about the latter end of the reign of Elizabeth, a period of
projects, when all sorts of commercial adventures, companies, and
monopolies were in fashion. At that time the Company was constituted
with extensive powers for increasing the commerce and the honor of
this country; because increasing its commerce, without increasing its
honor and reputation, would have been thought at that time, and will
be thought now, a bad bargain for the country. The powers of the
Company were, under that charter, merely commercial. By degrees, as
the theatre of operation was distant, as its intercourse was with many
great, some barbarous, and all of them armed nations, nations in which
not only the sovereign, but the subjects, were armed, it was found
necessary to enlarge their powers. The first power they obtained was a
power of naval discipline in their ships,--a power which has been
since dropped; the next was a power of law martial; the next was a
power of civil, and, to a degree, of criminal jurisdiction, within
their own factories, upon their own people and their own servants; the
next was (and here was a stride indeed) the power of peace and war.
Those high and almost incommunicable prerogatives of sovereignty,
which were hardly ever known before to be parted with to any subjects,
and which in several states were not wholly intrusted to the prince or
head of the commonwealth himself, were given to the East India
Company. That Company acquired these powers about the end of the reign
of Charles the Second; and they were afterwards more fully, as well as
more legally, given by Parliament after the Revolution. From this
time, the East India Company was no longer merely a mercantile
company, formed for the extension of the British commerce: it more
nearly resembled a delegation of the whole power and sovereignty of
this kingdom sent into the East. From that time the Company ought to
be considered as a subordinate sovereign power: that is, sovereign
with regard to the objects which it touched; subordinate with regard
to the power from whence its great trust was derived.

Under these successive arrangements things took a course very
different from their usual order. A new disposition took place, not
dreamt of in the theories of speculative politicians, and of which few
examples in the least resembling it have been seen in the modern
world, none at all in the ancient. In other instances, a political
body that acts as a commonwealth was first settled, and trade followed
as a consequence of the protection obtained by political power; but
here the course of affairs was reversed. The constitution of the
Company began in commerce and ended in empire. Indeed, wherever the
sovereign powers of peace and war are given, there wants but time and
circumstance to make these powers supersede every other. The affairs
of commerce will fall at last into their proper rank and situation.
However primary in their original intention, they will become
secondary. The possession, therefore, and the power of assertion of
these great authorities coinciding with the improved state of Europe,
with the improved state of arts in Europe, with the improved state of
laws, and, what is much more material, the improved state of military
discipline, more and more perfected every day with us,--universal
improvement in Europe coinciding with the general decay of Asia, (for
the proud day of Asia is passed,) this improvement coinciding with the
relaxation and dissolution of the Mogul government, with the decline
of its warlike spirit, with the total disuse of the ancient strictness
of the military discipline established by Tamerlane, the India Company
came to be what it is, a great empire, carrying on, subordinately, a
great commerce; it became that thing which was supposed by the Roman
law irreconcilable to reason and propriety,--_eundem negotiatorem et
dominum_: the same power became the general trader, the same power
became the supreme lord.

In this exalted situation, the India Company, however, still preserves
traces of its original mercantile character. The whole exterior order
of its political service is carried on upon a mercantile plan and
mercantile principles. In fact, the East India Company in Asia is a
state in the disguise of a merchant. Its whole service is a system of
public offices in the disguise of a counting-house. Accordingly, the
whole external order and series of the service, as I observed, is
commercial; the principal, the inward, the real, is almost entirely
political.

This system of the Company's service, its order and discipline, is
necessary to be explained to your Lordships, that you may see in what
manner the abuses have affected it. In the first place, all the
persons who go abroad in the Company's civil service enter as clerks
in the counting-house, and are called by a name to correspond to
it,--_writers_. In that condition they are obliged to serve five
years. The second step is that of a _factor_, in which they are
obliged to serve three years. The third step they take is that of a
_junior merchant_, in which they are obliged to serve three years
more. At that period they become _senior merchants_, which is the
highest stage of advance in the Company's service,--a rank by which
they had pretensions, before the year 1774, to the Council, to the
succession of the Presidency, and to whatever other honors the Company
has to bestow.

The Company had, in its early times, established factories in certain
places; which factories by degrees grew to the name of Presidencies
and Council, in proportion as the power and influence of the Company
increased, and as the political began first to struggle with, and at
length to predominate over, the mercantile. In this form it continued
till the year 1773, when the legislature broke in, for proper reasons
urging them to it, upon that order of the service, and appointed to
the superior department persons who had no title to that place under
the ordinary usage of the service. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Harwell,
whatever other titles they might have had, held solely under the act
of Parliament nominating them to that authority; but in all other
respects, except where the act and other subsequent acts have not
broken in upon it, the whole course of the service remains upon the
ancient footing, that is, the commercial footing, as to the gradation
and order of service.

Your Lordships see here a regular series of gradation, which requires
eleven years before any persons can arrive at the highest trusts and
situations. You will therefore be astonished, when so long a
probationary service was required, that effects very different from
those to be expected from long probation have happened, and that in a
much shorter time than those eleven years you have seen persons
returning into this kingdom with affluent, with overbearing fortunes.
It will be a great part of your inquiry, when we come before your
Lordships to substantiate evidence against Mr. Hastings, to discover
how that order came to be so completely broken down and erased that
scarce a trace of it for any good purpose remains. Though I will not
deny that that order, or that any order in a state, may be superseded
by the ruling power, when great talents, upon pressing exigencies, are
to be called forth, yet I must say the order itself was formed upon
wise principles. It furnished the persons who were put in that course
of probation with an opportunity (if circumstances enabled them) of
acquiring experience in business of revenue, trade, and policy. It
gave to those who watched them a constant inspection of their conduct
through all their progress. On the expectants of office it imposed the
necessity of acquiring a character in proportion to their standing, in
order that all which they had gained by the good behavior of years
should not be lost by the misconduct of an hour. It was a great
substantial regulation. But scarce a trace of the true spirit of it
remains to be discovered in Mr. Hastings's government; for Mr.
Hastings established offices, nay, whole systems of offices, and
especially a system of offices in 1781, which being altogether new,
none of the rules of gradation applied to them; and he filled those
offices in such a manner as suited best, not the constitution nor the
spirit of the service, but his own particular views and purposes. The
consequence has been, that persons in the most immature stages of life
have been appointed to conduct affairs which required the greatest
maturity of judgment, the greatest possible temper and moderation.
Effects naturally consequent have followed upon it.--I shall not
trouble your Lordships with any further observations on this system of
gradation.

I must, however, remark, before I go further, that there is something
in the representation of the East India Company in their Oriental
territory different from that, perhaps, of any other nation that has
ever transported any part of its power from one country to another.
The East India Company in India is not properly a branch of the
British nation: it is only a deputation of individuals. When the
Tartars entered into China, when the Arabs and Tartars successively
entered into Hindostan, when the Goths and Vandals penetrated into
Europe, when the Normans forced their way into England, indeed, in all
conquests, migrations, settlements, and colonizations, the new people
came as the offset of a nation. The Company in India does not exist as
a national colony. In effect and substance nobody can go thither that
does not go in its service. The English in India are nothing but a
seminary for the succession of officers. They are a nation of
placemen; they are a commonwealth without a people; they are a state
made up wholly of magistrates. There is nothing to be in propriety
called people, to watch, to inspect, to balance against the power of
office. The power of office, so far as the English nation is
concerned, is the sole power in the country: the consequence of which
is, that, being a kingdom of magistrates, what is commonly called the
_esprit du corps_ is strong in it. This spirit of the body
predominates equally in all its parts; by which the members must
consider themselves as having a common interest, and that common
interest separated both from that of the country which sent them out
and from that of the country in which they act. No control upon them
exists,--none, I mean, in persons who understand their language, who
understand their manners, or can apply their conduct to the laws.
Therefore, in a body so constituted, confederacy is easy, and has been
general. Your Lordships are not to expect that that should happen in
such a body which never happened in any body or corporation,--that is,
that they should, in any instance, be a proper check and control upon
themselves. It is not in the nature of things. The fundamental
principle of the whole of the East India Company's system is monopoly,
in some sense or other. The same principle predominates in the service
abroad and the service at home; and both systems are united into one,
animated with the same spirit, that is, with the corporate spirit. The
whole, taken together, is such as has not been seen in the examples of
the Moors, the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Romans,--in no old, in
no recent examples. The Dutch may resemble it, but they have not an
empire properly so denominated. By means of this peculiar circumstance
it has not been difficult for Mr. Hastings to embody abuse, and to put
himself at the head of a regular system of corruption.

Another circumstance in that service is deserving of notice. Except in
the highest parts of all, the emoluments of office do not in any
degree correspond with the trust, nor the nature of the office with
its name. In other official systems, the style, in general, is above
the function; here it is the reverse. Under the name of junior
merchant, senior merchant, writer, and other petty appellations of the
counting-house, you have magistrates of high dignity, you have
administrators of revenues truly royal, you have judges, civil, and in
some respects criminal, who pass judgment upon the greatest properties
of a great country. The legal public emoluments that belong to them
are very often so inadequate to the real dignity of the character,
that it is impossible, almost absolutely impossible, for the
subordinate parts of it, which, though subordinate, are stations of
power, to exist, as Englishmen, who look at a fortune to be enjoyed at
home as their ultimate object, and to exist in a state of perfect
incorruption in that service.

In some parts of Europe, it is true that the greatest situations are
often attended with but little emolument; yet still they are filled.
Why? Because reputation, glory, fame, the esteem, the love, the tears
of joy which flow from happy sensibility, the honest applauses of a
grateful country, sometimes pay the cares, anxieties, and toils which
wait on great situations in the commonwealth; and in these they pay in
money what cannot be paid in fame and reputation. It is the reverse in
the service of the India Company. Glory is not the lot of subordinated
merit,--and all the subordinate parts of the gradation are officers
who, in comparison with the offices and duties intrusted to them, are
miserably provided for; whereas the chief of each great Presidency has
emoluments securing him against every mode of temptation. But if this
has not secured the head, we may easily judge how the members are to
be coerced. Mr. Hastings, at the head of the service, with high legal
emoluments, has fouled his hands and sullied his government with
bribes. He has substituted oppression and tyranny in the place of
legal government. With all that unbounded, licentious power which he
has assumed over the public revenues, instead of endeavoring to find a
series of gradual, progressive, honorable, and adequate rewards for
the persons who serve the public in the subordinate, but powerful
situations, he has left them to prey upon the people without the
smallest degree of control. In default of honest emolument, there is
the unbounded license of power; and, as one of the honestest and
ablest servants of the Company said to me in conversation, the civil
service of the Company resembled the military service of the
Mahrattas,--little pay, but unbounded license to plunder. I do not say
that some of the salaries given in India would not sound well here;
but when you consider the nature of the trusts, the dignity of the
situation, whatever the name of them may be, the powers that are
granted, the hopes that every man has of establishing himself at home,
I repeat, it is a source of infinite grievance, of infinite abuse: of
which source of corrupt power we charge Mr. Hastings with having
availed himself, in filling up the void of direct pay by finding out
and countenancing every kind of oblique and unjust emolument; though
it must be confessed that he is far from being solely guilty of this
offence.

Another circumstance which distinguishes the East India Company is the
youth of the persons who are employed in the system of that service.
The servants have almost universally been sent out to begin their
progress and career in active occupation, and in the exercise of high
authority, at that period of life which, in all other places, has been
employed in the course of a rigid education. To put the matter in a
few words,--they are transferred from slippery youth to perilous
independence, from perilous independence to inordinate expectations,
from inordinate expectations to boundless power. School-boys without
tutors, minors without guardians, the world is let loose upon them
with all its temptations, and they are let loose upon the world with
all the powers that despotism involves.

It is further remarkable, these servants exercise what your Lordships
are now exercising, high judicial powers, and they exercise them
without the smallest study of any law, either general or municipal. It
is made a sort of rule in the service, a rule confirmed even by the
attempts that were made to correct it, (I mean confirmed by Sir Elijah
Impey, when, under the auspices of Mr. Hastings, he undertook to be
legislator for India,) that the judicial character, the last in the
order of legal progress, that to which all professional men look up as
the crown of their labors, that ultimate hope of men grown gray in
professional practice, is among the first experimental situations of a
Company's servant. It is expressly said in that body of regulations to
which I allude, that the office and situation of a judge of the
Dewanny Courts of Adawlut is to be filled by the _junior_ servants of
the Company; and as the judicial emolument is not substantially equal
to that of other situations, the office of a judge is to be taken, as
it were, _in transitu_, as a passage to other offices not of a
judicial nature. As soon, therefore, as a young man has supplied the
defects of his education by the advantage of some experience, he is
immediately translated to a totally different office; and another
young man is substituted, to learn, at the expense of the property of
India, to fill a situation which, when he may be qualified to fill, he
is no longer to hold.

It is in a great measure the same with regard to the other situations.
They are the situations of great statesmen, which, according to the
practice of the world, require, to fill properly, rather a large
converse with men and much intercourse in life than deep study of
books,--though that, too, has its eminent service. We know that in the
habits of civilized life, in cultivated society, there is imbibed by
men a good deal of the solid practice of government, of the true
maxims of state, and everything that enables a man to serve his
country. But these men are sent over to exercise functions at which a
statesman here would tremble, without any theoretical study, and
without any of that sort of experience which, in mixed societies of
business and converse, form men gradually and insensibly to great
affairs. Low cunning, intrigue, and stratagem are soon acquired; but
manly, durable policy, which never sacrifices the general interest to
a partial or momentary advantage, is not so cheaply formed in the
human understanding.

Mr. Hastings, in his defence before the House of Commons, and in the
defences he has made before your Lordships, has lamented his own
situation in this particular. It was much to be lamented, indeed. How
far it will furnish justification, extenuation, or palliation of his
conduct, when we come to examine that conduct, will be seen.

These circumstances in the system have in a great degree vitiated and
perverted what is in reality (and many things are in reality)
excellent in it. They have rendered the application of all correctives
and remedies to abuse, at best, precarious in their operation. The
laws that we have made, the covenants which the Company has obliged
its servants to enter into, the occasional orders that have been
given, at least ostensibly good, all have proved noxious to the
country, instead of beneficial.

To illustrate this point, I beg leave to observe to your Lordships,
that the servants of the Company are obliged to enter into that
service not only with an impression of the general duty which attaches
upon all servants, but are obliged to engage in a specific covenant
with their masters to perform all the duties described in that
covenant (which are all the duties of their relation) under heavy
penalties. They are bound to a repetition of these covenants at every
step of their progress, from writer to factor, from factor to junior
merchant, and from junior merchant to senior merchant. They ought,
according to the rule, to renew these covenants at these times by
something (I speak without offence) which may be said to resemble
confirmation in the Church. They are obliged to renew their obligation
in particular to receive no gifts, gratuities, or presents whatsoever.

This scheme of covenants would have been wise and proper, if it had
belonged to a judicious order, and rational, consistent scheme of
discipline. The orders of the Company have forbidden their servants to
take any extraneous emoluments. The act of Parliament has fulminated
against them. Clear, positive laws, and clear, positive private
engagements, have no exception of circumstances in them, no difference
_quoad majus et minus_; but every one who offends against the law is
liable to the law. The consequence is this: he who has deviated but an
inch from the straight line, he who has taken but one penny of
unlawful emolument, (and all have taken many pennies of unlawful
emolument,) does not dare to complain of the most abandoned extortion
and cruel oppression in any of his fellow-servants. He who has taken a
trifle, perhaps as the reward of a good action, is obliged to be
silent, when he sees whole nations desolated around him. The great
criminal at the head of the service has the laws in his hand; he is
always able to prove the small offence, and crush the person who has
committed it. This is one grand source of Mr. Hastings's power. After
he had got the better of the Parliamentary commission, no complaint
from any part of the service has appeared against Mr. Hastings. He is
bold enough to state it as one presumption of his merit, that there
has been no such complaint. No such complaint, indeed, can exist. The
spirit of the corps would of itself almost forbid it,--to which spirit
an informer is the most odious and detestable of all characters, and
is hunted down, and has always been hunted down, as a common enemy.
But here is a new security. Who can complain, or dares to accuse? The
whole service is irregular: nobody is free from small offences; and,
as I have said, the great offender can always crush the small one.

If you examine the correspondence of Mr. Hastings, you would imagine,
from many expressions very deliberately used by him, that the
Company's service was made out of the very filth and dregs of human
corruption; but if you examine his conduct towards the corrupt body he
describes, you would imagine he had lived in the speculative schemes
of visionary perfection. He was fourteen years at the head of that
service; and there is not an instance, no, not one single instance, in
which he endeavored to detect corruption, or that he ever, in any one
single instance, attempted to punish it; but the whole service, with
that whole mass of enormity which he attributes to it, slept, as it
were, at once, under his terror and his protection: under his
protection, if they did not dare to move against him; under terror,
from his power to pluck out individuals and make a public example of
them, whenever he thought fit. And therefore that service, under his
guidance and influence, was, beyond even what its own nature disposed
it to, a service of confederacy, a service of connivance, a service
composed of various systems of guilt, of which Mr. Hastings was the
head and the protector. But this general connivance he did not think
sufficient to secure to him the general support of the Indian
interest. He went further. We shall prove to your Lordships, that,
when the Company were driven by shame, not by inclination, to order
several prosecutions against delinquents in their service, Mr.
Hastings, directly contrary to the duty of his office, directly
contrary to the express and positive law of the Court of Directors,
which law Parliament had bound upon him as his rule of action, not
satisfied with his long tacit connivance, ventured, before he left his
government, and among his last acts, to pass a general act of pardon
and indemnity, and at once ordered the whole body of the prosecutions
directed by his masters, the Company, to be discharged.

Having had fourteen years' lease of connivance to bestow, and giving
at the end a general release of all suits and actions, he now puts
himself at the head of a vast body enriched by his bounties,
connivances, and indemnities, and expects the support of those whom he
had thus fully rewarded and discharged from the pursuit of the laws.
You will find, in the course of this business, that, when charges have
been brought against him of any bribery, corruption, or other
malversation, his course has been to answer little or nothing to that
specific bribery, corruption, or malversation: his way has been to
call on the Court of Directors to inquire of every servant who comes
to Europe, and to say whether there was any one man in it that will
give him an ill word. He has put himself into a situation in which he
may always safely call to his character, and will always find himself
utterly incapable of justifying his conduct.

So far I have troubled your Lordships with the system of confederacy
and connivance, which, under his auspices, was the vital principle of
almost the whole service. There is one member of the service which I
have omitted: but whether I ought to have put it first, or, as I do
now, last, I must confess I am at some loss; because, though it
appears to be the lowest (if any regular) part of the service, it is
by far the most considerable and the most efficient, without a full
consideration and explanation of which hardly any part of the conduct
of Mr. Hastings, and of many others that may be in his situation, can
be fully understood.

I have given your Lordships an account of writers, factors, merchants,
who exercise the office of judges, lord chancellors, chancellors of
the exchequer, ministers of state, and managers of great revenues. But
there is another description of men, of more importance than them all,
a description you have often heard of, but which has not been
sufficiently explained: I mean the _banian_. When the Company's
service was no more than mercantile, and the servants were generally
unacquainted with the country, they used the intervention of certain
factors among the natives, which were called _banians_: we called them
so, because they were of the tribe or caste of the banians or
merchants,--the Indians being generally distributed into trades
according to their tribes. The name still continues, when the
functions of the banians are totally altered. The banian is known by
other appellations. He is called _dewan_, or steward; and, indeed,
this is a term with more propriety applied to him in several of his
functions. He is, by his name of office, the steward of the household
of the European gentleman: he has the management of his affairs, and
the ordering of his servants. He is himself a domestic servant, and
generally chosen out of that class of natives who, by being habituated
to misery and subjection, can submit to any orders, and are fit for
any of the basest services. Trained under oppression, (it is the true
education,) they are fit to oppress others. They serve an
apprenticeship of servitude to qualify them for the trade of tyranny.
They know all the devices, all the little frauds, all the artifices
and contrivances, the whole panoply of the defensive armor by which
ingenious slavery secures itself against the violence of power. They
know all the lurking-holes, all the winding recesses, of the
unfortunate; and they hunt out distress and misery even to their last
retreats. They have suffered themselves; but, far from being taught by
those sufferings to abstain from rigor, they have only learned the
methods of afflicting their fellow-slaves. They have the best
intelligence of what is done in England. The moment a Company's
servant arrives in India, and his English connections are known to be
powerful, some of that class of people immediately take possession of
him, as if he were their inheritance. They have knowledge of the
country and its affairs; they have money; they have the arts of making
money. The gentleman who comes from England has none of these; he
enters into that world, as he enters into the world at large, naked.
His portion is great simplicity, great indigence, and a strong
disposition to relieve himself. The banian, once in possession,
employs his tyranny, not only over the native people of his country,
but often over the master himself, who has little other share in the
proceedings of his servant but in giving him the ticket of his name to
mark that he is connected with and supported by an European who is
himself well connected and supported at home. This is a commission
which nothing can resist. From that moment forward it is not the
Englishman, it is the black banian, that is the master. The nominal
master often lives from his hand. We know how young men are sent out
of this country; we know how happy we are to hear soon that they are
no longer a burden to their friends and parents. The banian knows it,
too. He supplies the young servant with money. He has him under his
power: first, from the necessity of employing such a man; and next,
(and this is the more important of the two,) he has that dreadful
power over his master which every creditor has over his debtor.
Actions the most abhorrent to his nature he must see done before his
face, and thousands and thousands worse are done in his absence, and
he dare not complain. The banian extorts, robs, plunders, and then
gives him just what proportion of the spoil he pleases. If the master
should murmur, the very power that was sent over to protect the people
of India from these very abuses, (the best things being perverted,
when applied to unknown objects and put into unsuitable situations,)
the very laws of England, by making the recovery of debts more easy,
infinitely increase the power of the banian over his master. Thus the
Supreme Court of Justice, the destined corrector of all abuses,
becomes a collateral security for that abominable tyranny exercised by
the moneyed banians over Europeans as well as the natives. So that,
while we are here boasting of the British power in the East, we are in
perhaps more than half our service nothing but the inferior, miserable
instruments of the tyranny which the lowest part of the natives of
India exercise, to the disgrace of the British authority, and to the
ruin of all that is respectable among their own countrymen. They have
subverted the first houses, totally ruined and undone the country,
cheated and defrauded the revenue,--the master a silent, sometimes a
melancholy spectator, until some office of high emolument has
emancipated him. This has often been the true reason that the
Company's servants in India, in order to free themselves from this
horrid and atrocious servitude, are obliged to become instruments of
another tyranny, and must prostitute themselves to men in power, in
order to obtain some office that may enable them to escape the
servitudes below, and enable them to pay their debts. And thus many
have become the instruments of Mr. Hastings.

These banians, or dewans, were originally among the lower castes in
the country. But now, it is true, that, after seeing the power and
profits of these men,--that there is neither power, profession, nor
occupation to be had, which a reputable person can exercise, but
through that channel,--men of higher castes, and born to better
things, have thrown themselves into that disgraceful servitude, have
become menial servants to Englishmen, that they might rise by their
degradation. But whoever they are, or of whatever birth, they have
equally prostituted their integrity, they have equally lost their
character; and, once entered into that course of life, there is no
difference between the best castes and the worst. That system Mr.
Hastings confirmed, established, increased, and made the instrument of
the most austere tyranny, of the basest peculations, and the most
scandalous and iniquitous extortions.

In the description I have given of banians a distinction is to be
made. Your Lordships must distinguish the banians of the British
servants in subordinate situations and the banians who are such to
persons in higher authority. In the latter case the banian is in
strict subordination, because he may always be ruined by his superior;
whereas in the former it is always in his power to ruin his nominal
superior. It was not through fear, but voluntarily, and not for the
banian's purposes, but his own, Mr. Hastings has brought forward his
banian. He seated him in the houses of the principal nobility, and
invested him with farms of the revenue; he has given him enormous
jobs; he has put him over the heads of a nobility which, for their
grandeur, antiquity, and dignity, might almost be matched with your
Lordships. He has made him supreme ecclesiastical judge, judge even of
the very castes, in the preservation of the separate rules and
separate privileges of which that people exists. He who has dominion
over the caste has an absolute power over something more than life and
fortune.

Such is that first, or last, (I know not which to call it,) order in
the Company's service called a banian. The _mutseddies_, clerks,
accountants, of Calcutta, generally fall under this description. Your
Lordships will see hereafter the necessity of giving you, in the
opening the case, an idea of the situation of a banian. You will see,
as no Englishman, properly speaking, acts by himself, that he must be
made responsible for that person called his banian,--for the power he
either uses under him, or the power he has acquired over him. The
banian escapes, in the night of his complexion and situation, the
inquiry that a white man cannot stand before in this country. Through
the banians, or other black natives, a bad servant of the Company
receives his bribes. Through them he decides falsely against the
titles of litigants in the court of castes, or in the offices of
public registry. Through them Mr. Hastings has exercised oppressions
which, I will venture to say, in his own name, in his own character,
daring as he is, (and he is the most daring criminal that ever
existed,) he never would dare to practise. Many, if not most, of the
iniquities of his interior bad administration have been perpetrated
through these banians, or other native agents and confidants; and we
shall show you that he is not satisfied with one of them, confiding
few of his secrets to Europeans, and hardly any of his instruments,
either native or European, knowing the secrets of each other. This is
the system of banianism, and of concealment, which Mr. Hastings,
instead of eradicating out of the service, has propagated by example
and by support, and enlarged by converting even Europeans into that
dark and insidious character.

I have explained, or endeavored to explain, to your Lordships these
circumstances of the true spirit, genius, and character, more than the
ostensible institutions of the Company's service: I now shall beg
leave to bring before you one institution, taken from the mercantile
constitution of the Company, so excellent, that I will venture to say
that human wisdom has never exceeded it. In this excellent institution
the counting-house gave lessons to the state. The active, awakened,
and enlightened principle of self-interest will provide a better
system for the guard of that interest than the cold, drowsy wisdom of
those who provide for a good out of themselves ever contrived for the
public. The plans sketched by private prudence for private interest,
the regulations by mercantile men for their mercantile purposes, when
they can be applied to the discipline and order of the state, produce
a discipline and order which no state should be ashamed to copy. The
Company's mercantile regulations are admirably fitted for the
government of a remote, large, disjointed empire. As merchants, having
factors abroad in distant parts of the world, they have obliged them
to a minuteness and strictness of register, and to a regularity of
correspondence, which no state has ever used in the same degree with
regard to its public ministers. The Company has made it a fundamental
part of their constitution, that almost their whole government shall
be a written government. Your Lordships will observe, in the course of
the proceeding, the propriety of opening fully to you this
circumstance in the government of India,--that is, that the Company's
government is a government of writing, a government of record. The
strictest court of justice, in its proceeding, is not more, perhaps
not so much a court of record as the India Company's executive service
is, or ought to be, in all its proceedings.

In the first place, they oblige their servants to keep a journal or
diary of all their transactions, public and private: they are bound to
do this by an express covenant. They oblige them, as a corrective upon
that diary, to keep a letter-book, in which all their letters are to
be regularly entered. And they are bound by the same covenant to
produce all those books upon requisition, although they should be
mixed with affairs concerning their own private negotiations and
transactions of commerce, or their closest and most retired concerns
in private life. But as the great corrective of all, they have
contrived that every proceeding in public council shall be
written,--no debates merely verbal. The arguments, first or last, are
to be in writing, and recorded. All other bodies, the Houses of Lords,
Commons, Privy Council, Cabinet Councils for secret state
deliberations, enter only resolves, decisions, and final resolutions
of affairs: the argument, the discussion, the dissent, does very
rarely, if at all, appear. But the Company has proceeded much further,
and done much more wisely, because they proceeded upon mercantile
principles; and they have provided, either by orders or course of
office, that all shall be written,--the proposition, the argument, the
dissent. This is not confined to their great Council; but this order
ought to be observed, as I conceive, (and I see considerable traces of
it in practice,) in every Provincial Council, whilst the Provincial
Councils existed, and even down to the minutest ramification of their
service. These books, in a progression from the lowest Councils to the
highest Presidency, are ordered to be transmitted, duplicate and
triplicate, by every ship that sails to Europe. On this system an able
servant of the Company, and high in their service, has recorded his
opinion, and strongly expressed his sentiments. Writing to the Court
of Directors, he says,

      "It ought to be remembered, that the basis upon which you
      rose to power, and have been able to stand the shock of
      repeated convulsions, has been the accuracy and simplicity
      of mercantile method, which makes every transaction in your
      service and every expenditure a matter of record."

My Lords, this method not only must produce to them, if strictly
observed, a more accurate idea of the nature of their affairs and the
nature of their expenditures, but it must afford them no trivial
opportunity and means of knowing the true characters of their
servants, their capacities, their ways of thinking, the turn and bias
of their minds. If well employed, and but a little improved, the East
India Company possessed an advantage unknown before to the chief of a
remote government. In the most remote parts of the world, and in the
minutest parts of a remote service, everything came before the
principal with a domestic accuracy and local familiarity. It was, in
the power of a Director, sitting in London, to form an accurate
judgment of every incident that happened upon the Ganges and the
Gogra.

The use of this recorded system did not consist only in the facility
of discovering what the nature of their affairs and the character and
capacity of their servants was, but it furnished the means of
detecting their misconduct, frequently of proving it too, and of
producing the evidence of it judicially under their own hands. For
your Lordships must have observed that it is rare indeed, that, in a
continued course of evil practices, any uniform method of proceeding
will serve the purposes of the delinquent. Innocence is plain, direct,
and simple: guilt is a crooked, intricate, inconstant, and various
thing. The iniquitous job of to-day may be covered by specious
reasons; but when the job of iniquity of to-morrow succeeds, the
reasons that have colored the first crime may expose the second
malversation. The man of fraud falls into contradiction,
prevarication, confusion. This hastens, this facilitates, conviction.
Besides, time is not allowed for corrupting the records. They are
flown out of their hands, they are in Europe, they are safe in the
registers of the Company, perhaps they are under the eye of
Parliament, before the writers of them have time to invent an excuse
for a direct contrary conduct to that to which their former pretended
principles applied. This is a great, a material part of the
constitution of the Company. My Lords, I do not think it to be much
apologized for, if I repeat, that this is the fundamental regulation
of that service, and which, if preserved in the first instance, as it
ought to be, in official practice in India, and then used as it ought
to be in England, would afford such a mode of governing a great,
foreign, dispersed empire, as, I will venture to say, few countries
ever possessed, even in governing the most limited and narrow
jurisdiction.

It was the great business of Mr. Hastings's policy to subvert this
great political edifice. His first mode of subverting it was by
commanding the public ministers, paid by the Company, to deliver their
correspondence upon the most critical and momentous affairs to him, in
order to be suppressed and destroyed at his pleasure. To support him
in this plan of spoliation, he has made a mischievous distinction in
public business between public and private correspondence. The
Company's orders and covenants made none. There are, readily I admit,
thousands of occasions in which it is not proper to divulge
promiscuously a private correspondence, though on public affairs, to
the world; but there is no occasion in which it is not a necessary
duty, on requisition, to communicate your correspondence to those who
form the paramount government, on whose interests and on whose
concerns and under whose authority this correspondence has been
carried on. The very same reasons which require secrecy with regard to
others demand the freest communication to them. But Mr. Hastings has
established principles of confidence and secrecy towards himself which
have cut off all confidence between the Directors and their ministers,
and effectually kept them at least out of the secret of their own
affairs. Without entering into all the practices by which he has
attempted to maim the Company's records, I shall state one more to
your Lordships,--that is, his avowed appointment of spies and
under-agents, who shall carry on the real state business, while there
are public and ostensible agents who are not in the secret. The
correspondence of those private agents he holds in his own hands,
communicates as he thinks proper, but most commonly withholds. There
remains nothing for the Directors but the shell and husk of a dry,
formal, official correspondence, which neither means anything nor was
intended to mean anything.

These are some of the methods by which he has defeated the purposes of
the excellent institution of a recorded administration. But there are
cases to be brought before this court in which he has laid the axe at
once to the root,--which was, by delegating out of his own hands a
great department of the powers of the Company, which he was himself
bound to execute, to a board which was not bound to record their
deliberations with the same strictness as he himself was bound. He
appointed of his own usurped authority a board for the administration
of the revenue, the members of which were expressly dispensed from
recording their dissents, until they chose it; and in that office, as
in a great gulf, a most important part of the Company's transactions
has been buried.

Notwithstanding his unwearied pains in the work of spoliation, some
precious fragments are left, which we ought infinitely to value,--by
which we may learn, and lament, the loss of what he has destroyed. If
it were not for those inestimable fragments and wrecks of the recorded
government which have been saved from the destruction which Mr.
Hastings intended for them all, the most shameful enormities that have
ever disgraced a government or harassed a people would only be known
in this country by secret whispers and unauthenticated anecdotes; the
disgracer's of government, the vexers and afflicters of mankind,
instead of being brought before an awful public tribunal, might have
been honored with the highest distinctions and rewards their country
has to bestow; and sordid bribery, base peculation, iron-handed
extortion, fierce, unrelenting tyranny, might themselves have been
invested with those sacred robes of justice before which this day they
have cause to tremble.

Mr. Hastings, sensible of what he suffers from this register of acts
and opinions, has endeavored to discredit and ruin what remains of it.
He refuses, in his defence to the House of Commons, in letters to the
Court of Directors, in various writings and declarations, he refuses
to be tried by his own recorded declarations; he refuses to be bound
by his own opinions, delivered under his own hand. He knows that he
and the record cannot exist together. He knows that what remains of
the written constitution which he has not destroyed is enough to
destroy him. He claims a privilege of systematic inconstancy, a
privilege of prevarication, a privilege of contradiction,--a privilege
of not only changing his conduct, but the principles of his conduct,
whenever it suits his occasions. But I hope your Lordships will show
the destroyers of that wise constitution, and the destroyers of those
records which are to be the securities against malversation in office,
the discoverers and avengers of it, that whoever destroys the
discoverer establishes the iniquity; that, therefore, your Lordships
will bind him to his own declarations, given on record under his own
hand; that you will say to this unfaithful servant of the Company,
what was said to another unfaithful person upon a far less occasion by
a far greater authority, "Out of thy own mouth will I judge thee, thou
wicked servant."

Having gone through what I have been instructed might be necessary to
state to your Lordships concerning the Company's constitution, (I mean
the real inside, and not the shell of its constitution,)--having
stated the abuses that existed in it,--having stated how Mr. Hastings
endeavored to perpetuate and to increase and to profit of the abuse,
and how he has systematically endeavored to destroy, and has in some
instances in fact destroyed, many things truly excellent in that
constitution,--if I have not wasted your time in explanation of
matters that you are already well acquainted with, I shall next beg
leave to state to you the abuse in some particulars of the other part
of the public authority which the Company acquired over the natives of
India, in virtue of the royal charter of the present Mogul emperor, in
the year 1766 [1765?].

My Lords, that you may the better judge of the abuse Mr. Hastings has
made of the powers vested in him, it will be expedient to consider a
little who the people are to whose prejudice he has abused these
powers. I shall explain this point with as much brevity as is
consistent with the distinctness with which I mean to bring the whole
before your Lordships; and I beg to observe to you that this previous
discourse, rather explanatory than accusatorial, (if I may use the
expression,) is meant rather to elucidate the nature of the matter to
come before you in regular charges than as proof of the charges
themselves.

I know that a good deal of latitude is allowed to advocates, when
opening a cause in a private court, to indulge themselves in their
narratives leading to the charges they intend to bring. They are not
always called to the strictest account for such prefatory matter,
because the court, when it comes to judge, sifts and distinguishes it
from the points to be strictly proved, and on whose merits the cause
relies. But I wish your Lordships to know, that, with the high opinion
I have of your gravity, (and it is impossible for a man to conceive a
higher,) and sensible of the weight of those I represent at this
place, namely, the Commons of Great Britain, I should be sorry that
any one substantial fact, even in this explanatory opening, or even
the color of the fact, should be alleged, which, when called upon, I
should not be ready to make good to you by proof,--I mean, by proof
adapted to its nature: public opinion, by evidence of public opinion;
by record, that to which record is applicable; by oral testimony,
things to which oral testimony alone can be produced; and, last of
all, that which is matter of historic proof, by historic evidence.
This I hope to do with the usual allowance to errors and mistakes,
which is the claim of human infirmity.

Then, my Lords, two distinct people inhabit India. Two sorts of people
inhabit the same country, as totally distinct from each other, in
characters, lives, opinions, prejudices, and manners, as the
inhabitants of countries most remote from each other. For both of
these descriptions Mr. Hastings was bound to provide equally,
agreeable to the terms of the charter which the Company received from
the lawful governing power of that country: a charter received at its
own solicitation; a charter not forced upon us by a superior power,
but given at the immediate solicitation of the principal servants
belonging to the Company; a charter solemnly accepted by the Company,
and by them, I am very sorry to say, little regarded,--or, at least,
little regarded by their principal servants.

My Lords, the first description of people who are subjected virtually
to the British empire through those mediums which I have described to
you are the original inhabitants of Hindostan, who have in all time,
and beyond all the eras which we use, (I mean always the two grand
eras excepted,) been the aboriginal inhabitants and proprietors of
that country,--with manners, religion, customs, and usages
appropriated to themselves, and little resembling those of the rest of
mankind. This description of men is commonly called Gentoos. The
system and principle of that government is locality. Their laws, their
manners, their religion are all local.

Their legislator, whoever he was, (for who he was is a matter lost in
the mists of a most obscure antiquity,) had it as a great leading
principle of his policy to connect the people with their soil.
Accordingly, by one of those anomalies which a larger acquaintance
with our species daily discovers, and which perhaps an attentive
reflection might explain in the nature of man, this aboriginal people
of India,--who are the softest in their manners of any of our race,
approaching almost to feminine tenderness,--who are formed
constitutionally benevolent, and, in many particulars, made to fill a
larger circle of benevolence than our morals take in,--who extend
their good-will to the whole animal creation,--these people are, of
all nations, the most unalliable to any other part of mankind. They
cannot, the highest orders of them, at least, cannot, come into
contact with any other. That bond which is one of the chief
instruments of society, and which, supporting the individual, connects
the species, can have no existence with them: I mean the convivial
bond. That race can be held to no other by that great link of life. No
Hindoo can mix at meals even with those on whom he depends for the
meat he eats. This circumstance renders it difficult for us to enter
with due sympathy into their concerns, or for them to enter into ours,
even when we meet on the same ground. But there are other
circumstances which render our intercourse, in our mutual relation,
very full of difficulty. The sea is between us. The mass of that
element, which, by appearing to disconnect, unites mankind, is to them
a forbidden road. It is a great gulf fixed between you and them,--not
so much that elementary gulf, but that gulf which manners, opinions,
and laws have radicated in the very nature of the people. None of
their high castes, without great danger to his situation, religion,
rank, and estimation, can ever pass the sea; and this forbids,
forever, all direct communication between that country and this. That
material and affecting circumstance, my Lords, makes it ten times more
necessary, since they cannot come to us, to keep a strict eye upon all
persons who go to them. It imposes upon us a stricter duty to guard
with a firm and powerful vigilance those whose principles of
conscience weaken their principles of self-defence. If we undertake to
govern the inhabitants of such a country, we must govern them upon
their own principles and maxims, and not upon ours. We must not think
to force them into the narrow circle of our ideas; we must extend ours
to take in their system of opinions and rites, and the necessities
which result from both: all change on their part is absolutely
impracticable. We have more versatility of character and manners, and
it is we who must conform. We know what the empire of opinion is in
human nature. I had almost said that the law of opinion was human
nature itself. It is, however, the strongest principle in the
composition of the frame of the human mind; and more of the happiness
and unhappiness of mankind resides in that inward principle than in
all external circumstances put together. But if such is the empire of
opinion even amongst us, it has a pure, unrestrained, complete, and
despotic power amongst them. The variety of balanced opinions in our
minds weakens the force of each: for in Europe, sometimes, the laws of
religion differ from the laws of the land; sometimes the laws of the
land differ from our laws of honor; our laws of honor are full of
caprice, differing from those other laws, and sometimes differing from
themselves: but there the laws of religion, the laws of the land, and
the laws of honor are all united and consolidated in one invariable
system, and bind men by eternal and indissoluble bonds to the rules of
what, amongst them, is called his _caste_.

It may be necessary just to state to your Lordships what a _caste_ is.
The Gentoo people, from the oldest time, have been distributed into
various orders, all of them hereditary: these family orders are called
castes; these castes are the fundamental part of the constitution of
the Gentoo commonwealth, both in their church and in their state.

Your Lordships are born to hereditary honors in the chief of your
houses; the rest mix with the people. With the Gentoos, they who are
born noble can never fall into any second rank. They are divided into
four orders,--the Brahmins, the Chittery, the Bice, and the Soodur,
with many subdivisions in each. An eternal barrier is placed between
them. The higher cannot pass into the lower; the lower cannot rise
into the higher. They have all their appropriated rank, place, and
situation, and their appropriated religion too, which is essentially
different in its rites and ceremonies, sometimes in its object, in
each of those castes. A man who is born in the highest caste, which at
once unites what would be tantamount in this country to the dignity of
the peerage and the ennobled sanctity of the episcopal character,--the
Brahmin, who sustains these characters, if he loses his caste, does
not fall into an inferior order, the Chittery, the Bice, or the
Soodur, but he is thrown at once out of all ranks of society. He is
precipitated from the proudest elevation of respect and honor to a
bottomless abyss of contempt,--from glory to infamy,--from purity to
pollution,--from sanctity to profanation. No honest occupation is open
to him; his children are no longer his children; their parent loses
that name; the conjugal bond is dissolved. Few survive this most
terrible of all calamities. To speak to an Indian of his caste is to
speak to him of his all.

But the rule of caste has, with them, given one power more to fortune
than the manners of any other nation were ever known to do. For it is
singular, the caste may be lost, not only by certain voluntary crimes,
but by certain involuntary sufferings, disgraces, and pollutions, that
are utterly out of their power to prevent. Those who have patiently
submitted to imprisonment,--those who have not flinched from the
scourge,--those who have been as unmoved as marble under
torture,--those who have laughed at the menaces of death itself,--have
instantly given way, when it has been attempted to subject them to any
of those pollutions by which they lose caste. To this caste they are
bound by all laws of all descriptions, human and divine; and
inveterate usage has radicated it in them to a depth and with an
adhesion with which no other known prejudice has been known to exist.
Tyranny is therefore armed against them with a greater variety of
weapons than are found in its ordinary stores.

This, amongst a thousand other considerations, speaks to us in very
authoritative language with what care and circumspection we ought to
handle people so delicate. In the course of this trial your Lordships
will see with horror the use which Mr. Hastings made, through several
of his wicked and abominable instruments, chosen from the natives
themselves, of these superadded means of oppression. I shall prove, in
the course of this trial, that he has put his own menial domestic
servant,--a wretch totally dependent,--a wretch grossly ignorant,--the
common instrument of his bribery and peculation,--he has enthroned
him, I say, on the first seat of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which
was to decide upon the castes of all those people, including their
rank, their family, their honor, and their happiness here, and, in
their judgment, their salvation hereafter. Under the awe of this
power, no man dared to breathe a murmur against his tyranny. Fortified
in this security, he says, "Who complains of me!"--"No, none of us
dare complain of you," says the trembling Gentoo. "No! your menial
servant has my caste in his power."--I shall not trouble your
Lordships with mentioning others; it was enough that Cantoo Baboo, and
Ginga Govind Sing, names to which your Lordships are to be
familiarized hereafter,--it is enough that those persons had the caste
and character of all the people of Bengal in their hands. Through them
he has taken effectual security against all complaint. Your Lordships
will hence discern how very necessary it is become that some other
personage should intervene, should take upon him their representation,
and by his freedom and his power should supply the defects arising
from their servitude and their impotence. The Commons of Great Britain
charge themselves with this character.

My Lords, these Gentoo people are the original people of Hindostan.
They are still, beyond comparison, the most numerous. Faults this
nation may have; but God forbid we should pass judgment upon people
who framed their laws and institutions prior to our insect origin of
yesterday! With all the faults of their nature and errors of their
institutions, their institutions, which act so powerfully on their
natures, have two material characteristics which entitle them to
respect: first, great force and stability; and next, excellent moral
and civil effects.

Their stability has been proved by their holding on an uniform tenor
for a duration commensurate to all the empires with which history has
made us acquainted; and they still exist in a green old age, with all
the reverence of antiquity, and with all the passion that people have
to novelty and change. They have stood firm on their ancient base;
they have cast their roots deep in their native soil,--perhaps because
they have never spread them anywhere else than in their native soil.
Their blood, their opinions, and the soil of their country make one
consistent piece, admitting no mixture, no adulteration, no
improvement: accordingly, their religion has made no converts, their
dominion has made no conquests; but in proportion as their laws and
opinions were concentred within themselves, and hindered from
spreading abroad, they have doubled their force at home. They have
existed in spite of Mahomedan and Portuguese bigotry,--in spite of
Tartarian and Arabian tyranny,--in spite of all the fury of successive
foreign conquest,--in spite of a more formidable foe, the avarice of
the English dominion.

I have spoken now, my Lords, of what their principles are, their laws
and religious institutions, in point of force and stability; I have
given instances of their force in the very circumstance in which all
the institutions of mankind in other respects show their weakness.
They have existed, when the country has been otherwise subdued. This
alone furnishes full proof that there must be some powerful influence
resulting from them beyond all our little fashionable theories upon
such subjects.

The second consideration in the Gentoo institutions is their
beneficial effects, moral and civil. The policy, civil or religious,
or, as theirs is, composed of both, that makes a people happy and a
state flourishing, (putting further and higher considerations out of
the way, which are not now before us,) must undoubtedly, so far as
human considerations prevail, be a policy wisely conceived in any
scheme of government. It is confirmed by all observation, that, where
the Hindoo religion has been established, that country has been
flourishing. We have seen some patterns remaining to this day. The
very country which is to be the subject of your Lordships' judicial
inquiry is an instance, by an entire change of government, of the
different effects resulting from the rapacity of a foreign hand, and
the paternal, lenient, protecting arm of a native government, formed
on the long connection of prejudice and power. I shall give you its
state under the Hindoo government from a book written by a very old
servant of the Company, whose authority is of the greater weight, as
the very destruction of all this scheme of government is the great
object of the author.

The author, Mr. Holwell, divides the country of Bengal into its
different provinces. He supposes what they then paid to the supreme
government; he supposes what the country is capable of yielding; and
his project is, to change entirely the application of the revenues of
the country, and to secure the whole into the hands of government. In
enumerating these provinces, at last he comes to the province of
Burdwan.

"In truth," (says this author,)

      "it would be almost cruelty to molest this happy people; for
      in this district are the only vestiges of the beauty,
      purity, piety, regularity, equity, and strictness of the
      ancient Hindostan government. Here the property as well as
      the liberty of the people are inviolate. Here no robberies
      are heard of, either public or private. The traveller,
      either with or without merchandise, becomes the immediate
      care of the government, which allots him guards, without any
      expense, to conduct him from stage to stage; and these are
      accountable for the safety and accommodation of his person
      and effects. At the end of the first stage he is delivered
      over, with certain benevolent formalities, to the guards of
      the next, who, after interrogating the traveller as to the
      usage he had received in his journey, dismiss the first
      guard with a written certificate of their behavior, and a
      receipt for the traveller and his effects; which certificate
      and receipt are returnable to the commanding officer of the
      first stage, who registers the same, and regularly reports
      it to the rajah.

      "In this form the traveller is passed through the country;
      and if he only passes, he is not suffered to be at any
      expense for food, accommodation, or carriage for his
      merchandise or baggage: but it is otherwise, if he is
      permitted to make any residence in one place above three
      days, unless occasioned by sickness, or any unavoidable
      accident. If anything is lost in this district,--for
      instance, a bag of money or other valuables,--the person who
      finds it hangs it upon the next tree, and gives notice to
      the nearest _chowkey_, or place of guard, the officer of
      which orders immediate publication of the same by beat of
      _tomtom_, or drum."

These, my Lords, are the effects universally produced by the Hindoo
polity throughout that vast region, before it was distorted and put
out of frame by the barbarism of foreign conquests. Some choice,
reserved spots continued to flourish under it to the year 1756. Some
remained till Mr. Hastings obtained the means of utterly defacing
them. Such was the prospect of Benares under the happy government of
Bulwant Sing. Such was the happy state of the same Benares in the
happy days of Cheyt Sing, until, in the year 1781, Mr. Hastings
introduced _his_ reform into that country.

Having stated the general outline of the manners of the original
people of Hindostan, having stated the general principles of their
policy, which either prohibit connection, or oblige us to a connection
very different from what we have hitherto used towards them, I shall
leave it to your Lordships' judgment whether you will suffer such fair
monuments of wisdom and benevolence to be defaced by the rapacity of
your governors. I hope I have not gone out of my way to bring before
you any circumstance relative to the Gentoo religion and manners,
further than as they relate to the spirit of our government over them;
for though there never was such food for the curiosity of the human
mind as is found in the manners of this people, I pass it totally
over.

I wish to divide this preliminary view into six periods; and your
Lordships will consider that of the Hindoos, which I have now
mentioned, as the first era.

The second era is an era of great misfortune to that country, and to
the world in general: I mean, the time of the prophet Mahomed. The
enthusiasm which animated his first followers, the despotic power
which religion obtained through that enthusiasm, and the advantages
derived from both over the enervated great empires, and broken,
disunited, lesser governments of the world, extended the influence of
that proud and domineering sect from the banks of the Ganges to the
banks of the Loire.

This second period is the era of the Arabs. These people made a great
and lasting impression on India. They established, very early,
Mahomedan sovereigns in all parts of it, particularly in the kingdom
of Bengal, which is the principal object of our present inquiry. They
held that kingdom for a long series of years, under a dynasty of
thirty-three kings,--having begun their conquest and founded their
dominion in Bengal not very long after the time of their prophet.

These people, when they first settled in India, attempted, with the
ferocious arm of their prophetic sword, to change the religion and
manners of that country; but at length perceiving that their cruelty
wearied out itself, and never could touch the constancy of the
sufferers, they permitted the native people of the country to remain
in quiet, and left the Mahomedan religion to operate upon them as it
could, by appealing to the ambition or avarice of the great, or by
taking the lower people, who had lost their castes, into this new
sect, and thus, from the refuse of the Gentoo, increasing the bounds
of the Mahomedan religion. They left many of the ancient rajahs of the
country possessed of an inferior sovereignty; and where the strength
of the country, or other circumstances, would not permit this
subordination, they suffered them to continue in a separate state,
approaching to independence, if not wholly independent.

The Mahomedans, during the period of the Arabs, never expelled or
destroyed the native Gentoo nobility, zemindars, or landholders of the
country. They all, or almost all, remained fixed in their places,
properties, and dignities; and the shadows of several of them remain
under our jurisdiction.

The next, which is the third era, is an era the more necessary to
observe upon, because Mr. Hastings has made many applications to it in
his defence before the Commons: namely, the invasion of the Tartars,
or the era of Tamerlane. These Tartars did not establish themselves on
the ruins of the Hindoos. Their conquests were over the other
Mahomedans: for Tamerlane invaded Hindostan, as he invaded other
countries, in the character of the great reformer of the Mahomedan
religion. He came as a sort of successor to the rights of the Prophet,
upon a divine title. He struck at all the Mahomedan princes who
reigned at that time. He considered them as apostates, or at least as
degenerated from the faith, and as tyrants abusing their power. To
facilitate his conquests over these, he was often obliged to come to a
sort of a composition with the people of the country he invaded.
Tamerlane had neither time nor means nor inclination to dispossess the
ancient rajahs of the country.

Your Lordships will observe that I propose nothing more than to give
you an idea of the principles of policy which prevailed in these
several revolutions, and not an history of the furious military
achievements of a barbarous invader. Historians, indeed, are generally
very liberal of their information concerning everything but what we
ought to be very anxious to know. They tell us that India was
conquered by Tamerlane, and conquered in such a year. The year will be
found to coincide somewhere, I believe, with the end of the fourteenth
century. Thinking the mere fact as of little moment, and its
chronology as nothing, but thinking the policy very material, which,
indeed, is to be collected only here and there, in various books
written with various views, I shall beg leave to lay before you a very
remarkable circumstance relative to that policy, and taken from the
same book to which I formerly referred, Mr. Holwell's.

      "When the Hindoo rajahs, or princes of Hindostan, submitted
      to Tamerlane, it was on these capital stipulations: that the
      emperor should marry a daughter of Rajah Cheyt Sing's house;
      that the head of this house should be in perpetuity
      governors of the citadel of Agra, and anoint the king at his
      coronation; and that the emperors should never impose the
      _jessera_ (or poll-tax) upon the Hindoos."

Here was a conqueror, as he is called, coming in upon terms; mixing
his blood with that of the native nobility of the country he
conquered, and, in consequence of this mixture, placing them in
succession upon the throne of the country he subdued; making one of
them even hereditary constable of the capital of his kingdom, and
thereby putting his posterity as a pledge into their hands. What is
full as remarkable, he freed the Hindoos forever from that tax which
the Mahomedans have laid upon every country over which the sword of
Mahomet prevailed,--namely, a capitation tax upon all who do not
profess the religion of the Mahomedans. But the Hindoos, by express
charter, were exempted from that mark of servitude, and thereby
declared not to be a conquered people. The native princes, in all
their transactions with the Mogul government, carried the evident
marks of this free condition in a noble independency of spirit. Within
their own districts the authority of many of them seemed entire. We
are often led into mistakes concerning the government of Hindostan, by
comparing it with those governments where the prince is armed with a
full, speculative, entire authority, and where the great people have,
with great titles, no privileges at all, or, having privileges, have
those privileges only as subjects. But in Hindostan the modes, the
degrees, the circumstances of subjection varied infinitely. In some
places hardly a trace at all of subjection was to be discerned; in
some the rajahs were almost assessors of the throne, as in this case
of the Rajah Cheyt Sing. These circumstances mark, that Tamerlane,
however he may be indicated by the odious names of Tartar and
Conqueror, was no barbarian; that the people who submitted to him did
not submit with the abject submission of slaves to the sword of a
conqueror, but admitted a great supreme emperor, who was just,
prudent, and politic, instead of the ferocious, oppressive, lesser
Mahomedan sovereigns, who had before forced their way by the sword
into the country.

That country resembled more a republic of princes with a great chief
at their head than a territory in absolute, uniform, systematic
subjection from one end to the other,--in which light Mr. Hastings and
others of late have thought proper to consider it. According to them,
if a subordinate prince, like Cheyt Sing, was not ready to pay any
exorbitant sum on instant demand, or submit to any extent of fine
which should be inflicted upon him by the mere will of the person who
called _robbery_ a _fine_, and who took the measure of that fine
without either considering the means of paying or the degree of
delinquency that justified it, their properties, liberties, and lives
were instantly forfeited. The rajahs of that country were armed; they
had fortresses for their security; they had troops. In the receipt of
both their own and the imperial revenue, their securities for justice
were in their own hands: but the policy of the Mogul princes very
rarely led them to push that people to such extremity as it is
supposed that on every slight occasion we have a right to push those
who are the subjects of our pretended conquest.

Mr. Holwell throws much light on this policy, which became the
standing law of the empire.

In the unfortunate wars which followed the death of Mauz-o-Din,
"Sevajee Cheyt Sing," (the great rajah we have just mentioned,)

      "with a select body of Rajpoots, by a well-conducted retreat
      recovered Agra, and was soon after reconciled to the king
      [the Mogul] and admitted to his favor,--conformable to the
      steady policy of this government, in keeping a good
      understanding with the principal rajahs, and more especially
      with the head of this house, who is ever capable of raising
      and fomenting a very formidable party upon any intended
      revolution in this despotic and precarious monarchy."

You see that it was the monarchy that was precarious, not the rights
of the subordinate chiefs. Your Lordships see, that, notwithstanding
our ideas of Oriental despotism, under the successors of Tamerlane,
these principal rajahs, instead of being called wretches, and treated
as such, as Mr. Hastings has thought it becoming to call and treat
them, when they were in arms against their sovereign, were regarded
with respect, and were admitted to easy reconciliations; because, in
reality, in their occasional hostilities, they were not properly
rebellious subjects, but princes often asserting their natural rights
and the just constitution of the country.

This view of the policy which prevailed during the dynasty of
Tamerlane naturally conducts me to the next, which is the fourth era
in this history: I mean the era of the Emperor Akbar. He was the first
of the successors of Tamerlane who obtained possession of Bengal. It
is easy to show of what nature his conquest was. It was over the last
Mahomedan dynasty. He, too, like his predecessor, Tamerlane, conquered
the prince, not the country. It is a certain mark that it was not a
conquered country in the sense in which we commonly call a country
conquered, that the natives, great men and landholders, continued in
every part in the possession of their estates, and of the
jurisdictions annexed to them. It is true, that, in the several wars
for the succession to the Mogul empire, and in other of their internal
wars, severe revenges were taken, which bore resemblance to those
taken in the wars of the Roses in this country, where it was the
common course, in the heat of blood,--"Off with his head!--so much for
Buckingham!" Yet, where the country again recovered its form and
settlement, it recovered the spirit of a mild government. Whatever
rigor was used with regard to the Mahomedan adventurers from Persia,
Turkey, and other parts, who filled the places of servile grandeur in
the Mogul court, the Hindoos were a favored, protected, gently treated
people.

The next, which is the fifth era, is a troubled and vexatious
period,--the era of the independent Subahs of Bengal. Five of these
subahs, or viceroys, governed from about the year 1717, or
thereabouts. They grew into independence partly by the calamities and
concussions of that empire, which happened during the disputes for the
succession of Tamerlane, and partly, and indeed principally, by the
great shook which the empire received when Thamas Kouli Khan broke
into that country, carried off its revenues, overturned the throne,
and massacred not only many of the chief nobility, but almost all the
inhabitants of the capital city. This rude shock, which that empire
was never able to recover, enabled the viceroys to become independent;
but their independence led to their ruin. Those who had usurped upon
their masters had servants who usurped upon them. Aliverdy Khan
murdered his master, and opened a way into Bengal for a body of
foreign invaders, the Mahrattas, who cruelly harassed the country for
several years. Their retreat was at length purchased, and by a sum
which is supposed to amount to five millions sterling. By this
purchase he secured the exhausted remains of an exhausted kingdom, and
left it to his grandson, Surajah Dowlah, in peace and poverty. On the
fall of Surajah Dowlah, in 1756, commenced the last, which is the
sixth,--the era of the British empire.

On the fifth dynasty I have only to remark to your Lordships, that at
its close the Hindoo chiefs were almost everywhere found in possession
of the country; that, although Aliverdy Khan was a cruel tyrant,
though he was an untitled usurper, though he racked and tormented the
people under his government, urged, however, by an apparent necessity
from an invading army of one hundred thousand horse in his
dominions,--yet, under him, the rajahs still preserved their rank,
their dignity, their castles, their houses, their seigniories, all the
insignia of their situation, and always the right, sometimes also the
means, of protecting their subordinate people, till the last and
unfortunate era of 1756.

Through the whole of this sketch of history I wish to impress but one
great and important truth upon your minds: namely, that, through all
these revolutions in government and changes in power, an Hindoo
polity, and the spirit of an Hindoo government, did more or less exist
in that province with which he was concerned, until it was finally to
be destroyed by Mr. Hastings.

My Lords, I have gone through all the eras precedent to those of the
British power in India, and am come to the first of those eras. Mr.
Hastings existed in India, and was a servant of the Company before
that era, and had his education between both. He is an antediluvian
with regard to the British dominion in Bengal. He was coexistent with
all the acts and monuments of that revolution, and had no small share
in all the abuses of that abusive period which preceded his actual
government. Bat as it was during that transit from Eastern to Western
power that most of the abuses had their origin, it will not be
perfectly easy for your Lordships thoroughly to enter into the nature
and circumstances of them without an explanation of the principal
events that happened from the year 1756 until the commencement of Mr.
Hastings's government,--during a good part of which time we do not
often lose sight of him. If I find it agreeable to your Lordships, if
I find that you wish to know these annals of Indian suffering and
British delinquency, if you desire that I should unfold the series of
the transactions from 1756 to the period of Mr. Hastings's government
in 1771, that you may know how far he promoted what was good, how far
he rectified what was evil, how far he abstained from innovation in
tyranny, and contented himself with the old stock of abuse, your
Lordships will have the goodness to consult the strength which from
late indisposition, begins almost to fail me. And if you think the
explanation is not time lost in this new world and in this new
business, I shall venture to sketch out, as briefly and with as much
perspicuity as I can give them, the leading events of that obscure and
perplexed period which intervened between the British settlement in
1757 and Mr. Hastings's government. If I should be so happy as to
succeed in that attempt, your Lordships' minds will be prepared for
hearing this cause. Then your Lordships will have a clear view of the
origin and nature of the abuses which prevailed in that government
before Mr. Hastings obtained his greatest power, and since that time;
and then we shall be able to enter fully and explicitly into the
nature of the cause: and I should hope that it will pave the way and
make everything easy for your subsequent justice.

I therefore wish to stop at this period, in which Mr. Hastings became
active in the service, pretty near the time when he began his
political career: and here, my Lords, I pause, wishing your indulgence
at such time as will suit your convenience for pursuing the rest of
this eventful history.




SPEECH IN OPENING THE IMPEACHMENT.



SECOND DAY: SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1788.


My Lords,--In what I had the honor of laying before your Lordships
yesterday, and in what I may further trouble you with to-day, I wish
to observe a distinction, which if I did not lay down so perfectly as
I ought, I hope I shall now be able to mark it out with sufficient
exactness and perspicuity.

First, I beg leave to observe that what I shall think necessary to
state, as matter of preliminary explanation, in order to give your
Lordships a true idea of the scene of action, of the instruments which
Mr. Hastings employed, and the effects which they produced,--all this
I wish to be distinguished from matter brought to criminate. Even the
matter, as stated by me, which may be hereafter brought to criminate,
so far as it falls to my share at present, is only to be considered,
in this stage of the business, as merely illustrative. Your Lordships
are to expect, as undoubtedly you will require, substantial matter of
crimination to be laid open for that purpose at the moment when the
evidence to each charge is ready to be produced to you. Thus your
Lordships will easily separate historical illustration from criminal
opening. For instance, if I stated yesterday to your Lordships, as I
did, the tyranny and cruelty of one of the usurping viceroys, whose
usurpation and whose vices led the way to the destruction of his
country and the introduction of a foreign power, I do not mean to
charge Mr. Hastings with any part of that guilt: what bears upon Mr.
Hastings is his having avowedly looked to such a tyrant and such a
usurper as his model, and followed that pernicious example with a
servile fidelity. When I have endeavored to lay open to your Lordships
anything abusive, or leading to abuse, from defects or errors in the
constitution of the Company's service, I did not mean to criminate Mr.
Hastings on any part of those defects and errors: I state them to show
that he took advantage of the imperfections of the institution to lot
in his abuse of the power with which he was intrusted. If, for a
further instance, I have stated that in general the service of the
India Company was insufficient in legal pay or emolument and abundant
in the means of illegal profit, I do not state that defect as owing to
Mr. Hastings; but I state it as a fact, to show in what manner and on
what pretences he did, fraudulently, corruptly, and for the purposes
of his own ambition, take advantage of that defect, and, under color
of reformation, make an illegal, partial, corrupt rise of emoluments
to certain favored persons without regard to the interests of the
service at large,--increasing rather than lessening the means of
illicit emolument, as well as loading the Company with many heavy and
ruinous expenses in avowed salaries and allowances.

Having requested your Lordships to keep in mind, which I trust you
would do even without my taking the liberty of suggesting it to you,
these necessary distinctions, I shall revert to the period at which I
closed yesterday, that great and memorable period which has remotely
given occasion to the trial of this day.



My Lords, to obtain empire is common; to govern it well has been rare
indeed. To chastise the guilt of those who have been instruments of
imperial sway over other nations by the high superintending justice of
the sovereign state has not many striking examples among any people.
Hitherto we have not furnished our contingent to the records of honor.
We have been confounded with the herd of conquerors. Our dominion has
been a vulgar thing. But we begin to emerge; and I hope that a severe
inspection of ourselves, a purification of our own offences, a
lustration of the exorbitances of our own power, is a glory reserved
to this time, to this nation, and to this August tribunal.

The year 1756 is a memorable era in the history of the world: it
introduced a new nation from the remotest verge of the Western world,
with new manners, new customs, new institutions, new opinions, new
laws, into the heart of Asia.

My Lords, if, in that part of Asia whose native regular government was
then broken up,--if, at the moment when it had fallen into darkness
and confusion from having become the prey and almost the sport of the
ambition of its home-born grandees,--if, in that gloomy season, a star
had risen from the West, that would prognosticate a better generation,
and would shed down the sweet influences of order, peace, science, and
security to the natives of that vexed and harassed country, we should
have been covered with genuine honor. It would have been a beautiful
and noble spectacle to mankind.

Indeed, something might have been expected of the kind, when a new
dominion emanated from a learned and enlightened part of the world in
the most enlightened period of its existence. Still more might it have
been expected, when that dominion was found to issue from the bosom of
a free country, that it would have carried with it the full benefit of
the vital principle of the British liberty and Constitution, though
its municipal forms were not communicable, or at least the advantage
of the liberty and spirit of the British Constitution. Had this been
the case, (alas! it was not,) you would have been saved the trouble of
this day. It might have been expected, too, that, in that enlightened
state of the world, influenced by the best religion, and from an
improved description of that best religion, (I mean the Christian
reformed religion,) that we should have done honor to Europe, to
letters, to laws, to religion,--done honor to all the circumstances of
which in this island we boast ourselves, at the great and critical
moment of that revolution.

My Lords, it has happened otherwise. It is now left for us to repair
our former errors. Resuming the history where I broke off yesterday by
your indulgence to my weakness,--Surajah Dowlah was the adopted
grandson of Aliverdy Khan, a cruel and ferocious tyrant, the manner of
whose acquisition of power I have already stated. He came too young
and unexperienced to that throne of usurpation. It was a usurpation
yet green in the country, and the country felt uneasy under it. It had
not the advantage of that prescriptive usage, that inveterate habit,
that traditionary opinion, which a long continuance of any system of
government secures to it. The only real security which Surajah
Dowlah's government could possess was the security of an army. But the
great aim of this prince and his predecessor was to supply the
weakness of his government by the strength of his purse; he therefore
amassed treasures by all ways and on all hands. But as the Indian
princes, in general, are as unwisely tenacious of their treasure as
they are rapacious in getting it, the more money he amassed, the more
he felt the effects of poverty. The consequence was, that their armies
were unpaid, and, being unpaid or irregularly paid, were
undisciplined, disorderly, unfaithful. In this situation, a young
prince, confiding more in the appearances than examining into the
reality of things, undertook (from motives which the House of Commons,
with all their industry to discover the circumstances, have found it
difficult to make out) to attack a little miserable trading fort that
we had erected at Calcutta. He succeeded in that attempt only because
success in that attempt was easy. A close imprisonment of the whole
settlement followed,--not owing, I believe, to the direct will of the
prince, but, what will always happen when the will of the prince is
but too much the law, to a gross abuse of his power by his lowest
servants,--by which one hundred and twenty or more of our countrymen
perished miserably in a dungeon, by a fate too tragical for me to be
desirous to relate, and too well known to stand in need of it.

At the time that this event happened, there was at the same time a
concurrence of other events, which, from this partial and momentary
weakness, displayed the strength of Great Britain in Asia. For some
years before, the French and English troops began, on the coast of
Coromandel, to exhibit the power, force, and efficacy of European
discipline. As we daily looked for a war with France, our settlements
on that coast were in some degree armed. Lord Pigot, then Governor of
Madras,--Lord Pigot, the preserver and the victim of the British
dominion in Asia,--detached such of the Company's force as could he
collected and spared, and such of his Majesty's ships as were on that
station, to the assistance of Calcutta. And--to hasten this history to
its conclusion--the daring and commanding genius of Clive, the patient
and firm ability of Watson, the treachery of Mir Jaffier, and the
battle of Plassey gave us at once the patronage of a kingdom and the
command of all its treasures. We negotiated with Mir Jaffier for the
viceroyal throne of his master. On that throne we seated him. And we
obtained, on our part, immense sums of money. We obtained a million
sterling for the Company, upwards of a million for individuals, in the
whole a sum of about two millions two hundred and thirty thousand
pounds for various purposes, from the prince whom we had set up. We
obtained, too, the town of Calcutta more completely than we had before
possessed it, and the twenty-four districts adjoining. This was the
first small seminal principle of the immense territorial acquisitions
we have since made in India.

Many circumstances of this acquisition I pass by. There is a sacred
veil to be drawn over the beginnings of all governments. Ours in India
had an origin like those which time has sanctified by obscurity. Time,
in the origin of most governments, has thrown this mysterious veil
over them; prudence and discretion make it necessary to throw
something of the same drapery over more recent foundations, in which
otherwise the fortune, the genius, the talents, and military virtue of
this nation never shone more conspicuously. But whatever necessity
might hide or excuse or palliate, in the acquisition of power, a wise
nation, when it has once made a revolution upon its own principles and
for its own ends, rests there. The first step to empire is revolution,
by which power is conferred; the next is good laws, good order, good
institutions, to give that power stability. I am sorry to say that the
reverse of this policy was the principle on which the gentlemen in
India acted. It was such as tended to make the new government as
unstable as the old. By the vast sums of money acquired by individuals
upon this occasion, by the immense sudden prodigies of fortune, it was
discovered that a revolution in Bengal was a mine much more easily
worked and infinitely more productive than the mines of Potosi and
Mexico. It was found that the work was not only very lucrative, but
not at all difficult. Where Clive forded a deep water upon an unknown
bottom, he left a bridge for his successors, over which the lame could
hobble and the blind might grope their way. There was not at that time
a knot of clerks in a counting-house, there was not a captain of a
band of ragged _topasses_, that looked for anything less than the
deposition of subahs and the sale of kingdoms. Accordingly, this
revolution, which ought to have precluded other revolutions,
unfortunately became fruitful of them; and when Lord Clive returned to
Europe, to enjoy his fame and fortune in his own country, there arose
another description of men, who thought that a revolution might be
made upon his revolution, and as lucrative to them as his was to the
first projectors. Scarcely was Mir Jaffier, Lord Olive's nabob, seated
on his _musnud_, than they immediately, or in a short time, projected
another revolution, a revolution which was to unsettle all the former
had settled, a revolution to make way for new disturbances and new
wars, and which led to that long chain of peculation which ever since
has afflicted and oppressed Bengal.

If ever there was a time when Bengal should have had respite from
internal revolutions, it was this. The governor forced upon the
natives was now upon the throne. All the great lords of the country,
both Gentoos and Mahomedans, were uneasy, discontented, and
disobedient, and some absolutely in arms, and refusing to recognize
the prince we had set up. An imminent invasion of the Mahrattas, an
actual invasion headed by the son of the Mogul, the revenues on
account of the late shock very ill collected even where the country
was in some apparent quiet, an hungry treasury at Calcutta, an empty
treasury at Moorshedabad,--everything demanded tranquillity, and with
it order and economy. In this situation it was resolved to make a new
and entirely mercenary revolution, and to set up to sale the
government, secured to its present possessor by every tie of public
faith and every sacred obligation which could bind or influence
mankind. This second revolution forms that period in the Bengal
history which had the most direct influence upon all the subsequent
transactions. It introduces some of the persons who were most active
in the succeeding scenes, and from that time to this has given its
tone and character to the British affairs and government. It marks and
specifies the origin and true principle of all the abuses which Mr.
Hastings was afterwards appointed to correct, and which the Commons
charge that he continued and aggravated: namely, the venal depositions
and venal exaltations of the country powers; the taking of bribes and
corrupt presents from all parties in those changes; the vitiating and
maiming the Company's records; the suppression of public
correspondence; corrupt combinations and conspiracies; perfidy in
negotiation established into principle; acts of the most atrocious
wickedness justified upon purity of intention; mock-trials and
collusive acquittals among the parties in common guilt; and in the
end, the Court of Directors supporting the scandalous breach of their
own orders. I shall state the particulars of this second revolution
more at large.

Soon after the revolution which had seated Mir Jaffier on the
viceroyal throne, the spirit of the Mogul empire began, as it were, to
make one faint struggle before it finally expired. The then heir to
that throne, escaping from the hands of those who had held his father
prisoner, had put himself at the head of several chiefs collected
under the standard of his house, and appeared in force on the
frontiers of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar, upon both which he
made some impression. This alarmed the new powers, the Nabob Mir
Jaffier, and the Presidency of Calcutta; and as in a common cause, and
by the terms of their mutual alliance, they took the field against
him. The Nabob's eldest son and heir-apparent commanded in chief.
Major Calliaud commanded the English forces under the government of
Calcutta. Mr. Holwell was in the temporary possession of the
Presidency. Mr. Vansittart was hourly expected to supersede him. Mr.
Warren Hastings, a young gentleman about twenty-seven years of age,
was Resident for the Company at the durbar, or court, of Mir Jaffier,
our new-created Nabob of Bengal, allied to this country by the most
solemn treaties that can bind men; for which treaties he had paid, and
was then paying, immense sums of money. Mr. Warren Hastings was the
pledge in his hands for the honor of the British nation, and their
fidelity to their engagements.

In this situation, Mr. Holwell, whom the terrible example of the Black
Hole at Calcutta had not cured of ambition, thought an hour was not to
be lost in accomplishing a revolution and selling the reigning Nabob.

My Lords, there was in the house of Mir Jaffier, in his court, and in
his family, a man of an intriguing, crafty, subtle, and at the same
time bold, daring, desperate, bloody, and ferocious character, called
Cossim Ali Khan. He was the son-in-law of Mir Jaffier; and he made no
other use of this affinity than to find some means to dethrone and to
murder him. This was the person in whose school of politics Mr.
Hastings made his first studies, and whose conduct he quotes as his
example, and for whose friends, agents, and favorites he has always
shown a marked predilection. This dangerous man was not long without
finding persons who observed his talents with admiration, and who
thought fit to employ him.

The Council at Calcutta was divided into two departments: one, the
Council in general; the other a Select Committee, which they had
arranged for the better carrying on their political affairs. But the
Select Committee had no power of acting wholly without the Council at
large,--at least, finally and conclusively. The Select Committee
thought otherwise. Between these litigant parties for power I shall
not determine on the merits,--thinking of nothing but the use that was
made of the power, to whomsoever it belonged. This Secret Committee,
then, without communicating with the rest of the Council, formed the
plan for a second revolution. But the concurrence of Major Calliaud,
who commanded the British troops, was essential to the purpose, as it
could not be accomplished without force. Mr. Hastings's assistance was
necessary, as it could not be accomplished without treachery.

These are the parties concerned in the intended revolution. Mr.
Holwell, who considered himself in possession only of temporary power,
was urged to precipitate the business; for if Mr. Vansittart should
arrive before his plot could be finally put into execution, he would
have all the leading advantages of it, and Mr. Holwell would be
considered only as a secondary instrument. But whilst Mr. Holwell, who
originally conceived this plot, urged forward the execution of it, in
order that the chief share of the profits might fall to him, the
Major, and possibly the Resident, held back, till they might receive
the sanction of the permanent governor, who was hourly expected, with
whom one of them was connected, and who was to carry with him the
whole weight of the authority of this kingdom. This difference
produced discussions. Holwell endeavored by his correspondence to
stimulate Calliaud to this enterprise, which without him could not be
undertaken at all. But Major Calliaud had different views. He
concurred inwardly, as he tells us himself, in all the principles of
this intended revolution, in the propriety and necessity of it. He
only wished delay. But he gave such powerful, solid, and satisfactory
reasons, not against the delay, but the very merits of the design
itself, exposing the injustice and the danger of it, and the
impossibility of mending by it their condition in any respect, as must
have damned it in the minds of all rational men: at least it ought to
have damned it forever in his own. But you will see that Holwell
persevered in his plan, and that Major Calliaud thought two things
necessary: first, not wholly to destroy the scheme, which he tells us
he always approved, but to postpone the execution,--and in the mean
time to delude the Nabob by the most strong, direct, and sanguine
assurances of friendship and protection that it was possible to give
to man.

Whilst the projected revolution stood suspended,--whilst Mr. Holwell
urged it forward, and Mr. Vansittart was expected every day to give it
effect,--whilst Major Calliaud, with this design of ruining the Nabob
lodged in his breast, suspended in execution, and condemned in
principle, kept the fairest face and the most confidential interviews
with that unfortunate prince and his son,--as the operations of the
campaign relaxed, the army drew near to Moorshedabad, the capital,
when a truly extraordinary scene happened, such I am sure the English
annals before that time had furnished no example of, nor will, I
trust, in future. I shall state it as one piece from beginning to end,
reserving the events which intervened; because, as I do not produce
any part of this series for the gratification of historical curiosity,
the con-texture is necessary to demonstrate to your Lordships the
spirit of our Bengal politics, and the necessity of some other sort of
judicial inquiries than those which that government institute for
themselves. The transaction so manifestly marks the character of the
whole proceeding that I hope I shall not be blamed for suspending for
a moment the narrative of the steps taken towards the revolution, that
you may see the whole of this episode together,--that by it you may
judge of the causes which led progressively to the state in which the
Company's affairs stood, when Mr. Hastings was sent for the express
purpose of reforming it.

The business I am going to enter into is commonly known by the name of
the Story of the Three Seals. It is to be found in the Appendix, No.
10, to the First Report of the state and condition of the East India
Company, made in 1773. The word _Report_, my Lords, is sometimes a
little equivocal, and may signify sometimes, not what is made known,
but what remains in obscurity: the detail and evidence of many facts
referred to in the Report being usually thrown into the Appendix. Many
people, and I among the rest, (I take shame to myself for it,) may not
have fully examined that Appendix. I was not a member of either of the
India committees of 1773. It is not, indeed, till within this year
that I have been thoroughly acquainted with that memorable history of
the Three Seals.

The history is this. In the year 1760 the allies were in the course of
operations against the son of the Mogul, now the present Mogul, who,
as I have already stated, had made an irruption into the kingdom of
Bahar, in order to reduce the lower provinces to his obedience. The
parties opposing him were the Nabob of Bengal and the Company's troops
under Major Calliaud. It was whilst they faced the common enemy as one
body, this negotiation for the destruction of the Nabob of Bengal by
his faithful allies of the Company was going on with diligence. At
that time the Nabob's son, Meeran, a youth in the flower of his age,
bold, vigorous, active, full of the politics in which those who are
versed in usurpation are never wanting, commanded the army under his
father, but was in reality the efficient person in all things.

About the 15th of April, 1760, as I have it from Major Calliaud's
letter of that date, the Nabob came into his tent, and, with looks of
the utmost embarrassment, big with some design which swelled his
bosom, something that was too large and burdensome to conceal, and yet
too critical to be told, appeared to be in a state of great
distraction. The Major, seeing him in this condition, kindly, gently,
like a fast and sure friend, employed (to use his own expression)
_some of those assurances that tend to make men fully open their
hearts_; and accordingly, fortified by his assurances, and willing to
disburden himself of the secret that oppressed him, he opens his heart
to the commanding officer of his new friends, allies, and protectors.
The Nabob, thus assured, did open himself, and informed Major Calliaud
that he had just received a message from the Prince, or his principal
minister, informing him that the Prince Royal, now the Mogul, had an
intention (as, indeed, he rationally might, supposing that we were as
well disposed to him as we showed ourselves afterwards) to surrender
himself into the hands of him, the Nabob, but at the same time wished,
as a guaranty, that the commander-in-chief of the English forces
should give him security for his life and his honor, when he should in
that manner surrender himself to the Nabob. I do not mean, my Lords,
by surrendering, that it was supposed he intended to surrender himself
prisoner of war, but as a sovereign dubious of the fidelity of those
about him would put himself into the hands of his faithful subjects,
of those who claimed to derive all their power, as both we and the
Nabob did, under his authority. The Nabob stated to the English
general, that without this English security the Prince would not
deliver himself into his hands. Here he confessed he found a
difficulty. For the giving this faith, if it were kept, would defeat
his ultimate view, which was, when the Prince had delivered himself
into his hands, in plain terms to murder him. This grand act could not
be accomplished without the English general. In the first place, the
Prince, without the English security, would not deliver himself into
the Nabob's hands; and afterwards, without the English concurrence, he
could not be murdered. These were difficulties that pressed upon the
mind of tho Nabob.

The English commander heard this astonishing proposition without any
apparent emotion. Being a man habituated to great affairs, versed in
revolutions, and with a mind fortified against extraordinary events,
he heard it and answered it without showing any signs of abhorrence or
detestation,--at the same time with a protestation that he would
indeed serve him, the Nabob, but it should be upon such terms as honor
and justice could support: informing him, that an assurance for the
Prince's safety could not be given by him, until he had consulted Mr.
Holwell, who was Governor, and his superior.

This conversation passed in the morning. On that very morning, and
whilst the transaction was hot, Major Calliaud writes to Mr. Holwell
an account of it. In his letter he informs him that he made an
inquiry, without stating from whom, but that he did inquire the
probability of the Nabob's getting possession of the Prince from some
persons, who assured him that there was no probability of the Prince's
intention to deliver himself to the Nabob on any terms. Be that as it
may, it is impossible not to remark that the whole transaction of the
morning of the 15th of April was not very discouraging to the
Nabob,--not such as would induce him to consider this most detestable
of all projects as a thing utterly unfeasible, and as such to abandon
it. The evening came on without anything to alter his opinion. Major
Calliaud that evening came to the Nabob's tent to arrange some matters
relative to the approaching campaign. The business soon ended with
regard to the campaign; but the proposal of the morning to Major
Calliaud, as might be expected to happen, was in effect renewed.
Indeed, the form was a little different; but the substantial part
remained the same. Your Lordships will see what these alterations
were.

In the evening scene the persons were more numerous. On the part of
the Company, Major Calliaud, Mr. Lushington, Mr. Knox, and the
ambassador at the Nabob's court, Mr. Warren Hastings. On the part of
the Moorish government, the Nabob himself, his son Meeran, a Persian
secretary, and the Nabob's head spy, an officer well known in that
part of the world, and of some rank. These were the persons of the
drama in the evening scene. The Nabob and his son did not wait for the
Prince's committing himself to their faith, which, it seems, Major
Calliaud did not think likely to happen; so that one act of treachery
is saved: but another opened of as extraordinary a nature. Intent and
eager on the execution, and the more certain, of their design, they
accepted the plan of a wicked wretch, principal servant of the then
prime-minister to the Mogul, or themselves suggested it to him. A
person called Conery, dewan or principal steward to Camgar Khan, a
great chief in the service of the Shahzada, or Prince, (now the Great
Mogul, the sovereign under whom the Company holds their charter,) had,
it seems, made a proposal to the Nabob, that, if a considerable
territory then held by his master was assured to him, and a reward of
a lac of rupees (ten or twelve thousand, pounds) secured to him, he
would for that consideration deliver the Prince, the eldest son of the
Mogul, alive into the hands of the Nabob; or if that could not be
effected, he engaged to murder him for the same reward. But as the
assassin could not rely on the Nabob and his son for his reward for
this meritorious action, and thought better of English honor and
fidelity in such delicate cases, he required that Major Calliaud
should set his seal to the agreement. This proposition was made to an
English commander: what discourse happened upon it is uncertain. Mr.
Hastings is stated by some evidence to have acted as interpreter in
this memorable congress. But Major Calliaud agreed to it without any
difficulty. Accordingly, an instrument was drawn, an indenture
tripartite prepared by the Persian secretary, securing to the party
the reward of this infamous, perfidious, murderous act. First, the
Nabob put his own seal to the murder. The Nabob's son, Meeran, affixed
_his_ seal. A third seal, the most important of all, was yet wanting.
A pause ensued: Major Calliaud's seal was not at hand; but Mr.
Lushington was sent near half a mile to bring it. It was brought at
length; and the instrument of blood and treachery was completely
executed. Three seals were set to it.

This business of the three seals, by some means not quite fully
explained, but (as suspected by the parties) by means of the
information of Mr. Holwell, who soon after came home, was conveyed to
the ears of the Court of Directors. The Court of Directors wrote out,
under date of the 7th of October, 1761, within a little more than a
year after this extraordinary transaction, to this effect:--that, in
conjunction with the Nabob, Major Calliaud had signed a paper offering
a reward of a lac of rupees, or some such sum, to several black
persons, for the assassination of the Shahzada, or Prince
heir-apparent,--which paper was offered to the then Chief of Patna to
sign, but which he refused on account of the infamy of the measure. As
it appeared in the same light to them, the Directors, they ordered a
strict inquiry into it. The India Company, who here did their duty
with apparent manliness and vigor, were resolved, however, to do it
with gentleness, and to proceed in a manner that could not produce any
serious mischief to the parties charged; for they directed the
commission of inquiry to the very clan and set of people who, from a
participation in their common offences, stood in awe of one
another,--in effect, to the parties in the transaction. Without a
prosecutor, without an impartial director of the inquiry, they left it
substantially to those persons to try one another for their common
acts.

Here I come upon the principle which I wish most strongly to mark to
your Lordships: I mean collusive trials and collusive acquittals. When
this matter came to be examined, according to the orders of the Court,
which was on the 4th of October, 1762, the Council consisted of Peter
Maguire, Warren Hastings, and Hugh Watts. Mr. Hastings had by this
time accomplished the business of Resident with the Nabob, and had
taken the seat to which his seniority entitled him in Council. Here a
difficulty arose _in limine_. Mr. Hastings was represented to have
acted as interpreter in this business; he was therefore himself an
object of the inquisition; he was doubtful as evidence; he was
disqualified as a judge. It likewise appeared that there might be some
objection to others whose evidence was wanting, but who were
themselves concerned in the guilt. Mr. Lushington's evidence would be
useful, but there were two circumstances rather unlucky. First, he had
put the seal to the instrument of murder; and, secondly, and what was
most material, he had made an affidavit at Patna, whilst the affair
was green and recent, that he had done so; and in the same affidavit
had deposed that Warren Hastings was interpreter in that transaction.
Here were difficulties both on him and Mr. Hastings. The question was,
how to get Mr. Hastings, the interpreter, out of his interpretation,
and to put him upon the seat of judgment. It was effected, however,
and the manner in which it was effected was something curious. Mr.
Lushington, who by this time was got completely over, himself tells
you that in conferences with Major Calliaud, and by arguments and
reasons by him delivered, he was persuaded to unsay his swearing, and
to declare that he believed that the affidavit which he made at Patna,
and while the transaction was recent or nearly recent, must be a
mistake: that he _believed_ (what is amazing indeed for any belief)
that not Mr. Hastings, but he himself, interpreted. Mr. Lushington
completely loses his own memory, and he accepts an offered, a given
memory, a memory supplied to him by a party in the transaction. By
this operation all difficulties are removed: Mr. Hastings is at once
put into the capacity of a judge. He is declared by Mr. Lushington not
to have been an interpreter in the transaction. After this, Mr.
Hastings is himself examined. Your Lordships will look at the
transaction at your leisure, and I think you will consider it as a
pattern for inquiries of this kind. Mr. Hastings is examined: he does
not recollect. His memory also fails on a business in which it is not
easy to suppose a man could be doubtful,--whether he was present or
not: he thinks he was not there,--for that, if he had been there, and
acted as interpreter, he could not have forgot it.

I think it is pretty nearly as I state it: if I have fallen into any
error or inaccuracy, it is easily rectified; for here is the state of
the transaction given by the parties themselves. On this inaccurate
memory of Mr. Hastings, not venturing, however, to say positively that
he was not the interpreter, or that he was not present, he is
discharged from being an accomplice,--he is removed from the bar, and
leaps upon the seat of justice. The court thus completed, Major
Calliaud comes manfully forward to make his defence. Mr. Lushington is
taken off his back in the manner we have seen, and no one person
remains but Captain Knox. Now, if Captain Knox was there and
assenting, he is an accomplice too. Captain Knox asserts, that, at the
consultation about the murder, he said it was a pity to cut off so
fine a young fellow in such a manner,--meaning that fine young fellow
the Prince, the descendant of Tamerlane, the present reigning Mogul,
from whom the Company derive their present charter. The purpose to be
served by this declaration, if it had any purpose, was, that Captain
Knox did not assent to the murder, and that therefore his evidence
might be valid.

The defence set up by Major Calliaud was to this effect. He was
apprehensive, he said, that the Nabob was alarmed at the violent
designs that were formed against him by Mr. Holwell, and that
therefore, to quiet his mind, (to quiet it by a proposition compounded
of murder and treason,--an odd kind of mind he had that was to be
quieted by such means!)--but to quiet his mind, and to show that the
English were willing to go all lengths with him, to sell body and soul
to him, he did put his seal to this extraordinary agreement, he put
his seal to this wonderful paper. He likewise stated, that he was of
opinion at the time that nothing at all sinister could happen from it,
that no such murder was likely to take place, whatever might be the
intention of the parties. In fact, he had very luckily said in a
letter of his, written a day after the setting the seal, "I think
nothing will come of this matter, but it is no harm to try." This
experimental treachery, and these essays of conditional murder,
appeared to him good enough to make a trial of; but at the same time
he was afraid nothing would come of it. In general, the whole gest of
his defence comes to one point, in which he persists,--that, whatever
the act might be, his mind is clear: "My hands are guilty, but my
heart is free." He conceived that it would be very improper,
undoubtedly, to do such an act, if he suspected anything could happen
from it: he, however, let the thing out of his own hands; he put, it
into the hands of others; he put the commission into the hands of a
murderer. The fact was not denied; it was fully before these severe
judges. The extenuation was the purity of his heart, and the bad
situation of tho Company's affairs,--the perpetual plea, which your
Lordships will hear of forever, and which if it will justify evil
actions, they will take good care that the most nefarious of their
deeds shall never want a sufficient justification. But then he calls
upon his life and his character to oppose to his seal; and though he
has declared that Mr. Holwell had intended ill to the Nabob, and that
he approved of those measures, and only postponed them, yet he thought
it necessary, he says, to quiet the fears of the Nabob; and from this
motive he did an act abhorrent to his nature, and which, he says, he
expressed his abhorrence of the morning after he signed it: not that
he did so; but if he had, I believe it would only have made the thing
so many degrees worse. Your Lordships will observe, that, in this
conference, as stated by himself, these reasons and apologies for it
did not appear, nor did they appear in the letter, nor anywhere else,
till next year, when he came upon his trial. Then it was immediately
recollected that Mr. Holwell's designs were so wicked they certainly
must be known to the Nabob, though he never mentioned them in the
conference of the morning or the evening of the 15th; yet such was now
the weight and prevalence of them upon the Major's mind, that he calls
upon Mr. Hastings to know whether the Nabob was not informed of these
designs of Mr. Holwell against him. Mr. Hastings's memory was not
quite correct upon the occasion. He does not recollect anything of the
matter. He certainly seems not to think that he ever mentioned it to
the Nabob, or the Nabob to him; but he does recollect, he thinks,
speaking something to some of the Nabob's attendants upon it, and
further this deponent sayeth not. On this state of things, namely, the
purity of intention, the necessities of the Company, the propriety of
keeping the Nabob in perfect good-humor and removing suspicions from
his mind, which suspicions he had never expressed, they came to the
resolution I shall have the honor to read to you: "That the
representation, given in the said defence, of the state of the affairs
of the country at that time" (that is, about the month of April, 1760)
"is true and just" (that is, the bad state of the country, which we
shall consider hereafter); "that, in such circumstances, the Nabob's
urgent account of his own distresses, the Colonel's desire of making
him easy," (for here is a recapitulation of the whole defence,)

      "as the first thing necessary for the good of the service,
      and the suddenness of the thing proposed, might deprive him
      for a moment of his recollection, and surprise him into a
      measure which, as to the measure itself, he could not
      approve. That such only were the motives which did or could
      influence Colonel Calliaud to assent to the proposal is
      fully evinced by the deposition of Captain Knox and Mr.
      Lushington, that _his_ [_Calliaud's_] _conscience, at the
      time, never reproached him with a bad design_."

Your Lordships have heard of the testimony of a person to his own
conscience; but the testimony of another man to any one's
conscience--this is the first time, I believe, it ever appeared in a
judicial proceeding. It is natural to say, "My conscience acquits me
of it"; but _they_ declare, that "_his_ conscience never reproached
him with a bad design, and therefore, upon the whole, they are
satisfied that his intention was good, though he erred in the
measure."

I beg leave to state one thing that escaped me: that the Nabob, who
was one of the parties to the design, was, at the time of the inquiry,
a sort of prisoner or an exile at Calcutta; that his _moonshee_ was
there, or might have been had; and that his spy was likewise there;
and that they, though parties to this transaction, were never called
to account for it in any sense or in any degree, or to show how far it
was _necessary_ to quiet the Nabob's mind.

The accomplices, by acquitting him upon _their_ testimony to _his
conscience_, did their business nobly. But the good Court of
Directors, who were so easily satisfied, so ready to condemn at the
first proposition and so ready afterwards to acquit, put the last
finishing hand of a master to it. For the accomplices acquit him of
evil intentions and excuse his act. The Court of Directors,
disapproving indeed the measure, but receiving the testimony of his
conscience in justification of his conduct, and taking up the whole
ground, honorably acquit him, and commend this action as an instance
of heroic zeal in their service.

The great end and purpose for which I produce this to your Lordships
is to show you the necessity there is for other inquiries, other
trials, other acquittals of parties, than those made by a collusive
clan abroad, or by the Directors at home, who had required the parties
to inquire of themselves, and to take the testimony of the judges at
second-hand, as to the conscience of the party accused, respecting
acts which neither they nor any man living can look upon but with
horror.

I have troubled your Lordships with the story of the Three Seals, as a
specimen of the then state of the service, and the politics of the
servants, civil and military, in the horrid abuses which then
prevailed, and which render at length the most rigorous reformation
necessary. I close this episode to resume the proceedings at the
second revolution.

This affair of the three seals was, we have seen, to quiet the fears
of the Nabob. His fears it was indeed necessary to quiet; for your
Lordships will see that the man whose fears were to be set asleep by
Major Calliaud's offering him, in a scheme for murdering his
sovereign, an odd sort of opiate, made up of blood and treason, was
now in a fair way of being murdered himself by the machinations of him
whose seal was set to his murderous security of peace, and by those
his accomplices, Holwell and Hastings: at least they resolved to put
him in a situation in which his murder was in a manner inevitable, as
you will see in the sequel of the transaction. Now the plan proceeds.
The parties continued in the camp; but there was another _remora_. To
remove a nabob and to create a revolution is not easy: houses are
strong who have sons grown up with vigor and fitness for the command
of armies. They are not easily overturned by removing the principal,
unless the secondary is got rid of: and if this _remora_ could be
removed, everything was going on in a happy way in the business. This
plan, which now (that is, about the month of July) began to get into
great ripeness and forwardness, Mr. Holwell urged forward, Mr.
Vansittart being hourly expected. I do not know whether I am going to
state a thing, though it is upon the records, which will not have too
theatrical an appearance for the grave state in which we are. But here
it is,--the difficulty, the knot, and the solution, as recorded by the
parties themselves. It was the object of this bold, desperate,
designing man, Cossim All Khan, who aimed at everything, and who
scrupled not to do anything in attaining what he aimed at, to be
appointed the lieutenant of the Nabob Jaffier Ali, and thus to get
possession of his office during his lifetime under that name, with a
design of murdering him: for that office, according to many usages of
that country, totally supersedes the authority of the first
magistrate, renders him a cipher in his hand, gives the administration
of his affairs and command of his troops to the lieutenant. It was a
part of his plan, that he was, after his appointment to the
lieutenancy, to be named to the succession of the Nabob, who had
several other children; but the eldest son stood in the way.

But as things hastened to a crisis, this difficulty was removed in the
most extraordinary and providential unheard-of manner, by the most
extraordinary event that, I believe, is recorded in history. Just in
the nick of time, in the moment of projection, on the 3d of July, this
Prince Meeran, in the flower of his age, bold, active, enterprising,
lying asleep in his tent, is suddenly, without any one's knowing it,
without any alarm or menace in the heavens that ever was heard of or
mentioned, without any one whatever being hurt or even alarmed in the
camp, killed with a flash of lightning. My Lords, thus was the Gordian
knot cut. This prince dies of a flash of lightning, and Mr. Lushington
(of whom you have heard) comes in the morning with his hair standing
erect, comes frightened into the presence of Major Calliaud, and, with
the utmost alarm, tells him of a circumstance that was afterwards to
give them so much pleasure. The alarm was immediately communicated to
the Major, who was seized with a fright; and fearing lest the army
should mutiny upon the death of their chief, it was contrived, in a
manner that I believe was most difficult to contrive, that what might
have excited a general mutiny was concealed by the ability, the good
conduct, and dexterity of Major Calliaud for seven days together, till
he led the army out of the place of danger. Thus a judgment fell upon
one of the (innocent) murderers in the scene of the Three Seals. This
man, who was probably guilty in his conscience as well as in act, thus
fell by that most lucky, providential, and most useful flash of
lightning.

There were at that time, it seems, in Calcutta, a wicked, skeptical
set of people, who somehow or other believed that _human_ agency was
concerned in this elective flash, which came so very opportunely, and
which was a favor so thankfully acknowledged. These wicked,
ill-natured skeptics disseminated reports (which I am sure I do not
mean to charge or prove, leaving the effect of them to you) very
dishonorable, I believe, to Cossim Ali Khan in the business, and to
some Englishmen who were concerned.

The difficulty of getting rid of Meeran being thus removed, Mr.
Vansittart comes upon the scene. I verily believe he was a man of good
intentions, and rather debauched by that amazing flood of iniquity
which prevailed at that time, or hurried and carried away with it. In
a few days he sent for Major Calliaud. All his objections vanish in
_an instant_: like that flash of lightning, everything is _instant_.
The Major agrees to perform his part. They send for Cossim Ali Khan
and Mr. Hastings; they open a treaty and conclude it with him, leaving
the management of it to two persons, Mr. Holwell and another person,
whom we have heard of, an Armenian, called Coja Petruse, who
afterwards played his part in another illustrious scene. By this
Petruse and Mr. Holwell the matter is settled. The moment Mr. Holwell
is raised to be a Secretary of State, the revolution is accomplished.
By it Cossim Ali Khan is to have tho lieutenancy at present, and the
succession. Everything is put into his hands, and he is to make for it
large concessions, which you will hear of afterwards, to the Company.
Cossim Ali Khan proposed to Mr. Holwell, what would have been no bad
supplement to the flash of lightning, the murder of the Nabob; but Mr.
Holwell was a man of too much honor and conscience to suffer that. He
instantly flew out at it, and declared the whole business should stop,
unless the affair of the murder was given up. Accordingly things were
so settled. But if he gave the Nabob over to an intended murderer, and
delivered his person, treasure, and everything into his hands, Cossim
Ali Khan might have had no great reason to complain of being left to
the execution of his own projects in his own way. The treaty was made,
and amounted to this,--that the Company was to receive three great
provinces: for here, as we proceed, you will have an opportunity of
observing, with the progress of these plots, one thing which has
constantly and uniformly pervaded the whole of these projects, and
which the persons concerned in them have avowed as a principle of
their actions,--that they were first to take care of the Company's
interest, then of their own; that is, first to secure to the Company
an enormous bribe, and under the shadow of that bribe to take all the
little emoluments they could to themselves. Three great, rich,
southern provinces, maritime, or nearly maritime, Burdwan, Midnapoor,
and Chittagong, were to be dissevered from the Subah and to be ceded
to the Company. There were other minor stipulations, which it is not
necessary at present to trouble you with, signed, sealed, and executed
at Calcutta between these parties with the greatest possible secrecy.
The lieutenancy and the succession were secured to Cossirn Ali, and he
was likewise to give somewhere about the sum of 200,000_l._ to the
gentlemen who were concerned, as a reward for serving him so
effectually, and for serving their country so well. Accordingly, these
stipulations, actual or understood, (for they were eventually carried
into effect,) being settled, a commission of delegation, consisting
chiefly of Mr. Vansittart and Major Calliaud, was sent up to
Moorshedabad: the new Governor taking this opportunity of paying the
usual visit of respect to the Nabob, and in a manner which a new
Governor coming into place would do, with the detail of which it is
not necessary to trouble you. Mr. Hastings was at this time at the
durbar; and having everything prepared, and the ground smoothed, they
first endeavored to persuade the Nabob to deliver over the power
negotiated for into the hands of their friend Cossim Ali Khan. But
when the old man, frightened out of his wits, asked, "What is it he
has bid for me?" and added, "I will give half as much again to save
myself; pray let me know what my price is,"--he entreated in vain.
They were true, firm, and faithful to their word and their engagement.
When he saw they were resolved that he should be delivered into the
hands of Cossim Ali Khan, he at once surrenders the whole to him. They
instantly grasp it. He throws himself into a boat, and will not remain
at home an hour, but hurries down to Calcutta to leave his blood at
our door, if we should have a mind to take it. But the life of the
Nabob was too great a stake (partly as a security for the good
behavior of Cossim Ali Khan, and still more for the future use that
might be made of him) to be thrown away, or left in the hands of a man
who would certainly murder him, and who was very angry at being
refused the murder of his father-in-law. The price of this second
revolution was, according to their shares in it, (I believe I have it
here,) somewhere about 200,000_l_. This little eflusion to private
interest settled the matter, and here ended the second revolution in
the country: effected, indeed, without bloodshed, but with infinite
treachery, with infinite mischief, consequent to the dismemberment of
the country, and which had nearly become fatal to our concerns there,
like everything else in which Mr. Hastings had any share.

This prince, Cossim Ali Khan, the friend of Mr. Hastings, knew that
those who could give could take away dominion. He had scarcely got
upon the throne, procured for him by our public spirit and his own
iniquities, than he began directly and instantly to fortify himself,
and to bend all his politics against those who were or could be the
donors of such fatal gifts. He began with the natives who were in
their interest, and cruelly put to death, under the eye of Mr.
Hastings and his clan, all those who, by their moneyed wealth or
landed consideration, could give any effect to their dispositions in
favor of those ambitious strangers. He removed from Moorshedabad
higher up into the country, to Monghir, in order to be more out of our
view. He kept his word pretty well, but not altogether faithfully,
with the gentlemen; and though he had no money, for his treasury was
empty, he gave obligations which are known by the name of
_jeeps_--(the Indian vocabulary will by degrees become familiar to
your Lordships, as we develop the modes and customs of the country).
As soon as he had done this, he began to rack and tear the provinces
that were left to him, to get as much from them as should compensate
him for the revenues of those great provinces he had lost; and
accordingly he began a scene of extortion, horrible, nefarious,
without precedent or example, upon almost all the landed interest of
that country. I mention this, because he is one of those persons whose
governments Mr. Hastings, in a paper called his Defence, delivered in
to the House of Commons, has produced as precedents and examples which
he has thought fit to follow, and which he thought would justify him
in the conduct he has pursued. This Cossim Ali Khan, after he had
acted the tyrant on the landed interest, fell upon the moneyed
interest. In that country there was a person called Juggut Seit. There
were several of the family, who were bankers to such a magnitude as
was never heard of in the world. Receivers of the public revenue,
their correspondence extended all over Asia; and there are those who
are of opinion that the house of Juggut Seit, including all its
branches, was not worth less than six or seven millions sterling. This
house became the prey of Cossira Ali Khan; but Mr. Holwell had
predicted that _it should be delivered over to Satan to be buffeted_
(his own pious expression). He predicted the misfortunes that should
befall them; and we chose a Satan to buffet them, and who did so
buffet them, by the murder of the principal persons of the house, and
by robbing them of great sums of their wealth, that I believe such a
scene of nefarious tyranny, destroying and cutting up the root of
public credit in that country, was scarce ever known. In the mean time
Cossim was extending his tyranny over all who were obnoxious to him;
and the persons he first sought were those traitors who had been
friends to the English. Several of the principal of these he murdered.
There was in the province of Bahar a man named Ramarain; he had got
the most positive assurances of English faith; but Mr. Macguire, a
member of the Council, on the receipt of five thousand gold mohurs, or
something more than 8,000_l._ sterling, delivered him up to be first
imprisoned, then tortured, then robbed in consequence of the torture,
and finally murdered, by Cossim Ali Khan. In this way Cossim Ali Khan
acted, while our government looked on. I hardly choose to mention to
you the fate of a certain native in consequence of a dispute with Mr.
Mott, a friend of Mr. Hastings, which is in the Company's
records,--records which are almost buried by their own magnitude from
the knowledge of this country. In a contest with this native for his
house and property, some scuffle having happened between the parties,
the one attempting to seize and the other to defend, the latter made a
complaint to the Nabob, who was in an entire subjection at that time
to the English, and who ordered this unfortunate man, on account of
this very scuffle, arising from defending his property, to be blown
off from the mouth of a cannon. In short, I am not able to tell your
Lordships of all the nefarious transactions of this man, whom the
intrigues of Mr. Holwell and Mr. Hastings had set upon the throne of
Bengal. But there is a circumstance in this business that comes across
here, and will tend to show another grievance that vexed that country,
which vexed it long, and is one of the causes of its chief disasters,
and which, I fear, is not so perfectly extirpated but that some part
of its roots may remain in the ground at this moment.

Commerce, which enriches every other country in the world, was
bringing Bengal to total ruin. The Company, in former times, when it
had no sovereignty or power in the country, had large privileges under
their _dustuck_, or permit: their goods passed, without paying duties,
through the country. The servants of the Company made use of this
dustuck for their own private trade, which, while it was used with
moderation, the native government winked at in some degree; but when
it got wholly into private hands, it was more like robbery than trade.
These traders appeared everywhere; they sold at their own prices, and
forced the people to sell to them at their own prices also. It
appeared more like an army going to pillage the people, under pretence
of commerce, than anything else. In vain the people claimed the
protection of their own country courts. This English army of traders
in their march ravaged worse than a Tartarian conqueror. The trade
they carried on, and which more resembled robbery than commerce,
anticipated the resources of the tyrant, and threatened to leave him
no materials for imposition or confiscation. Thus this miserable
country was torn to pieces by the horrible rapaciousness of a double
tyranny. This appeared to be so strong a case, that a deputation was
sent to him at his new capital, Monghir, to form a treaty for the
purpose of giving some relief against this cruel, cursed, and
oppressive trade, which was worse even than the tyranny of the
sovereign. This trade Mr. Vansittart, the President about this time,
that is, in 1763, who succeeded to Mr. Holwell, and was in close union
of interests with the tyrant Cossim Ali Khan, by a treaty known by the
name of the treaty of Monghir, agreed very much to suppress and to
confine within something like reasonable bounds. There never was a
doubt on the face of that treaty, that it was a just, proper, fair
transaction. But as nobody in Bengal did then believe that rapine was
ever forborne but in favor of bribery, the persons who lost every
advantage by the treaty of Monghir, when they thought they saw corrupt
negotiation carrying away the prizes of unlawful commerce, and were
likely to see their trade crippled by Cossim Ali Khan, fell into a
most violent fury at this treaty; and as the treaty was made without
the concurrence of the rest of the Council, the Company's servants
grew divided: one part were the advocates of the treaty, the other of
the trade. The latter were universally of opinion that the treaty was
bought for a great sum of money. The evidence we have on our records
of the sums of money that are stated to have been paid on this
occasion has never been investigated to the bottom; but we have it on
record, that a great sum (70,000_l._) was paid to persons concerned in
that negotiation. The rest were exceedingly wroth to see themselves
not profiting by the negotiation, and losing the trade, or likely to
be excluded from it; and they were the more so, because, as we have it
upon our journals, during all that time the trade of the negotiators
was not proscribed, but a purwannah was issued by Cossim Ali Khan,
that the trade of his friends Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hastings should
not be subject to the general regulations. This filled the whole
settlement with ill blood; but in the regulation itself (I put the
motive and the secret history out of the case) undoubtedly Mr.
Hastings and Mr. Vansittart were on the right side. They had shown to
a demonstration the mischief of this trade. However, as the other
party were strong, and did not readily let go their hold of this great
advantage, first, dissensions, murmurs, various kinds of complaints,
and ill blood arose. Cossim Ali was driven to the wall; and having at
the same time made what he thought good preparations, a war broke out
at last. And how did it break out? This Cossim Ali Khan signalized his
first acts of hostility by an atrocity committed against the faith of
treaties, against the rules of war, against every principle of honor.
This intended murderor of his father-in-law, whom Mr. Hastings had
assisted to raise to the throne of Bengal, well knowing his character
and his disposition, and well knowing what such a man was capable of
doing,--this man massacred the English wherever he met them. There
were two hundred, or thereabouts, of the Company's servants, or their
dependants, slaughtered at Patna with every circumstance of the most
abominable cruelty. Their limbs were cut to pieces. The tyrant whom
Mr. Hastings set up cut and hacked the limbs of British subjects in
the most cruel and perfidious manner, threw them into wells, and
polluted the waters of the country with British blood. Immediately war
is declared against him in form. That war sets the whole country in a
blaze; and then other parties begin to appear upon the scene, whose
transactions you will find yourselves deeply concerned in hereafter.

As soon as war was declared against Cossim, it was necessary to
resolve to put up another Nabob, and to have another revolution: and
where do they resort, but to the man whom, for his alleged tyranny,
for his incapacity, for the numberless iniquities he was said to have
committed, and for his total unfitness and disinclination to all the
duties of government, they had dethroned? This very man they take up
again, to place on the throne from which they had about two years
before removed him, and for the effecting of which they had committed
so many iniquities. Even this revolution was not made without being
paid for. According to the usual order of procession, in which the
youngest walk first, first comes the Company; and the Company had
secured to it in perpetuity those provinces which Cossim Ali Khan had
ceded, as it was thought, rather in the way of mortgage than anything
else. Then, under the name of compensation for sufferings to the
people concerned in the trade, and in the name of donation to an army
and a navy which had little to do in this affair, they tax him--what
sum do you think? They tax that empty and undone treasury of that
miserable and undone country 500,000_l_. for a private emolument to
themselves,--for the compensation for this iniquitous trade,--for the
compensation for abuses of which he was neither the author nor the
abettor, they tax this miserable prince 500,000_l_. That sum was given
to individuals. Now comes the Company at home, which, on hearing this
news, was all inflamed. The Directors were on fire. They were shocked
at it, and particularly at this donation to the army and navy. They
resolved they would give it no countenance and support. In the mean
time the gentlemen did not trouble their heads upon that subject, but
meant to exact and get their 500,000_l_. as they could.

Here was a third revolution, bought at this amazing sum, and this
poor, miserable prince first dragged from Moorshedabad to Calcutta,
then dragged back from Calcutta to Moorshedabad, the sport of fortune
and the plaything of avarice. This poor man is again set up, but is
left with no authority: his troops limited,--his person, everything
about him, in a manner subjugated,--a British Resident the master of
his court: he is set up as a pageant on this throne, with no other
authority but what would be sufficient to give a countenance to
presents, gifts, and donations. That authority was always left, when
all the rest was taken away. One would have thought that this
revolution might have satisfied these gentlemen, and that the money
gained by it would have been sufficient. No. The partisans of Cossim
Ali wanted another revolution. The partisans of the other side wished
to have something more done in the present. They now began to think
that to depose Cossim instantly, and to sell him to another, was too
much at one time,--especially as Cossim Ali was a man of vigor and
resolution, carrying on a fierce war against them. But what do you
think they did? They began to see, from the example of Cossim Ali,
that the lieutenancy, the ministry of the king, was a good thing to be
sold, and the sale of that might turn out as good a thing as the sale
of the prince.

For this office there were two rival candidates, persons of great
consideration, in Bengal: one, a principal Mahomedan, called Mahomed
Reza Khan, a man of high authority, great piety in his own religion,
great learning in the law, of the very first class of Mahomedan
nobility; but at the same time, on all these accounts, he was abhorred
and dreaded by the Nabob, who necessarily feared that a man of Mahomed
Reza Khan's description would be considered as better entitled and
fitter for his seat, as Nabob of the provinces. To balance him, there
was another man, known by the name of the Great Rajah Nundcomar. This
man was accounted the highest of his caste, and held the same rank
among the Gentoos that Mahomed Reza Khan obtained among the
Mahomedans. The prince on the throne had no jealousy of Nundcomar,
because he knew, that, as a Gentoo, he could not aspire to the office
of Subahdar. For that reason he was firmly attached to him; he might
depend completely on his services; he was _his_ against Mahomed Reza
Khan, and against the whole world. There was, however, a flaw in the
Nabob's title, which it was necessary should be hid. And perhaps it
lay against Mahomed Reza Khan as well as him. But it was a source of
apprehension to the Nabob, and contributed to make him wish to keep
all Mahomedan influence at a distance. For he was a Syed, that is to
say, a descendant of Mahomet, and as such, though of the only
acknowledged nobility among Mussulmen, would be by that circumstance
excluded, by the known laws of the Mogul empire, from being Subahdar
in any of the Mogul provinces, in case the revival of the constitution
of that empire should ever again take place.

An auction was now opened before the English Council at Calcutta.
Mahomed Reza Khan bid largely; Nundcomar bid largely. The
circumstances of these two rivals at the Nabob court were equally
favorable to the pretensions of each. But the preponderating merits of
Mahomed Reza Khan, arising from the subjection in which he was likely
to keep the Nabob, and make him fitter for the purpose of continued
exactions, induced the Council to take his money, which amounted to
about 220,000_l_. Be the sum paid what it may, it was certainly a
large one; in consequence of which the Council attempted to invest
Mahomed Reza Khan with the office of Naib Subah, or Deputy Viceroy. As
to Nundcomar, they fell upon him with a vengeful fury. He fought his
battle as well as he could; he opposed bribe to bribe, eagle to eagle;
but at length he was driven to the wall. Some received his money, but
did him no service in return; others, more conscientious, refused to
receive it; and in this battle of bribes he was vanquished. A
deputation was sent from Calcutta to the miserable Nabob, to tear
Nundcomar, his only support, from his side, and to put the object of
all his terrors, Mahomed Reza Khan, in his place.

Thus began a new division that split the Presidency into violent
factions; but the faction which adhered to Nundcomar was undoubtedly
the weakest. That most miserable of men, Mir Jaffier Ali Khan,
clinging, as to the last pillar, to Nundcomar, trembling at Mahomed
Reza Khan, died in the struggle, a miserable victim to all the
revolutions, to all the successive changes and versatile politics at
Calcutta. Like all the rest of the great personages whom we have
degraded and brutalized by insult and oppression, he betook himself to
the usual destructive resources of unprincipled misery,--sensuality,
opium, and wine. His gigantic frame of constitution soon gave way
under the oppression of this relief, and he died, leaving children and
grandchildren by wives and concubines. On the old Nabob's death,
Mahomed Reza Khan was acknowledged Deputy Nabob, the money paid, and
this revolution completed.

Here, my Lords, opened a new source of plunder, peculation, and
bribery, which was not neglected. Revolutions were no longer
necessary; succession supplied their places: and well the object
agreed with the policy. Rules of succession could not be very well
ascertained to an office like that of the Nabob, which was hereditary
only by the appointment of the Mogul. The issue by lawful wives would
naturally be preferred by those who meant the quiet of the country.
But a more doubtful title was preferred, as better adapted to the
purposes of extortion and peculation. This miserable succession was
sold, and the eldest of the issue of Munny Begum, an harlot, brought
in to pollute the harem of the seraglio, of whom you will hear much
hereafter, was chosen. He soon succeeded to the grave. Another son of
the same prostitute succeeded to the same unhappy throne, and followed
to the same untimely grave. Every succession was sold; and between
venal successions and venal revolutions, in a very few years seven
princes and six sales were seen successively in Bengal. The last was a
minor, the issue of a legitimate wife, admitted to succeed because a
minor, and because there was none illegitimate left. He was instantly
stripped of the allowance of his progenitors, and reduced to a pension
of 160,000 a year. He still exists, and continued to the end of Mr.
Hastings's government to furnish constant sources of bribery and
plunder to him and his creatures.

The offspring of Munny Begum clinging, as his father did, to
Nundcomar, they tore Nundcomar from his side, as they had done from
the side of his father, and carried him down as a sort of prisoner to
Calcutta; where, having had the weakness to become the first informer,
he was made the first example. This person, pushed to the wall, and
knowing that the man he had to deal with was desperate and cruel in
his resentments, resolves on the first blow, and enters before the
Council a regular information in writing of bribery against Mr.
Hastings. In his preface to that charge he excuses himself for what is
considered to be an act equally insane and wicked, and as the one
inexpiable crime of an Indian, the discovery of the money he
gives,--that Mr. Hastings had declaredly determined on his ruin, and
to accomplish it had newly associated himself with one Mohun Persaud,
a name I wish your Lordships to remember, a bitter enemy of his, an
infamous person, whom Mr. Hastings knew to be such, and as such had
turned him out of his house,--that Mr. Hastings had lately recalled,
and held frequent communications with this Mohun Persaud, the subject
of which he had no doubt was his ruin. In the year 1775 he was hanged
by those incorrupt English judges who were sent to India by Parliament
to protect the natives from oppression.

Your Lordships will observe that this new sale of the office of
ministers succeeded to the sale of that of nabobs. All these varied
and successive sales shook the country to pieces. As if those
miserable exhausted provinces were to be cured of inanition by
phlebotomy, while Cossim Ali was racking it above, the Company were
drawing off all its nutriment below. A dreadful, an extensive, and
most chargeable war followed. Half the northern force of India poured
down like a torrent on Bengal, endangered our existence, and exhausted
all our resources. The war was the fruit of Mr. Hastings's cabals. Its
termination, as usual, was the result of the military merit and the
fortune of this nation. Cossim Ali, after having been defeated toy the
military genius and spirit of England, (for the Adamses, Monroes, and
others of that period, I believe, showed as much skill and bravery as
any of their predecessors,) in his flight swept away above three
millions in money, jewels, or effects, out of a country which he had
plundered and exhausted by his unheard-of exactions. However, he
fought his way like a retiring lion, turning his face to his pursuers.
He still fought along his frontier. His ability and his money drew to
his cause the Subahdar of Oude, the famous Sujah ul Dowlah. The Mogul
entered into these wars, and penetrated into the lower provinces on
one side, whilst Bulwant Sing, the Rajah of Benares, entered them on
another. After various changes of party and changes of fortune, the
loss which began in the treachery of the civil service was, as I have
before remarked, redeemed by military merit. Many examples of the same
sort have since been seen.

Whilst these things were transacted in India, the Court of Directors
in London, hearing of so many changes, hearing of such an incredible
mass of perfidy and venality, knowing that there was a general market
made of the country and of the Company, that the flame of war spread
from province to province, that, in proportion as it spread, the fire
glowed with augmented fierceness, and that the rapacity which
originally gave rise to it was following it in all its progress,--the
Company, my Lords, alarmed not only for their acquisitions, but their
existence, and finding themselves sinking lower and lower by every
victory they obtained, thought it necessary at length to come to some
system and some settlement. After composing their differences with
Lord Clive, they sent him out to that country about the year 1765, in
order, by his name, weight, authority, and vigor of mind, to give some
sort of form and stability to government, and to rectify the
innumerable abuses which prevailed there, and particularly that great
source of disorders, that fundamental abuse, presents: for the bribes
by which all these revolutions were bought had not the name of
conditions, stipulations, or rewards; they even had the free and
gratuitous style of presents. The receivers contended that they were
mere gratuities given for service done, or mere tokens of affection
and gratitude to the parties. They may give them what names they
please, and your Lordships will think of them what you please; but
they were the donations of misery to power, the gifts of sufferers to
the oppressors; and consequently, where they prevailed, they left no
certain property or fixed situation to any man in India, from the
highest to the lowest. The Court of Directors sent out orders to
enlarge the servants' covenants with new and severe clauses, strongly
prohibiting the practice of receiving presents. Lord Clive himself had
been a large receiver of them. Yet, as it was in the moment of a
revolution which gave them all they possessed, the Company would hear
no more of it. They sent him out to reform: whether they chose well or
ill does not signify. I think, upon the whole, they chose well;
because his name and authority could do much. They sent him out to
redress the grievances of that country, and it was necessary he should
be well armed for that service. They sent him out with such powers as
no servant of the Company ever held before. I would not be understood
here in my own character, much less in the delegated character in
which I stand, to contend for any man in the totality of his conduct.
Perhaps in some of his measures he was mistaken, and in some of his
acts reprehensible; but justice obliges me to say, that the plan which
he formed and the course which he pursued were in general great and
well imagined,--that he laid great foundations, if they had been
properly built upon. For, in the first place, he composed all the
neighboring countries torn to pieces by the wars of Cossim Ali, and
quieted the apprehensions raised by the opinion of the boundless
ambition of England. He took strong measures to put an end to a great
many of the abuses that prevailed in the country subject to the
Company. He then proceeded to the upper provinces, and formed a plan
which, for a military man, has great civil and political merit. He put
a bound to the aspiring spirit of the Company's servants; he limited
its conquests; he prescribed bounds to its ambition. "First" (says he)
"quiet the minds of the country; what you have obtained regulate; make
it known to India that you resolve to acquire no more."

On this solid plan he fixed every prince that was concerned in the
preceding wars, on the one side and on the other, in an happy and easy
settlement. He restored Sujah ul Dowlah, who had been driven from his
dominions by the military arm of Great Britain, to the rank of Vizier,
and to the dominion of the territories of Oude. With a generosity that
astonished all Asia, he reinstated this expelled enemy of his nation
peaceably upon his throne. And this act of politic generosity did more
towards quieting the minds of the people of Asia than all the terror,
great as it was, of the English arms. At the same time, Lord Clive,
generous to all, took peculiar care of our friends and allies. He took
care of Bulwant Sing, the great Rajah of Benares, who had taken our
part in the war. He secured him from the revenge of Sujah ul Dowlah.
The Mogul had granted us the superiority over Bulwant Sing. Lord Clive
reestablished him in a secure, easy independency. He confirmed him,
under the British guaranty, in the rich principality which he held.

The Mogul, the head of the Mussulman religion in India, and of the
Indian empire, a head honored and esteemed even in its ruins, he
procured to be recognized by all the persons that were connected with
his empire. The rents that ought to be paid to the Vizier of the
Empire he gave to the Vizierate. Thus our alliances were cemented, our
enemies were reconciled, all Asia was conciliated by our settlement
with the king. To that unhappy fugitive king, driven from place to
place, the sport of fortune, now an emperor and now a prisoner, prayed
for in every mosque in which his authority was conspired against, one
day opposed by the coin struck in his name and the other day sold for
it,--to this descendant of Tamerlane he allotted, with a decent share
of royal dignity, an honorable fixed residence, where he might be
useful and could not be dangerous.

As to the Bengal provinces, he did not take for the Company the
viceroyalty, as Mr. Holwell would have persuaded, almost forced, the
Company to do; but, to satisfy the prejudices of the Mahomedans, the
country was left in the hands nominally of the Subah, or viceroy, who
was to administer the criminal justice and the exterior forms of
royalty. He obtained from the sovereign the _dewanny_. This is the
great act of the constitutional entrance of the Company into the body
politic of India. It gave to the settlement of Bengal a fixed
constitutional form, with a legal title, acknowledged and recognized
now for the first time by all the natural powers of the country,
because it arose from the charter of the undoubted sovereign. The
_dewanny_, or high-stewardship, gave to the Company the collection and
management of the revenue; and in this modest and civil character they
appeared, not the oppressors, but the protectors of the people. This
scheme had all the real power, without any invidious appearance of it;
it gave them the revenue, without the parade of sovereignty. On this
double foundation the government was happily settled. The minds of the
natives were quieted. The Company's territories and views were
circumscribed. The arm of force was put out of sight. The imperial
name covered everything. The power of the purse was in the hand of the
Company. The power of the sword was in effect so, as they contracted
for the maintenance of the army. The Company had a revenue of a
million and a half. The Nabob had, indeed, fallen from any real and
effective power, yet the dignity of the court was maintained. The
prejudices and interests of tho Mahomedans, and particularly of their
nobility, who had suffered more by this great revolution even than the
old inhabitants of the country, were consulted; for by this plan a
revenue of 500,000_l._ was settled on the viceroyalty, which was thus
enabled to provide in some measure for those great families. The
Company likewise, by this plan, in order to enjoy their revenues
securely, and to avoid envy and murmur, put them into the hands of
Mahomed Reza Khan, whom Lord Clive found in the management of affairs,
and did not displace; and he was now made deputy-steward to the
Company, as he had been before lieutenant-viceroy to the Nabob. A
British Resident at Moorshedabad was established as a control. The
Company exercised their power over the revenue in the first instance
through the natives, but the British Resident was in reality the great
mover.

If ever this nation stood in a situation of glory throughout Asia, it
was in that moment. But, as I have said, some material errors and
mistakes were committed. After tho formation of this plan, Lord Clive
unfortunately did not stay long enough in the country to give
consistency to the measures of reformation he had undertaken, but
rapidly returned to England; and after his departure, the government
that continued had not vigor or authority to support the settlement
then made, and considerable abuses began to prevail in every quarter.
Another capital period in our history here commences. Those who
succeeded (though I believe one of them was one of the honestest men
that ever served the Company, I mean Governor Verelst) had not weight
enough to poise the system of the service, and consequently many
abuses and grievances again prevailed. Supervisors were appointed to
every district, as a check on the native collectors, and to report
every abuse as it should arise. But they who were appointed to redress
grievances were themselves accused of being guilty of them. However,
the disorders were not of that violent kind which preceded Mr.
Hastings's departure, nor such as followed his return: no mercenary
wars, no mercenary revolutions, no extirpation of nations, no violent
convulsions in the revenue, no subversion of ancient houses, no
general sales of any descriptions of men,--none of these, but
certainly such grievances as made it necessary for the Company to send
out another commission in 1769, with instructions pointing out the
chief abuses. It was composed of Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Ford, and Mr.
Scrafton. The unfortunate end of that commission is known to all the
world; but I mention it in order to state that the receipt of presents
was considered as one of the grievances which then prevailed in India,
and that the supervisors under that commission were ordered upon no
account whatever to take presents. Upon the unfortunate catastrophe
which happened, the Company was preparing to send out another for the
rectification of these grievances, when Parliament thought it
necessary to supersede that commission, to take the matter into their
own hands, and to appoint another commission in a Parliamentary way
(of which Mr. Hastings was one) for the better government of that
country. Mr. Hastings, as I must mention to your Lordships, soon after
the deposition and restoration of Jaffier Ali Khan, and before Lord
Clive arrived, quitted for a while the scene in which he had been so
mischievously employed, and returned to England to strengthen himself
by those cabals which again sent him out with new authority to pursue
the courses which were the natural sequel to his former proceedings.
He returned to India with great power, indeed,--first to a seat in
Council at Fort St. George, and from thence to succeed to the
Presidency of Fort William. On him the Company placed their chief
reliance. Happy had it been for them, happy for India and for England,
if his conduct had been such as to spare your Lordships and the
Commons the exhibition of this day!

When this government, with Mr. Hastings at the head of it, was
settled, Moorshedabad did still continue the seat of the native
government, and of all the collections. Here the Company was not
satisfied with placing a Resident at the durbar, which was the first
step to our assuming the government in that country. These steps must
be traced by your Lordships; for I should never have given you this
trouble, if it was not necessary to possess you clearly of the several
progressive steps by which the Company's government came to be
established and to supersede the native. The next step was the
appointment of supervisors in every province, to oversee the native
collector. The third was to establish a general Council of Revenue at
Moorshedabad, to superintend the great steward, Mahomed Reza Khan. In
1772 that Council by Mr. Hastings was overturned, and the whole
management of the revenue brought to Calcutta. Mahomed Reza Khan, by
orders of the Company, was turned out of all his offices, and turned
out for reasons and principles which your Lordships will hereafter
see; and at last the dewanny was entirely taken out of the native
hands, and settled in the Supreme Council and Presidency itself in
Calcutta; and so it remained until the year 1781, when Mr. Hastings
made another revolution, took it out of the hands of the Supreme
Council, in which the orders of the Company, an act of Parliament, and
their own act had vested it, and put it into a subordinate council:
that is, it was entirely vested in himself.

Now your Lordships see the whole of the revolutions. I have stated
them, I trust, with perspicuity,--stated the grounds and principles
upon which they were made,--stated the abuses that grew upon
them,--and that every revolution produced its abuse. You saw the
native government vanish by degrees, until it was reduced to a
situation fit for nothing but to become a private perquisite, as it
has been, to Mr. Hastings, and to be granted to whom he pleased. The
English government succeeded, at the head of which Mr. Hastings was
placed by an act of Parliament, having before held the office of
President of the Council,--the express object of both these
appointments being to redress grievances; and within these two periods
of his power, as President and Governor-General, were those crimes
committed of which he now stands accused. All this history is merely
by way of illustration: his crimination begins from his nomination to
the Presidency; and we are to consider how he comported himself in
that station, and in his office of Governor-General.

The first thing, in considering the merits or demerits of any
governor, is to have some test by which they are to be tried. And
here, my Lords, we conceive, that, when a British governor is sent
abroad, he is sent to pursue the good of the people as much as
possible in the spirit of the laws of this country, which in all
respects intend their conservation, their happiness, and their
prosperity. This is the principle upon which Mr. Hastings was bound to
govern, and upon which he is to account for his conduct here. His rule
was, what a British governor, intrusted with the power of this
country, was bound to do or to forbear. If he has performed and if he
has abstained as he ought, dismiss him honorably acquitted from your
bar; otherwise condemn him. He may resort to other principles and to
other maxims; but this country will force him to be tried by its laws.
The law of this country recognizes that well-known crime called
misconduct in office; it is a head of the law of England, and, so far
as inferior courts are competent to try it, may be tried in them. Here
your Lordships' competence is plenary: you are fully competent both to
inquire into and to punish the offence.

And, first, I am to state to your Lordships, by the direction of those
whom I am bound to obey, the principles on which Mr. Hastings declares
he has conducted his government,--principles which he has avowed,
first in several letters written to the East India Company, next in a
paper of defence delivered to the House of Commons explicitly, and
more explicitly in his defence before your Lordships. Nothing in Mr.
Hastings's proceedings is so curious as his several defences; and
nothing in the defences is so singular as the principles upon which he
proceeds. Your Lordships will have to decide not only upon a large,
connected, systematic train of misdemeanors, but an equally connected
system of principles and maxims of government, invented to justify
those misdemeanors. He has brought them forward and avowed them in the
face of day. He has boldly and insultingly thrown them in the face of
the representatives of a free people, and we cannot pass them by
without adopting them. I am directed to protest against those grounds
and principles upon which he frames his defence; for, if those grounds
are good and valid, they carry off a great deal at least, if not
entirely, the foundation of our charge.

My Lords, we contend that Mr. Hastings, as a British governor, ought
to govern on British principles, not by British forms,--God
forbid!--for if ever there was a case in which the letter kills and
the spirit gives life, it would be an attempt to introduce British
forms and the substance of despotic principles together into any
country. No! We call for that spirit of equity, that spirit of
justice, that spirit of protection, that spirit of lenity, which ought
to characterize every British subject in power; and on these, and
these principles only, he will be tried.

But he has told your Lordships, in his defence, that actions in Asia
do not bear the same moral qualities which the same actions would bear
in Europe.

My Lords, we positively deny that principle. I am authorized and
called upon to deny it. And having stated at large what he means by
saying that the same actions have not the same qualities in Asia and
in Europe, we are to let your Lordships know that these gentlemen have
formed a plan of _geographical morality_, by which the duties of men,
in public and in private situations, are not to be governed by their
relation to the great Governor of the Universe, or by their relation
to mankind, but by climates, degrees of longitude, parallels, not of
life, but of latitudes: as if, when you have crossed the equinoctial,
all the virtues die, as they say some insects die when they cross the
line; as if there were a kind of baptism, like that practised by
seamen, by which they unbaptize themselves of all that they learned in
Europe, and after which a new order and system of things commenced.

This geographical morality we do protest against; Mr. Hastings shall
not screen himself under it; and on this point I hope and trust many
words will not be necessary to satisfy your Lordships. But we think it
necessary, in justification of ourselves, to declare that the laws of
morality are the same everywhere, and that there is no action which
would pass for an act of extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and of
oppression in England, that is not an act of extortion, of peculation,
of bribery, and oppression in Europe, Asia, Africa, and all the world
over. This I contend for not in the technical forms of it, but I
contend for it in the substance.

Mr. Hastings comes before your Lordships not as a British governor
answering to a British tribunal, but as a subahdar, as a bashaw of
three tails. He says,

      "I had an arbitrary power to exercise: I exercised it.
      Slaves I found the people: slaves they are,--they are so by
      their constitution; and if they are, I did not make it for
      them. I was unfortunately bound to exercise this arbitrary
      power, and accordingly I did exercise it. It was
      disagreeable to me, but I did exercise it; and no other
      power can be exercised in that country."

This, if it be true, is a plea in bar. But I trust and hope your
Lordships will not judge by laws and institutions which you do not
know, against those laws and institutions which you do know, and under
whose power and authority Mr. Hastings went out to India. Can your
Lordships patiently hear what _we_ have heard with indignation enough,
and what, if there were nothing else, would call these principles, as
well as the actions which are justified on such principles, to your
Lordships' bar, that it may be known whether the peers of England do
not sympathize with the Commons in their detestation of such doctrine?
Think of an English governor tried before you as a British subject,
and yet declaring that he governed on the principles of arbitrary
power! His plea is, that he did govern there on arbitrary and
despotic, and, as he supposes, Oriental principles. And as this plea
is boldly avowed and maintained, and as, no doubt, all his conduct was
perfectly correspondent to these principles, the principles and the
conduct must be tried together.

If your Lordships will now permit me, I will state one of the many
places in which he has avowed these principles as the basis and
foundation of all his conduct.

      "The sovereignty which they assumed, it fell to my lot, very
      unexpectedly, to exert; and whether or not such power, or
      powers of that nature, were delegated to me by any
      provisions of any act of Parliament, I confess myself too
      little of a lawyer to pronounce. I only know that the
      acceptance of the sovereignty of Benares, &c., is not
      acknowledged or admitted by any act of Parliament; and yet,
      by the particular interference of the majority of the
      Council, the Company is clearly and indisputably seized of
      that sovereignty."

So that this gentleman, because he is not a lawyer, nor clothed with
those robes which distinguish, and well distinguish, the learning of
this country, is not to know anything of his duty; and whether he was
bound by any, or what act of Parliament, is a thing he is not lawyer
enough to know! Now, if your Lordships will suffer the laws to be
broken by those who are not of the long robe, I am afraid those of the
long robe will have none to punish but those of their own profession.
He therefore goes to a law he is better acquainted with,--that is, the
law of arbitrary power and force, if it deserves to be called by the
name of law. "If, therefore," says he,

      "the _sovereignty_ of Benares, as ceded to us by the Vizier,
      have _any rights whatever_ annexed to it, and be not a mere
      empty word without meaning, those rights must be such as are
      held, countenanced, and established by the law, custom, and
      usage of the Mogul empire, and not by the provisions of any
      British act of Parliament hitherto enacted. _Those rights_,
      and none other, I have been the involuntary instrument of
      enforcing. And if any future act of Parliament shall
      positively or by implication tend to annihilate those very
      rights, or their exertion as I have exerted them, I much
      fear that the boasted sovereignty of Benares, which was held
      up as an acquisition, almost obtruded on the Company against
      my consent and opinion, (for I acknowledge that even then I
      foresaw many difficulties and inconveniences in its future
      exercise,)--I fear, I say, that this sovereignty will be
      found a burden instead of a benefit, a heavy clog rather
      than a precious gem to its present possessors: I mean,
      unless the whole of our territory in that quarter shall be
      rounded and made an uniform compact body by one grand and
      systematic arrangement.--such an arrangement as shall do
      away all the mischiefs, doubts, and inconveniences (both to
      the governors and the governed) arising from the variety of
      tenures, rights, and claims in all cases of landed property
      and feudal jurisdiction in India, from the informality,
      invalidity, and instability of all engagements in so divided
      and unsettled a state of society, and from the unavoidable
      anarchy and confusion of different laws, religions, and
      prejudices, moral, civil, and political, all jumbled
      together in one unnatural and discordant mass.

      "Every part of Hindostan has been constantly exposed to
      these and similar disadvantages ever since the Mahomedan
      conquests. The Hindoos, who never incorporated with their
      conquerors, were kept in order only by the strong hand of
      power. The constant necessity of similar exertions would
      increase at once their energy and extent; so that rebellion
      itself is the parent and promoter of despotism. Sovereignty
      in India implies nothing else. For I know not how we can
      form an estimate of its powers, but from its visible
      effects; and those are everywhere the same, from Cabool to
      Assam. The whole history of Asia is nothing more than
      precedents to prove the invariable exercise of arbitrary
      power. To all this I strongly alluded in the minutes I
      delivered in Council, when the treaty with the new Vizier
      was on foot in 1775; and I wished to make Cheyt Sing
      independent, because in India dependence included a thousand
      evils, many of which I enumerated at that time, and they are
      entered in the ninth clause of the first section of this
      charge. I knew the powers with which an Indian sovereignty
      is armed, and the dangers to which tributaries are exposed.
      I knew, that, from the history of Asia, and from the very
      nature of mankind, the subjects of a despotic empire are
      always vigilant for the moment to rebel, and the sovereign
      is ever jealous of rebellious intentions. A zemindar is an
      Indian subject, and as such exposed to the common lot of his
      fellows. _The mean and depraved state of a mere zemindar_ is
      therefore this very dependence above mentioned on a despotic
      government, this very proneness to shake off his allegiance,
      and this very exposure to continual danger from his
      sovereign's jealousy, which are consequent on the political
      state of Hindostanic governments. Bulwant Sing, if he had
      been, and Cheyt Sing, as long as he was a zemindar, stood
      exactly in this _mean and depraved state_ by the
      constitution of his country. I did not make it for him, but
      would have secured him from it. Those who made him a
      zemindar entailed upon him the consequences of so mean and
      depraved a tenure. Aliverdy Khan and Cossim Ali fined all
      their zemindars on the necessities of war, and on every
      pretence either of court necessity or court extravagance."

My Lords, you have now heard the principles on which Mr. Hastings
governs the part of Asia subjected to the British empire. You have
heard his opinion of the mean and depraved state of those who are
subject to it. You have heard his lecture upon arbitrary power, which
he states to be the constitution of Asia. You hear the application he
makes of it; and you hear the practices which he employs to justify it
and who the persons were on whose authority he relies, and whose
example he professes to follow. In the first place, your Lordships
will be astonished at the audacity with which he speaks of his own
administration, as if he was reading a speculative lecture on the
evils attendant upon some vicious system of foreign government in
which he had no sort of concern whatsoever. And then, when in this
speculative way he has established, or thinks he has, the vices of the
government, he conceives he has found a sufficient apology for his own
crimes. And if he violates the most solemn engagements, if he
oppresses, extorts, and robs, if he imprisons, confiscates, banishes
at his sole will and pleasure, when we accuse him for his
ill-treatment of the people committed to him as a sacred trust, his
defence is,--

      "To be robbed, violated, oppressed, is their privilege. Let
      the constitution of their country answer for it. I did not
      make it for them. Slaves I found them, and as slaves I have
      treated them. I was a despotic prince. Despotic governments
      are jealous, and the subjects prone to rebellion. This very
      proneness of the subject to shake off his allegiance exposes
      him to continual danger from his sovereign's jealousy, and
      this is consequent on the political state of Hindostanic
      governments."

He lays it down as a rule, that despotism is the genuine constitution
of India, that a disposition to rebellion in the subject or dependent
prince is the necessary effect of this despotism, and that jealousy
and its consequences naturally arise on the part of the
sovereign,--that the government is everything, and the subject
nothing,--that the great landed men are in a mean and depraved state,
and subject to many evils.

Such a state of things, if true, would warrant conclusions directly
opposite to those which Mr. Hastings means to draw from them, both
argumentatively and practically, first to influence his conduct, and
then to bottom his defence of it.


Perhaps you will imagine that the man who avows these principles of
arbitrary government, and pleads them as the justification of acts
which nothing else can justify, is of opinion that they are on the
whole good for the people over whom they are exercised. The very
reverse. He mentions them as horrible things, tending to inflict on
the people a thousand evils, and to bring on the ruler a continual
train of dangers. Yet he states, that your acquisitions in India will
be a detriment instead of an advantage, if you destroy arbitrary
power, unless you can reduce all the religious establishments, all the
civil institutions, and tenures of land, into one uniform mass,--that
is, unless by acts of arbitrary power you extinguish all the laws,
rights, and religious principles of the people, and force them to an
uniformity, and on that uniformity build a system of arbitrary power.

But nothing is more false than that despotism is the constitution of
any country in Asia that we are acquainted with. It is certainly not
true of any Mahomedan constitution. But if it were, do your Lordships
really think that the nation would bear, that any human creature would
bear, to hear an English governor defend himself on such principles?
or, if he can defend himself on such principles, is it possible to
deny the conclusion, that no man in India has a security for anything,
but by being totally independent of the British government? Here he
has declared his opinion, that he is a despotic prince, that he is to
use arbitrary power; and of course all his acts are covered with that
shield. "_I know_," says he, "_the constitution of Asia only from its
practice_." Will your Lordships submit to hear the corrupt practices
of mankind made the principles of government? No! it will be your
pride and glory to teach men intrusted with power, that, in their use
of it, they are to conform to principles, and not to draw their
principles from the corrupt practice of any man whatever. Was there
ever heard, or could it be conceived, that a governor would dare to
heap up all the evil practices, all the cruelties, oppressions,
extortions, corruptions, briberies, of all the ferocious usurpers,
desperate robbers, thieves, cheats, and jugglers, that ever had
office, from one end of Asia to another, and, consolidating all this
mass of the crimes and absurdities of barbarous domination into one
code, establish it as the whole duty of an English governor? I believe
that till this time so audacious a thing was never attempted by man.

_He_ have arbitrary power! My Lords, the East India Company have not
arbitrary power to give him; the king has no arbitrary power to give
him; your Lordships have not; nor the Commons, nor the whole
legislature. We have no arbitrary power to give, because arbitrary
power is a thing which neither any man can hold nor any man can give.
No man can lawfully govern himself according to his own will; much
less can one person be governed by the will of another. We are all
born in subjection,--all born equally, high and low, governors and
governed, in subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law,
prior to all our devices and prior to all our contrivances, paramount
to all our ideas and all our sensations, antecedent to our very
existence, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of
the universe, out of which we cannot stir.

This great law does not arise from our conventions or compacts; on the
contrary, it gives to our conventions and compacts all the force and
sanction they can have. It does not arise from our vain institutions.
Every good gift is of God; all power is of God; and He who has given
the power, and from whom alone it originates, will never suffer the
exercise of it to be practised upon any less solid foundation than the
power itself. If, then, all dominion of man over man is the effect of
the Divine disposition, it is bound by the eternal laws of Him that
gave it, with which no human authority can dispense,--neither he that
exercises it, nor even those who are subject to it; and if they were
mad enough to make an express compact that should release their
magistrate from his duty, and should declare their lives, liberties,
and properties dependent upon, not rules and laws, but his mere
capricious will, that covenant would be void. The acceptor of it has
not his authority increased, but he has his crime doubled. Therefore
can it be imagined, if this be true, that He will suffer this great
gift of government, the greatest, the best, that was ever given by God
to mankind, to be the plaything and the sport of the feeble will of a
man, who, by a blasphemous, absurd, and petulant usurpation, would
place his own feeble, contemptible, ridiculous will in the place of
the Divine wisdom and justice?

The title of conquest makes no difference at all. No conquest can give
such a right; for conquest, that is, force, cannot convert its own
injustice into a just title, by which it may rule others at its
pleasure. By conquest, which is a more immediate designation of the
hand of God, the conqueror succeeds to all the painful duties and
subordination to the power of God which belonged to the sovereign whom
he has displaced, just as if he had come in by the positive law of
some descent or some election. To this at least he is strictly bound:
he ought to govern them as he governs his own subjects. But every wise
conqueror has gone much further than he was bound to go. It has been
his ambition and his policy to reconcile the vanquished to his
fortune, to show that they had gained by the change, to convert their
momentary suffering into a long benefit, and to draw from the
humiliation of his enemies an accession to his own glory. This has
been so constant a practice, that it is to repeat the histories of all
politic conquerors in all nations and in all times; and I will not so
much distrust your Lordships' enlightened and discriminating studies
and correct memories as to allude to one of them. I will only show you
that the Court of Directors, under whom he served, has adopted that
idea,--that they constantly inculcated it to him, and to all the
servants,--that they run a parallel between their own and the native
government, and, supposing it to be very evil, did not hold it up as
an example to be followed, but as an abuse to be corrected,--that they
never made it a question, whether India is to be improved by English
law and liberty, or English law and liberty vitiated by Indian
corruption.

No, my Lords, this arbitrary power is not to be had by conquest. Nor
can any sovereign have it by succession; for no man can succeed to
fraud, rapine, and violence. Neither by compact, covenant, or
submission,--for men cannot covenant themselves out of their rights
and their duties,--nor by any other means, can arbitrary power be
conveyed to any man. Those who give to others such rights perform acts
that are void as they are given,--good indeed and valid only as
tending to subject themselves, and those who act with them, to the
Divine displeasure; because morally there can be no such power. Those
who give and those who receive arbitrary power are alike criminal; and
there is no man but is bound to resist it to the best of his power,
wherever it shall show its face to the world. It is a crime to bear
it, when it can be rationally shaken off. Nothing but absolute
impotence can justify men in not resisting it to the utmost of their
ability.

Law and arbitrary power are in eternal enmity. Name me a magistrate,
and I will name property; name me power, and I will name protection.
It is a contradiction in terms, it is blasphemy in religion, it is
wickedness in politics, to say that any man can have arbitrary power.
In every patent of office the duty is included. For what else does a
magistrate exist? To suppose for power is an absurdity in idea. Judges
are guided and governed by the eternal laws of justice, to which we
are all subject. We may bite our chains, if we will, but we shall be
made to know ourselves, and be taught that man is born to be governed
by law; and he that will substitute _will_ in the place of it is an
enemy to GOD.

Despotism does not in the smallest degree abrogate, alter, or lessen
any one duty of any one relation of life, or weaken the force or
obligation of any one engagement or contract whatsoever. Despotism, if
it means anything that is at all defensible, means a mode of
government bound by no written rules, and coerced by no controlling
magistracies or well-settled orders in the state. But if it has no
written law, it neither does nor can cancel the primeval,
indefeasible, unalterable law of Nature and of nations; and if no
magistracies control its exertions, those exertions must derive their
limitation and direction either from the equity and moderation of the
ruler, or from downright revolt on the part of the subject by
rebellion, divested of all its criminal qualities. The moment a
sovereign removes the idea of security and protection from his
subjects, and declares that he is everything and they nothing, when he
declares that no contract he makes with them can or ought to bind him,
he then declares war upon them: he is no longer sovereign; they are no
longer subjects.

No man, therefore, has a right to arbitrary power. But the thought
which is suggested by the depravity of him who brings it forward is
supported by a gross confusion of ideas and principles, which your
Lordships well know how to discern and separate. It is manifest, that,
in the Eastern governments, and the Western, and in all governments,
the supreme power in the state cannot, whilst that state subsists, be
rendered criminally responsible for its actions: otherwise it would
not be the supreme power. It is certainly true: but the actions do not
change their nature by losing their responsibility. The arbitrary acts
which are unpunished are not the less vicious, though none but God,
the conscience, and tho opinions of mankind take cognizance of them.

It is not merely so in this or that government, but in all countries.
The king in this country is undoubtedly unaccountable for his actions.
The House of Lords, if it should ever exercise, (God forbid I should
suspect it would ever do what it has never done!)--but if it should
ever abuse its judicial power, and give such a judgment as it ought
not to give, whether from fear of popular clamor on the one hand, or
predilection to the prisoner on the other,--if they abuse their
judgments, there is no calling them to an account for it. And so, if
the Commons should abuse their power, nay, if they should have been so
greatly delinquent as not to have prosecuted this offender, they could
not be accountable for it; there is no punishing them for their acts,
because we exercise a part of the supreme power. But are they less
criminal, less rebellious against the Divine Majesty? are they less
hateful to man, whose opinions they ought to cultivate as far as they
are just? No: till society fall into a state of dissolution, they
cannot be accountable for their acts. But it is from confounding the
unaccountable character inherent in the supreme power with arbitrary
power, that all this confusion of ideas has arisen.

Even upon a supposition that arbitrary power can exist anywhere, which
we deny totally, and which your Lordships will be the first and
proudest to deny, still, absolute supreme dominion was never conferred
or delegated by you,--much less, arbitrary power, which never did in
any case, nor ever will in any case, time, or country, produce any one
of the ends of just government.

It is true that the supreme power in every constitution of government
must be absolute, and this may be corrupted into the arbitrary. But
all good constitutions have established certain fixed rules for the
exercise of their functions, which they rarely or ever depart from,
and which rules form the security against that worst of evils, the
government of will and force instead of wisdom and justice.

But though the supreme power is in a situation resembling arbitrary,
yet never was there heard of in the history of the world, that is, in
that mixed chaos of human wisdom and folly, such a thing as an
_intermediate_ arbitrary power,--that is, of an officer of government
who is to exert authority over the people without any law at all, and
who is to have the benefit of all laws, and all forms of law, when he
is called to an account. For that is to let a wild beast (for such is
a man without law) loose upon the people to prey on them at his
pleasure, whilst all the laws which ought to secure the people against
the abuse of power are employed to screen that abuse against the cries
of the people.

This is _de facto_ the state of our Indian government. But to
establish it so in right as well as in fact is a thing left for us to
begin with, the first of mankind. For a subordinate arbitrary or even
despotic power never was heard of in right, claim, or authorized
practice; least of all has it been heard of in the Eastern
governments, where all the instances of severity and cruelty fall upon
governors and persons intrusted with power. This would be a gross
contradiction. Before Mr. Hastings, none ever came before his
superiors to claim it; because, if any such thing could exist, he
claims the very power of that sovereign who calls him to account.

But suppose a man to come before us, denying all the benefits of law
to the people under him,--and yet, when he is called to account, to
claim all the benefits of that law which was made to screen mankind
from the excesses of power: such a claim, I will venture to say, is a
monster that never existed, except in the wild imagination of some
theorist. It cannot be admitted, because it is a perversion of the
fundamental principle, that every power given for the protection of
the people below should be responsible to the power above. It is to
suppose that the people shall have no laws with regard to _him_, yet,
when _he_ comes to be tried, he shall claim the protection of those
laws which were made to secure the people from his violence,--that he
shall claim a fair trial, an equitable hearing, every advantage of
counsel, (God forbid he should not have them!) yet that the people
under him shall have none of those advantages. The reverse is the
principle of every just and rational procedure. For the people, who
have nothing to use but their natural faculties, ought to be gently
dealt with; but those who are intrusted with an artificial and
instituted authority have in their hands a great deal of the force of
other people; and as their temptations to injustice are greater, so
their moans are infinitely more effectual for mischief by turning the
powers given for the preservation of society to its destruction: so
that, if an arbitrary procedure be justifiable, (a strong one I am
sure is,) it is when used against those who pretend to use it against
others.

My Lords, I will venture to say of the governments of Asia, that none
of them ever had an arbitrary power; and if any governments had an
arbitrary power, they cannot delegate it to any persons under them:
that is, they cannot so delegate it to others as not to leave them
accountable on the principles upon which it was given. As this is a
contradiction in terms, a gross absurdity, as well as a monstrous
wickedness, let me say, for the honor of human nature, that, although
undoubtedly we may speak it with the pride of England that we have
better institutions for the preservation of the rights of men than any
other country in the world, yet I will venture to say that no country
has wholly meant, or ever meant, to give this power.

As it cannot exist in right on any rational and solid principles of
government, so neither does it exist in the constitution of Oriental
governments,--and I do insist upon it, that Oriental governments know
nothing of arbitrary power. I have taken as much pains as I could to
examine into the constitutions of them. I have been endeavoring to
inform myself at all times on this subject; of late my duty has led me
to a more minute inspection of them; and I do challenge the whole race
of man to show me any of the Oriental governors claiming to themselves
a right to act by arbitrary will.

The greatest part of Asia is under Mahomedan governments. To name a
Mahomedan government is to name a government by law. It is a law
enforced by stronger sanctions than any law that can bind a Christian
sovereign. Their law is believed to be given by God; and it has the
double sanction of law and of religion, with which the prince is no
more authorized to dispense than any one else. And if any man will
produce the Koran to me, and will but show me one text in it that
authorizes in any degree an arbitrary power in the government, I will
confess that I have read that book, and been conversant in the affairs
of Asia, in vain. There is not such a syllable in it; but, on the
contrary, against oppressors by name every letter of that law is
fulminated. There are interpreters established throughout all Asia to
explain that law, an order of priesthood, whom they call _men of the
law_. These men are conservators of the law; and to enable them to
preserve it in its perfection, they are secured from the resentment of
the sovereign: for he cannot touch them. Even their kings are not
always vested with a real supreme power, but the government is in some
degree republican.

To bring this point a little nearer home,--since we are challenged
thus, since we are led into Asia, since we are called upon to make
good our charge on the principles of the governments there, rather
than on those of our own country, (which I trust your Lordships will
oblige him finally to be governed by, puffed up as he is with the
insolence of Asia,)--the nearest to us of the governments he appeals
to is that of the Grand Seignior, the Emperor of the Turks.--_He_ an
arbitrary power! Why, he has not the supreme power of his own country.
Every one knows that the Grand Seignior is exalted high in _titles_,
as our prerogative lawyers exalt an abstract sovereign,--and he cannot
be exalted higher in our books. I say he is destitute of the first
character of sovereign power: he cannot lay a tax upon his people. The
next part in which he misses of a sovereign power is, that he cannot
dispose of the life, of the property, or of the liberty of any of his
subjects, but by what is called the _fetwah_, or sentence of the law.
He cannot declare peace or war without the same sentence of the law:
so much is _he_, more than European sovereigns, a subject of strict
law, that he cannot declare war or peace without it. Then, if he can
neither touch life nor property, if he cannot lay a tax on his
subjects, or declare peace or war, I leave it to your Lordships'
judgment, whether he can be called, according to the principles of
that constitution, an arbitrary power. A Turkish sovereign, if he
should be judged by the body of that law to have acted against its
principles, (unless he happens to be secured by a faction of the
soldiery,) is liable to be deposed on the sentence of that law, and
his successor comes in under the strict limitations of the ancient law
of that country: neither can he hold his place, dispose of his
succession, or take any one step whatever, without being bound by law.
Thus much may be said, when gentlemen talk of the affairs of Asia, as
to the nearest of Asiatic sovereigns: and he is more Asiatic than
European, he is a Mahomedan sovereign; and no Mahomedan is born who
can exercise any arbitrary power at all, consistently with their
constitution; insomuch that this chief magistrate, who is the highest
executive power among them, is the very person who, by the
constitution of the country, is the most fettered by law.

Corruption is the true cause of the loss of all the benefits of the
constitution of that country. The _practice of Asia_, as the gentleman
at your bar has thought fit to say, is what he holds to; the
constitution he flies away from. The question is, whether you will
take the constitution of the country as your rule, or the base
practices of those usurpers, robbers, and tyrants who have subverted
it. Undoubtedly, much blood, murder, false imprisonment, much
peculation, cruelty, and robbery are to be found in Asia; and if,
instead of going to the sacred laws of the country, he chooses to
resort to the iniquitous practices of it, and practices authorized
only by public tumult, contention, war, and riot, he may indeed find
as clear an acquittal in the practices as he would find condemnation
in the institutions of it. He has rejected the law of England. Your
Lordships will not suffer it. God forbid! For my part, I should have
no sort of objection to let him choose his law,--Mahomedan, Tartarian,
Gentoo. But if he disputes, as he does, the authority of an act of
Parliament, let him state to me that law to which he means to be
subject, or any law which he knows that will justify his actions. I am
not authorized to say that I shall, even in that case, give up what is
not in me to give up, because I represent an authority of which I must
stand in awe; but, for myself, I shall confess that I am brought to
public shame, and am not fit to manage the great interests committed
to my charge. I therefore again repeat of that Asiatic government with
which we are best acquainted, which has been constituted more in
obedience to the laws of Mahomet than any other, that the sovereign
cannot, agreeably to that constitution, exercise any arbitrary power
whatever.

The next point for us to consider is, whether or no the Mahomedan
constitution of India authorizes that power. The gentleman at your
Lordships' bar has thought proper to say, that it will be happy for
India, (though soon after he tells you it is an happiness they can
never enjoy,) "when the despotic institutes of Genghiz Khan or
Tamerlane shall give place to the liberal spirit of a British
legislature; and," says he, "I shall be amply satisfied in my present
prosecution, if it shall tend to hasten the approach of an event so
beneficial to the great interests of mankind."

My Lords, you have seen what he says about an act of Parliament. Do
you not now think it rather an extraordinary thing, that any British
subject should, in vindication of the authority which he has
exercised, here quote the names and institutes, as he calls them, of
fierce conquerors, of men who were the scourges of mankind, whose
power was a power which they held by force only?

As to the institutes of Genghiz Khan, which he calls arbitrary
institutes, I never saw them. If he has that book, he will oblige the
public by producing it. I have seen a book existing, called Yassa of
Genghiz Khan; the other I never saw. If there be any part of it to
justify arbitrary power, he will produce it. But if we may judge by
those ten precepts of Genghiz Khan which we have, there is not a
shadow of arbitrary power to be found in any one of them. Institutes
of arbitrary power! Why, if there is arbitrary power, there can be no
institutes.

As to the institutes of Tamerlane, here they are in their original,
and here is a translation. I have carefully read every part of these
institutes; and if any one shows me one word in them in which the
prince claims in himself arbitrary power, I again repeat, that I shall
for my own part confess that I have brought myself to great shame.
There is no book in the world, I believe, which contains nobler, more
just, more manly, more pious principles of government than this book,
called the Institutions of Tamerlane. Nor is there one word of
arbitrary power in it, much less of that arbitrary power which Mr.
Hastings supposes himself justified by,--namely, a delegated,
subordinate, arbitrary power. So far was that great prince from
permitting this gross, violent, intermediate arbitrary power, that I
will venture to say the chief thing by which he has recommended
himself to posterity was a most direct declaration of all the wrath
and indignation of the supreme government against it. But here is the
book. It contains the institutes of the founder of the Mogul empire,
left as a sacred legacy to his posterity, as a rule for their conduct,
and as a means of preserving their power.

      "Be it known to my fortunate sons, the conquerors of
      kingdoms, to my mighty descendants, the lords of the earth,
      that, since I have hope in Almighty God that many of my
      children, descendants, and posterity shall sit upon the
      throne of power and regal authority, upon this account,
      having established laws and regulations for the well
      governing of my dominions, I have collected together those
      regulations and laws as a model for others, to the end that,
      every one of my children, descendants, and posterity acting
      agreeably thereto, my power and empire, which I acquired
      through hardships and difficulties and perils and bloodshed,
      by the Divine favor, and by the influence of the holy
      religion of Mahomet, (God's peace be up on him!) and with
      the assistance of the powerful descendants and illustrious
      followers of that prophet, may be by them preserved. And let
      them make these regulations the rule of their conduct in the
      affairs of their empire, that the fortune and the power
      which shall descend from me to them may be safe from discord
      and dissolution.

      "Now, therefore, be it known to my sons, the fortunate and
      the illustrious, to my descendants, the mighty subduers of
      kingdoms, that, in like manner as I by twelve maxims, which
      I established as the rule of my conduct, attained to regal
      dignity, and with the assistance of these maxims conquered
      and governed kingdoms, and decorated and adorned the throne
      of my empire, let them also act according to these
      regulations, and preserve the splendor of mine and their
      dominions.

      "And among the rules which I established for the support of
      my glory and empire, the _first_ was this,--that I promoted
      the worship of Almighty God, and propagated the religion of
      the sacred Mahomet throughout the world, and at all times
      and in all places supported the true faith.

      "_Secondly_. With the people of the twelve classes and
      tribes I conquered and governed kingdoms, and with them I
      strengthened the pillars of my fortune, and from them I
      formed my assembly.

      "_Thirdly_. By consultation and deliberation and provident
      measures, by caution and by vigilance, I vanquished armies,
      and I reduced kingdoms to my authority. And I carried on the
      business of my empire by complying with times and occasions,
      and by generosity, and by patience, and by policy; and I
      acted with courteousness towards my friends and towards my
      enemies.

      "_Fourthly_. By order and by discipline I regulated the
      concerns of my government; and by discipline and by order I
      so firmly established my authority, that the emirs and the
      viziers and the soldiers and the subjects could not aspire
      beyond their respective degrees; and every one of them was
      the keeper of his own station.

      "_Fifthly_. I gave encouragement to my emirs and to my
      soldiers, and with money and with jewels I made them glad of
      heart; and I permitted them to come into the banquet; and in
      the field of blood they hazarded their lives. And I withheld
      not from them my gold nor my silver. And I educated and
      trained them to arms; and to alleviate their sufferings, I
      myself shared in their labors and in their hardships, until
      with the arm of fortitude and resolution, and with the
      unanimity of my chiefs and my generals and my warriors, by
      the edge of the sword, I obtained possession of the thrones
      of seven-and-twenty kings, and became the king and the ruler
      of the kingdoms of Eraun, and of Tooraun, and of Room, and
      of Mughrib, and of Shaum, and of Missur, and of
      Erauk-a-Arrub, and of Ajjum, and of Mauzinduraun, and of
      Kylaunaut, and of Shurvaunaut, and of Azzurbauejaun, and of
      Fauris, and of Khorausaun, and of the Dusht of Jitteh, and
      the Dusht of Kipchauk, and of Khauruzm, and Khuttun, and of
      Kauboolistaun, and of Hindostaun, and of Bauktur Zemeen.

      "And when I clothed myself in the robe of empire, I shut my
      eyes to safety, and to the repose which is found on the bed
      of ease. And from the twelfth year of my age I travelled
      over countries, and combated difficulties, and formed
      enterprises, and vanquished armies, and experienced mutinies
      amongst my officers and my soldiers, and was familiarized to
      the language of disobedience; and I opposed them with policy
      and with fortitude, and I hazarded my person in the hour of
      danger; until in the end I vanquished kingdoms and empires,
      and established the glory of my name.

      "_Sixthly_. By justice and equity I gained the affections of
      the people of God; and I extended my clemency to the guilty
      as well as to the innocent; and I passed that sentence which
      truth required; and by benevolence I gained a place in the
      hearts of men; and by rewards and punishments I kept both my
      troops and my subjects divided between hope and fear. And I
      compassionated the lower ranks of my people, and those who
      were distressed. And I gave gifts to the soldiers.

      "And I delivered the oppressed from the hand of the
      oppressor; and after proof of the oppression, whether on the
      property or the person, the decision which I passed between
      them was agreeable to the sacred law. And I did not cause
      any one person to suffer for the guilt of another.

      "Those who had done me injuries, who had attacked my person
      in battle, and had counteracted my schemes and enterprises,
      when they threw themselves on my mercy, I received them with
      kindness, I conferred on them additional honors, and I drew
      the pen of oblivion over their evil actions; and I treated
      them in such sort, that, if suspicion remained in their
      hearts, it was plucked out entirely.

      "_Seventhly_, I selected out, and treated with esteem and
      veneration, the posterity of the Prophet, and the
      theologians, and the teachers of the true faith, and the
      philosophers, and the historians. And I loved men of courage
      and valor; for God Almighty loveth the brave. And I
      associated with good and learned men; and I gained their
      affections, and I entreated their support, and I sought
      success from their holy prayers. And I loved the dervishes
      and the poor; and I oppressed them not, neither did I
      exclude them from my favor. And I permitted not the evil and
      the malevolent to enter into my council; and I acted not by
      their advice; and I listened not to their insinuations to
      the prejudice of others.

      "_Eighthly_. I acted with resolution; and on whatever
      undertaking I resolved, I made that undertaking the only
      object of my attention; and I withdrew not my hand from that
      enterprise, until I had brought it to a conclusion. And I
      acted according to that which I said. And I dealt not with
      severity towards any one, and I was not oppressive in any of
      my actions; that God Almighty might not deal severely
      towards me, nor render my own actions oppressive unto me.

      "And I inquired of learned men into the laws and regulations
      of ancient princes, from the days of Adam to those of the
      Prophet, and from the days of the Prophet down to this time.
      And I weighed their institutions and their actions and their
      opinions, one by one. And from their approved manners and
      their good qualities I selected models. And I inquired into
      the causes of the subversion of their power, and I shunned
      those actions which tend to the destruction and overthrow of
      regal authority. And from cruelty and from oppression, which
      are the destroyers of posterity and the bringers of famine
      and of plagues, I found it was good to abstain.

      "_Ninthly_. The situation of my people was known unto me.
      And those who were great among them I considered as my
      brethren; and I regarded the poor as my children. And I made
      myself acquainted with the tempers and the dispositions of
      the people of every country and of every city. And I
      contracted intimacies with the citizens and the chiefs and
      the nobles; and I appointed over them governors adapted to
      their manners and their dispositions and their wishes. And I
      knew the circumstances of the inhabitants of every province.
      And in every kingdom I appointed writers of intelligence,
      men of truth and integrity, that they might send me
      information of the conduct and the behavior and the actions
      and the manners of the troops and of the inhabitants, and of
      every occurrence that might come to pass amongst them. And
      if I discovered aught contrary to their information, I
      inflicted punishment on the intelligencer; and every
      circumstance of cruelty and oppression in the governors and
      in the troops and in the inhabitants, which reached my ears,
      I chastised agreeably to justice and equity.

      "_Tenthly_. Whatever tribe, and whatever horde, whether
      Toork, or Taucheek, or Arrub, or Ajjum, came in unto me, I
      received their chiefs with distinction and respect, and
      their followers I honored according to their degrees and
      their stations; and to the good among them I did good, and
      the evil I delivered over to their evil actions.

      "And whoever attached himself unto me, I forgot not the
      merit of his attachment, and I acted towards him with
      kindness and generosity; and whoever had rendered me
      services, I repaid the value of those services unto him. And
      whoever had been my enemy, and was ashamed thereof, and,
      flying to me for protection, humbled himself before me, I
      forgot his enmity, and I purchased him with liberality and
      kindness.

      "In such manner Share Behraum, the chief of a tribe, was
      along with me. And he left me in the hour of action, and he
      united with the enemy, and he drew forth his sword against
      me. And at length my salt, which he had eaten, seized upon
      him; and he again fled to me for refuge, and humbled himself
      before me. As he was a man of illustrious descent, and of
      bravery, and of experience, I covered my eyes from his evil
      actions; and I magnified him, and I exalted him to a
      superior rank, and I pardoned his disloyalty in
      consideration of his valor.

      "_Eleventhly_. My children, and my relations, and my
      associates, and my neighbors, and such as had been connected
      with me, all these I distinguished in the days of my fortune
      and prosperity, and I paid unto them their due. And with
      respect to my family, I rent not asunder the bands of
      consanguinity and mercy; and I issued not commands to slay
      them, or to bind them with chains.

      "And I dealt with every man, whatever the judgment I had
      formed of him, according to my own opinion of his worth. As
      I had seen much of prosperity and adversity, and had
      acquired knowledge and experience, I conducted myself with
      caution and with policy towards my friends and towards my
      enemies.

      "_Twelfthly_. Soldiers, whether associates or adversaries, I
      held in esteem,--those who sell their permanent happiness to
      perishable honor, and throw themselves into the field of
      slaughter and battle, and hazard their lives in the hour of
      danger.

      "And the man who drew his sword on the side of my enemy, and
      committed hostilities against me, and preserved his fidelity
      to his master, him I greatly honored; and when such a man
      came unto me, knowing his worth, I classed him with my
      faithful associates; and I respected and valued his fidelity
      and his attachment.

      "And the soldier who forgot his duty and his honor, and in
      the hour of action turned his face from his master, and came
      in unto me, I considered as the most detestable of men.

      "And in the war between Touktummish Khaun, his emirs forgot
      their duty to Touktummish, who was their master and my foe,
      and sent proposals and wrote letters unto me. And I uttered
      execrations upon them, because, unmindful of that which they
      owed to their lord, they had thrown aside their honor and
      their duty, and came in unto me. I said unto myself, 'What
      fidelity have they observed to their liege lord? what
      fidelity will they show unto me?'

      "And, behold, it was known unto me by experience, that every
      empire which is not established in morality and religion,
      nor strengthened by regulations and laws, from that empire
      all order, grandeur, and power shall pass away. And that
      empire may be likened unto a naked man, who, when exposed to
      view, commandeth the eye of modesty to be covered; and it is
      like unto a house which hath neither roof nor gates nor
      defences, into which whoever willeth may enter unmolested.

      "Therefore I established the foundation of my empire on the
      morality and the religion of Islaum; and by regulations and
      laws I gave it stability. And by laws and by regulations I
      executed every business and every transaction that came
      before me in the course of my government."

I need not read any further, or I might show your Lordships the noble
principles, the grand, bold, and manly maxims, the resolution to
abstain from oppression himself, and to crush it in the governors
under him, to be found in this book, which Mr. Hastings has thought
proper to resort to as containing what he calls arbitrary principles.

But it is not in this instance only that I must do justice to the
East. I assert that their morality is equal to ours, in whatever
regards the duties of governors, fathers, and superiors; and I
challenge the world to show in any modern European book more true
morality and wisdom than is to be found in the writings of Asiatic men
in high trust, and who have been counsellors to princes. If this be
the true morality of Asia, as I affirm and can prove that it is, the
plea founded on Mr. Hastings's geographical morality is annihilated.

I little regard the theories of travellers, where they do not relate
the facts on which they are founded. I have two instances of facts
attested by Tavernier, a traveller of power and consequence, which are
very material to be mentioned here, because they show that in some of
the instances recorded, in which the princes of the country have used
any of those cruel and barbarous executions which make us execrate
them, it has been upon governors who have abused their trust,--and
that this very Oriental authority to which Mr. Hastings appeals would
have condemned him to a dreadful punishment. I thank God, and I say it
from my heart, that even for his enormous offences there neither is
nor can be anything like such punishments. God forbid that we should
not as much detest out-of-the-way, mad, furious, and unequal
punishments as we detest enormous and abominable crimes! because a
severe and cruel penalty for a crime of a light nature is as bad and
iniquitous as the crime which it pretends to punish. As the instances
I allude to are curious, and as they go to the principles of Mr.
Hastings's defence, I shall beg to quote them.

The first is upon a governor who did what Mr. Hastings says he has a
power delegated to him to do: he levied a tax without the consent of
his master. "Some years after my departure from Com," says Tavernier,

      "the governor had, of his own accord, and without any
      communication with the king, laid a small impost upon every
      pannier of fruit brought into the city, for the purpose of
      making some necessary reparations in the walls and bridges
      of the town. It was towards the end of the year 1632 that
      the event I am going to relate happened. The king, being
      informed of the impost which the governor had laid upon the
      fruit, ordered him to be brought in chains to court. The
      king ordered him to be exposed to the people at one of the
      gates of the palace; then he commanded the son to pluck off
      the mustachios of his father, to cut off his nose and ears,
      to put out his eyes, and then cut off his head. The king
      then told the son to go and take possession of the
      government of his father, saying, _See that you govern
      better than this deceased dog, or thy doom shall be a death
      more exquisitely tormenting_."

My Lords, you are struck with horror, I am struck with horror, at this
punishment. I do not relate it to approve of such a barbarous act, but
to prove to your Lordships, that, whatever power the princes of that
country have, they are jealous of it to such a degree, that, if any of
their governors should levy a tax, even the most insignificant, and
for the best purposes, he meets with a cruel punishment. I do not
justify the punishment; but the severity of it shows how little of
their power the princes of that country mean to delegate to their
servants, the whole of which the gentleman at your bar says was
delegated to him.

There is another case, a very strong one, and that is the case of
presents, which I understand is a custom admitted throughout Asia in
all their governments. It was of a person who was raised to a high
office; no business was suffered to come before him without a previous
present.

      "One morning, the king being at this time on a hunting
      party, the _nazar_ came to the tent of the king, but was
      denied entrance by the _meter_, or master of the wardrobe.
      About the same time the king came forth, and, seeing the
      nazar, commanded his officers to take off the bonnet from
      the head of that dog that took gifts from his people, and
      that he should sit three days bareheaded in the heat of the
      sun, and as many nights in the air. Afterwards he caused him
      to be chained about the neck and arms, and condemned him to
      perpetual imprisonment, with a _mamoudy_ a day for his
      maintenance; but he died for grief within eight days after
      he was put in prison."

Do I mean, by reading this to your Lordships, to express or intimate
an approbation either of the cruelty of the punishment or of the
coarse barbarism of the language? Neither one nor the other. I produce
it to your Lordships to prove to you, from this dreadful example, the
horror which that government felt, when any person subject to it
assumed to himself a privilege to receive presents. The cruelty and
severity exercised by these princes is not levelled at the poor
unfortunate people who complain at their gates, but, to use their own
barbarous expression, _to dogs that impose taxes and take presents_.
God forbid I should use that language! The people, when they complain,
are not called dogs and sent away, but the governors, who do these
things against the people: they are called dogs, and treated in that
cruel manner. I quote them to show that no governors in the East, upon
any principle of their constitution or any good practice of their
government, can lay arbitrary imposts or receive presents. When they
escape, it is probably by bribery, by corruption, by creating factions
for themselves in the seraglio, in the country, in the army, in the
divan. But how they escape such punishments is not my business to
inquire; it is enough for me that the constitution disavows them, that
the princes of the country disavow them,--that they revile them with
the most horrible expressions, and inflict dreadful punishments on
them, when they are called to answer for these offences.
Thus much concerning the Mahomedan laws of Asia. That the people of
Asia have no laws, rights, or liberty, is a doctrine that wickedly is
to be disseminated through this country. But I again assert, every
Mahomedan government is, by its principles, a government of law.

I shall now state, from what is known of the government of India, that
it does not and cannot delegate, as Mr. Hastings has frequently
declared, the whole of its powers and authority to him. If they are
absolute, as they must be in the supreme power, they ought to be
arbitrary in none; they were, however, never absolute in any of their
subordinate parts, and I will prove it by the known provincial
constitutions of Hindostan, which are all Mahomedan, the laws of which
are as clear, as explicit, and as learned as ours.

The first foundation of their law is the _Koran_. The next part is the
_Fetwah_, or adjudged cases by proper authority, well known there. The
next, the written interpretations of the principles of jurisprudence:
and their books are as numerous upon the principles of jurisprudence
as in any country in Europe. The next part of their law is what they
call the _Kanon_,--that is, a positive rule equivalent to acts of
Parliament, the law of the several powers of the country, taken from
the Greek word [Greek: Kanon], which was brought into their country,
and is well known. The next is the _Rawaj-ul-Mulk_, or common law and
custom of the kingdom, equivalent to our common law. Therefore they
have laws from more sources than we have, exactly in the same order,
grounded upon the same authority, fundamentally fixed to be
administered to the people upon these principles.

The next thing is to show that in India there is a partition of the
powers of the government, which proves that there is no absolute power
delegated.

In every province the first person is the _Subahdar_ or _Nazim_, or
Viceroy: he has the power of the sword, and the administration of
criminal justice only. Then there is the _Dewan_, or High Steward: he
has the revenue and all exchequer causes under him, to be governed
according to the law and custom and institutions of the kingdom. The
law of inheritances, successions, and everything that relates to them,
is under the _Cadi_, in whose court these matters are tried. But this,
too, was subdivided. The Cadi could not judge, but by the advice of
his assessors. Properly in the Mahomedan law there is no appeal, only
a removal of the cause; but when there is no judgment, as none can be
when the court is not unanimous, it goes to the general assembly of
all the men of the law. There are, I will venture to say, other
divisions and subdivisions; for there are the _Kanongoes_, who hold
their places for life, to be the conservators of the canons, customs,
and good usages of the country: all these, as well as the Cadi and the
Mufti, hold their places and situations, not during the wanton
pleasure of the prince, but on permanent and fixed terms for life. All
these powers of magistracy, revenue, and law are all different,
consequently not delegated in the whole to any one person.

This is the provincial constitution, and these the laws of Bengal;
which proves, if there were no other proof, by the division of the
functions and authorities, that the supreme power of the state in the
Mogul empire did by no means delegate to any of its officers the
supreme power in its fulness. Whether or no we have delegated to Mr.
Hastings the supreme power of King and Parliament, that he should act
with the plenitude of authority of the British legislature, you are to
judge.

Mr. Hastings has no refuge here. Let him run from law to law; let him
fly from the common law and the sacred institutions of the country in
which he was born; let him fly from acts of Parliament, from which his
power originated; let him plead his ignorance of them, or fly in the
face of them. Will he fly to the Mahomedan law? That condemns him.
Will he fly to the high magistracy of Asia to defend taking of
presents? Padishah and the Sultan would condemn him to a cruel death.
Will he fly to the Sophis, to the laws of Persia, or to the practice
of those monarchs? I cannot utter the pains, the tortures, that would
be inflicted on him, if he were to govern there as he has done in a
British province. Let him fly where he will, from law to law; law, I
thank God, meets him everywhere, and enforced, too, by the practice of
the most impious tyrants, which he quotes as if it would justify his
conduct. I would as willingly have him tried by the law of the Koran,
or the Institutes of Tamerlane, as on the common law or statute law of
this kingdom.

The next question is, whether the Gentoo laws justify arbitrary power:
and if he finds any sanctuary there, let him take it, with the cow in
the pagoda. The Gentoos have a law which positively proscribes in
magistrates any idea of will,--a law with which, or rather with
extracts of it, that gentleman himself has furnished us. These people
in many points are governed by their own ancient written law, called
the _Shaster_. Its interpreters and judges are the _Pundits_. This law
is comprehensive, extending to all the concerns of life, affording
principles and maxims and legal theories applicable to all cases,
drawn from the sources of natural equity, modified by their
institutions, full of refinement and subtilty of distinction equal to
that of any other law, and has the grand test of all law, that,
wherever it has prevailed, the country has been populous, flourishing,
and happy.

Upon the whole, then, follow him where you will, let him have Eastern
or Western law, you find everywhere arbitrary power and peculation of
governors proscribed and horribly punished,--more so than I should
ever wish to punish any, the most guilty, human creature. And if this
be the case, as I hope and trust it has been proved to your Lordships,
that there is law in these countries, that there is no delegation of
power which exempts a governor from the law, then I say at any rate a
British governor is to answer for his conduct, and cannot be justified
by wicked examples and profligate practices.

But another thing which he says is, that he was left to himself, to
govern himself by his own practice: that is to say, when he had taken
one bribe, he might take another; when he had robbed one man of his
property, he might rob another; when he had imprisoned one man
arbitrarily, and extorted money from him, he might do so by another.
He resorts at first to the practice of barbarians and usurpers; at
last he comes to his own. Now, if your Lordships will try him by such
maxims and principles, he is certainly clear: for there is no manner
of doubt that there is nothing he has practised once which he has not
practised again; and then the repetition of crimes becomes the means
of his indemnity.

The next pleas he urges are not so much in bar of the impeachment as
in extenuation. The first are to be laid by as claims to be made on
motion for arrest of judgment, the others as an extenuation or
mitigation of his fine. He says, and with a kind of triumph,

      "The ministry of this country have great legal
      assistance,--commercial lights of the greatest commercial
      city in the world,--the greatest generals and officers to
      guide and direct them in military affairs: whereas I, poor
      man, was sent almost a school-boy from England, or at least
      little better,--sent to find my way in that new world as
      well as I could. I had no men of the law, no legal
      assistance, to supply my deficiencies."

_At Sphingem habebas domi_. Had he not the chief-justice, the tamed
and domesticated chief-justice, who waited on him like a familiar
spirit, whom he takes from province to province, his amanuensis at
home, his postilion and riding express abroad?

Such a declaration would in some measure suit persons who had acted
much otherwise than Mr. Hastings. When a man pleads ignorance in
justification of his conduct, it ought to be an humble, modest,
unpresuming ignorance, an ignorance which may have made him lax and
timid in the exercise of his duty; but an assuming, rash,
presumptuous, confident, daring, desperate, and disobedient ignorance
heightens every crime that it accompanies. Mr. Hastings, if through
ignorance he left some of the Company's orders unexecuted, because he
did not understand them, might well say, "I was an ignorant man, and
these things were above my capacity." But when he understands them,
and when he declares he will not obey them, positively and
dogmatically,--when he says, as he has said, and we shall prove it,
_that he never succeeds better than when he acts in an utter defiance
of those orders_, and sets at nought the laws of his country,--I
believe this will not be thought the language of an ignorant man. But
I beg your Lordships' pardon: it is the language of an ignorant man;
for no man who was not full of a bold, determined, profligate
ignorance could ever think of such a system of defence. He quitted
Westminster School almost a boy. We have reason to regret that he did
not finish his education in that noble seminary, which has given so
many luminaries to the Church and ornaments to the State. Greatly it
is to be lamented that he did not go to those Universities where
arbitrary power will I hope never be heard of, but the true principles
of religion, of liberty, and law will ever be inculcated, instead of
studying in the school of Cossim Ali Khan.

If he had lived with us, he would have quoted the example of Cicero in
his government, he would have quoted several of the sacred and holy
prophets, and made _them_ his example. His want of learning, profane
as well as sacred, reduces him to the necessity of appealing to every
name and authority of barbarism, tyranny, and usurpation that are to
be found; and from these he says, "From the practice of one part of
Asia or other I have taken my rule." But your Lordships will show him
that in Asia as well as in Europe the same law of nations prevails,
the same principles are continually resorted to, and the same maxims
sacredly held and strenuously maintained, and, however disobeyed, no
man suffers from the breach of them who does not know how and where to
complain of that breach,--that Asia is enlightened in that respect as
well as Europe; but if it were totally blinded, that England would
send out governors to teach them better, and that he must justify
himself to the piety, the truth, the faith of England, and not by
having recourse to the crimes and criminals of other countries, to the
barbarous tyranny of Asia, or any other part of the world.

I will go further with Mr. Hastings, and admit, that, if there be a
boy in the fourth form of Westminster School, or any school in
England, who does not know, when these articles are read to him, that
he has been guilty of gross and enormous crimes, he may have the
shelter of his present plea, as far as it will serve him. There are
none of us, thank God, so uninstructed, who have learned our
catechisms or the first elements of Christianity, who do not know that
such conduct is not to be justified, and least of all by examples.

There is another topic he takes up more seriously, and as a general
rebutter to the charge. Says he, "After a great many of these
practices with which I am charged, Parliament appointed me to my
trust, and consequently has acquitted me."--Has it, my Lords? I am
bold to say that the Commons are wholly guiltless of this charge. I
will admit, if Parliament, on a full state of his offences before
them, and full examination of those offences, had appointed him to the
government, that then the people of India and England would have just
reason to exclaim against so flagitious a proceeding. A sense of
propriety and decorum might have restrained us from prosecuting. They
might have been restrained by some sort of decorum from pursuing him
criminally. But the Commons stand before your Lordships without shame.
First, in their name we solemnly assure your Lordships that we had not
in our Parliamentary capacity (and most of us, myself I can say
surely, heard very little, and that in confused rumors) the slightest
knowledge of any one of the acts charged upon this criminal at either
of the times of his being appointed to office, and that we were not
guilty of the nefarious act of collusion and flagitious breach of
trust with which he presumes obliquely to charge us; but from the
moment we knew them, we never ceased to condemn them by reports, by
votes, by resolutions, and that we admonished and declared it to be
the duty of the Court of Directors to take measures for his recall,
and when frustrated in the way known to that court we then proceeded
to an inquiry. Your Lordships know whether you were better informed.
We are, therefore, neither guilty of the precedent crime of colluding
with the criminal, nor the subsequent indecorum of prosecuting what we
had virtually and practically approved.

Secondly, several of his worst crimes have been committed since the
last Parliamentary renewal of his trust, as appears by the dates in
the charge.

But I believe, my Lords, the judges--judges to others, grave and
weighty counsellors and assistants to your Lordships--will not, on
reference, assert to your Lordships, (which God forbid, and we cannot
conceive, or hardly state in argument, if but for argument,) that, if
one of the judges had received bribes before his appointment to an
higher judiciary office, he would not still be open to prosecution.

So far from admitting it as a plea in bar, we charge, and we hope your
Lordships will find it an extreme aggravation of his offences, that no
favors heaped upon him could make him grateful, no renewed and
repeated trusts could make him faithful and honest.

We have now gone through most of the general topics.

But he is not responsible, as being thanked by the Court of Directors.
He has had the thanks and approbation of the India Company for his
services.--We know too well here, I trust the world knows, and you
will always assert, that a pardon from the crown is not pleadable
here, that it cannot bar the impeachment of the Commons,--much less a
pardon of the East India Company, though it may involve them in guilt
which might induce us to punish them for such a pardon. If any
corporation by collusion with criminals refuse to do their duty in
coercing them, the magistrates are answerable.

It is the use, virtue, and efficacy of Parliamentary judicial
procedure, that it puts an end to this dominion of faction, intrigue,
cabal, and clandestine intelligences. The acts of men are put to their
proper test, and the works of darkness tried in the face of day,--not
the corrupted opinions of others on them, but their own intrinsic
merits. We charge it as his crime, that he bribed the Court of
Directors to thank him for what they had condemned as breaches of his
duty.

The East India Company, it is true, have thanked him. They ought not
to have done it; and it is a reflection upon their character that they
did it. But the Directors praise him in the gross, after having
condemned each act in detail. His actions are _all_, every one,
censured one by one as they arise. I do not recollect any one
transaction, few there are, I am sure, in the whole body of that
succession of crimes now brought before you for your judgment, in
which the India Company have not censured him. Nay, in one instance he
pleads their censure in bar of this trial;[27] for he says, "In that
censure I have already received my punishment." If, for any other
reasons, they come and say, "We thank you, Sir, for all your
services," to that I answer, Yes; and _I_ would thank him for his
services, too, if I knew them. But _I_ do not;--perhaps _they_ do. Let
them thank him for those services. I am ordered to prosecute him for
these crimes. Here, therefore, we are on a balance with the India
Company; and your Lordships may perhaps think it some addition to his
crimes, that he has found means to obtain the thanks of the India
Company for the whole of his conduct, at the same time that their
records are full of constant, uniform, particular censure and
reprobation of every one of those acts for which he now stands
accused.

He says, there is the testimony of Indian princes in his favor. But do
we not know how seals are obtained in that country? Do we not know how
those princes are imposed upon? Do we not know the subjection and
thraldom in which they are held, and that they are obliged to return
thanks for the sufferings which they have felt? I believe your
Lordships will think that there is not, with regard to some of these
princes, a more dreadful thing that can be said of them than that he
has obtained their thanks.

I understand he has obtained the thanks of the miserable Princesses of
Oude, whom he has cruelly imprisoned, whose treasure he has seized,
and whose eunuchs he has tortured.[28] They thank him for going away;
they thank him for leaving them the smallest trifle of their
subsistence; and I venture to say, if he wanted a hundred more
panegyrics, provided he never came again among them, he might have
them. I understand that Mahdajee Sindia has made his panegyric, too.
Mahdajee Sindia has not made his panegyric for nothing; for, if your
Lordships will suffer him to enter into such a justification, we shall
prove that he has sacrificed the dignity of this country and the
interests of all its allies to that prince. We appear here neither
with panegyric nor with satire; it is for substantial crimes we bring
him before you, and amongst others for cruelly using persons of the
highest rank and consideration in India; and when we prove he has
cruelly injured them, you will think the panegyrics either gross
forgeries or most miserable aggravations of his offences, since they
show the abject and dreadful state into which he has driven those
people. For let it be proved that I have cruelly robbed and maltreated
any persons, if I produce a certificate from them of my good behavior,
would it not be a corroborative proof of the terror into which those
persons are thrown by my misconduct?

My Lords, these are, I believe, the general grounds of our charge. I
have now closed completely, and I hope to your Lordships'
satisfaction, the whole body of history of which I wished to put your
Lordships in possession. I do not mean that many of your Lordships may
not have known it more perfectly by your own previous inquiries; but,
bringing to your remembrance the state of the circumstances of the
persons with whom he acted, the persons and power he has abused, I
have gone to the principles he maintains, the precedents he quotes,
the laws and authorities which he refuses to abide by, and those on
which he relies; and at last I have refuted all those pleas in bar on
which he depends, and for the effect of which he presumes on the
indulgence and patience of this country, or on the corruption of some
persons in it. And here I close what I had to say upon this
subject,--wishing and hoping, that, when I open before your Lordships
the case more particularly, so as to state rather a plan of the
proceeding than the direct proof of the crimes, your Lordships will
hear me with the same goodness and indulgence I have hitherto
experienced,--that you will consider, if I have detained you long, it
was not with a view of exhausting my own strength, or putting your
patience to too severe a trial, but from the sense I feel that it is
the most difficult and the most complicated cause that was ever
brought before any human tribunal. Therefore I was resolved to bring
the whole substantially before you. And now, if your Lordships will
permit me, I will state the method of my future proceeding, and the
future proceeding of the gentlemen assisting me.

I mean first to bring before you the crimes as they are classed, and
are of the same species and genus, and how they mutually arose from
one another. I shall first show that Mr. Hastings's crimes had root in
that which is the root of all evil, I mean avarice; that avarice and
rapacity were the groundwork and foundation of all his other vicious
system; that he showed it in setting to sale the native government of
the country, in setting to sale the whole landed interest of the
country, in setting to sale the British government and his own
fellow-servants, to the basest and wickedest of mankind.

I shall then show your Lordships, that, when, in consequence of such a
body of corruption and peculation, he justly dreaded the indignation
of his country and the vengeance of its laws, in order to raise
himself a faction embodied by the same guilt and rewarded in the same
manner, he has, with a most abandoned profusion, thrown away the
revenues of the country to form such a faction here.

I shall next show your Lordships, that, having exhausted the resources
of the Company, and brought it to extreme difficulties within, he has
looked to his _external_ resources, as he calls them; he has gone up
into the country. I will show that he has plundered, or attempted to
plunder, every person dependent upon, connected, or allied with this
country.

We shall afterwards show what infinite mischief has followed in the
case of Benares, upon which he first laid his hands; next, in the case
of the Begums of Oude.

We shall then lay before you the profligate system by which he
endeavored to oppress that country: first by Residents; next by spies
under the name of British Agents; and lastly, that, pursuing his way
up to the mountains, he has found out one miserable chief, whose
crimes were the prosperity of his country,--that him he endeavored to
torture and destroy,--I do not mean in his body, but by exhausting the
treasures which he kept for the benefit of his people.

In short, having shown your Lordships that no man who is in his power
is safe from his arbitrary will,--that no man, within or without,
friend, ally, rival, has been safe from him,--having brought it to
this point, if I am not able in my own person immediately to go up
into the country and show the ramifications of the system, (I hope and
trust I shall be spared to take my part in pursuing him through both,)
if I am not, I shall go at least to the root of it, and some other
gentleman, with a thousand times more ability than I possess, will
take up each separate part in its proper order. And I believe it is
proposed by the managers that one of them shall as soon as possible
begin with the affair of Benares.

The point I now mean first to bring before your Lordships is the
corruption of Mr. Hastings, his system of peculation and bribery, and
to show your Lordships the horrible consequences which resulted from
it: for, at first sight, bribery and peculation do not seem to be so
horrid a matter; they may seem to be only the transferring a little
money out of one pocket into another; but I shall show that by such a
system of bribery the country is undone.

I shall inform your Lordships in the best manner I can, and afterwards
submit the whole, as I do with a cheerful heart and with an easy and
assured security, to that justice which is the security for all the
other justice in the kingdom.


END OF VOL. IX.



NOTES:


[1: 2d year of George II.]

[2: See his letter of the 11th of July, 1785, at the end of the
Charges.]

[3: 13 Geo. III. c. 63, Sec. 10.]

[4: 29 February, 1784.]

[5: Dated, Benares, 4th of November, 1781.]

[6: Revenue Consultation, 28th January, 1775.]

[7: Revenue Board, 14th May, 1772.]

[8: Address to the Court of Directors, 25th March, 1775.]

[9: 3d November, 1772.]

[10: 24th October, 1774.]

[11: 22d April, 1775.]

[12: 5th February, 1777; 4th July, 1777.]

[13: 3d November, 1772.]

[14: 14th May, 1772.]

[15: See his letter of the 11th July, 1785, at the end of the Charges]

[16: Sic orig.]

[17: 28th May, 1782.]

[18: 15th Dec, 1775.]

[19: On the 15th of November.]

[20: Resolution of the House of Commons, 28th May, 1782.]

[21: Anderson's letter of 26th January, 1782.]

[22: Anderson's letter of 24th February, 1782.]

[23: Sic orig.]

[24: Sic orig.]

[25: Observations on Mr. Bristow's Defence.]

[26: As the letter referred to in the Eighth and Sixteenth Articles of
Charge is not contained in any of the Appendixes to the Reports of the
Select Committee, it has been thought necessary to annex it as an
Appendix to these Charges.]

[27: See Mr. Hastings's answer to the first charge.]

[28: A Latin sentence, which was quoted here, is omitted in the MS of
the short-hand writer.--Ed.]





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