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MCollective::Security::Ssl

Impliments a public/private key based message validation system using SSL public and private keys.

The design goal of the plugin is two fold:

To setup you need to create a SSL key pair that is shared by all nodes.

openssl genrsa -out mcserver-private.pem 1024
openssl rsa -in mcserver-private.pem -out mcserver-public.pem -outform PEM -pubout

Distribute the private and public file to /etc/mcollective/ssl on all the nodes. Distribute the public file to /etc/mcollective/ssl everywhere the client code runs.

Now you should create a key pair for every one of your clients, here we create one for user john - you could also if you are less concerned with client id create one pair and share it with all clients:

openssl genrsa -out john-private.pem 1024
openssl rsa -in john-private.pem -out john-public.pem -outform PEM -pubout

Each user has a unique userid, this is based on the name of the public key. In this example case the userid would be ‘john-public’.

Store these somewhere like:

/home/john/.mc/john-private.pem
/home/john/.mc/john-public.pem

Every users public key needs to be distributed to all the nodes, save the john one in a file called:

/etc/mcollective/ssl/clients/john-public.pem

If you wish to use registration or auditing that sends connections over MC to a central host you will need also put the server-public.pem in the clients directory.

You should be aware if you do add the node public key to the clients dir you will in effect be weakening your overall security. You should consider doing this only if you also set up an Authorization method that limits the requests the nodes can make.

client.cfg:

securityprovider = ssl
plugin.ssl_server_public = /etc/mcollective/ssl/server-public.pem
plugin.ssl_client_private = /home/john/.mc/john-private.pem
plugin.ssl_client_public = /home/john/.mc/john-public.pem

If you have many clients per machine and dont want to configure the main config file with the public/private keys you can set the following environment variables:

export MCOLLECTIVE_SSL_PRIVATE=/home/john/.mc/john-private.pem
export MCOLLECTIVE_SSL_PUBLIC=/home/john/.mc/john-public.pem

server.cfg:

securityprovider = ssl
plugin.ssl_server_private = /etc/mcollective/ssl/server-private.pem
plugin.ssl_server_public = /etc/mcollective/ssl/server-public.pem
plugin.ssl_client_cert_dir = /etc/mcollective/etc/ssl/clients/

# Log but accept messages that may have been tampered with
plugin.ssl.enforce_ttl = 0

Serialization can be configured to use either Marshal or YAML, data types in and out of mcollective will be preserved from client to server and reverse

You can configure YAML serialization:

plugins.ssl_serializer = yaml

else the default is Marshal. Use YAML if you wish to write a client using a language other than Ruby that doesn’t support Marshal.

Validation is as default and is provided by MCollective::Security::Base

Initial code was contributed by Vladimir Vuksan and modified by R.I.Pienaar

Public Instance Methods

callerid() click to toggle source

sets the caller id to the md5 of the public key

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 188
def callerid
  if @initiated_by == :client
    id = "cert=#{File.basename(client_public_key).gsub(/\.pem$/, '')}"
    raise "Invalid callerid generated from client public key" unless valid_callerid?(id)
  else
    # servers need to set callerid as well, not usually needed but
    # would be if you're doing registration or auditing or generating
    # requests for some or other reason
    id = "cert=#{File.basename(server_public_key).gsub(/\.pem$/, '')}"
    raise "Invalid callerid generated from server public key" unless valid_callerid?(id)
  end

  return id
end
decodemsg(msg) click to toggle source

Decodes a message by unserializing all the bits etc, it also validates it as valid using the psk etc

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 90
def decodemsg(msg)
  body = deserialize(msg.payload)

  should_process_msg?(msg, body[:requestid])

  if validrequest?(body)
    body[:body] = deserialize(body[:body])

    unless @initiated_by == :client
      if body[:body].is_a?(Hash)
        update_secure_property(body, :ssl_ttl, :ttl, "TTL")
        update_secure_property(body, :ssl_msgtime, :msgtime, "Message Time")

        body[:body] = body[:body][:ssl_msg] if body[:body].include?(:ssl_msg)
      else
        unless @config.pluginconf["ssl.enforce_ttl"] == nil
          raise "Message %s is in an unknown or older security protocol, ignoring" % [request_description(body)]
        end
      end
    end

    return body
  else
    nil
  end
end
encodereply(sender, msg, requestid, requestcallerid=nil) click to toggle source

Encodes a reply

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 142
def encodereply(sender, msg, requestid, requestcallerid=nil)
  serialized  = serialize(msg)
  digest = makehash(serialized)


  req = create_reply(requestid, sender, serialized)
  req[:hash] = digest

  serialize(req)
end
encoderequest(sender, msg, requestid, filter, target_agent, target_collective, ttl=60) click to toggle source

Encodes a request msg

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 154
def encoderequest(sender, msg, requestid, filter, target_agent, target_collective, ttl=60)
  req = create_request(requestid, filter, "", @initiated_by, target_agent, target_collective, ttl)

  ssl_msg = {:ssl_msg => msg,
             :ssl_ttl => ttl,
             :ssl_msgtime => req[:msgtime]}

  serialized = serialize(ssl_msg)
  digest = makehash(serialized)

  req[:hash] = digest
  req[:body] = serialized

  serialize(req)
end
update_secure_property(msg, secure_property, property, description) click to toggle source

To avoid tampering we turn the origin body into a hash and copy some of the protocol keys like :ttl and :msg_time into the hash before hashing it.

This function compares and updates the unhashed ones based on the hashed ones. By default it enforces matching and presense by raising exceptions, if ssl.enforce_ttl is set to 0 it will only log warnings about violations

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 123
def update_secure_property(msg, secure_property, property, description)
  req = request_description(msg)

  unless @config.pluginconf["ssl.enforce_ttl"] == "0"
    raise "Request #{req} does not have a secure #{description}" unless msg[:body].include?(secure_property)
    raise "Request #{req} #{description} does not match encrypted #{description} - possible tampering"  unless msg[:body][secure_property] == msg[property]
  else
    if msg[:body].include?(secure_property)
      Log.warn("Request #{req} #{description} does not match encrypted #{description} - possible tampering") unless msg[:body][secure_property] == msg[property]
    else
      Log.warn("Request #{req} does not have a secure #{description}") unless msg[:body].include?(secure_property)
    end
  end

  msg[property] = msg[:body][secure_property] if msg[:body].include?(secure_property)
  msg[:body].delete(secure_property)
end
validrequest?(req) click to toggle source

Checks the SSL signature in the request body

# File lib/mcollective/security/ssl.rb, line 171
def validrequest?(req)
  message = req[:body]
  signature = req[:hash]

  Log.debug("Validating request from #{req[:callerid]}")

  if verify(public_key_file(req[:callerid]), signature, message.to_s)
    @stats.validated
    return true
  else
    @stats.unvalidated
    raise(SecurityValidationFailed, "Received an invalid signature in message")
  end
end

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